वात्स्यायनभाष्यसंवलितम् गौतमीयं

न्यायदर्शनम्

NYĀYADARŚANA

OF

GOTAMA

[With Sanskrit Text, Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya, Sanskrit Commentary, English Summary and English Translation]

English Translation by

Satish Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa

Re-Edited by

Dr. Raghunath Ghosh

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FOREWORD

I

Differences of opinion prevail as to the precise number of the original aphorisms of the Nyāya-Darśana of Gautama. Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Satīśachandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa[1] is inclined to take the extreme view that it is only the first book of the Nyāya-Darśana containing a brief explanation of the sixteen categories that we are justified in ascribing to Gotama, while the remaining four books bear marks of different hands and ages, the last and most considerable additions having been made by Vātsayāyana who sought to harmonise the different, and at times conflicting, additions and interpolations by the ingenious introduction of Sūtras of his own making fathered upon Gotama. We are unable to subscribe to this view. The Nyāya-Darśana is admittedly a *system* of philosophy, and its method, like that of the Viśeṣika, consists in the enumeration, definition and examination of the categories. You cannot retain the first book, and reject the others, without mutilating the system. As regards the so-called references in the second, third and fourth books to the tenets of the Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta and Buddhist philosophy, it should not be forgotten that every system of thought which has flourished on the soil of India has its source in a common fund of national philosophy, "a large Mānasa lake of philosophical thought and language, for away in the distant North, and in the distant past, from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his own purposes". Similarly of words and ideas here and there is therefore not a safe guide in the determination of the originality or otherwise of one system in relation to another. Moreover, isolated similarity of thought and expression is no ground for the rejection of whole books as spurious. The parallelism between the wording of some of the aphorisms and certain passages in the Laṅkāvatā Sūtra, Mādhyamika Sūtra, and the Śataka is also misleading. For instance, as obseved by Dr. Keith[2], on

1. Introduction. page xxxiv.
2. *Indian Logic and Atomism*, by A. B. Keith, 1921. page 23.

the authority of Winternitz, Gesch. d. ind. Litt., II.i.243, the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra in its present form is not earlier than the sixth century A.D., that is, is later than even Vātsyāyana.

The Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana also presents a most formidable obstacle to the acceptance of the theory propounded by Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa. For it is not confined to the first book alone but covers the other books as well. The difficulty can be overcome only by denying the authentic character of the Bhāṣya in its present form. And this is exactly what Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has done. We are not aware of any good reason for doubting the genuineness of the Bhāṣya as it has come down to us. Let us examine Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's reasons. He translates aphorism II.i.29 (II.i.28 of the Bibliotheca Indica series edition) as follows : "It may be the objected that the contact of a sense with its object is not the cause of perception, as it is inefficient in some instances", and then proceeds :

"An objector may say that the contact of a sense with its object is not the cause of perception, as we find that a person listening to a song may not see colour, though it comes in contact with his eye."

"Vātsyāyana interprets the aphorism as follows : If the conjunction of soul with mind is not accepted as the cause of perception a well-known conclusion will be debarred, viz., the mark of the mind is that only one act of knowledge is possible at a time. This interpretation, here inappropriate, is based on the Bhāṣya-commentary published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1865. I fully agree with those who hold that the real Bhāṣya-commentary of Vātsyāyana is not yet available to us."

Similarly the translates the next aphorism as follows : "It is not so, because there is pre-eminence of some particular object", and proceeds :

"It is admitted that a person while listening to a song may not see colour, though it comes in contact with his eye. Yet the instance does not prove that the contact of a sense with its object is not the cause of perception, for it is to be understood that his intent listening prevents him from seeing the colour. In other words, the auditory perception supersedes the visual perception, because the song is more attractive than the colour.

"Vātsyāyana interprets the aphorism thus :—The conjunction of the soul with mind is not rendered useless, even if there is predominance

of the senses and their objects. If perception is produced when a person is asleep or inattentive, it is because these is then the predominance of his sense and its object, though even then there is a faint conjunction of soul with mind. This interpretation is based on the Bhāṣya-commentary as available to us. It is ingenious but out of place here."

With due respect to the memory of the distinguished critic we submit that he has not been quite fair in his representation of the Nyāya-Bhāṣya on these two aphorisms. In the translation and explanation which we have felt constrained to substitute in the text in place of the above we have tried to show what Vātsyāyana exactly means. It will be seen that Vātsyāyana's interpretation of the two aphorisms is not necessarily inappropriate or out of place. It also goes without saying that for a pseudo-Vātsyāyana who could produce a Bhāṣya which has commanded universal respect through all the ages, it would not have been difficult to avoid such inappropriateness as is alleged, or to grasp the more obvious interpretation which he is supposed to have missed. Moreover, it is well-known that uncertainties as to the correct reading of the Nyāya-Sūtra and the Nyāya-Bhāṣya have given rise to two different schools of interpretation from very early times. One of these schools is represented by Tātparya-Pariśuddhi and Nyāya-Pariśiṣṭa of Udayanāchārya and Pariśuddhi-Prakāśa and Anvīkṣā-Naya-Tattvabodha of Vardhamāna Upādhyāya; the other school, by Tātparya-Ṭīkā and Nyāya-Sūchī-Nibandha of Vācaspati Miśra. Mere difference of opinion as to the appropriateness of the Bhāṣya here and there cannot, therefore, be accepted as a sufficient reason for questioning the authenticity of the Bhāṣya in its present form. On the other hand, the Bhāṣya has been accepted as genuine in all the seats of Sanskrit learning in India, and, among modern researchers in the field, by Mahāmahopādhyāyas Chandrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra, Bhīmāchārya Jhalkikar, Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga, and Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā. Even amongst European orientalists Dr. Herrman Jacobi does not doubt that the author of the complete Nyāya-Bhāṣya is one and the same person. Dr. Keith also is convinced that there is no evidence of any corruption of the text of the Nyāya-Bhāṣya, and that the suggestion that Vātsyāyana is responsible for remodelling the Nyāya-Sūtra is wholly unsupported by evidence.[1]

Vātsyāyana is an ancient Ṛṣi. By tradition he is regarded as "Bhagavān", "Muni", "Mahāmuni", and "Maharṣi". His date cannot be very far removed from the time when the aphorisms of Gotama were first reduced to writing. Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāsudeva Śāstri Abhyankar

1. *Indian Logic and Atomism*, by A. B. Keith. 1921, pages 25 and 27.

assigns *circa* 300 A.D. to him.[1] It is therefore reasonable to conclude that all the original aphorisms of Gotama have been preserved in the Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. Difficulties have been experienced from very early times in picking out the Sūtra from the Bhāṣya, particularly in those places where the Bhāṣya does not clearly indicate the Sūtra. These difficulties have been considerably enhanced by the privilege enjoyed by Bhāṣya-writers and undoubtedly exercised by Vātsyāyana of raising issues and solving them in the course of the Bhāṣya in the form of aphorisms.[2] This has misled many scholars in attributing the aphorisms of Vātsyāyana to Gotama and *vice versa*. The results of such diverse readings are shown below in a tabular form :

1. Reading referred to by M.M. Chandrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra in Śrīgopāla Vasumallik Fellowship Lectures on Hindu Philosophy, 1898 — 547 aphorisms.
2. Publication by the Asiatic Society of Bengal in the Bibliotheca Indica series, 1865 — 540 aphorisms.
3. According to Nyāyakoṣa by M.M. Bhīmāchārya Jhālkikara, second edition, 1893 (Bombay Sanskarit Series No. XLIX) — 537 aphorisms.
4. According to M.M. Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā in the Nyāya-Darśana, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1920-25 — 532 aphorisms.
5. According to M.M. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga in the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, volume IX, 1896 — 531aphorisms.
6. According to Nyāyasūchīnibandha of Vāchaspati Miśra, *circa*. 841 — 528 aphorisms.

The diversity of readings, again, is not confined only to the number of the aphorisms, but extends also to the aphorisms themselves; for in regard to particular aphorisms commentators and compilers differ as to whether they are aphorisms or are the assertions of the author of the Bhāṣya. The statement below will explain the position from this point of view. Thus :

1. *Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha*, Goverment Oriental (Hindu) Series No. 1. Poona, 1924.
2. *Cf.* "The knowers of Bhāṣyas know that to be Bhāṣya by which is explained the meaning of aphorisms by means of words appropriate to the aphorisms as well as texts of the commentator himself."

Book, Chapter	*Number of aphorisms according to the edition of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1865*	*Number rejected by Vāchaspati*	*Number added by Vācaspati*	*Number of aphorisms according to Nyāya-Sūchī-Nibandha of Vācaspati Miśra*	*Revised Edition*
I, I	41	*	*	41	41
II	20	*	*	20	20
II, I	69	2	1	68	70
II	71	3	1	69	72
III, I	75	6	4	73	79
II	78	6	*	72	78
IV, I	68	2	1	67	69
II	50	*	1	51	51
V, II	43	*	*	43	43
II	25	1	*	24	25
I-V, I-X	540	20	8	528	548

Since the publication of the Nyāya-Bhāṣya by the Asiatic Society of Bengal a fairly large number of valuable manuscripts have come to light, and the results of recent investigations go to confirm the correctness of the Index to the Aphorisms of Nyāya (Nyāya-Sūchī-Nibandha) by Vāchaspati Miśra. We have therefore revised the work of Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa according to, and on the authority of, Vāchaspati.

M.M. Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā and Pandit Dhuṇḍirāja Śāstrī have also followed the Nyāya-Sūchī-Nibandha in their edition of the "The Sūtras of Gautama and Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana with two Commentaries" published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1925. They have, however, retained four aphorisms which have been omitted from the Nyāya-Sūchī-Nibandha. The total number of aphorisms according to them is 548. The learned editors have not assigned any specific reasons for treating these four aphoristic statements as aphorisms of Gotama. They merely state that they "feel constrained to deviate from it (*i.e.*, the Nyāya-Sūchī-Nibandha) on the clear authority of either the Bhāṣya or the Vārtika." With due respect for the authority of Dr. Jhā we are unable to persuade ourselves to be of the same view. The absence of these so-called aphorisms leaves no extraordinary or unusual gap in the

line of thought in the aphorisms of Gotama. We are therefore content to follow the lead of M.M. Chandrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra in accepting Vāchaspati Miśra as a reliable guide to the aphorisms of Gotama.

II

In his posthumous work entitled "History of Indian Logic", published by the University of Calcutta in the year 1921, Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has completely changed his opinions as to the authorship and the date of the composition or compilation of the Nyāya-Sūtras. We give below a resume of the results of his later researches with our comments thereon.

"The word *nyāya* popularly signifies 'right' or 'justice'. The *Nyāya-śāstra* is therefore the science of right judgement or true reasoning."[1] "Technically the word *nyāya* signifies a syllogism (or a speech of five parts), and the Ānvīkṣikī was called *Nyāya-śāstra,* when *nyāya* constituted its special topic."[2] "The term 'Nyāya' in the sense of Logic does not appear to have been used in literature before the first century A.D. Pāṇini (about 350 B.C.) did not know the word 'Nyāya' in the sense of Logic."[3] "There is no doubt tha Pāṇini derives the word *nyāya* (evidently in the sense of justice) from the root *nī* in his Aṣṭādhyāyī, 3-3-122, as follows : अध्याय न्यायोद्यावसंहाराश्च His Aṣṭādhyāyī, 4-2-60, क्रतुकथादि सुत्रान्तात्ठक्, does not, however, presuppose *nyāya* in the sense of 'Logic'."[4]

"Medhātithi Gautama (was) the founder of Ānvikṣikī *par excellence* (circa 550 B.C.)".[5] He "was quite different from Akṣapāda. While one lived in Mithilā, the other flourished at Prabhāsa in Kathiawar. The Brahmāṇḍa-purāṇa describes Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda as the sons of a Brāhmaṇa named Soma-Śarmā who was Śiva incarnate, and well-known for his practice of austerities at the shrine of Prabhāsa during the time of Jātūkarṇya Vyāsa."[6] "It is by no means easy to determine who was the real author of the Nyāya-sūtra. Gautama and Akṣapāda seem both to have contributed to the production of the work."[7]

1. *History of Indian Logic*, 1921, page 40.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*, page 41.
4. *Ibid.*; page 41., footnote 4.
5. *Ibid.*, page 17.
6. *Ibid.*, page 49.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

The Nyāya-Sūtra "treats of four distinct subjects, *viz.* (1) the art of debate *(tarka),* (2) the means of valid knowledge *(pramāṇa),* (3) the doctrine of syllogism *(avayava),* and (4) the examination of contemporaneous philosophical doctrines *(anyamata-parīkṣā)*".[8] The first two subjects, "combined together, constitute the Tarka-śāstra (the philosophy of reasoning), popularly known as Gautamī-vidyā (the Gotamide learning)."[9] "The third subject, the doctrine of the Syllogism, does not appear to have been known in India a considerable time before the Christian era. The forth subject refers to numerous philosophical doctrines that were propounded from time to time upto the second century A.D. Gotama's Tarka-śāstra, after these two subjects had been introduced into it, became, about the second century A.D., designated as the Nyāya-sūtra, the aphorisms on logic."[10]

"Ananta-yajvan, in his commentary on the Pitṛmedha-sūtra, observes that Gautama and Akṣapāda were the same person, while the Nyāya-koṣa mentions a legend to account for the name as applied, according to it, to Gautama. As no credible evidence has been adduced in either case, I consider the identification as fanciful, and maintain that Gotama or Gautama was quite different from Akṣapāda, but that both of them contributed to the production of the Nyāya-sūtra, one at its early stage and the other in its final form."[11]

"Though Akṣapāda introduced into the Nyāya-sūtra the doctrine of the syllogism, he was by no means the first promulgator of the doctrine—nay, not even its first disseminator. The doctrine was carried to great perfection in Greece by Aristotle in the fourth century B.C. (384-322 B.C.). That it was known even in India prior to Akṣapāda is apparent from a notice of the same in the Charaka-saṁhitā, about 78 A.D."[12]

"Some philosophical doctrines of the third and fourth centuries A.D. were incorporated into the Nyāya-sūtra of Akṣapāda by Vātsyāyana the first commentator (about 400 A.D.), through the introduction of certain sūtras of his own making fathered upon Akṣapāda."[13]

Thus according to Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, "Ancient logic was called

8. *History of Indian Logic*, p. 497.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, p. 498
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 498-499.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 497, foot note 3.

Anvīkṣikī, or the science of debate, but with the introduction of syllogism or proper reasoning it came to be called Nyāya from the first century A.D.",[14] and that "The Ancient School, which reached the height of its development at the hands of Akṣapāda about 150 A.D., extended over a period of one thousand year, beginning with Gautama about 550 B.C. and ending with Vātsyāyana about 400 A.D."[15]

III

It is gratifying to find that Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has discarded his former opinion that only the first book of the Nyāya-sūtra is the work of Gotama, while the remaining four books bear marks of different hands and ages. His opinion now is that Gotama's "work on Ānvīkṣikī has not come down to us in its original form,"[16] and that Akṣapāda is "the real author of the Nyāya-sūtra which derived a considerable part of its materials from the Ānvīkṣikī-vidyā of Goutama."[17] We have already explained why the charge against Vātsyāyana, *viz.*, that he interpolated into the Nyāya-sūtra aphorisms of his own making fathered upon Akṣapāda, must be rejected. The theory, again, that Gotama and Akṣapāda are two different persons is equally unsound. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa is wrong in supposing that Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda were sons of Soma-śarmā. The word 'sons' in the text of the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa means disciples. There is also no inconsistency in Gotama, born in Mithilā, proceeding to Prabhāsa for education. The identity of Gotama and Akṣapāda does not admit of doubt. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa himself has fully established it in the Introduction. We shall only point out that the com-mentators on "Amarakoṣa : Naiyāyikaḥ tu akṣapādaḥ", explain that Akṣapāda, Ākṣapāda—these two are the names of Gotama who holds that the number of Predicables is sixteen, *viz.*, Pramāṇa, Prameya, Saṁśaya, etc.

Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa seems to us to have been induced to change his opinion as to the authorship and the date of the composition or compliation of the Nyāya-Sūtra by the idea that the doctrine of the syllogism was imported into India from Greece. We propose, therefore to discuss this point, not fully, but in some detail. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's reference to Pāṇini is complete. Pāṇini does not use the word "Nyāya" in the sense of justice only. In Aṣṭādhyāyī, I.3.36 सम्माननोत् सञ्जना चार्य

14. *History of Indian Logic*, Introduction, p. xvi.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

करण ज्ञानभृति विगणन व्ययेषु नियः: the root *nī* is said to take the ātmanepada form of conjugation when it is used in one or other of the seven senses mentioned therein. One of these senses is Jñāna, knowledge. The commentators explain Jñāna as Prameyaniśchaya, ascertainment of the object is right knowledge. They also illustrate the use of the verb in this sense thus : Tattvam nayate, demonstrates or verifies the truth. It is therefore idle to argue that Pāṇini did not know the word "Nyāya" in the sense of Logic. And Pāṇini is as old as "Most probably the seventh century B.C. in my opinion, for which good authority might be cited" (*Ancient and Hindu India* by V.A. Smith, second edition, 1923, page 57, foornote 1).

Again, according to Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, the old Ānvīkṣikī was called Nyāya-Śāstra when Nyāya in the technical sense of the syllogism came to constitute its special topic, *i.e.*, about the second century A.D. This argument is demolished by Bhāsa's reference to "Medhātitheḥ Nyāyaśāstraṁ", the Nyāya-Śāstra of Medhātithi, in his drama *Pratimā*. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa seeks to get out of the difficulty by observing that by "Nyāya-śāstra" Bhāsa "really meant its prototype the Ānvīkṣikī." But the question is not what Bhāsa really meant, but that the term Nyāya-Śāstra in the sense of Logic was prevalent in the days of Bhāsa whereas, according to Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, it came into use about the second century A.D. And Bhāsa, in the opinion of M.M. Pandit Gaṇapati Śāstrī, is even older than Pāṇini (vide his introduction to *Pratimā* nāṭaka).

Dr. Keith shows a more correct appreciation of the position of Indian Logic *vis a vis* the Logic or Greece. He says : "Of logical doctrine in its early stages there is no reason whatever to suspect a Greek origin : the syllogism of Gautama and Kaṇāda alike is obviously of natural growth, but of stunted development. It is with Dignāga only that the full doctrine of invariable concomitance as the basis of inference in lieu of reasoning by analogy appears, and it is not unreasonable to hazard the suggestion that in this case again Greek influence may have been at work. But the possibility of a natural development is not excluded...."[18]

But we do not agree with the learned Doctor that the doctrine of invariable concomitance was unknown to Indian Logic before the time of Dignāga. We apprehend that he has missed the full significance and the true function of the *example* in the syllogism. the reasoning of Kaṇāda and Gotama was not merely from particular to particular and their

18. *Indian Logic and Atomism*, 1921, p. 18.

example was not a mere particular experience. Generally, as Welton points out, "even in cases where the inference at first sight seems to be founded on one or more particular experiences, it is really based on the recognition of the universal element in which they agree; and this may be expressed in a general proposition which forms the major premise of a syllogism."[19] The need for the universal was fully recognised by Kaṇāda and Gotama. They do not draw their conclusion from the *example* alone, but from the *reason* as well. The function of the *example* and the *reason* have also been distinguished by Kaṇāda. According to him inference is based on the relation of "It is its' between the *subject* and the *reason,* and this relation can be grasped by the intellect and not by the sense." He has also explained (Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra, III.i.14) that the mark of inference must be preceded by the recollection of its universal relation *(prasiddhi)* to that of which it is a mark. The Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra is older than the Nyāya-Sūtra. It is clear therefore that the doctrine of the universal relation was not borrowed from Greece.

19. *Intermediate Logic* by J. Welton and A. J. Monahan, 1911. p. 271.

INTRODUCTION

I. GOTAMA THE FOUNDER OF NYĀYADARŚANA

The word "Nyāya" Explained

Pāṇini, the celebrated Sanskrit grammarian, who is supposed to have flourished about 350 B.C.,[1] derives the word "Nyāya"[2] from the root "*i*" which conveys the same meaning as "gam"—to go. "Nyāya" as signifying logic is therefore etymologically identical with "nigama" the conclusion of a syllogism. Logic is designated in Sanskrit not only by the word "Nyāya" but also by various other words which indicate diverse aspects of the science. For instance, it is called "Hetu-vidyā"[3] or "Hetu-Śāstra" the science of causes, "Ānvīkṣikī"[4] the science of inquiry, "Pramāṇa-Śāstra" the science of correct knowledge, "Tattva-

1. Paṇini is said to have been disciple of Upavarṣa, minister of King of the Nanda dynasty, about 350 B.C., as is evident from the following:—
अथ कालेन वर्षस्य शिष्यवर्गो महानभूत्।
तत्र एक: पाणिनिर्नाम जडबुद्धितरोऽभवत्।।
(*Kathāsarit-sāgara*, Chapter IV, verse 20)
Dr. Otto Boehtlink observes:—
"We need therefore only make a space of fifty years between each couple of them. in order to arrive at the year 350, into the neighbourhood of which date our grammarian is to be placed, according to the *Kathāsarit-sāgara.*"—Goldstuker's Pāṇini, p. 85.
2. अध्यायन्यायोद्यावसंहाराश्च।
(Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3-3-122).
3. निर्घण्टौ निगमे पुराणे इतिहासे वेदे व्याकरणे निरुक्ते शिक्षायां छन्दसि यज्ञकल्पे ज्योतिषि सांख्ये योगे क्रियाकल्पे वैशेषिके वैशिके अर्थविद्यायां बार्हस्पत्ये आश्चर्य्ये आसुरे मृगपक्षिरुते हेतुविद्यायां जतुयन्त्रे . . . . . . सर्वत्र बोधिसत्त्व एव विशव्यते स्म।।
(*Lalitavistara*, Chapter XII, p. 179, Dr. Rajendra Lal Mitra's edition).
4. आन्वीक्षिकी दण्डनीतिस्तर्कविद्यार्थशास्त्रयो:।
(*Amarakoṣa*, svargavarga, verse 155)

Śāstra" the science of categories, "Tarka-vidyā" the science of reasoning, "Vādārtha" the science of discussion and "Phakkikā-Śāstra" the science of sophism. Nyāya-sūtra is the earliest work extant on Nyāya Philosophy.

The founder of 'Nyāya' called Gotama, Gautama, Akṣapāda or Dīrghatapas

The Nyāya of logic is said to have been founded by a sage named Gotama.[1] He is also known as Gautama, Akṣapāda[2] and Dīrghatapas.[3] The names Gotama and Gautama points to the family to which he belonged while the names Akṣapāda and Dīrghatapas refer respectively to his meditative habit and practice of long penance.

The Family of Gotama

In the Ṛgveda-saṁhitā as well as the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa of the white Yajurveda we find mention of one Gotama who was son of Rahūgaṇa[4] and priest of the Royal family of Kuru-sṛñjaya for whose

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1. मुक्तये यः शिलात्वाय शास्त्रमूचे महामुनिः।
गोतमं तमवेतैव यथा वित्थ तथैव सः।।

(*Naiṣadhacharitam* 17-75)

कणादेन तु सम्प्रोक्तं शास्त्रं वैशेषिकं महत्
गोतमेन तथा न्यायं सांख्यं तु कपिलेन वै।।

(*Padmapurāṇa Uttarakhaṇḍa* Chapter 263)

गोतमः स्वेन तर्केण खण्डयन् तत्र तत्र हि।

(*Skanda-purāṇa, Kālikā Khaṇḍa*, Chapter XVII)

2. यदक्षपादः प्रवरो मुनीनाम् शमाय शस्त्रं जगतो जगाद।
कुतार्कि काज्ञाननिवृत्तिहेतुः करिष्यते तत्र मया निबन्धः।।

(Udyotakāra's *Nyāyavārtika*, opening lines)

In the Sarvadars' ana-saṃgraha Nyāya philosophy is called the Akṣapāda system.

3. Kālidāsa's *Raghuvaṁśam* 11-33.

4. अत्रेदमाख्यानम्। रहूगणपुत्रो गोतमः कुरु सृंजयानां राज्ञां पुरोहित आसीत्। तेषां राज्ञां परैः सह युद्धे सति स ऋषिरनेन सूक्तेनेन्द्रं स्तुत्वा स्वकीयानां जयं प्रार्थयामासेति। तस्य च तत्पुरोहितत्वं वाजसनेयिभिराम्नातम्। गोतम ह वै राहूगण उभयेषां कुरु सृंजयानां पुरोहित आसीत्।

(*Ṛgveda-saṁhitā*, Maṇḍala 1, Sūkta 81, Mantra 3, Sāyaṇa's commentary)

विदेघो ह माधवोऽग्निं वैश्वानरं मुखे बभार।
तस्य गोतमो राहूगणः ऋषि पुरोहित आस।।

(*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* of the white Yajurveda, Kāṇḍa 1, Adhyāya 4 Mādhyandinīya recention)

victory in battle he prayed to Indra. Nodhāḥ,[1] son of Gotama, was also called Gotama who composed several new hymns in honour of Indra. The sages sprung from the family of Gotama are designated Gotamāsaḥ[2] who were very intelligent; and Agni, pleased with their adoration, gave them cattle and rice in abundance. It is related that Gotama, once pinched with thirst, prayed for water of the Marut-Gods, who out of mercy, placed a well[3] before him transplanted from elsewhere. The water gushing out copiously from the well not only quenched his thirst but formed itself into a river, the source of which was the seat of the original well.

The Teachers called Gautama

In the Ṛgveda-saṁhitā the descendants of Gotama as already noticed are also called Gotama while in later Vedic literature they are called Gautama. The Vaṁsa-Brāhmaṇa of the Sāmaveda mentions four members of the Gotama family[4] among the teachers who transmitted

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1. सनायते गोतम इन्द्र नव्यमतक्षद्ब्रह्म हरियोजनाय।
सुनीथाय नः शवसानं नोधाः प्रातर्मक्षू धिया वसुर्जगम्यात्।।

(*Ṛgveda-saṁhitā* Maṇḍala 1, Sūkta 63, Mantra 13)

2. एवा ते हरियोजना सुवृक्तीन्द्र ब्रह्माणि गोतमासो अक्रन्।

(*Ṛgveda-saṁhitā* Maṇḍala 1, Sūkta 61, Mantra 16)

एवाग्निर्गोतमेभिर्ऋतावा विप्रेभिरस्तोष्ट जातवेदाः।
स एषु द्युम्नं पीपयत् स वाजं स पुष्टिं याति जोषमाचिकित्वान्।।

(*Ṛgveda-saṃhitā*, Maṇḍala 77, Sūkta 77, Mantra 5)

3. जिह्मं नुनुद्रेऽवतं तया दिशासिंचन्नुत्सं गोतमाय तृष्णजे।
आगच्छं तीमवसा चित्रभानवः कामं विप्रस्य तर्पयंत धामभिः।।

(*Ṛgveda-saṁhitā*, Maṇḍala 1, Sūkta 85, Mantra 11)

Sāyaṇa in commenting on *Ṛgveda-saṃhitā*, Maṇḍala 1, Sūkta 77, mantra 10, observes:—

अत्रेमाख्यायिका। गोतम ऋषिः पिपासया पीड़ितः सन् मरुत उदकं ययाचे। तदनंतरं मरुतोऽदूरस्थं कूपमुद्धृत्य यत्र स गोतम ऋषिस्तिष्ठति तां दिशं नीत्वा ऋषिसमीपे कूपमवस्थाप्य तत्पार्श्वे आहावं च कृत्वा तस्मिन्नाहावे कूपमुत्सिच्य तमृषिं तेनोदकेन तर्पयांचक्रुः। अयमर्थोऽनया उत्तरया च प्रतिपद्यते।

The well (utsadhi) is alluded to in the *Ṛgveda*, Maṇḍala 1, Sūkta 88, Mantra 4, thus:—

अहानि गृध्राः पर्या व आगुरिमां धियं वार्कार्यां च देवीं।
ब्रह्म कृण्वं तो गोतमासो अर्कैरूर्ध्वं नुनुद्र उत्सधिं पिबद्धै:।।

4. राधाच्च गौतमाद्राधो गौतमो गातुर्गौतमात् पितुर्गाता गौतमः।

Sāmavedīya Vaṃśa-Brāhmaṇa, Khaṇḍa 2, Satyavrata Sāmāśrami's edition p. 7)

that Veda to posterity, *viz.*, the Rādha-Gautama, Gātṛ-Gautama, Sumantrabābhrava-Gautama and Saṁkara-Gautama, and the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad of the same Veda mentions another teacher named Hāridrumata-Gautama[1] who was approached by Satya-Kāma Jāvāla to be his teacher. The Gobhila Gṛhya Sūtra of the Sāmaveda cites the opinion of a Gautama[2] who held that during the winter season there should be three oblations offered to the dead ancestors. Another Gautama was the author of the Pitṛmedha Sūtra[3] which perhaps belongs to the Sāmaveda. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka[4] of the white Yajurveda mentions a teacher named Gautama, while in the Kaṭhopaniṣad of the Black Yajurdeva the sage Nāchiketas[5] who conversed with Yama on the mystery of life, is called Gautama which evidently is a generic name as his father is also called Gautama in the same work. A Gautama[6] is mentioned as a teacher in the Kauśika sūtra of the Atharvaveda while to another Gautama is attributed the authorship of the Gautama Dharma sūtra[7] an authoritative work on the sacred law.

सुमन्ताद् बाभ्रवाद् गौतमात् सुमन्तो बाभ्रवो गौतमः।
(*Sāmavedīya Vaṃśa-Brāhmaṇa*, Khaṇḍa 2)

संकराद् गौतमात् संकरो गौतमः।
(*Sāmavedīya Vaṃśa-Brāhmaṇa*, Khaṇḍa 3)

1. स ह हारिद्रुमतं गौतममेत्योवाच ब्रह्मचर्यं भगवति वत्स्याम्युपेयां भगवन्तमिति।।3।।
(*Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, Adhyāya 4, Khaṇḍa 4)

2. चतुरष्टको हेमन्तः।।4।।
ज्यष्टक इत्यौद्गाहमानिः।।7।।
तथा गौतमवार्कखण्डी।।8।।
(*Gobhila Gṛhya Sūtra*, 3-10)

3. An incomplete manuscript of the Pitṛmedha Sūtra is contained in the Library of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, but the work was printed in America several years ago.

4. गौतमाद् गौतमः।।1।2।3।।
(*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, Adhyāya 4)

5. हन्त त इदं प्रवक्ष्यामि गुह्यं ब्रह्म सनातनम्।
यथा च मरणं प्राप्य आत्मा भवति गौतम।।6।।
(*Kaṭhopaniṣad* Valli 5)

शान्तसंकल्पः सुमना यथा स्याद्वीमन्युर्गौतमो माभिमृत्यो।
त्वत् प्रसृष्टं माभिवदेत् प्रतीत एतत् त्रयाणां प्रथमं वरं बृणे।
(*Kaṭhopaniṣad* Valli 5)

6. Vide Weber's *History of Indian Literature*, p. 153.
7. The text of the *Gautama Dharma-sūtra* has been printed several times in Indian while an English translation of it by Dr. G. Bühler has appeared in the Sacred Books of the East Series.

We need not take any notice of one Gautama[1] who at the bidding of his mother, as stated in the Mahābhārata, cast into the Ganges his old and blind father Dīrghatamas who was however miraculously saved.

Gautama, husband of Ahalyā

The Rāmāyaṇa mentions a Gautama[2] who had his hermitage in a grove at the outskirts of the city of Mithilā where he lived with his wife Ahalyā. It is well-known how Ahalyā, for her seduction by Indra, was cursed by her lord to undergo penace and mortification until her emancipation at the happy advent of Rāma. The Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa, while repeating the same account, places the hermitage of Gautama[3] on the banks of the Ganges; and our great poet Kālidāsa follows the Rāmāyaṇic legend describing Gautama[4] as Dīrghatapas, a sage who practised long penance.

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1. स वै दीर्घतमा नाम शापादृषिरजायत।।22।।
जात्यन्धो वेदवित् प्राज्ञः पत्नीं लेभे स विद्यया।।23।।
तरुणीं रूप सम्पन्नां प्रद्वेषीं नाम ब्राह्मणीम्।
स पुत्रान् जनयामास गौतमादीन् महायशाः।।24।।
(*Mahābhārata, Ādiparva* Adhyāya 104)

2. मिथिलोवने तत्र आश्रमं दृश्य राघवः।
पुराणं निर्जनं रम्यं पप्रच्छ मुनिपुङ्गवम्।।11।।
इदमाश्रमसंकाशं किं न्विदं मुनिवर्जितम्।
श्रोतुमिच्छामि भगवन् कस्थायम्पूर्व आश्रमः।।12।।
गौतमस्य नरश्रेष्ट पूर्वमासीन्महात्मनः।
आश्रमो दिव्यसंकाशः सुरैरपि सुपूजितः।।15।।
(*Rāmāyaṇa, Ādikāṇḍa*, Sarga 48)

3. इत्युक्त्वा मुनिभिस्ताभ्यां ययौ गङ्गासमीपगम्।
गौतमस्याश्रमं पुण्यं यत्राहल्या शिलामयी।।14।।
(*Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa, Ādikāṇḍa*, adhyāya 6)

4. तैः शिवेषु वसतिर्गताध्वभिः।
सायमाश्रमतरुष्वगृह्यत।
येषु दीर्घतपसः परिग्रहो
वासवक्षणकलत्रतां ययौ।।33।।
प्रत्यपद्यत चिराय यत् पुन-
श्चारुगौतमबधूः शिलामयी।
स्वं वपुः स किल किल्विषच्छिदां
रामपादरजसामनुग्रहः।।34।।
(*Raghuvaṃśa*, Sarga 11)

Akṣapāda

The Vāyupurāṇa describes a sage named Akṣapāda[1] as the disciple of a Brāhmaṇa named Soma Śarmā who was Śiva incarnate and well-known for his practice of austerities at the shrine of Prabhāsa during the time of Jātūkarṇya Vyāsa. This Akṣapāda mentioned along with Kaṇāda is evidently to other person than Gotama or Gautama who founded the Nyāya philosophy. As to the origin of the name Akṣapāda ("having eyes in the feet") as applied to Gautama, legend has it that Gautama was so deeply absorbed in philosophical contemplation that one day during his walks he fell unwittingly into a well out of which he was rescued with great difficulty. God therefore mercifully provided him with a second pair of eyes in his feet to protect the sage from further mishaps. Another legend[2] which represents Vyāsa, a disciple of Gautama, lying prostrate before his master until the latter condescended to look upon him, not with his natural eyes, but with a new pair of eyes in his feet, may be dismissed with scanty ceremony as being the invention of a later generation of logicians, anxious to humiliate Vyāsa for vilification of the Nyāya system in his Mahābhārata and Vedānta sūtra.

Local Tradition

The people of Mithilā (modern Darbhanga in North Bihar) ascribe the foundation of Nyāya philosophy to Gautama, husband of Ahalyā, and point out as the place of his birth a village named Gautamasthāna where a fair is held every year on the 9th day of the lunar month of Chaitra (March-April). It is situated 28 miles north-east of Darbhanga and has a mud-hill of considerable height (supposed to be the hermitage of Gautama) at the base of which lies the celebrated "Gautama-kuṇḍa" or Gautama's well the water whereof is like milk to the taste and feeds

1. सप्तविंशति मे प्राप्ते परिवर्त्ते क्रमागते।
जातुकर्ण्यो यदा ब्यासो भविष्यति तपोधनः।।201।।
तदाहं संभविष्यामि सोमशर्म्मा द्विजोत्तमः।
प्रभासतीर्थमासाद्य योगात्मा लोकविश्रुतः।।203।।
तत्रापि मम ते पुत्रा भविष्यन्ति तपोधनाः।
अक्षपादः कणादश्च उलूको वत्स एव च।।203।।

(*Vāyupurāṇa*, Adhyāya 23)

2. गौतमो हि स्वमतदूषकस्य व्यासस्य मुखदर्शनं चक्षुषा न कर्त्तव्यमिति प्रतिज्ञाय पश्चात् व्यासेन प्रसादितः पादे नेत्रं प्रकाश्य तं दृष्टवान् इवि पौराणिकी कथा।

(*Nyāyakoṣa*, 2nd edition, by M. M. Bhīmācārya Jhālakīkara, Bombay)

a perennial rivulet called on this account Kṣīrodadhi or Khiroi (literally the sea of milk). Two miles to the east of the village there is another village named Ahalyāsthāna where between a pair of trees lies a slab of stone identified with Ahalyā in her accursed state. In its vicinity these is a temple which commemorates the emancipation of Ahalyā by Rāma Chandra. The Gautama-kuṇḍa and the Kṣīrodadhi river, which are still extant at Gautama-sthāna, verify the account of Gatama given above from the Ṛgveda while the stone slab and the temple of Rāma at Ahalyā-sthāna are evidence corroborative of the story of Ahalyā as given in the Rāmāyaṇa. There is another tradition prevalent in the town of Chapra that Gautama, husband of Ahalyā and founder of the Nyāya philosophy, resided in a village now called Godnā at the confluence of the rivers Ganges and Sarayū where a Sanskrit academy called Gautama Thomson Pāṭhaśālā has been established to commemorate the great sage.

The Founder of Nyāya Philosophy Identified

It seems to me that Gautama, son of Rahūgaṇa, as mentioned in the Ṛgveda, was the founder of the Gautama family from which sprang Gautama, husband of Ahalyā, as narrated in the Rāmāyaṇa. It is interesting to note that Śatānanda[1], son of Gautama and Ahalyā, is a priest in the royal family of Janaka much in the same way as Gautama, son of Rahūgaṇa, is a priest in the royal family of Kurusṛñjaya. The fields waving with paddy plants which greet the eyes of a modern traveller near and round Gautama-sthāna bear testimony to Agni's gift of rice and cattle in abundance to the family of Gautama. The Nyāya-philosophy was, on the authority of the tradition prevalent in Mithilā, founded by Gautama, husband of Ahalyā. The same Gautama has been designated as Akṣapāda in the Vāyu Purāṇa already referred to Akṣapāda has been identified by Anantayajvan[2] with the author of the Pitṛmedha Sūtra as well as with that of the Gautama Dharma sūtra, and ir is possible that he is not other than the Gautama referred to in the Kauśika sūtra of the

1. शतानन्दं पुरस्कृत्य पुरोहितमनिन्दितः।
प्रतिगृह्य तु तां पूजां जनकस्य महात्मनः।

(*Rāmāyaṇa*, ādikāṇḍa, Sarga 50)

गौतमश्च शतानन्दो जनकानां पुरोहितः।

(*Uttara Rāma charitam*)

2. The *Gṛhya Sūtras* of the *Sāmaveda* probably belong also Gautama Pitṛmedhasūtra (*Cf.* Burnell, p. 57; the commentator Antantayajvan identifies the author with Akṣapāda the author of the Nyāya-sūtra), and the Gautama dharma-sūtra.—Weber's *History of Indian LIterature*, p 85.

Atharva Veda. The other Gautamas mentioned in the Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, etc., appear to be the kinsmen of their illustrious name sake.

His Residence

The Rāmāyaṇa, as we have found, places the hermitage of Gautama, husband of Ahalyā, at Gautama-sthāna twenty-eight miles north-east of Darbhaṅgā while the Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa places it on the banks of the Ganges at its confluence with the Sarayū off the town of Chāprā. The Vāyu-purāṇa fixes the residence of Akṣapāda, supposed to be identical with Gautama, at Prabhāsa[1] beyond Girnar in Kathiawar on the sea-coast. To reconcile these conflicting statements it has been suggested that Akṣapāda otherwise known as Gotama or Gautama was the founder of the Nyāya philosophy, that he was born at Gautama-sthāna in Mithilā on the river Kṣīrodadhi, lived for some years at the village now called Godnā at the confluence of the Ganges and Sarayū until his retirement to Prabhāsa the well-known sacred place of pilgrimage in Kathiawar on the sea-coast.

His Age about 550 B.C.

The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa mentions Gautama along with Āsurāyaṇa and the Vāyupurāṇa (already quoted) states that Akṣapāda, *alias* Gotama or Gautama, flourished during time of Jātūkarṇya Vyāsa. Now

1. Prabhāsa washed on its western side by the river Sarasvati and reputed as the residence of Kṛṣṇa, is mentioned in the Śrīmad Bhāgavata thus:—
   न वस्तव्यमिहास्माभिर्जिजीविषुभिरार्य्यका:।
   प्रभासं सुमहत्पुण्यं यास्यामोऽद्यैव माचिरम्।।35।।
   (*Bhāgavata*, Skandha II, adhyāya 6)
   स्त्रियो बालाश्च वृद्धाश्च शंखोद्धारं व्रजन्त्वित:।
   वयं प्रभासं यास्यामो यत्र प्रत्यक् सरस्वती।।6।।
   (*Bhāgavata*, Skandha II, adhyāya 30)
   Prabhāsa was situated beyond the rock of Girnar in Kathiawar where we come across all the edicts of Aśoka as well as an inscription of Rudradāma supposed to be the first inscription in Sanskrit dated about 100 A.D. which mentions Chandra Gupta and Aśoka by names. There are also some inscriptions in Gupta characters, and there is no doubt that Prabhāsa situated on the Sarasvati acquired celebrity in very old times.
   This Prabhāsa is not to be confounded with another town called Prabhāsa in Kausāmbi near Allahabad on the Jamna where there is an inscription, dated about the 2nd century B. C., of Aṣadasena, a descendant of Sonakāyana of Adhicchatra, (*vide* Dr. Fuher's Pabhosa inscriptions in *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. II. pp. 242-243.)

Jātūkarṇya, according to the Madhukāṇḍa and Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍa of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa[1] (Kāṇva recension), was a pupil of Āsurāyaṇa and Yāska who are supposed to have lived about 550 B.C. This date tallies well with the time of another Gautama who, together with Araṇemi, is described in the Divyāvadāna[2] a Buddhist Sanskrit work translated into Chinese in the 2nd century A.D., as having transmitted the Vedas to posterity before they were classified by Vyāsa. It does not conflict with the view that Akṣapāda is identical with Gautama, author of the Gautama Dharma-Sūtra which is "declared to the oldest of the existing works on the sacred law[3]." Akṣapāda-Gautama, founder of the Nyāya Philosophy, was almost a contemporary of Buddha-Gautama who founded Buddhism and Indrabhūti Gautama who was a disciple of Mahāvīra, the reputed founder of Jainism.

The fourfold division of the means of knowledge (Pramāṇa) into perception, inference, comparison and word fouded in the Jaina Prakṛta scriptures such as the Nandī-Sūtra, Sthānāṅga-Sūtra[4] and Bhagavatī Sūtra

1. *Vide* Weber's *History of Indian LIterature*, p. 140.
   In the Mādhyandinīya recension of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa a teacher intervenes between Yāska and Jātūkarṇya, *viz*. Bhāradvāja. Cf.
   जातुकर्ण्याज्जातुकर्ण्यो भारद्वाजाद् भारद्वाजो भारद्वाजाच्चासुरायणाच्च गौतमाच्च गौतमो ......
   .... पाराशर्य्यात् पाराशर्य्यो जातुकर्ण्याज्जातुकर्ण्यो भारद्वाजाद् भारद्वाजो भारद्वाजाच्चासुरायणाच्च यास्काच्चासुरायण:।
   (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, Mādhyandinīya recension, Kāṇḍa 14, adhyāya 5.)
2. The 33rd chapter of the Divyāvadāna called Mātaṅga Sūtra, in Chinese Mo-tan-nu-cin, was translated into Chinese by An-shi-kao-cie of the Eastern Han dynasty in A. D. 148-17. (*Vide* Bunjiu Nanjio's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka*). In it we read :—
   ब्रह्मा देवानां परमतापस: इन्द्रस्य कौशिकस्य वेदार्थान् वाचयति स्म। इन्द्र: कौशिकोऽरणेमीगौतमे वेदान् वाचयति। अरणेमीगौतमौ श्वेतकेतुं वेदान् वाचयत: श्वेतकेतु: शुकं पण्डितं वेदान् वाचयति। शुक: पंडितश्चतुर्धा वेदान् विभजति स्म।
   (*Divyāvadāna*, Chap. XXXIII)
3. Bühler observes :—"These arguments which allow us to place Gautama before both Baudhāyana and Vāśiṣtha are that both these authors quote Gautama as an authority on law........ These facts will, I think, suffice to show that the Gautama Dharma Sūtra may be safely declared to be the oldest of the existing works on the sacred law." (Buhler's Gautama Introduction, pp. XLIX and LIV, S. B. E. series).
4. अथवा हेऊ चउव्विहे पन्नत्ते तं जहा
   पच्चक्खे अनुमाणे उवमे आगमे।
   (*Sthānāṅga-Sūtra*, Page 309, published by Dhanapat Singh)

compiled by Indrabhūti-Gautama finds its parallel in the Nyāya-Sūtra of Akṣapāda-Gautama leading to the conclusion that this particular doctrine was either borrowed by Indrabhūti from Akṣapāda or was the common property of both. In the Pāli and Prākṛta scriptures Gautama is called Gotama, and a Pāli Sutta mentions a sect called "Gotamakā,"[1] who were followers of Guatama, identified perhaps with the founder of the Nyāya Philosophy. The Pāli Canonical scriptures such as the Brahmajāla Sutta,[2] Udāna, etc., which embody the teachings of Buddha, mention a class of Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas who were "takkī" or "takkika" (logicians) and "vīmamsī" (casuists) and indulged in "takka" (logic) and vīmamsā (casuistry), alluding perhaps to the followers of Akṣapāda-Gautama described as "Goramakā".

The Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa[3], a Pāli work of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, composed by Moggaliputra Tissa at the third Buddhist Council during the reign of Aśoka about 255 B.C., mentions "patiññā" (in Sanskrit : "pratijña," proposition), "Upanaya" (application of reasons), "Niggaha" (in Sanskrit : "Nigraha," humilation or defeat) etc., which are the technical terms of Nyāya philosophy or Logic. Though Moggali-putta Tissa has not made any actual reference to Logic or Nyāya, his mention of some of its technical terms warrants us to suppose that that philosophy existed in some shape in India in his time about 255 B.C. These facts lead us to conclude that Gotama, Gautama or

1. *Vide* Prof. T.W. Rhys David's Introduction to the Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta, pp. 220-222. It is observed :—
"The only alternative is that some Brāhmaṇa, belonging to the Gotama Gotra, is here referred to as having had a community of Bhikṣus named after him."
2. इध, भिक्खवे, एकच्चो समणो वा ब्राह्मणो व तक्की होति वीमंशी। सो तक्कपरियाहतं वीमंसानुचरितं सयं पटिभानं एवं आह "अधिच्चसमुप्पन्नो अत्ता च लोको चाति"।
(*Brahmajāla Sutta* 1-32, edited by Rhys Davids and Carpenter)
याव सम्मासम्बुद्धा लोके नुप्पज्जन्ति, न तक्किका सुज्झन्ति च चापि सावका दुद्दिट्ठी न दुक्खा पमुच्चरेति।
(*Udāna*, p. 10, edited by Paul Steinthal. P. T. S. edition)
3. The terms "Paṭiññā" (pratijñā, proposition) and "niggaha" (nigraha, defeat) occur in the following passages:—
न च प्नय तया तत्थ हेताय पटिज्जाय हेवं पटिजानन्ता हेवं निग्गहेतब्बो।
(*Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa*, Siamese edition, p. 3)
"Niggaha-Catukkam" is the name of a section of the first chapter of the Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa while "Upanaya-Catukkaṁ" is the name of another section of that work.

Akṣapāda, the founder of Nyāya Philosophy, lived about the year 550 B.C.

II. NYĀYASŪTRA THE FIRST WORK ON NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

The Earliest Contribution to the Sūtra Literature

To Gotama, Gautama or Akṣapāda, of whom a short account has been given above, is attributed the authorship of the Nyāya-Sūtra, the earliest work on Nyāya Philosophy. Sanskrit literature in the Sūtra or aphoristic style was presumably inaugurated at about 550 B.C. and the Nyāya-Sūtra the author of which lived, as already stated, at about that time, must have been the first[1] contribution to that literature. The "Sutta" or Sūtra section of the Pāli literature reads very much like a body of sermons bearing no affinity with the Sūrya works of the Brāhmaṇas.

The Gradual Development of the Nyāya-Sūtra

The *Nyāya-Sūtra* is divided into five books, each containing two chapters called āhṇikas or Diurnal portions. It is believed that Akṣapāda finished his work on Nyāya in ten lectures corresponding to the āhṇikas referred to above. We do not know whether the whole of the Nyāya-Sūtra, as it exists at present, was the work of Akṣapāda, nor do we know for certain whether his teachings were committed to writing by himself or transmitted by oral tradition only. It seems to me that it is only the first book of the Nyāya-Sūtra containing a brief explanation of the 16 categories that we are justified in ascribing to Akṣapāda, while the second, third and fourth books which discuss particular doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta and Buddhist Philosophy bear marks of different hands and ages. In these books there are passages quoted almost *verbatim* from the Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra[2], a Sanskrit work of the Yogāchāra Buddhist Philosophy, from the Mādhyamika Sūtra of

1. Kapila is stated in the Sāṁkhye-Kārikā, verse 70, to have taught his philosophy to Āsuri who is mentioned in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa as a teacher, Āsurāyaṇa and Yāska who followed Āsuri were the teachers of Jātūkarṇya, a contemporary of Akṣapāda-Gautama. Kapila therefore preceded Akṣapāda by at least three generations. Kapila's Philosophy believed to have come down by oral traditions and was not perhaps committed to writing in his life-time. Hence, the Nyāya-Sūtra has been stated to be the first work of the Sūtra period.
2. *Vide Nyāya Sūtra* 4-2-26, which quoted the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (dated about 300 A.D.)

Nāgārjuna[1] and from the Śataka[2] of Ārya Deva—works which were composed in the early centuries of Christ. The fifth book treating of the varieties of futile rejoinders and occasions for rebuke was evidently not the production of Akṣapāda who dismissed those topics without entering into their details. The last and most considerable additions were made by Vātsyāyana, otherwise known as Pakṣila Svāmi, who about 450 A.D. wrote the first regular commentary, "Bhāṣya", on the Nyāya Sūtra, and harmonised the different, and at times conflicting, additions and interpolations by the ingenious introduction of Sūtras of his own making fathered upon Akṣapāda.

Commentaries on the Nyāya-Sūtra

The *Nyāya-Sūtra* has, since its composition, enjoyed a very great popularity as is evident from the numerous commentaries that have from time to time centred round it. A few of the commentaries are mentioned below :

TEXT

1. Nyāya-Sūtra by Gotama or Akṣapāda (550 B.C.)

COMMENTARIES

2. Nyāya-Bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana (450 A.D.)
3. Nyāya-Vārtika by Udyotakāra.
4. Nyāya-Vārtika-tātparya-tīkā by Vācaspati Miśra.
5. Nyāya-Vārtika-tātparya-tīkā-pariśuddhi by Udayana.
6. Pariśuddhiprakāśa by Vardhamāna.
7. Vardhamānendu by Padmanābha Miśra.
8. Nyāyālaṅkāra by Śrīkaṇṭha.
9. Nyāyālaṅkāra Vṛtti by Jayanta.
10. Nyāya-mañjarī by Jayanta.
11. Nyāya-Vṛtti by Abhayatilakopādhyāya.
12 Nyāya-Vṛtti by Viśvanātha.
13. Mitabhāṣiṇī Vṛtti by Mahādeva Vedāntī.
14. Nyāyaprakāśa by Keśava Miśra.
15. Nyāyabodhinī by Govardhana.
16. Nyāya Sūtra Vyākhyā by Mathurānātha.

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1. *Vide Nyāya-Sūtra* 2-1-39. 4-1-39 and 4-1-48, which criticise the Mādhyamika Sūtra.
2. *Vide Nyāya-Sūtra* 4-1-48 which criticises Śataka of Āryaveda.

III. RECEPTION ACCORDED TO THE NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy Inaugurated by Members of the Military Caste

It appears from the Chāndogya-upaniṣad, Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad and Kauṣītakī Brāhmaṇa[1] that Philosophy (Adhyātma-Vidyā) received its first impetus from the Kṣatriyas (members of the military caste) who carried it to great perfection. King Ajātaśatru in an assembly of the Kuru-Pañchālas consoled a Brāhmaṇa named Śvetaketu, son of Āruṇi of the Gautama family, that he had no cause of being sorry for his inability to explain certain doctrines of Adhyātma-Vidyā which were known only to the Kṣatriyas. It may be observed that Mahāvīra and Buddha who founded respectively Jainism and Buddhism—two universal religions based on philosophy or Adhyātma-Vidyā—were also Kṣatriyas. Kapila is reputed to be the first Brāhmaṇa who propounded a system of philosophy called Sāṁkhya, but his work on the subject not having come down to us in its original form we are not in a position to ascertain

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1. *Kauṣitakī-Brāhmaṇa* 2-1, 2;16, 4.
Bṛhadāraṇyaka 2-1-20, 2-3-6.
Chhāndogya 3-14-1; 5-11, 24; 1-8-9; 1-9-3, 7-1-3 and 5-11.
मा त्वं गौतमावदो यथेयं न प्राक् त्वत्तः पुरा विद्या ब्राह्मणान् गच्छति तस्मादु सर्व्वेषु लोकेषु क्षत्रस्यैव प्रशासनमभूदिति तस्मै होवाच॥7॥ (*Chāndogya-upaniṣad* 5-3)
Professor P. Deussen observes :—
In this narrative, preserved by two different Vedic schools, it is expressly declared that the knowledge of the Brahman as ātman, the centrale doetrine of the entire Vedānta, is possessed by the King; but, on the contrary, is not possessed by the Brāhmaṇa "famed as a Vedic scholar."—*Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 17-18.
Again he remarks :—We are forced to conclude, if not with absolute certainly, yet with a very high degree of probability, that as a matter of fact the doctrine of the ātman standing as it did in such sharp contrast to all the principles of the Vedic ritual, though the original conception may have been due to Brāhmaṇas, was taken up and cultivated primarily not in Brāhmana but in Kṣatriya circles, and was first adopted by the farmer in later times. *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 19.
सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म। विज्ञानमानन्दं बह्म। तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो। सोऽहं ब्रह्म।
These four pregnant expressions (Mahāvākya) originated from the Brāhmaṇas, whence it may be concluded Nirguṇa-Brahma-Vidyā or knowledge of absolute Brahman was confined among them. It was the Saguṇa-Brahma Vidyā or knowledge of Brahman limited by form and attibutes that is said to have been introduced by the Kṣatriyas.

what relation it bore to the Vedas or what kind of reception was given to it by the orthodox Brāhmaṇas. We know for certain that the most powerful Brāhmaṇa who undertook to study and teach philosophy openly was Gotama, Gautama or Akṣapāda, the renowned author of the Nyāya-Sūtra. He founded a rational system of philosophy called "Nyāya" which at its inception had no relation with the topics of the Vedic Saṁhitā and Brāhmaṇa. At this stage the Nyāya was pure Logic inconnected with the scriptural dogmas. Akṣapāda recognised four means of valid knowledge, *viz.*, perception inference, comparison and word of which the last signified knowledge derived through any reliable assertion.

Nyāya (Logic) not Received with Favour

This being the nature of Nyāya or Logic at its early stage it was not received with favour by the orthodox community of Brāhmaṇas who were anxious to establish an organised society, paid their sole attention to the Saṁhitās and Brāhmaṇas which treated of rituals, ignoring altogether the portions which had nothing to do with them. The sage Jaimini[1] in his Mīmāṁsa-Sūtra distinctly says that the Veda having for its sole purpose the perscription of actions, those parts of it which do not serve that purpose are useless. We are therefore not surprised to find Manu[2] enjoining excommunication upon those members of the twice-born caste who disregarded the Vedas and Dharma-Sūtra relying upon the support of Hetu-Śāstra or Logic. Similarly Vālmīki in his Rāmāyaṇa[3] discredits those persons of perverse intellect who indulge in the frivolities of Ānvīkṣikī, the science of Logic, regardless of the works of sacred law (Dharma-śāstra) which they should follow as their guide. Vyāsa in the Mahābhārata,[4] Sāntiparva, relates the doleful story

1. आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थकत्वात् अनार्थ क्यम् अतदर्थानाम्।1।2।1।

(*Mīmāṁsā Sūtra*)

2. योऽवमन्येत ते मूले हेतूशास्त्राश्रयाद्द्विजः।
स साधुभिर्बहिष्कार्य्यो नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः।।

(*Manu*, adhyāya 2, verse 11)

3. धर्मशास्त्रेषु मुख्येषु विद्यमानेषु दुर्बुधाः।
बुद्धिमान्वीक्षिकीं प्राप्य निरर्थं प्रवदन्ति ते।।36।।

(*Rāmāyaṇa Ayodhyā Kāṇḍa*, Sarga 100)

4. अहमासं पण्डितको हैतुको वेदनिन्दकः।
आन्वीक्षिकीं तर्कविद्यामनुरक्तो निरर्थकाम्।।47।।
हेतुवादान् प्रवदिता वक्ता संसत्सु हेतुमत्।
आक्रोष्टा चाभिवक्ता च ब्रह्मवाक्येषु च द्विजान्।।48।।

of a repentant Brāhmaṇa who, addicted to Tarkavidyā (Logic), carried on debates divorced from all faith in the Vedas and was on that account, turned in to a jackal in his next birth as a penalty. In another passage of the Śāntiparva,[1] Vyāsa warns the followers of the Vedānta Philosophy against communicating their doctrines to a Naiyāyika or Logician. Vyāsa[2] does not care even to review the Nyāya system in the Brahma-sūtra seeing that it has not been recognised by any worthy sage. Stories of inflation of penalties on those given to the study of Nyāya are related in the Skanda Purāṇa,[3] and other works; and in the Naiṣadha-charita[4] we find Kali satirising the found of Nyāya Philosophy as "Gotama" the "most bovine" among sages.

Nyāya Reconciled with Scriptural Dogmas

Gradually however this system of philosophy instead of relying entirely upon reasoning came to attach due weight to the authority of the Vedas, and later on, after its reconciliation with them, the principles

नास्तिकः सर्वशङ्की च मूर्खः पण्डितमानिकः।
तस्येयं फलनिर्वृत्तिः शृगालत्वं मम द्विज।।49।।

(*Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva*, adhyāya 180)

In the Gandharva tantra we find :—
गोतमप्रोक्तशास्त्रार्थनिरताः सर्व एव हि।
शार्गालीं योनिमापन्नाः सन्दिग्धाः सवकर्मसु।।

(Quoted in *Prāṇatoṣiṇītantra*)

1. स्नातकानामिदं शास्त्रं वाच्यं पुत्रानुशासनम्।
× × × × ×
न तर्कशास्त्रदग्धाय तथैव पिशुनाय च।।18।।

(*Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva*, adhyāya 246)

2. अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा।।17।।

(*Vedānta-sūtra* 2-2)

3. गोतमः स्वेन तर्केण खण्डयन् तत्र हि।
शप्तोऽथ मुनिभिस्तत्र शार्गालीं योनिमृच्छति।
पुनश्चानुगृहितोऽसौ श्रुतिसिद्धान्ततर्कतः।
सर्वलोकोपकाराय तव शास्त्रं भविष्यति।।

(*Skanda Purāṇa, Kālikākhaṇḍa*, adhyāya 17)

4. मुंक्तये यः शिलात्वाय शास्त्रमूचे महामुनिः।
गोतिमं तमवेतैव यथा वित्थ तथैव सः।।

(*Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañchānanas* edition)

of Nyāya were assimilated in other systems of philosophy such as the Vaiśeṣika,[1] Yoga, Mīmāṁsā,[2] Sāṁkhya[3], etc.

Nyāya as an approved branch of knowledge

Henceforth the Nyāya was regarded as an approved branch of learning. Thus, the Gautama-Dharma-sūtra[4] prescribes a course of training in Logic (Nyāya) for the King and acknowledges the utility of *Tarka* or Logic in the administration of justice though in the case of consclusions proving incompatible ultimate decision is directed to be made by reference to persons versed in the Vedas. Manu[5] says that *dharma* or duty is to be ascertained by logical reasoning not opposed to the injunctions of the Vedas. He recommends Logic (Nyāya) as a necessary study for a King and a logician to be an indispensable member of a legal assembly. Yājñavalkya[6] counts "Nyāya" or Logic among the fourteen principal sciences while Vyāsa[7] admits that he was able to arrange and classify the Upaniṣads with the help of the Ānvīkṣiki or

1. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 1-1-4, 2-1-15, 1-1-16, 2-1-17, 2-2-17, 2-2-32, 3-1-15, 9-2-3, 9-2-4.
2. *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* 1-1-14, 1-3-1, 1-3-2, 1-3-3, 1-4-14, 1-4-35, 1-5-8, 3-1-17, 3-1-20, 4-3-18, 5-1-6, 1-3-35.
3. *Sāṁkhyā-sūtra* 1-60,1-101, 1-106, 5-10, 5-11, 5-12.
   Yoga-sūtra 1-5, 6.
4. राजा सर्वस्येष्टे ब्राह्मणवर्जुं साधुकारी स्यात् साधुवादी, त्रय्याम् आन्बीक्षिक्याञ्चाभिविनीत:। . .....न्यायाधिगमो तर्कोऽभ्युपाय: तेनाभ्युह्य यथास्थानं गमयेत्। विप्रतिपत्तौ त्रैविद्यवृद्धेभ्य: प्रत्यवहृत्य निष्ठां गमयेत्। (*Gautamadharma-sūtra*, adhyāya 11)
5. आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना।
   यस्तर्केणानुसंधत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतर:।।
   (*Manu*, adhyāya 12, verse 106)
   त्रैविद्येभ्यस्त्रयीं विद्याद् दण्डनीतिञ्च शाश्वतीम्।
   अन्वीक्षिकीञ्चात्मविद्यां वार्त्ताम्भांश्च लोकत:।
   (*Manu*, adhyāya 7, verse 43)
   त्रैविद्यो हैतुकस्तर्की नैरुक्तो धर्म्मपाठक:।
   त्रयश्चाश्रमिण: पूर्व्वे परिषत् स्याद्दशावरा।।
   (*Manu*, adhyāya 12, verse 111)
6. पुराणन्यायमीमांसा धर्म्मशास्त्राङ्गमिश्रिता:।
   वेदा: स्थानानि विद्यानां धर्म्मस्य च चतुर्द्दश।।
   (*Yājñavalkya saṃhitā*, adhyāya 1, verse 3)
7. तत्रोपनिषदं तात परिशेषं तु पार्थिव।
   मथ्यनामि मनसा तात दृष्ट्वा चान्वीक्षिकीं पराम्।।
   (*Mahābhārata* quoted by Viśvanātha in his Vṛtti on *Nyāya-sūtra* 1-1-1)

Logic. In the Padma-purāṇa[1] Logic is includede among the fourteen principal branches of learning promulgated by God Viṣṇu, while in the Matsya-purāṇa,[2] Nyāya-Vidyā, together with the Vedas, is said to have emanated from the month of Brahmā himself. In fact so wide-spread was the study of Nyāya that the Mahābhārata is full of references to that science.

In the Ādiparva of the Mahābhārata Nyāya[3] or Logic is mentioned along with the Veda and Chikitsā (the science of medicine), and the hermitage of Kāśyapa is describes as being filled with sages who were versed in the Nyāya-tattva (logical truths) and knew the true meaning of a proposition, objection and conclusion. The Śānti-parva[4] refers to numerous tenets of Nyāya supported by reason and scripture while the Aśvamedha-parva[5] describes the sacrificial ground as being resounded by logicians (Hetu-vādin) who employed arguments and counter-arguments

1. अङ्गानि चतुरो वेदान् पुराणन्यायविस्तरान्।
   मीमांसां धर्म्मशास्त्रञ्च परिगृह्याथ साम्प्रतम्।।
   मत्यस्यरूपेण च पुन: कल्पादावुदकान्तरे।
   (*Padma-purāṇa*, *vide* Muir's Sanskrit text Vol. III, p. 27)
2. अनन्तरञ्च वक्त्रेभ्यो वेदास्तस्य विनि:स्मृता:।
   मीमांसा न्यायविद्या च प्रमाणाष्टकसंयुता।।
   (*Matsya-purāṇa* 3-2)
3. न्यायशिक्षा चिकित्सा चदानं पाशुपतं तथा।
   हेतुनैव समं जन्म दिब्यमानुषसंज्ञितम्।।67।।
   (*Mahābhārata, Ādiparva*, adhyāya 1)
   न्यायतत्त्वात्मबिज्ञानसम्पन्नैर्वेपारगै:।।42।।
   नानावाक्यसमाहारसमवायविशारदै:।
   विशेकार्य्यविद्भिश्च मोक्षधर्म्मपरायणै:।।43।।
   स्थापनाक्षेपसिद्धान्त परमार्थज्ञतां गतै:।
   शब्दच्छन्दोनिरुक्तज्ञै: कालज्ञानविशारदै:।।44।।
   द्रव्यकर्म्मगुणज्ञैश्च कार्य्यकारणवेदिभि:।।
   (*Mahābhārata, Ādiparva*, adhyāya 70)
4. न्यायतन्त्राण्यनेकानि तैस्तैरुक्तानि वादिभि:।
   हेत्वागमसमाचारैर्यदुक्तं तदुपास्यताम्।।22।।
   (*Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva*, adhyāya 210)
5. तस्मिन् यज्ञे प्रवृत्ते तु वाग्मिनो हेतुवादिन:।
   हेतुवादान् बहूनाहु: परस्परजिगीषव:।।27।।
   (*Mahābhārata, Āsvamedhaparva*, adhyāya 85)

to vanquish one another. In the Sabhā-parva[1] the sage Nārada is described as being versed in Logic (Nyāyavid) and skilful in distinguishing unity and plurality ("aikya" and "nānātva"), conjunction and co-existence ("saṁyoga" and "samavāya"), genus and species ("parāpara"), etc., capable of deciding questions by evidences (Pramāṇa) and ascertaining the validity and invalidity of a five-membered syllogism (Pañchāvayava-vākya).

The Course of Nyāya

In fact the Nyāya (Logic) was in course of time deservedly held in very high esteem. If it were allowed to follow its original course unimpeded by religious dogmas it would have risen to the very height of perfection. Nevertheless the principles of Nyāya entering into the different systems of philosophy gave them each its proper compactness and cogency just as Bacon's Inductive Method shaped the sciences and philosophies of a later age in a different country. It is however to be regretted that during the last five hundred years the Nyāya has been mixed up with Law (smṛti), Rhetoric (alaṅkāra), Vedānta, etc., and thereby has hampered the growth of those branches of knowledge upon which it has grown up as a sort of parasite.

—Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana

1. न्यायविद् धर्म्मतत्वज्ञः षड्ङ्गविदनुत्तमः।
ऐक्यसंयोगनानात्व समवायविशारदः।।3।।
वक्ता प्रगल्भो मेधावी स्मृतिमान्नयवित् कविः।
परापरविभागज्ञः प्रमाणकृतनिश्चयः।।4।।
पञ्चावयवयुक्तस्य वाक्यस्थ गुणदोषवित्।
उत्तरोत्तरवक्ता च वदतोऽपि बृहस्पतेः।।5।।
(*Mahābhārata*, *Sabhāparva*, adhyāya 5)

INTRODUCTION II

The present work entitled : *Nyāyadraśana* is a revised and enlarged edition of the book: *The Nyāyasūtras of Gotama* translated by Mahamahopadhyaya Satish Chandra Vidyabhushana who was the first Anglo-Sanskrit scholar translating the technical Sanskrit texts of Nyāya into English. We may find across many English translation of this text available at present, but the charm and flavour of the translation done by Vidyabhushana is quite unique and unparallel in its presentation and lucidity. As the book was not available for a long time, there was an urgent need of the same felt by the oriental and occidental scholars. That is why, an effort has been made to reproduce the same in a revised and enlarged form so that the interested scholars may have the taste of his versatility and dedication to the field of Philosophy in general and Indian Logic in particular. In Mahamahopadhyaya's edition there was no original text of Vatsyayana, but the literal English translation of the same was given along with its summary found at the end of the book. In this edition the original Sanskrit text of Vātsyāyana called *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* is given side by side so that the schloars and researchers on the field can follow the excellence of the translation and elucidation keeping texts side by side. The present author has been entrusted with this job part from making some comments and editorial notes on the texts and translation.

The *Nyāyasūtra* along with the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana is a very significant text, which should be read by each and every student of Philosophy. The following points may be highlighted in order to show the logical excellence of the text and its inevitability in understanding philosophy.

The *Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama is a primordial literature available in the Nyāya Philosophy. The specific characteristic of a system is known through its metaphysical or ontological presuppositions. The Advaita Vedānta is differentiated from the other systems by virtue of its acceptance of Brahman as the sole Reality. In the same way, the Sāṁkhya presupposes the existence of two realities-Prakṛti and Puruṣa, the

Buddhists admit the theory of momentariness, which gives rise to various other theories like *nairātmyvāda* (no-soul theory), *svalakṣaṇavāda* (the theory of unique character of an object), *apohavāda* etc. In the similar manner, the Nyāya is called a realistic school as it accepts sixteen categories or *padārthas* centering which their philosophy has been developed. The mention of the categories is found in the first *sūtra* of Gautama. To them category is of sixteen types like *pramāṇa, prameya, saṁśaya, vāda* etc. Logically the Naiyayikas are not in a position to say something, which does not come within the purview of the enumerated sixteen categories.

The Nyāya philosophy deals with the heightened interest of the external world and the assumption of numerous individual souls. The recognition of one individual soul leads an individual being to the world of deliverance (*apavarga*). To Nyāya, the knowledge of the sixteen categories was explained as a prerequisite for the *apavarga*. Among the sixteen categories *pramāṇa* occurs first in the series and *prameya* in the second (ie. knowable entity). In oerder to understand *prameya pramāṇa* has to be applied according to the principle-'*Mānādhīnā meyasiddhiḥ*' (ie., a knowable entity is to be known through the means of knowing valid cognition). Moreover, *pramāṇa* plays an important role in revealing some object and hence it occupies a prominent place in Philosophy. It is said in the beginning of the *Bhāṣya* that an object is taken to be really existent due to its capacity of having unfailing correspondence to the fact applying some *Pramāṇa* (*Pramāṇataḥ arthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam*)[1]. In other words, *Pramāṇa* has got some capacity of revealing an object, which is taken to be really existent through its unfailing correspondence to the fact. In short, without *Pramāna* an object cannot be known. If an object is not known at all, how can its unfailing correspondence to the fact (*pravṛttisāmarthya*) be known? Hence *Pramāṇa* has been admitted as a category. A question may be raised how the right cognition of *Pramāṇa (tattvjñāna)* is grasped. If the right cognition of *Pramāṇa* depends on another *Pramāṇa*, there would arise the defect of *Infinite Regress (anavasthā)*. It may be asked whether the right cognition of *Pramāṇa* is known by itself (*svataḥ*) or through another *Pramāṇa* (*pramāṇāntaragrāhya*). In the case of latter the defect of *Infinite Regress* would crop up. If former, the statement that *pramāṇa*, if known rightly, leads us to the attainment of highest good would become insignificant, as it is known intrinsically without depending on other factors. In order to avoid this we should know the real character of it, which is

called *tattvajñāna*. To know something as such ie., the positivity of a positive object and negativity of a negative object (*sataśca sadbhāvaḥ asataśca asadbhāvaḥ*) is called *tattva*.[2] If *pramāṇa* is known as such, it is called the right cognition of it as different from *pramāṇābhāsa (pseudo pramāṇa)*. The validity (*prāṇya*) of a *Pramāṇa* depends on its successful inclination, the form of which goes as follows : *Pramāṇaṁ arthavat pravṛttisāmarthyāt*. Hence the validity of *Pramāṇa* depends on another *Pramāṇa*, which leads to the fallacy of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). Moreover, the validity of *Pramāṇa* depends on inference, which may again depend on another inference for it validity, and ultimately it leads ot *infinitie regress (anavasthā)*.

In order to avoid these defects it can be said that the capacity of leading to the successful inclination serves two purposes-first it differentiates it from *pseudo-pramāṇa* and secondly it can substantiate its validity. Though there is a defect called *anyonyāśraya* (mutual dependence), it is of virtuous type (*phalamukha*) on account of the fact that it is inevitable to know *Pramāṇa* as such (*tattvajñāna*) leading to the attainment of liberation. When the validity is determined by an inference, it can never be doubted. For, it is found in the practical life that all person are performing their works after presuming the accuracy of time as per their wristwatches. Apart from this various types of work are going on smoothly depending on some mathematical calculation. There does not arise any question of doubt of their validity. Moreover, if there is any question of doubt the cause of it must be mentioned. To entertain doubt without investigating any root of the same is meaningless. In the case of reason of the previous inference there is not at all defect and hence the doubt of its validity cannot be generated. That is why, it is said by Vācaspati Mishra that as the inference mentioned above is intrinsically true, there is no question of the defect called *anavasthā ('anumānasya tu...........svataḥprāmāṇyaṁ' Tātparyatikā, 'svataḥprāmāṇyamiti nānavasthā' Tattvacintāmaṇi)*.[4]

If *pramāṇ* is substantiated as a category, other objects like *prameya* (knowlable entity), *pramātā* (knower) and *pramiti* (right cognition) are substantiated or become meaningful (*'arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātā prameyaṁ pramitirityarthavanti bhavanti'*)[5]. It is the main objective of Philosophy in general to discuss mainly either on *pramāṇa*, which is called *pramāṇaśāstra* (epistemology) or *prameyaśāstra* (metaphysics). Vātsyayana feels that *prameya* apart from *pramiti* and *pramātā* is always connect with the first category called *pramāṇa*. In this way he has highlighted the primacy of it. Even the

proper *lakavyavahāra* (day to day behaviour) is possible if there is a proper application of *pramāṇa*. If an object is rightly revealed through *pramāṇa*, the action like *pravṛtti* (inclination), *nivṛtti* (refraining from) and *upekṣā* (an indifferent attitude) are possible.[6]

The right cognition of the categories leads us to the attainment of mundane and transcendental wellbeing-*dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa niḥśreyasa*. The right cognition of the categories like *pramāṇa, vāda, Jalpa, vitaṇḍā, hetvābhāsa, chala, jāti, nighrahasthāna* etc. leads us to the mundane well being, because these are beneficial for defeating others and defending our own standpoint. If an individual is well conversant with the categories and their application, he can easily understand the points of defeat *(nigrahasthāna) chala* and *hetvābhāsa* in others argument, which can land him to the world of victory in the field of philosophical debate. In the same way, the right cognition of self, which is accepted as one of the *prameyas*, can conjoin us with the transcendental wellbeing *(adṛṣaniḥśreyasa)* like the attainment of liberation.[7] The true cognition of self can remove ignorance or wrong notion *(mithyājñāna)*, which again removes aversion and attachment (*rāgadveṣau*) caused by the wrong notion. If there is non-attachment, there cannot be inclination (*pravṛtti*) towards an object or work due to it. Due to the absence of inclination the merit or demerit cannot be generated. Owing to the lack of *dharma* and *adharma* there is no possibility of rebirth, which is meant for the enjoyment of the result of *karma* done by an individual being. The absence of birth leads to the absence of suffering, which is the state of liberation according to Nyāya, (*duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānamuttarottarāpaye tadanta-rāpāyādapavargaḥ' Nyāyasūtra*-½). In this way the right cognition of the *prameyas* can conjoin us with liberation,[8] which is described as unseen highest good or *adṛṣṭa niḥśreyasa*.

The Indian term for Philosophy is '*darśana*' (literally seeing) which means 'critical subsequent seeing' (*anvīkṣā*) an object already seen earlier but not a mere seeing, which is adopted in all the systems of Indian Philosophy in general and *Nyāyabhāṣya* in particular. Because it has been taken as a basic need for philosophizing. This critical observation or reflection is one of the general characteristic features of *darśana*, which is also a precondition of having proper vision. As Nyāya particularly deals with this phenomenon of 'subsequent seeing' (*anvīkṣā*), it is otherwise called *anvīkṣikī considering* this aspect in view.[9] If there is no scope for critical thinking or original thinking, it is not a proper system in the true sense of the term. For, to follow

something without proper reflections gives us a training to follow blindly what is in the tradition and hence there is no fresh air to receive a new thing. that is why; *anvīkṣikī* or critical thinking has occupied an important role in Indian philosophical systems. A critical thinking has occupied an important role in Indian philosophical systems. A critical thinking on the phenomenon of falling an apple downward from the tree gives rise to the discovery of Law of gravitation. In this way it can be said that in each and every original finding there is a role of such *anvīkṣā*. This phenomenon is also known as *manana* by the Advaitins. The *manana* is to be understood as *darśana* by secondary implication *(lakṣaṇā)*. The critical examiniation of the theory or statement already presented is called *manana*. According to Dharmarāja Adhvarindra, the phenomenon of *manana* is a kind of mental exercise, which when in respect of a particular meaning of a word there is doubt as to the conflict with other *pramāṇas*, causes knowledge in the form of *Tarka* which becomes promoter to remove doubt.[10] That is to say, a researcher tries to examine through his Intellect that which he has known from other sources. The method called *manana* is a stage when an individual applies some argument in favour of his own standpoint or in order to make his position more firm-footed by way of removing the doubt regarding the nature of an object.

The Naiyāyikas forward their argument in a very precise educative method of *uddeśa* (i.e. mere introduction of an object), *lakṣaṇa* (i.e. definition of the object) and *parikṣā* (i.e. critical examination of the same),[11] which makes the system more philosophically alive. There is a method for a scientific research, which consists of the three mentioned above. If a researcher wants to know something very systematically, it is our duty to provide him a rough idea about the object with mere introduction, which is called *uddeṣa*. But this is not all; we at the successive moment should give a definite description of the object, which is called *lakṣaṇa*. At the end it is essential to judge what is said earlier as definition and to see whether it is free from the defects of over-coverage and under-coverage. If one follows this methodology, it is the perfect way of knowing or clarifying a concept. That is why; it is said by Vātsyāyana that mere introduction of an object with the description of its name etc. its called *uddeśa* (*'tatra nāmadheyaśabdena padārthamātrasyābhidhānamuddeśaḥ'—Nyāya-bhāṣya*-½). To describe an uncommon characteristic of the intended objects, which can eliminate it from other objects (*'attvavyavacchedako dharmaḥ—Nyāyabhāṣya'*) is called *lakṣaṇa*. *Parīkṣā* is an ascertainment

of reality (*tattvanirṇaya*) with the help of certain arguments. When it is observed whether the introduced object is really known with the help of the definition or not, it is called *parīkṣā ('lakṣitasya yathālakṣ aṇamupapadyate na veti pramāṇairavadhāraṇaṁ parīkṣā'—Nyāya-bhāṣya-½)*. In the *bhāṣya* it is found that some topics occur many times in order to show honour to this methodology. They are mentioned in the first chapter just as introduction, which is followed by their definitions and critical reflections in the subsequent chapters. The methodology is so scientific and philosophical that it has been adopted by Hemachandra also, the famous Jaina logician, in his *Pramāṇamīmāṁsā*. to him any philosophical discussion should center around three things like *uddeśa* etc. (*'Trayi hi śāstrasya pravṛttiḥ.....'*). The definitions of *uddeśa* and *lakṣaṇa* are same as those of the Naiyāyikas. To them *Parīkṣā* is a method which examines a theory to know whether it is such or such not. *(lakṣitasya idamitthaṁ bhavatiti nyāyataḥ parīkṣ aṇaṁ parīkṣā).*[12]

In the *sūtra-'pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdaḥ pramāṇāni'* (1/3) it is said that *pramāṇa* is of four types like perception etc. In this connection a problem has been raised by Vātsyayana and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa that in this *sūtra* only classification of *pramāṇa* is given without giving its introduction or *uddeśa*. Without a general definition *(uddeśa)* the specific definition called *lakṣaṇa* cannot at all be understood. Hence one may raise the queston of procedural lapse for the part of Gautama. In response to this Vātsyāyana had given an interpretation of the *sūtra*, which justifies the so-called procedural lapse. In fact the word '*pramāṇāni*' inserted in the *sūtra*, gives the general definition of *pramāṇa* though it is primarily used to indicate its classification. There is a provision of taking general meaning of the term by virtue of the fact that it bears the *sūtra*-character, which has capability of generating more than one meaning *(sūtrañca vahvarthasūcanād bhavati)*. What is the general meaning of the term *pramāṇa*? That by which some thing is known is called *pramāṇa (pramīyaye aneneti pramāṇaṁ)*. The valid cognition, which is called *pramā* involves some operative process of its manifestation. In other words, there is an instrument of cognizing an object rightly. This instrument is called *pramāṇa*, which is described by Jayanta as *sādhyasādhana* i.e. an instrument of some thing, which is to be known. The object known is called *sādhya* and the means through which it is known is called *sādhana*. So *pramāṇa* is an instrument of knowing an object correctly. This general meaning available in the etymology of the term is hinted in the *sūtra*. By the

usage of the term *pramāṇa* only one time Gautama wanted to mean both the general meaning and its classification. *(edenanena sūtreṇa dvyañcāha mahāmuniḥ/ pramāṇeṣucātuhsaṁkhyaṁ tathā sāmānyalakṣ aṇaṁ).*[13]

While critically reviewing one may partly or wholly reject or reinterpret the earlier view of the opponents *(pūrvapakṣa)*. The whole system achieves a philosophical growth through the opponent-proponent-debate. If the earlier view of the opponent (*pūrvapakṣa*) is not tenable to a proponent, it is expressed as *tanmandaṁ* (i.e. the thesis achieves less merit). If it is considered as absurd, it is described as *tattucchaṁ* i.e. thesis is ignorable. In this way various commentarial literature called *bhāṣya, vārtika, ṭīkā* etc. develop to justify or reject the theory of the opponents and to substantiate a particular position. In a debate between an opponent and a proponent the determination of truth, which is technically called *vāda*, is the main objective of the Naiyāyikas leaving the question of victory aside. If the desire of victory prevails in debates, the determination of truth is bypassed, which is called *jalpa* and hence it is not taken as an ideal pattern of putting argument in a philosophical debate. If someone refutes the opponent's standpoint only without forwarding his own, it is called *vitaṇḍā*,[14] which is also not encouraged in the Nyāya logic as well as in any philosophical methodology. Hence each and every theory is called *vāda* like *nirvikalpavāda, iśvaravāda* etc.

Reductio-ad-absurdum methods, which is technically called *Tarka*, is adopted in Nyāya to prove the falsity of the opponent's thesis and to remove the doubt regarding the nature of an object in order to strengthen its arguments, which is very much important in philosophical methodology. If someone bears a doubt whether smoke and fire have an invariable relation or not, this doubt can be dispelled by demonstrating the *Tarka* in the following form: 'If smoke be deviated from fire, it would not have been caused by fire' (*dhūmo yadi vahnivyabhicārī syāttarhi vanhijanyo na syāt*). From this it is indirectly proved that as smoke is caused by fire, it will not be deviated from fire. Such a method is found in Symbolic Logic where the negation of the conclusion is deliberately drawn inference and proved as contradictory or absurd in a subsequent step, it will indirectly follow that the original conclusion i.e. p is true.

The Naiyayikas are very much cautious about the probable vitiation of their arguments by the fallacies like *vādhita* (contradiction),

asiddha (unfounded ness) etc and logical defects like *anyonyāśraya* (circularity), *gaurava* (technical heaviness) etc. All these are essential to convince a serious thinker. Though the Naiyayikas believe in the authority of the Vedas, they unlike Advaitins have given priority in common-sense-argument to prove th existence of the metaphysical entities like God etc and at the end qouted *Śruti* text, which is in consonance with their argument. These patterns of philosophical methodology have been adopted by the Naiyayikas to make their statements logically precise and reasonable to the scholars.

The Naiyāyika could say that doubt arises when there is a cognition touching both the alternatives (*ubhayakoṭikajñāna*). When an object is known as either as a man or a trunk of a tree, it is true that there is some lack of cognition. It can be interpreted that when there is cognition of a man, it is due to the lack of cognition of a trunk of a tree. When ther arises the cognition of a trunk of a tree, it is due to the lack of the cognition of a man. Whatever may be the case we must admit that there is certainly a cognition sometimes taking man as its content and sometimes taking a trunk of a tree as its content. An individual's mind wavers between two cognitions successively, but not simultaneously. ths is why; such wavering cognition arises from the mental state metaphorised as the movement of the cradle (*dolācala-cittavṛtti*). The cognition of a man may be caused by the absence of the cognition of a trunk of a tree or otherwise, but the peculiarities in a man is known in the successive moment, but not simultaneously as accepted by *Nāgārjuna* in his *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* (*Sūtra* No. XI, XII & XIII.) Herein lies the difference between two shcools—Bauddha and Nyāya.

When the determinants are not available in determining the nature of an object, doubt arises there. The absence of determining proof of an entity, which is the object of knowledge, is the cause of doubt. Morever, in Nyāya doubt (*saṁśaya*) is not always taken as a devil (*piśācinī*), because logical argument can alone be applied to the object in doubt has been accepted as one of the sixteen categories admitted by Nyāya, the right cognition of which leads us to the attainment of our desired ends-mundane and transcendental. Doubt plays a positive role in generating critical thinking of mankind after removing blind faith from them. In other words, doubt is the opener of the windows of our critical and open-minded thinking. Considering this aspect Gautama has enumerated it an one of the sixteen categories, the right cognition of which lead us to success (*Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1.). To Vātsyāyana doubt

has been given a due emphasis in Nyāya on account of the fact that logic can alone be applied to the object in doubt, but not to an object with is purely known or unknown (*Tatra nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte'rthe nyāyaḥ pravarttate. Kiṁ tarhi/ saṁśayite'rthe-Nyāyabhāṣya on sūtra no.* 1.1.1.). From this statement it is proved that Nāgārjuna's thesis that something is either known or unknown is wrong. If it is known, he says it is a kind of valid cognition. if it is unknown, it is to be taken as illusion. Vātsyāyana is of the opinion that this is the ideal case where we can have doubt. To him doubt is a kind of intellectual activity arising out of the confrontation by two different philosophical positions called *pakṣa* (thesis) and *pratipakṣa* (antithesis) at the same time.[15] To think an entity as both known and unknown does not lead us to admit its fictitious character, but is a kind of doubt. This view of the Naiyāyikas will find support in Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmatī* where he accepts the dubious character of an object as a criterion of an enquiry about it.[16] That is why; doubt is the initial requirement for knowing a theory.

We may recall udayana in this connection. To him if there is mistrust among the familymembers, social-beings etc, our empirical doubt will not be possible. If, on the other hand, there is no doubt, there does not arise any philosophical enquiry. (*Śaṁkācedanumāstyeva na cecchaṅkā tataṣtarāṁ/vyāghātavadhirāśaṅkā tarkaḥ saṁkāvadhir-mataḥ.//*)[17]. If there is doubt, there is inferential cognition or an inferential procedure is to be resorted to with a view to resolving doubt. If not, inference is established easily. Such doubt is permissible so long there does not arises self-contratiction (*vyāghāta*). Sometime the method of *Tarka (reductio-ad-adsurdum)* is taken into account. From this it is proved that doubt has got a positive role in philosophical methodology if it is taken as a category.

Vātsyāyana haṣ beautifully elucidated the Bouddha-Nyāya controversy regarding the application of *pramāṇa* to know an object. The Naiyāyikas are of the view that an objhect can be known through the application of more than one *pramāṇa*. Let us understand this with the help of an example. An individual can have the knowledge of fire from a person who has seen fire there. If he is still dissatisfied, he can proceed to the hill and perceive fire there. This phenomenon is called *pramāṇasamplava* (capability of applying many *pramāṇas* to apprehend an object). To the Buddhists a particular *pramāṇa* can be applied to know an object of a particular nature. What *pramāṇa* is applicable to a particular object depends on the nature of the object. Perception can

alone be applicable to an object having *svalakṣaṇa* (unique particular) character remaining for a moment only. Inference cannot be applicable there, as it cannot reveal such object. An object associated with description or mental ascription called *kalpanā* can alone be revealed by inference, but not perception. Such a theory is called *pramāṇavyavasthā* (a particular *pramāṇa* is fixed with certain object).[18]

In fact this text can be taken as a small encyclopaedia where many theories admitted by various philosophical schools have put forth and critically adjudged. One can have the taste or anlyticity and logical excellence of the text, which is essential for building a proper ground of philosolphy and enhancing the power of argumentation. For these reasons the translation and elucidation in English language was higly needed by most of the scholars, who do not know much Sanskrit.

References

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2. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
3. 'Pramāṇa-prameya-saṁśaya-prayojana.....nigrahasthānānāṁ tattvajñānān-niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ'—*Nyāyasūtra* 1/1.
4. *Nyāyadarśana*, Vol. 1, Edited by Phanibhushan Tarkavagisha, p. 5, Foot note, W.B.S.B.B. 1989. (Henceforth, ND).
5. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
6. 'Pramāṇena khalvayaṁ jñātā'rthamupalabhya tamarthamabhīpsati jihāsati vā.' *Ibid.*, p. 1.
7. N.D., Vol. 1, p. 65.
8. 'Yadā tu tattvajñānānmithyājñānamapaiti, tadā mithyājñānāpāye dosā apayanti, doṣāpāye pravṛttirapaita, pravṛttypāye janmāpaiti, janmāpāye duhkhampaiti, duhkhāpāye cātyantiko' pavargo niḥśreyasamiti'. *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya on sūtra* 1.1.2.
9. "Pratyakṣāgamabhyāmikṣītasyānvīkṣaṇamanvīksā" *Vātsyāyanabhāsya* on sūtra 1.1.1.
10. "Mananaṁ nāma sabdāvadhārite'rthe mānāntaravirodhaśaṁkāyāṁ" tannirākranānukūlatarkātmakajñānajanako mānasavypāraḥ" —*Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Viṣayapariccheda).
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13. N.D.pp. 24-25.
14. 'Pramāṇāntarakasādhanopolambhaḥ siddhāntaviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ' 'Yathoktopapannaśchalajātinigrahasthānasādhanopalambho jalpaḥ' 'Sa pratipattisthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā' *Nyāyasūtra*-1.2.1-3.
15. 'Vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyāmarthāvadhāraṇaṁ nirṇayaḥ' *Nyāyasūtra*-1.1.41.
16. *Bhāmatī* on Adhyāsabhābhāsya (first two lines).
17. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*-3/7.
18. "Jijñāsitatamarthamāptopadeśāt pratipadyamāno liṅgadarśanenāpi bubhutsate, liṅgadarśanānumitañca pratykṣato didṛkṣate, pratyaksato upalabdhe'rthe jijñāsā nivarttate. Pūrvoktamudāharaṇamagniritiḥ. Pramātuḥ pramātavye'rthe pramāṇaṁ saṁkaro' bhisamplavaḥ, asaṁkaro vyavatheti' *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* on sūtra-1.1.3.

THE NYĀYADARŚANA

न्यायदर्शनम्

Book I, Chapter I

प्रमाण प्रमेय संशय प्रयोजन दृष्टान्त सिद्धान्तावयव तर्क निर्णय वाद जल्प वितण्डा हेत्वाभास च्छल जाति निग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञाना-न्निश्श्रेयसाधिगमः॥ 1॥

निर्देशे यथावचनं विग्रहः, चार्थे द्वन्द्वसमासः, प्रमाणादीनां तत्त्वमिति शैषिकी षष्ठी, तत्त्वस्य ज्ञानं निःश्रेयसस्याधिगम इति कर्मणि षष्ठ्यौ, ते एतावन्तो विद्यमानार्थाः, एषामविपरीतज्ञानार्थमिहोपदेशः, सोयमनवयवेन तन्त्रार्थ उद्दिष्टो वेदितव्यः। आत्मादेः खलु प्रमेयस्य तत्त्वज्ञानाद् निःश्रेयसाधिगमः तच्चैतद् उत्तरसूत्रेणाऽनूद्यते इति। हेयं तस्य निर्वर्तकं हानमात्यन्तिकं तस्योपायोऽधिगन्तव्य इत्येतानि चत्वार्यऽर्थपदानि सम्यग् बुद्ध्वा निःश्रेयसमधिगच्छति।

तत्र संशयादीनां पृथग्वचनमनर्थकम्—संशयादयो यथासंभवं प्रमाणेषु प्रमेयेषु चान्तर्भवन्तो न व्यतिरिच्यन्ते इति। सत्यमेतत्, इमास्तु चतस्रो विद्याः पृथक्प्रस्थानाः प्राणभृतामनुग्रहायोपदिश्यन्ते यासां चतुर्थीयमाऽऽन्वीथिकी न्यायविद्यातस्या पृथक्प्रस्थानाः संशयादयः पदार्थाः तेषां पृथग्वचनमन्तरेणाऽध्यात्मविद्यामात्रमियं स्याद् यथोपनिषदः तस्मात् संशयादिभिः पदार्थैः पृथक् प्रस्थाप्यते।

तत्र नाऽनुपलब्धे न निर्णातेऽर्थे न्यायः प्रवर्तते। किं तर्हि? संशयितेऽर्थे, यथोक्तम्—"विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणं निर्णयः 1-1-41" इति विमर्शः=संशयः पक्षप्रतिपक्षौ=न्यायप्रवृत्तिः अर्थावधारणम्=निर्णयः=तत्त्वज्ञानमिति। स चायम् 'किं स्वित्' इति वस्तुविमर्षमात्रमनवधारणं ज्ञानं संशयः प्रमेयेऽन्तर्भवन् एवमर्थं पृथगुच्यते।

अथ प्रयोजनम्—येन प्रयुक्तः प्रवर्तते तत् प्रयोजनम्, यमर्थमभीप्सन् जिहासन् वा कर्मारभते, तेनानेन सर्वे प्राणिनः सर्वाणि कर्माणि सर्वाश्च विद्या व्याप्ताः तदाश्रयश्च न्यायः प्रवर्तते। कः पुनरयं न्यायः? प्रमाणैरर्थपरीक्षणं न्यायः। प्रत्यक्षागमाश्रितम् अनुमानं साऽन्वीक्षा=प्रत्यक्षागमाभ्यामीक्षितस्यान्वीक्षणमन्वीक्षा तया प्रवर्तते इत्यान्वीक्षिकी न्यायविद्या=न्यायशास्त्रम्। यत् पुनरनुमानं प्रत्यक्षागमविरुद्धं न्यायाभासः स इति।

तत्र वादजल्पौ सप्रयोजनौ वितण्डा तु परीक्ष्यते–वितण्डया प्रवर्तमानो वैतण्डिक: स प्रयोजनमनुयुक्तो यदि प्रतिपद्यते? सोऽस्य पक्ष:=सोऽस्य सिद्धान्त इति वैतण्डिकत्वं जहाति, अथ न प्रतिपद्यते? नायं लौकिको न परिक्षक इत्यापद्यते, अथापि परपक्षप्रतिषेधज्ञापनं प्रयोजनं ब्रवीति? एतदपि तादृगेवं यो ज्ञापयति यो जानाति येन ज्ञाप्यते एतच्च प्रतिपद्यते यदि? तदा वैतण्डिकत्वं जहाति, अथ न प्रतिपद्यते? 'परपक्षप्रतिषेधज्ञापनं प्रयोजनम्' इत्येतदस्य वाक्यमनर्थकं भवति। वाक्यसमूहश्च स्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा तस्य यद्यभिधेयं प्रतिपद्यते? सोऽस्य पक्ष: स्थापनीयो भवति, अथ न प्रतिपद्यते? प्रलापमात्रमनर्थकं भवति वितण्डात्वं निवर्तते इति।

अथ दृष्टान्त: प्रत्यक्षविषयोऽर्थ:=यत्र लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां दर्शनं न व्याहन्यते, स च प्रमेयम् तस्य पृथग् वचनं च तदाश्रयावनुमानागमौ=तस्मिन् सति स्यातामनुमानागमौ असति च न स्याताम् तदाश्रया च न्यायप्रवृत्ति:। दृष्टान्तविरोधन च परपक्षप्रतिषेधो वचनीयो भवति, दृष्टान्तसमाधिना च स्वपक्ष: साधनीयो भवति। नास्तिकश्च दृष्टान्तमभ्युपगच्छन् नास्तिकत्वं जहाति अनभ्युपगच्छन् किंसाधन: परमुपालभेत? निरुक्तेन च दृष्टान्तेन शक्यमभिधातुम्। "साध्यसाधर्म्यात् तद्धर्मभावी दृष्टान्त:=उदाहरणम् 1-1-36", "तद्विपर्ययाद् विपरीतम् 1-1-37" इति!

'अस्त्ययम्' इत्यनुज्ञायमानोऽर्थ: सिद्धान्त:, स च प्रमेयं तस्य पृथग् वचनं सत्सु सिद्धान्तभेदेषु वादजल्पवितण्डा: प्रवर्तन्ते नाऽतोन्यथेति।

साधनीयार्थस्य यावति शब्दसमूहे सिद्धि: परिसमाप्यते तस्य पञ्चाऽवयवा: प्रतिज्ञादय: समूहमपेक्ष्य अवयवा उच्यन्ते, तेषु प्रमाणसमवाय आगम: प्रतिज्ञा, हेतुरनुमानम्, उदाहरणं प्रत्यक्षम्, उपनय उपमानम्, सर्वेषामेकार्थसमवाये सामर्थ्यप्रदर्शनं निगमनमिति, सोयं परमो न्याय इति, एतेन वादजल्पवितण्डा: प्रवर्तन्ते नातोऽन्यथेति, तदाश्रया च तत्त्वव्यवस्था, ते चैते अवयवा: शब्दविशेषा: सन्त: प्रमेयेऽन्तर्भूता एवमर्थं पृथगुच्यन्ते इति।

तर्को न प्रमाणसंगृहीतो न प्रमाणान्तरं प्रमाणानामनुग्राहकस्तत्त्वज्ञानाय कल्पते, तस्योदाहरणम्–किमिदं जन्म कृतकेन हेतूना निर्वर्त्यते? आहोस्विदऽकृतकेन? अथाऽऽकस्मिकम्? इति, एवमविज्ञातेऽर्थे कारणोपपत्त्या ऊह: प्रवर्तते–यदि कृतकेन हेतुना निर्वर्त्यते? ततो हेतूच्छेदादुपपन्नोयं जन्मोच्छेद:, अथाऽकृतकेन हेतुना? ततो हेतूच्छेदस्याऽशंक्यत्वादनुपपन्नो जन्मोच्छेद:, अथाऽऽकस्मिकम्? ततोऽकस्माद् निर्वर्त्यमानं न पुनर्निवर्त्स्यतीति निवृत्तिकारणं नोपपद्यते तेन जन्मानुच्छेद इति। एतस्मिन् तर्कविषये कर्मनिमित्तं जन्मेति प्रमाणानि प्रवर्तमानानि तर्केणानुगृह्यन्ते, तत्त्वज्ञानविषयस्य विभागात् तत्त्वज्ञानाय कल्पते तर्क इति। सोयमित्थम्भूतस्तर्क: प्रमाणसहितो वादे साधनाय उपालम्भाय चार्थस्य भवतीत्येवमर्थं पृथगुच्यते प्रमेयान्तर्भूतोऽपीति।

निर्णय:=तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रमाणानां फलं तदवसानो वादस्तस्य पालनार्थं जल्पवितण्डे। तावेतौ तर्कनिर्णयौ लोकयात्रां वहत इति। सोयं निर्णय: प्रमेयान्तर्भूत एवमर्थं पृथगुद्दिष्ट इति।

वाद: खलु नानाप्रवक्तृक: प्रत्यधिकरणसाधनोऽन्यतराधिकरणनिर्णयावसानो वाक्यसमूह: पृथगुद्दिष्ट उपलक्षणार्थम्–उपलक्षितेन व्यवहारस्तत्त्वज्ञानाय भवतीति। तद्विशेषौ जल्पवितण्डे तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थमित्युक्तम्।

निग्रहस्थानेभ्य: पृथगुद्दिष्टा हेत्वाभासा वादे चोदनीया भविष्यन्तीति, जल्पवितण्डयोस्तु निग्रहस्थानानीति। छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां पृथगुपदेश उपलक्षणार्थ इति, उपलक्षितानां स्ववाक्यपरिवर्जनं छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां परवाक्ये च पर्यनुयोग:। जातेश्च परेण प्रयुज्यमानाया: सुलभ: समाधि: स्वयं च सुकर: प्रयोग इति।

सेयमान्वीक्षिकी प्रमाणादिभि: पदार्थैर्विभज्यमाना–

प्रदीप: सर्वविद्यानामुपाय: सर्वकर्मणाम्।
आश्रय: सर्वधर्माणां विद्योद्देशे प्रकीर्तिता॥

तदिदं तत्त्वज्ञानं नि:श्रेयसाधिगमार्थं यथाविद्यं वेदितव्यम्, इह त्वऽध्यात्मविद्याया-मात्मादितत्त्वज्ञानम्। नि:श्रेयसाधिगम:=अपवर्गप्राप्ति:। तत् खलु नि:श्रेयसं किं तत्त्वज्ञानान्तरमेव भवति? नेत्युच्यते, किं तर्हि? तत्त्वज्ञानात्॥1॥

प्रमाण pramāṇa, proof; प्रमेय prameya, provable, knowable, object of proof; संशय saṁśaya, doubt, uncertainty; प्रयोजन Prayojana, aim, purpose; दृष्टान्त dṛṣṭānta, example, familiar instance; सिद्धान्त siddhānta, conclusion; अवयव avayava, members of the syllogism; तर्क tarka, hypothetical reasoning confutation; निर्णय nirṇaya, ascertainment; वाद vāda, discussion; जल्प jalpa, sophistry; वितण्डा vitaṇḍā cavil, wrangling; हेत्वाभास hetvābhāsa, pseudo-mark, fallacy; छल chhala, quibbling ; जाति jāti, futility; निग्रहस्थान nigraha-sthāna, occasion for rebuke, opponnt's errors; तत्त्वज्ञानात् Tattvajñānāy, from knowledge of the true nature; नि:श्श्रेयसाधिगम: niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ, attainment of the supreme good.

1. Supreme felicity is attained by the knowledge about the true nature of the sixteen categories, *viz.*, means of right knowledge (pramāṇa), Object of right knowledge (premeya), doubt (saṁśaya), purpose (prayojana), familiar instance (dṛṣtānta), established tenet (sidhānta, members (avayava), confutation (tarka[1]), ascertainment (nirṇaya), discussion (vāda), wrangling (jalpa), cavil (vitaṇḍa), fallacy (hetvā-

1. The English equivalent for "tarka" si variously given as "conutation," "argumentation," "reductio ad absurdum," "hypothetical reasoning," etc.

bhāsa), quibble (chhala), futility (jāti), and occasion for rebuke (nigrahasthāna).—1.

Knowledge about the true nature of the sixteen categories[1] means true knowledge by the "enunciation," "definition" and "critical examination" of the categories. Book I (of the Nyāya Sūtra) treats of "enunciation," and "definition," while the remainning four Books are reserved for "critical examination." The attainment of supreme felicity is preceded by the knowledge of four things *viz.*, (1) that which is fit to be abandoned *viz.*, (pain), (2) that which produces what is fit to be abandoned (*viz.*, misapprehension, etc.), (3) complete destruction of what is fit to be abandoned and (4) the means of destroying what is fit to be abandoned (*viz.*, true knowledge[2]).

दुःख जन्म प्रवृति दोष मिथ्याज्ञानाना मुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरा-पायादपवर्गः॥ 2॥

तत्रात्माद्यपवर्गपर्यन्तं प्रमेये मिथ्याज्ञानमनेकप्रकारं प्रवर्तते, आत्मनि तावत् 'नास्ति' इति, अनात्मनि 'आत्मा' इति, दुःखे सुखमिति, अनित्ये नित्यमिति, अत्राणे त्राणमिति, सभये निर्भयमिति, जुगुप्सितेऽभिमतमिति, हातव्येऽप्रतिहातव्यमिति, प्रवृत्तौ नास्ति कर्म नास्ति कर्मफलमिति, दोषेषु नायं दोषनिमित्तः संसार इति, प्रेत्यभावे नास्ति जन्तुर्जीवो वा सत्त्व आत्मा वा यः प्रेयात् प्रेत्य च भवेदिति, अनिमित्तं जन्माऽनिमित्तो जन्मोपरम इति, आदिमान् प्रेत्यभावोऽनन्तश्चेति, नैमित्तिकः सन्न कर्मनिमित्तः प्रेत्यभाव इति, देहेन्द्रियबुद्धि-वेदनासन्तानोच्छेदप्रतिसंधानाभ्यां निरात्मकः प्रेत्यभाव इति, अपवर्गे भीष्मः खल्वयं सर्वकार्योऽपरमः सर्वविप्रयोगेऽपगर्वे बहु भद्रकं लुप्यते इति कथं बुद्धिमान सर्वसुखोच्छेदम-ऽचैतन्यममुमऽपवर्गं रोचयेदिति, एतस्मान्मिथ्याज्ञानादनुकूलेषु रागः प्रतिकूलेषु द्वेषः, रागद्वेषाधिकाराच्चाऽसत्येर्षामायालोभादयो दोषा भवन्ति।

दोषैः प्रयुक्तः–शरीरेण प्रवर्तमानो हिंसास्तेयप्रतिषिद्धमैथुनान्याचरति, वाचाऽनृतपरुषसूचनाऽसंबद्धानि, मनसा परद्रोहं परद्रव्याभीप्सां नास्तिक्यं चेति, सेयं पापात्मिका प्रवृत्तिरधर्माय। अथ शुभा–शरीरेण दानं परित्राणं परिचरणं चेति, वाचा सत्यं हितं प्रियं स्वाध्यायं चेति, मनसा दयामस्पृहां श्रद्धां चेति, सेयं धर्माय।

1. Vātsyāyana observes :—
   त्रिविधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः। उद्देशो परीक्षा चेति।
   (*Nyāyadarśana*, p. 9, Bibliotheca Indica Series)
2. हेयं तस्य निवर्त्तकं हानमात्यन्तिकं तस्योपायोधिगन्तव्य इत्येतानि चत्वारि अर्थपदानि सम्यक् बुद्ध्वा निःश्रेयसमधिगच्छति।
   (*Nyāyadarśana*, p. 2)

अत्र प्रवृत्तिसाधनौ धर्माधर्मौ प्रवृत्तिशब्देनोक्तौ यथा–अन्नसाधनाः प्राणाः 'अन्नं वै प्राणिनः प्राणाः' इति, सेयं प्रवृतिः कुत्सितस्याऽभिपूजितस्य च जन्मनः कारणम्।

जन्म पुनः शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धीनां निकायविशिष्टः प्रादुर्भावः तस्मिन् सति दुःखम्, तत् पुनः प्रतिकूलवेदनीयं बाधना पीडा ताप इति।

त इमे मिथ्याज्ञानादयो दुःखान्ता धर्मा अविच्छेदेनैव प्रवर्तमानाः संसार इति। यदा तु तत्त्वज्ञानाद् मिथ्याज्ञानमपैति तदा मिथ्याज्ञानाापाये दोषा अपयन्ति, दोषापाये प्रवृत्तिरपैति, प्रवृत्त्यपाये जन्माऽपैति, जन्मापाये दुःखमपैति, दुःखापाये चाऽऽत्यन्तिकोऽपवर्गो निश्रेयसमिति।

तत्त्वज्ञानं तु खलु मिथ्याज्ञानविपर्ययेण व्याख्यातम्–आत्मनि तावदस्तमीति, अनात्मन्यऽनात्मेति, एवं दुःखेऽनित्येऽत्राणे सभये जुगुप्सिते हातव्ये च यथाविषयं वेदितव्यम्। प्रवृत्तौ–अस्ति कर्म अस्ति कर्मफलमिति, दोषेषु–दोषनिमित्तोयं संसार इति, प्रेत्यभावे खल्वस्ति जन्तुर्जीवः सत्त्व आत्मा वा यः प्रेत्य भवेदिति, निमित्तवज्जन्म निमित्तवान् जन्मोपरम इति, अनादिः प्रेत्यभावोऽपवर्गान्त इति, नैमित्तिकः सन् प्रेत्यभावः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त इति, सात्मकः सन् देहेन्द्रियबुद्धिवेदनासंतानोच्छेदप्रतिसंधानाभ्यां प्रवर्तते इति, अपवर्गे–शान्तः खल्वयं सर्वविप्रयोगः=सर्वोपरमोऽपवर्गः बहु च कृच्छ्रं घोरं पापकं लुप्यते इति, कथं बुद्धिमान् सर्वदुःखोच्छेदं सर्वदुःखाऽसंविदमपवर्गं न रोचयेदिति, तद् यथा मधुविषसंपृक्तान्न-मनादेयमिति एवं सुखं दुःखानुषक्तमनादेयमिति।।2।।

दुःख duḥkha, pain; जन्म janma, birth; प्रवृत्ति pravṛtti, activity; दोष doṣa, fault; मिथ्याज्ञान mithyā-jñāna, false knowledge; उत्तरोत्तरापाये uttarauttara-apāye, on the disappearance of one after another in the reverse order; तदनन्तरापायात् tat-anantara apāyāt, owing to the absence of each successive one; अपवर्गः apavargaḥ, final release, attainment of the end.

2. Pain, birth, activity, faults and misapprehension—on the successive annihilation of these in the reverse order, there follows **release.**—2.

Misapprehension, faults, activity, birth and pain—these in their uninterrupted course constitute the "world." Release, which consists in the soul's getting rid of the world, is the condition of supreme felicity marked by perfect tranquillity and not tainted by any defilement. A person, by the true knowledge of the sixteen categories, is able to remove his misapprehensions. When this is done, his faults, *viz.*, affection, aversion and stupidity, disappear. He is then no longer subject to any activity and is consequently freed from transmigration and pains. This is the way in which his release is effected and supreme felicity secured.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 1: Subject-matter, purpose and relation: Sūtras 1-2.

Pramāṇa (means of proof) is connected with Artha (Object), because the success of activity (pravṛtti) depends on the establishment if the Artha by means of Pramāṇa. Activity consists in the effort to acquire or to avoid an Artha after its cognition by means of Pramāṇa. Artha is pleasure, cause of pleasure, pain, cause of pain. The knower (pramātā), the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), the knowlable (prameya) and knowledge (pramiti)—these four terms comprehend artha-Tattva, the truth about the Object. By Tattva (reality) is meant, in the case of an existent thing, the being existent, and, in the case of a non-existent thing, the being non-existent. In other words, an existent something which always appears as existent and in a particular form and is never known in any other form, is called a reality. Similarly in the case of a non-existent thing. But how can a thing which does not exist be known? The pramāṇa which reveals an existent thing, reveals a non-existent thing as well. Absence of cognition, while the pramāṇas are operative, is the test of non-existence.

The Nyāya-Sūtras groups existent things under sixteen classes (I.i.1). They constitute its subject-matter : Its purpose is to teach how to know them in their true character. Among these sixteen classes it is the knowledge of the reality of the soul and other knowables (I.i.9) which is the cause of the attainment of the supreme good (niḥśreyasa). One attains the supreme good by thoroughly realising the fore subjects established in the Nyāya-Sūtras, namely the thing to be avoided (*i.e*, pain), its causes (*i.e.*, desire an ignorance), absolute avoidance, and the means of such aviodance (*i.e.*, true knowledge) which is to be secured.

It is true that Pramāṇa and prameya comprise *all* objects. Doubt and the rest (I.i.1) are included in them. These have been separately mentioned to show that they have received special treatment in the Nyāya-Sūtras. Four Sciences (Vidyā) have been propounded for the benefit of mankind: Vārttā, vocation, the science of agriculture, trade, commerce, etc., which produces wealth (artha), supplies the physical needs of man; Daṇḍanīti, the rule of the rod, polity, controls his passions, desires and emotions and enables him to enjoy the amenities (kāma) of social life; Trayī, the three Vedas (Ṛk, Yajus and Sāma), which deals with the sacrifice of Agnihotra, etc., enriches his religious experience (dharma); and Ānvīkṣikī the science of reflection, critique, which deals

with the soul, etc., ministers to his spiritual needs and helps him to attain Release (mokṣa). Nyāya-vidyā is this fourth science of Ānvīkṣikī. If the Nyāya did not treat of doubt and the rest as its special subjects, it would not be distinguished from a pure science of the self like the Upaniṣads.

Nyāya (reasoning) has no scope where the object either is not perceived or is already ascertained, but only where it is doubted. As has been said, "Ascertainment is the determination of the object by means of opposite views after first impression" (I.i.41). The order of sequence is : first impression, dout, opposite views, application of Nyāya (reasoning), determination of the object, ascertainment, knowledge of reality. On this account, Saṃśaya (Doubt) in the form of "what this may be," which is indetermminate cognition consisting of the mere first impression of an entity, is separately mentioned, though it is included in the class of prameya (knowlable.)

Prayojana (Purpose) is that by which one is prompted to act. It is an object which one desires to secure or desires to reject. Purpose pervades all living beings, all acts and all systems of knowledge. For its promotion does Nyāya proceed.

Nyāya is the investigation of objects by the application of the processes of proposition, etc. (I. i. 32) which ae the Pramāṇas (means of knowledge such as Perception, etc. Inference based on perception and revelation is called Anvīkṣā. re-view, that is, review of what has been viewed by perception and revelation. The system of knowledge which proceeds by this method, is Ānvīkṣikī, Nyāya-vidyā, Nyāya-śāstra. Inference which is contradicted by perception and revelation, is pseudo-nyāya, false reasoning.

Vāda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā are the three forms of discourse or controversy (Kathā). Vāda and Jalpa have definite ends in yiew; Vitaṇḍā has not. Vāda (assertion or discussion has the ascertainment of the truth as its object. In Jalpa (sophistry) the opponent only seeks personal victory, Vitaṇḍā (cavil) is merely destructive criticism. If it advances a proposition of its own, it ceases to be itself; if it does not, it becomes a meaningless jargon.

Dṛṣṭānta (Example) is an object of perception in respect of which the observation of common people and of experts is unobstructed. It is

a Prameya. It has been separately mentioned on account of its importance. Both inference and revelation rest upon it : without it neither inference nor revelation would be possible. The application of Nyāya depends upon it. The position aken up by an opponent is assailed on the ground of its contradiction to the Example; by agreement with it one's own position is established. The Nihilist (nāstika) abandons his nihilism if he admits an Example. If he does not admit one he robs himself of the weapon with which to strike down the opponent. It makes possible to define the Udāharaṇa (instance), the third member of a Nyāya or syllogism (I. i. 36, 37).

When an object is at last known in the form "Such and such exists," it is called a Siddhānta, an established tenet, a conclusion. It is also a Prameya. It has been separately mentioned because Vāda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā find scope only where there exists a diversity of siddhāntas or principles of discourse, and not otherwise.

Avayavas (Members), that is, the five beginning with Pratijñā (Proppsition) (I. i. 32), are so called with reference to the concatenation of words considered as a whole, which completes the estalishment of the object to be established. In them combine all the Pramāṇa : Pratijñā (Proposition) (is the enunciation for demonstration to another of the object obtained form) Āgama (revelation, Testimony); Hetu (Reason or Mark) is (the vehicle of) Anumāna (Inference); Udāharaṇa (Instance) is (an object of) Patyakṣa (Perecption); Upanayana (Application) is Upamāna (Comparison); Nigamana (Conclusion) shows the convergence of all towards the same object. Such is the Nyāya *par excellence.* Vāda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā proceed by means of it. The ascertainment of the specific character of a reality depends upon it. For this reason, the members have been separately mentioned, though, as forms of Sounds, they are included in the general class of the Premeya.

Tarka (Hypothesis) is neither included in the Pramāṇas not is it an additional Pramāṇa, but is subservient to the Pramāṇas, and as such conduces to tattva-jñāna, knowledge of reality. For instance : Is birth the result of past acts or is it the result of causes other than past acts? The object being thus unknown, there follows rational doubt or cojecture : if birth is the result of acts, then termination of birth is poss-ible through the termination of the cause; but if it is the result of causes other than acts, then the termination of the cause being beyond the power of man, the termination of birth is also impossible. Or, if birth is accidental,

then as it happens by accident, it will happen again; the cause of cessation therefore cannot be expected; hence, the termination of birth is not possible. (Tarka subseres the Pramāṇas which proceed to establish one out of the alternative suppositions, namely that birth is due to action. It conduces to tattva-jñāna, knowledge of reality, through an analysis of the subject-matter of tattva-jñāna. Tarka which is of such a character, in association with the pramāṇas, helps in the establishment as well as in the elimination of the object. For this reason it has been separately mentioned, though it is included in the Prameya.

Nirṇaya (Ascertainment) is tattva-jñāna, knowledge if truth. It is the result of the Pramāṇas. Vāda (discussion) ends with it. For its maintenance are Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā. Tarka (hypothesis) and Nirṇaya (ascertainment) help carry on the afairs of the world. For this reason Nirṇaya though included in the Prameya, has been separately mentioned.

Vāda is discussion in which different speakers take part, each seeking to make good his own hypothesis, and which ends with establishment emphasise its special feature. By the use of it as so defined tattva-jñāna, knowledge of truth, is attained.

Jalpa (sophistry) and Vitaṇḍā (cavil) ae varieties of Vāda, and are employed tokeep up the effort in the pursuit of truth.

Hetvābhāsas (Fallacies of Reason); have been mentioned separately from Nigrahasthānas (Occasions for Rebuke,) bucause they furnish ground of attack in Vāda, while Nigrahasthānas do so in Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā.

Chhala (Quibble), Jāti (Futility) and Nigrahasthānas have distinctions of their own and are therefore separately mentioned.

Thus is Ānvīkṣikī divided by the topic of the Pramāṇas, etc. It is the light of all sciences, the way of all actions, the foundation of all pious acts. It is this which has been recited among the four Sciences.

And the tattva-jñāna, knowledge of truth, produced by Ānvīkṣikī for the realisation of the supreme good, should be understood according to the scope of each science. In the presente Science of the Soul it mean as knowledge of the truth about the soul, etc., and the realisation of the supreme good means the attainment of Release.

The supreme good does not arise immediately after the knowledge of the truth about the soul, etc. False knowledge in many forms exists in regard to the prameyas form the soul to relese (I. i. 9). *E.g.* the soul does not exist; the not-soul is looked upon as the soul, pain as pleasure,

the non-eternal as the eternal, non-release as release, the cause of fear as not the cause of fear, the ugly as the pleasant, what is fit to be avoided as not so; there is no karma (action) nor the fruit of karma; saṁsāra (stream of births and deaths) is not due to doṣa or faults; there is no animal or embodied soul or entity or soul which is to depart and, arter departing, to come back; birth has no reason behind it, therefore cessation of births in future comes about by itself, hence existence after departing from life has a begining but no end; it has a cause, but karma is its cause; re-birth does not requir a soul, but is brought about by the disjunction and conjunction of the body, the senses and the stream of ideas and sensations; in release we fear there is cessation of all action, in release which means separation from everything much that is good is lost, hence how can an intelligent man like such release which is unconsciousness, the cessation of all experiene of pleasure?

Form such false knowledge arise attraction for things agreeable and avertion to things disagreeable. Under the influence of attraction and aversion spring up untruthfulness, envy, delusion or attachment, greed, and other faults. The faults incite to acts vice with the body, speech and mind. Vices produce adharma, demerit. Virtues produce dharma, merit. In the text (I. i.2) pravṛtti, activity, has the sense of its products, merit and demrit. It is the cause of good or evil birth.

Birth is the appearance of the body, the senses and the intellect, or cognition (buddhi) as an aggregate. It is the condition of Pain which is known as disagreeable feeling, hindrance, suffering, burning.

These conditions, namely false knowledge, falts, activity, birth and pain, ever following wothout interruption, constitute saṃsāra or the wheel of life. Knowledge of truth removes false knowledge. On the removal of false knowledge faults disappear. On the disappearance of faults activity ceases. On the cessation of activity birth does not take place. In the absence of birth there is no pain. In the absence of pain absolute success, *i.e.* release, which is the supreme good, is attained.

Knowledge of trouth is the opposite of the false notions mentioned above. And therefore, just as food mixed with honey and poison is unacceptable so is also pleasure tainted with pain.

The method of the Nyāya-Sūtras is threefold : enumeration, definition and examination. First is given the division of the subject enumerated, and then the definiton of each division. Next is given the subdivison of the subject enumerated and defined.

The subdivision of Pramāṇa are Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāna (inference), Upamāna (comparison) and Śabdha (word).

Pratyakṣa is the vṛtti (modification) of each sense according to each object appropriate to it. Vṛtti is proximity or knowledge. Whenever there proximity there is knowledge of reality. The consequence of knowledge is the idea of avoidance or acqusition or indifference.

Anumāna is the knowledge of the object after the observation of the previously known mark.

Upamāna is the knowledge of an object by means of its resemblance to known object.

Śabda is that by which an object is designated, *i.e.*, made known as such and such.

The four pramāṇas sometimes operate conjointly and sometimes individually according to the nature of the prameya. Thus, the existence of the soul is known form testimony by inference (I. i. 10), and by perception through a particular conjunction of the internal organ with the soul brought about by the power of meditation of a Yogī. In the case of heaven there can be neither the observation of mark nor perception. When the rumbling of a cloud is heard, the cloud is not an object of perception or of testimony, but of inference from the sound. In the case of one's own hand there is neither inference nor testimoney

Pramiti, knowlede, which is thus the result of the pramāṇas, ultimately rests on perception. The object of enquiry which is obtained from testimony, is sought to be know by means of the observation of the mark; that which is inferred from the observation of the mark, is sought to be seen by perception; and when th object is realised in perception the enquiry ceases.

त्रिविधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः–उद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति, तत्र नामधेयेन पदार्थमात्रस्याभिधानम् उद्देशः तत्रोद्दिष्टस्य तत्त्वव्यवच्छेदको धर्मो लक्षणम्, लक्षितस्य यथालक्ष्णमुपपद्यते न वेति प्रमाणैरवधारणं परिक्षा। तत्रोद्दिष्टस्य प्रविभक्तस्य लक्षणमुच्यते यथा प्रमाणानां प्रमेयस्य च, उद्दिष्टस्य लक्षितस्य च विभागवचनं यथा छलस्य "वचन-विघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या छलम् 1-2-10", "तत् त्रिविधम् 1-2-11" इति। अथोद्दिष्टस्य विभागवचनम्–

प्रत्यक्षा नुमानोपमानशब्दाः "प्रमाणानि"॥ 3॥

अक्षस्याऽक्षस्य प्रतिविषयं वृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षम्, वृत्ति स्तु संनिकर्षो ज्ञानं वा, यदा संनिकर्षस्तदा ज्ञानं प्रमितिः, यदा ज्ञानं तदा हानोपादानोपेक्षाबुद्धयः फलम्। अनुमानम्–मितेन लिङ्गेनाऽर्थस्य पश्चन्मानमऽनुमानम्। उपमानम्–सामीप्यज्ञानम्–'यथा गौरवं गवयः' इति समीप्यं तु सामान्ययोगः शब्दः शब्द्यतेऽनेनार्थ इति अभिधीयते=ज्ञाप्यते। उपलब्धिसाधनानि

प्रमाणानीति समाख्यानिर्वचनसामर्थ्याद् बोद्धव्यम्-प्रमीयतेऽनेनेति करणार्थाभिधानो हि प्रमाणशब्दः। तद्विशेषसमाख्याया अपि तथैव व्याख्यानम्।

किं पुनः प्रमाणानि प्रमेयमभिसंप्लवन्ते? अथ प्रतिप्रमेयं व्यवतिष्ठन्ते? इति। उभयथा दर्शनम्-'अस्त्यात्मा' इत्याप्तोपदेशात्, प्रतीयते, तत्रानुमानम्-''इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःख-ज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गमिति 1-1-10'' प्रत्यक्षम्-युञ्जानस्य योगसमाधिजम् आत्ममनसोः संयोगविशेषादात्मा प्रत्यक्ष इति। अग्निराप्तोपदेशात् प्रतीयते-'अत्राग्निः' इति, प्रत्यासीदता धूमदर्शनेनानुमीयते, प्रत्यासन्नेन च प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्यते।

व्यवस्था पुनः-''अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः'' इति लौकिकस्य स्वर्गे न लिङ्गदर्शनं न प्रत्यक्षम्, स्तनयित्नुशब्दे श्रूयमाणे शब्दहेतोरनुमानं तत्र न प्रत्यक्षं नागमः, पाणौ प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्यमाने नानुमानं नागम इति, सा चेयं प्रमितिः प्रत्यक्षपरा-जिज्ञासितमर्थ-माप्तोपदेशात् प्रतिपद्यमानो लिङ्गदर्शनेनापि बुभुत्सते, लिङ्गदर्शनानुमितं च प्रत्यक्षतो दिदृक्षते, प्रत्यक्षत उपलब्धेऽर्थे जिज्ञासा निवर्तते, पूर्वोक्तमुदाहरणम्। अग्निरिति प्रमातुः प्रमातव्येऽर्थे प्रमाणानां संकरोऽभिसंप्लवः, असंकारो व्यवस्थेति।।3।।

।। इति त्रिसूत्रीभाष्यम्।।

प्रत्यक्ष pratyakṣa, perception; अनुमान anumāna, inference; उपमान upamāna, comperison; शब्द śabda, word; प्रमाणानि pramāṇāni; proofs, means of right knowledge.

3. Perception, inference, comparison and word (verbal testimony)—these are the **means of right knowledge.**—3.

[The Chārvākas admit only one means of right knowledge, *viz.*, perception (pratyakṣa); the Vaiśeṣikas and Bauddhas admit two *viz.*, perception and inference (anumāna); the Sāṅkhyas admit three, *viz.*, perception, inference and verbal testimony (āgama or śabda); while the Naiyāyikas, whose fundamental work is the Nyāya-sūtra, admit four, *viz.*, perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison (upamāna). The Prābhākaras admit a fifth means of right knowledge called persumption (arthāpatti), the Bhāṭṭas and Vedantins admit a sixth, *viz.*, non-existence (abhāva), and the Paurāṇikas recognise a seventh and eighth means of right knowledge named probability (sambhava) and rumour (aitihya].

अथ विभक्तनां लक्षणमिति-

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं ''प्रत्यक्षम्''।। 4।।

इन्द्रियस्यार्थेन संनिकर्षाद् उत्पद्यते यज् ज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षम्, न तर्हीदानीमिदं भवति-आत्मा मानसा युज्यते मन इन्द्रियेण इन्द्रियमर्थेनेति?, नेदं कारणावधारणम्-'एतावत् प्रत्यक्षे कारणम्' इति किं तु विशिष्टकारणवचनमिति=यत् प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य विशिष्टकारणं तदुच्यते यत्तु समानमनुमानादिज्ञानस्य न तद् निवर्तते इति। मनसस्तर्हीन्द्रियेण संयोगो वक्तव्यः?, भिद्यमानस्य प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य नायं भिद्यते इति समानत्वान्नोक्त इति।।

यावदर्थं वै नामधेयशब्दास्तैरर्थसंप्रत्ययोऽर्थसंप्रत्ययाच्च व्यवहारः तत्रेमिन्द्रियार्थ-संनिकर्षादुत्पन्नमर्थज्ञानं रूपमिति वा रस इत्येवं वा भवति रूपरसशब्दाश्च विषयनामधेयं तेन व्यपदिश्यते ज्ञानम्-रूपमिति जानीते रस इति जानीते, नामधेयशब्देन व्यपदिश्यमानं सत् शब्दं प्रसज्यते अत आह-अव्यपदेश्यमिति, यदिदमनुपयुक्ते शब्दार्थसंबन्धेऽर्थज्ञानं तद् नामधेयशब्देन व्यपदिश्यते, गृहीतेपि च शब्दार्थसंबन्धे 'अस्यार्थस्यायं शब्दों नामधेयम्' इति, यदा तु सोऽर्थो गृह्यते तदा तत पूर्वस्मादर्थज्ञानान्न विशिष्यते तदर्थविज्ञानं तादृगेव भवति, न चाऽप्रतीयमानेन व्यवहारः तस्माद् ज्ञेयस्यार्थस्य संज्ञाशब्देन इतिकरणयुक्तेन निर्दिश्यते-रूपमिति ज्ञानं रस इति ज्ञानमिति तदेवमर्थज्ञानकाले स न समाख्याशब्दो व्याप्रियते व्यवहारकाले तु व्याप्रियते, तस्मात्-'अशाब्दमर्थज्ञानमिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नम्' इति।

ग्रीष्मे मरीचयो भौमेनोष्मणा संसृष्टाः स्पन्दमाना दूरस्थस्य चक्षुषा संनिकृष्यन्ते तत्रेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षात् उदकमिति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तच्च प्रत्यक्षं प्रसज्यते इत्यत आह-अव्यभिचारीति। यद् अतस्मिन् तदिति तद् व्यभिचारि। यत्तु तस्मिन् तदिति तद् अव्यभिचारि प्रत्यक्षमिति।

दूराच्चक्षुषा ह्ययमर्थं पश्यन् नावधारयति-धूम इति वा रेणुरिति वा तदेतद् इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नमऽनवधारणज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं प्रसज्यते इत्यत आह-व्यवसायात्मकमिति। न चैतन्मन्तव्यम्-आत्ममनःसंनिकर्षजमेवाऽनवधारणज्ञानमिति, चक्षुषा ह्ययमर्थं पश्यन् नावधारयति, यथा चेन्द्रियेणोपलब्धमर्थं मनसोपलभते एवमिन्द्रियेणाऽनवधारयन् मनसा नावधारयति, यच्चैतद् इन्द्रिगानवधारणपूर्वकं मनसाऽनवधारणं तद् विशेषपेक्षं विमर्शमात्रं संशयो न पूर्वमिति। सर्वत्र प्रत्यक्षविषये ज्ञातुरिन्द्रियेण व्यवसायः-उपहतेन्द्रियाणा-मनुव्यवसायाभावादिति।

आत्मदिषु सुखादिषु च प्रत्यक्षलक्षणं वक्तव्यम्?-अनिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षजं हि तदिति। इन्द्रियस्य वै सतो मनस इन्द्रियेभ्यः पृथगुपदेशो धर्मभेदात्, भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणि नियतविषयाणि सगुणानां चैषाभिन्द्रियभाव इति, मनस्त्वऽभौतिकं सर्वविषयं च नास्य सगुणस्येन्द्रियभाव इति, सति चेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षे संनिधिमसंनिधिं चास्य युगपज्ज्ञाना-नुत्पत्तिकारणं वक्ष्याम इति, मनसश्चेन्द्रियभावाद् न वाच्यं लक्षणान्तरमिति, तन्त्रान्तरसमाचा-राच्चैतत् प्रत्येतव्यमिति-परमतमप्रतिषिद्धमनुमतमिति हि तन्त्रयुक्तिः। व्याख्यातं प्रत्यक्षम्।।4।।

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नम् indriya-artha-sannikarṣa-utpannam, produced from the contact of the sense with the object; ज्ञानम् jñānam, knowledge; अव्यपदेश्यम् a-vyapadeśuyam, without naming; अव्यभिचारि a-vyabhichāri, unerring; व्यवसायत्मक vyavasāya-ātmakam, certain in nature; प्रत्यक्ष pratyakṣam, perception.

4. **Perception** is that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is determinate, unnameable and non-erratic.—4.

Determinate—This epithet distinguishes perception from in determinate knowledge; as, for instance, a man looking from a distance cannot ascertain whether there is smoke or dust.

Unnameable—Signifies that the knowledge of a things derived through perception has no connection with the name which the thing bears.

Non-erratic—In summer the sun's rays coming in contact with earthly heat quiver and appear to the eyes of men as water. The knowledge of water derived in the way is not perception. To eliminate such cases the epithet non-erratic has been used.

[This aphorism may also be translated as follows:—**Perception** is knowledge and which arises form the contact of a sense with its object and which is non-erratic being either, indeterminate (nirvikalpaka, as "this is something") or determinate (savikalpaka, as "this is a Brāhmaṇa")].

अथ तत्पूर्व्वकं "त्रिविधमनुमानं" पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतो दृष्टं च॥ 5॥

तत्पूर्वकमित्यनेन लिङ्गलिङ्गिनो: संबन्धदर्शनं लिङ्गदर्शनं चाभिसंबध्यते, लिङ्गलिङ्गिनो: संबद्धयोर्दर्शनेन लिङ्गिस्मृतिरभिसंबध्यते, स्मृत्या लिङ्गदर्शनेन चाऽप्रत्यक्षोऽर्थोऽनुमीयते।

पूर्ववदिति यत्र कारणेन कार्यमनुमीयते यथा मेघोन्नत्या भविष्यति दृष्टिरिति। शेषवत्–तद् यत्र कार्येण कारणमनुमीयते–पूर्वोदकविपरीतमुदकं नद्याः पूर्णत्वं शीघ्रत्वं च दृष्ट्वा स्त्रोतसोऽनुमीयते–भूता दृष्टिरिति। सामान्यतो दृष्टम्–व्रज्यापूर्वकमन्यत्र दृष्टस्याऽन्यत्र दर्शनमिति तथा चादित्यस्य, तस्मादस्त्यऽप्रत्याक्षाप्यादित्यस्य व्रज्येति।

अथ वा–पूर्ववदिति यत्र यथापूर्वं प्रत्यक्षभूतयोरन्यतरदर्शनेनाऽन्यतरस्याऽप्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानं यथा धूमेनाग्निरिति। शेषवद् नाम परिशेषः स च प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधेऽन्यत्राऽप्रसङ्गात् शिष्यमाणे संप्रत्ययः यथा–'सदनित्यम्' इत्येवमादिना द्रव्यगुणकर्मणामविशेषेण सामान्यविशेषसमावायेभ्यो विभक्तस्य शब्दस्य तस्मिन् द्रव्यकर्मगुणसंशये न द्रव्यम्–एकद्रव्यत्वात् न, कर्म–शब्दान्तर–हेतुत्वात्, यस्तु शिष्यते सोयमिति शब्दस्य गुणत्वप्रतिपत्तिः।

सामान्यतोदृष्टं नाम यत्राऽप्रत्यक्षे लिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः संबन्धे केनचिदर्थेन लिङ्गस्य सामान्याद् अप्रत्यक्षो लिङ्गी गम्यते यथेच्छादिभिरात्मा, इच्छादयो गुणा गुणाश्च द्रव्यसंस्थानाः तद् यदेषां स्थानां स आत्मेति।

विभागवचनादेव त्रिविधमितिसिद्धे त्रिविधवचनं महतो महाविषयस्य न्यायस्य लघीयसा सूत्रेणोपदेशात् परं वाक्यलाघवं मन्यमानस्याऽन्यस्मिन् वाक्यलाघवेऽनादरः, तथा चायमित्थम्भूतेन वाक्यविकल्पेन प्रवृत्तः सिद्धान्ते छले शब्दादिषु च बहुलं समाचारः शास्त्रे इति। सद्विषयं च प्रत्यक्षं सदसद्विषयं चानुमानम्। कस्मात्?, त्रैकाल्यग्रहणात्= त्रिकालयुक्ता अर्था अनुमानेन गृह्यन्ते–भविष्यतीत्यनुमीयते, भवतीति च अभूदिति च। असच्च खल्वऽतीतमनागतं च॥5॥

अथ atha, then; तत्पूर्वकं tat-pūrvakam, preceded by perception; त्रिविधं tri-vidham, three fold; अनुमानं anuāmanaṁ, inference: पूर्ववत् pūrva-vat, from cause to effect; शेषवत् śeṣa-vat, from effect to cause; सामान्यतो दृष्टं sāmānyto-dṛṣṭam, commonly seen; च cha, and.

5. **Inference** is knowledge which is preceded by perception, and is of three kinds, *viz.*, ā priori, ā posteriori and 'commonly seen.—5.

Ā priori is the knowledge of effect derived from the perception of its cause. *e.g.* one seeing clouds infers that there will be rain.

Ā posteriori is the knowledge of cause derived from the perception of its effects, *e.g.*, one seeing a river swollen infers that there was rain.

'Commonly seen.' is the knowledge of one thing derived from the perception of another things with which it is commonly seen *e.g.*, one seeing a beast possessing horns, infers that it possesses also a tail, or one seeing smoke on a hill infers that there is fire on it.

अथोपमानम्–

प्रसिद्धासाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनम् "उपमानम्"॥ 6॥

प्रज्ञातेन सामान्यात् प्रज्ञापनीयस्य प्रज्ञापनमुपमानमिति–यथा गौरेवं गवय इति। किं पुनरत्रोपमानेन क्रियते?, यदा खल्वयं गवा समानधर्मं प्रतिपद्यते तदा प्रत्यक्षतस्तमर्थं प्रतिपद्यते इति, समाख्यासंबन्धप्रतिपत्तिरुपमानार्थ इत्याह। यथा गौरेवं गवय इत्युपमाने प्रयुक्ते गवा समानधर्ममर्थम् इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षादुपलभमानोऽस्य गवयशब्दः संज्ञेति संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धं प्रतिपद्यते इति। यथा मुद्गस्तथा मुद्गपर्णी यथा माषस्तथा माषपर्णी इत्युपमाने प्रयुक्ते उपमानात् संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धं प्रतिपद्यमानस्तामोषधीं भैषजयाऽऽहरति। एवमन्योपि उपमानस्य लोके विषयो बुभुत्सितव्य इति॥6॥

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् prasiddha-sādharmyāt, through similarity to a known object; साध्यसाधनं sādhya-sādhanam, the making known of the thing posited; उपमानं upamānam, comparison, analogy.

6. **Comparison** is the knowledge of thing through its similarity to another thing previously well known.—6

A man, hearing form a forester that a *bos gavaeus* is like a cow, resorts to a forest where he sees an animal like a cow. Having recollected what he heard he institutes a comparison, by which he arrives at the conviction that the animal which he sees is *bos gavaeus*. This is knowledge drived through comparison. Some hold that comparison is not a separate means of knowledge, for when one notices the likeness of a cow in a strange animal one really performs an act of perception. In reply it is urged that we cannot deny comparison as a separate means of knowledge, for how does otherwise the name *bos gavaeus* signify the general notion of the animal called *bos gavaeus*? That the name *bos gavaeus* signifies one and all members of the *bos gavaeus* class is not a result of perception, but the consequence of a distinct knowledge, called comparison.

अथ शब्दः—

आप्तोपदेशः "शब्दः"॥ 7॥

आप्तः खलु साक्षात्कृतधर्मा यथादृष्टस्यार्थस्य चिख्यापयिषया प्रयुक्त उपदेष्टा, साक्षात्करणमर्थस्याऽऽप्तिस्तया प्रवर्तते इत्याप्तः ऋष्यार्यम्लेच्छानां समानं लक्षणं तथा च सर्वेषां व्यवहाराः प्रवर्तन्ते इति। एवमेभिः प्रमाणर्देवमनुष्यतिरश्चां व्यवहाराः प्रकल्पन्ते नाऽतोऽन्यथेति॥7॥

आप्तोपदेशः āpta-upadeśaḥ, the direction or instruction of a reliable person; शब्दः śabdaḥ, word, testimony.

7. **Word (verbal testimony)** is the instructive assertion of a reliable person.—7.

A reliable person is one—may be a ṛṣi, ārya or mleccha,—who as an expert in a certain matter is willing to communicate his experiences of it.

[Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable : the word of the old man is to be accepted as a means of right knowledge, called verbal testimony].

"स द्विविधो" दृष्टाऽदृष्टार्थत्वात्॥ 8॥

यस्येह दृश्यतेऽर्थः स दृष्टार्थः यस्याऽमुत्र प्रतीयते सोऽदृष्टार्थ एवमृषिलौकिकवाक्यानां

विभाग इति। किमर्थं पुनरिदमुच्यते? स न मन्येत—दृष्टार्थ एवाप्तोपदेशः प्रमाणम्—अर्थस्यावधारणात् इति, अदृष्टार्थोपि प्रमाणम्-अर्थस्यानुमानादिति॥8॥

॥ इति प्रमाणभाष्यम्॥

सः saḥ, it, word; द्विविधः dvi-vidhaḥ twofold; दृष्टाऽदृष्टार्थत्वात् dṛṣṭa-adṛṣṭa-artha-tvāt because its object may be seen or not seen.

8. **It is of two kinds**, *viz.*, that which refers to *matter which is seen,* and that which refers to *matter which is not seen.*—8.

The first kind involves matter which can be actually verified. Though we are in capable of verifying the matter involved in the second kind, we can somehow ascertain it by means of inference.

[*Matter which is seen e.g,* a physician's assertion that physical strength is gained by taking butter].

[*Matter which is not seen,* a religious teacher's assertion that one conquers heaven by performing horse-sacrifices].

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 2 : Definition of Pramāṇas : Sūtras 3-8.

Gotama now proceeds to give the definition of each of the four pramāṇas.

Perception is the knowledge which is produced from the contact of the sense with the object. The contact of the soul with the mind and of the mind with sense is not mentioned, because it is common to cognitions produced by all the pramāṇas. The definition only gives the specific cause of perceptual knowledge. The knowledge of the object produced from the contact of the sense with the object takes the form of "colour", "taste", etc. The words, colour, taste, etc. are the names of the viṣayas or contents of the knowledge. But the name-words have no operation at the time of the production of the knowledge of the object ; they operate only when use has to be made of the knowledge. Hence, the knowledge of the object produced from the contact of the sense with the object is independent of words. Again, mirage is also produced from the contact of the sense with the object. But it is not perception, because it is erratic, unreal. Perceptual knowledge must be unerring, real. For the same reason doubt or uncertain knowledge, *e.g.*, be that a post or a man, a cloud of smoke or of dust, it not perceptual knowledge.

Moreover, the latter must be discreet, specific, particular, and not general such as is produced from the contact of the soul with the mind alone.

The soul, etc. as well as pleasure, etc. are also objects of perception. But their perception is not produced from the contact of the sense with the object.

Mansa, the mind, is a sense, but it has been separately mentioned because of its distinctive character. The sense are constituted by the elements, are restricted each to its own province, and possess attributes. The mind, on the other hand, is not constituted by the elements, and is all-extensive and without attribute. Hence, it is said that perceptual knowledge of the soul, etc., which is produced from a particular conjunction of soul and the mind, is not produced from the contact of the sense with the object. Otherwise the doctrine that the mind is a sense which has been established the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras, is also adimitted in the Nyāyā-Sūtras, according to the rule of interpretation that the doctrine of another which is not controverted, is approved.

Inference is the knowledge the antecedents of which are the observation of the connection between the mark and the thing marked, and the observation of the mark (liṅga, singn). Recollection of the mark follows from the observation of the mark and the thing marked as connected. By means of recollection and the observation of the mark an unperceived object is inferred.

Inference of succession is of three kinds : (1) from cause to effect, (2) from effect to cause, and (3) from change of position, as, *e.g.*, the inference of the movement of the sun from its change of position in the sky. Inference of co-existence is as of the fire by smoke; that is, when two objects have been previously known as co-existent, the presene of one, though not perceived, is inferred from the presence of the other. Inference also takes place by the method of exhaustion or residue; *e.g.*, Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, II.i.25. Again where the connection of the mark and the thing marked is not an object of perception, inference of the thing marked which is unperceived, may yet take place through the resemblance of the mark to some other object *e.g.*, the inference if the soul by means of desire, etc.; desire, etc. are attributes, attributes reside in substances, the substance in which desire, etc. reside, is the soul.

The sphere of perception is the present ; that of inference is the present, past and future.

Comparison makes an object known through its resemblance to a

known object, *e.g.* as the cow so the *bos gavaus*. Comparison subserves perception. It enables one to know an object designated by a particular name.

Testimoney is the direction of an Āpta, *i.e.* of one, be he a seer or a man of culture or a savage, who possesses ture knowledge and is truthful. The object of testimony may be of this world or of the other world.The testimony of common people is confined to the things of this world; the testimony of seers embraces things of the other word also. Both kinds of testimony are pramāṇa: the former is based on actual experience; the latter, on inference.

It is by means of these four pramāṇas and not otherwise, that the affairs of gods, men and lower animals ae conducted.

किं पुनरनेन प्रमाणेनार्थजातं प्रमातव्यमिति? तदुच्यते–

आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु "प्रमेयम्"॥ 9॥

तत्रात्मा सर्वस्य द्रष्टा सर्वस्य भोक्ता सर्वज्ञः=सर्वानुभवी, तस्य भोगायतनं शरीरम्, भोगसाधनानि इन्द्रियाणि, भोक्तव्या इन्द्रियार्थाः, भोगो बुद्धिः। सर्वार्थोपलब्धौ नेन्द्रियाणि प्रभवन्तीति सर्वविषयमऽन्तःकरणं मनः शरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिसुखवेदनानां निर्वृत्तिकारणं प्रवृत्ति-दोषाश्च। नास्येदं शरीरमपूर्वमनुत्तरं च, पूर्वशरीराणामादिर्नास्ति उत्तरेषामपवर्गोऽन्त इति प्रेत्यभावः। ससाधनसुखदुःखोपभोगः फलम्, दुःखमिति नेदमनुकूलवेदनीयस्य सुखस्य प्रतीतेः प्रत्याख्यानम्, किं तर्हि? जन्मन एवेदं ससुखसाधनस्य दुःखानुषङ्गात्=दुःखेना-ऽविप्रयोगात्=विविधबाधनायोगाद् दुःखमिति समाधिभावनमुपदिश्यते, समाहितो भावयति भावयन् निर्विद्यते निर्विण्णस्य वैराग्यं विरक्तस्याऽपवर्ग इति, जन्ममरणप्रबन्धोच्छेदः सर्वदुःखप्रहारणम् अपवर्ग इति। अस्त्यन्यदति-द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाः प्रमेयं तद् भेदेन चाऽपरिसंख्येयम्। अस्य तु तत्त्वज्ञानादपवर्गो मिथ्याज्ञानात् संसार इत्यत एतदुपदिष्टं विशेषेणेति॥9॥

आत्मा ātmā, soul; शरीर śarīra, body; इन्द्रिय indriya, sense; अर्थ artha, object; बुद्धि buddhi consciousness, intellect, reason, under-standing; मनः manas, mind, sensorium, प्रवृति pravṛtti; दोष doṣa, fault; प्रत्येभाव pretya. bhāva, rebirth; फल phala, fruit; दुःख duḥkha, pain; अपवर्ग apavarga, release, salvation; तु tu, excludes other provables; प्रमेयम् prameyam the object of proof.

9. Soul, body, senses, objects of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration, from, pain and release—are the objects of right knowledge.—9.

The objects of right knowledge are also enumerated as substance quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation [and non-existence which are the technicalities of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy].

तत्रात्मा तावत् प्रत्यक्षतो न गृह्यते स किमाप्तोपदेशमात्रादेव प्रतिपद्यते इति?, नेत्युच्यते–अनुमानाच्च प्रतिपत्तव्य इति। कथम्?

इच्छा द्वेष प्रयत्न सुख दुःख ज्ञानानि "आत्मनो लिङ्गम्" इति॥ 10॥

यज्जातीयस्यार्थस्य संनिकर्षात् सुखमाऽऽत्मा उपलब्धवान् तज्जातीयमेवार्थं पश्यन् उपादातुमिच्छति सेयमुपादातुमिच्छा एकस्यानेकार्थदर्शिनो दर्शनप्रतिसंधानाद् भवन्ती लिङ्गमात्मनः–नियतविषये हि बुद्धिभेदमात्रे न संभवति देहान्तरवदिति। एवमेकस्या–ऽनेकार्थदर्शिनो दर्शनप्रतिसंधानाद् दुःखहेतौ द्वेषः। यज्जातीयोऽस्यार्थः सुखहेतुः प्रसिद्धस्त–ज्जातीयमर्थं पश्यन् आदातुं प्रयतते सोयं प्रयत्न एकमनेकार्थदर्शिनं दर्शनप्रतिसंधातारमन्तरेण न स्यात्–नियतविषये बुद्धिमात्रे न संभवति देहान्तरवदिति, एतेन दुःखहेतौ प्रयत्नो व्याख्यातः। सुखदुःखस्मृत्या चायं तत्साधनमाददानः सुखमुपलभते दुःखमुपलभते सुखदुःख वेदयते पूर्वोक्त एव हेतुः। बुभुत्समानः खल्वयं विमृशति–किं स्विदिति, विमृशं श्च जानीते–इदमिति, तदिदं ज्ञानं बुभुत्साविमर्शाभ्यामभिन्नकर्तृकं गृह्यमाणमात्मलिङ्गं पूर्वोक्त एव हेतुरिति। तत्र देहान्तरवदिति विभज्यते–यथाऽनात्मवादिनो देहान्तरेषु नियतविषया बुद्धिभेदा न प्रतिसंधीयन्ते तथैकदेहविषया अपि न प्रतिसंधीयेरन्–अविशेषात्। सोयमेक–सत्त्वस्य समाचारः–स्वयं दृष्टस्य स्मरणं नान्यदृष्टास्य नादृष्टस्येति, एवं खलु नानासत्त्वानां समाचारः– अन्यदृष्टमन्यो न स्मरतीति, तदेतदुीवमशक्यमऽनात्मवादिना व्यवस्थापयितुमिति। एवमुपमन्नम्–अस्त्यात्मेति॥10॥

इच्छा ichchhā, desire; द्वेष dveṣa, aversion; प्रयत्न prayatna, effort; सुख sukha, pleasure; दुःख duḥkha. pain; ज्ञान jñāna, cognition; आत्मनः ātmanaḥ, of the soul; लिङ्गं liṅgam, mark.

10. Desire aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and intelligence are the marks of the **soul**.—10.

[These abide in the soul, or rather are the qualities of the substances called soul].

तस्य भोगोधिष्ठानम्–

चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः "शरीरम्"॥ 11॥

कथं चेष्टाश्रयः?, ईप्सितं जिहासितं वाऽर्थमधिकृत्येप्साजिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य तदुपायानुष्ठानलक्षणा समीहा चेष्टा सा यत्र प्रवर्तते तच्छरीरम्। कथमिन्द्रियाश्रयः? यसनुग्रहेणानुगृहीतानि उपद्याते. चोपहतानि स्वविषयेषु साध्वऽसाधुषु वर्तन्ते स एषामाश्रयः

तच्छरीरम्। कथमर्थाश्रयः?, यस्मिन्नाऽऽयतने इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षादुत्पन्नयोः सुखदुःखयोः प्रतिसंवेदनं प्रवर्तते स एषामाश्रयस्यच्छरीम्॥11॥

चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः cheṣṭā indriya-artha āśrayaḥ, site or locus of volition, or striving, senses, and objects, *viz.*, pleasure and pain; शरीरम् śarīram, body.

11. **Body** is the site of gesture, senses and sentiments.—11.

Body is the site of *gesture,* inasmuch as it strives to reach what is desirable and to avoid what is hateful. It is also the site of *senses,* for the latter act well or ill, according as the former is in good or bad order. *Sentiments* which comprise pleasure and pain are also located in the body which experiences them.

भोगसाधनानि पुनः–

घ्राण रसन चक्षु स्त्वक्श्रोत्राणि "इन्द्रियाणि" भूतेभ्यः॥ 12॥

जिघ्रत्यनेनेति घ्राणम्, गन्धं गृह्णीतीति। रसयत्यनेनेति रसनम्, रसं गृह्णीतीति। चष्टेऽननेति चक्षुः रूपं पश्यतीति। त्वक्स्थानमिन्द्रियं त्वक् तदुपचारः स्थानादिति। शृणोत्यनेनेति श्रोत्रम्, शब्दं गृह्णीतीति। एव समाख्यानिर्वचनसामर्थ्याद् बोध्यम्–स्वविषय–ग्रहणलक्षणानीन्द्रियाणीति। भूतेभ्य इति–नानाप्रकृतीनामेषां सतां विषयनियमो नैकप्रकृतीनाम्, सति च विषयनियमे स्वविषयग्रहणलक्षणत्वं भवतीति॥12॥

घ्राण रसन चक्षुस्त्वक् श्रोत्राणि ghrāṇa-rasana-chakṣus-tvak-śrotrāṇi, nose ton ue, eye, skin and ear; इन्द्रयाणि indriyāṇi भूतेभ्यः bhūtebhyaḥ, from the elements.

12. Nose, tongue, eye, skin and ear are the **senses** produced from elements.—12.

Nose is of the same nature as earth, tongue as water, eye as light, skin as aire and ear as ether.

कानि पुनरिन्द्रिकारणानि?

पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशमिति "भूतानि"॥ 13॥

संज्ञाशब्दैः पृथगुपदेशो भूतानां विभक्तानां सुवचं कार्यं भविष्यीति॥13॥

पृथिवी Pṛthivī, earth; आप āpaḥ, water; तेजस् tejas, fire; वायु vāyuḥ; air; आकाश ākāśam, ether; इति iti, these; भूतानि bhūiāni, elements.

13. Earth, water, light, air and ether—these are the **elements.**—13.

इमे तु खलु–

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दाः ''पृथिव्यादिगुणाः'' तदर्थाः।। 14।।

पृथिव्यादीनां यथाविनियोगं गुणा इन्द्रियाणां यथाक्रममर्थाः=विषया इति।।14।।

गन्ध रस रूप स्पर्श शब्दाः Gandha-rasa-rūpa-sparśa śabdāḥ, smell, taste, colour, touch and sound; पृथिव्यादिगुण pṛthivī-ādi-guṇāḥ, attributes of earth, etc., तदर्थाः Tat-arthāḥ, objects of them, the senses.

14. Smell, taste, colour, touch and sound are **objects of the senses** and **qualities** of the earth, etc.—14.

Smell is the object of nose and the prominent quality of earth, taste is the objects of tongue and quality of water, colour is the object of eye and quality of fire, touch is the object of skin and quality of air, and sound is the objects of ear and quality of ether.

अचेतनस्य करणस्य बुद्धेर्ज्ञानं वृत्तिः चेतनस्याऽकर्तुरुपलब्धिरिति युक्तिविरुद्धमर्थं प्रत्याचक्षाणक इवेदमाह–

''बुद्धिः'' उपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम्।। 15।।

नाऽचेतनस्य करणस्य बुद्धेर्ज्ञानं भवितुमर्हति, तद्धि चेतनं स्यात्, एकाश्चायं चेतनो देहेन्द्रियसंघातव्यतिरिक्त इति। प्रमेयलक्षणार्थस्य वाक्यथ्याऽन्यार्थप्रकाशनमुपपत्तिसामर्थ्यादिति।।15।।

बुद्धिः buddhiḥ consciousness, understanding; उपलब्धि Upalabdhiḥ, apprehension, intuition; ज्ञानं jñānam, cognition; इति iti, this अनर्थान्तरं an-artha-antaram, statement of synonyms.

15. **Intellect**, apprehension and knowledge—these are not different from one another.—15.

[The term apprehension (*upalabdhi*) is generally used in the sense of perception (*pratyakṣa*). According to the Sāṅkhya philosophy, intellect (*buddhi*), which is the first thing evolved out of primordial matter (*prakṛti*), is altogether different from knowledge (*jñāna*), which consists in the reflection of external objects on the soul (*puruṣa*), the abode of transparent consciousness].

स्मृत्यनुमानागमसंशयप्रतिभास्वप्नज्ञानोहाः सुखादिप्रत्यक्षमिच्छादयश्च मनसो लिङ्गानि तेषु सत्सु इयमपि–

युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिः ''मनसो लिङ्गम्''।। 16।।

अनिन्द्रियनिमित्ताः स्मृत्यादयः करणान्तरनिमित्ता भवितुमर्हन्तीति। युगपच्च खलु घ्राणादीनां गन्धादीनां च संनिकर्षेषु सत्सु युगपद् भानानि नोत्पद्यन्ते तेनानुमीयते-अस्ति तत्तदिन्द्रिसंयोगि सहकारि निमित्तान्तरमव्यापि यस्याऽसंनिधेर्नोत्पद्यते ज्ञानं संनिधेश्चोत्पद्यते इति। मनःसंयोगानपेक्षस्य हीन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षस्य ज्ञानहेतुत्वे युगपदुत्पद्येरन् ज्ञानानीति।।16।।

युगपत yugapat, simultaneous; ज्ञानानुत्पत्ति Jñāna-anutpattiḥ, non-appearance of cognitions; मनसः manasaḥ, of manas, mind. लिङ्गम् liṅgam, mark.

16. The mark of the **mind** is that there do not arise (in the soul) more acts of knowledge than one at a time.—16.

It is impossible to perceive two things simultaneously. Perception does not arise merely from the contact of a sense-organ with its object but it requires also a conjunction of the mind. Now, the mind, which is an atomic substance, cannot be conjoined with more than one sense organ at a time, hence there cannot occure more acts of perception than one at one time.

क्रमप्राप्ता तु–

''प्रवृत्तिः'' वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भ इति।। 17।।

मनोऽत्र बुद्धिरित्यभिप्रेतम्-बुध्यतेऽनेनेति बुद्धिः। सोयमारम्भः शरीरेण वाचा मनसा च पुण्यः पापश्च दशविधः तदेतत्कृतभाष्यं द्वितीयमूत्रे इति।।17।।

प्रवृत्तिः Pravṛtiḥ, activity; वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भः Vāk-buddhi-śarīra-āram. bhaḥ the start made by speech, manas and body.

17. **Activity** is that which makes the voice, mind and body begin their action.—17.

There are three kinds of action, *viz.*, *vocal*, *mental* and *bodily*, each of which may be sub divided as good or bad.

Bodily actions which are *bad* are :—(1) killing, (2) stealing, and (3) committing adultery.

Bodily actions which are *good* are :—(1) giving, (2) protecting, and (3) serving.

Vocal actions which are *bad* are :—(1) telling a lie, (2) using harsh language, (3) slandering, and (4) indulging in frivolous talk.

Vocal actions which are *good* are :—(1) speaking the truth, (2)

speaking what is useful, (3) speaking what is pleasant, and (4) reading sacred books.

Mental actions which are *bad* are :—(1) malice, (2) covetousness, and (3) scepticism.

Mental actions which are *good* are :—(1) compassion, (2) refraining from covetousness, and (3) devotion.

प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणा "दोषा:"।। 18।।

प्रवर्तना=प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्त्वम्, ज्ञातारं हि रागादय: प्रवर्तयन्ति पुण्ये पापे वा, यत्र मिथ्याज्ञानं तत्र रागद्वेषविति। प्रत्यात्मवेदनीया हीमे दोषा: कस्माल्लक्षणतो निर्दिश्यन्ते? इति, कर्मलक्षणा: खलु रक्तद्विष्टमूढा:–रक्तो हि तत्कर्म कुरुते येन कर्मणा सुखं दु:खं वा लभते, तथा द्विष्टास्तथा मूढ इति, रागद्वेषमोहा इत्युच्यमाने बहु नोक्तं भवतीति।।18।।

प्रवर्त्तना लक्षण: pravartanā lakṣaṇāḥ of which the characteristic is to move to activity; दोषा: doṣāḥ faults.

18. **Faults** have the characteristic of causing ativity.—18.

The faults are affection, aversion and stupidity.

पुनरुत्पत्ति: "प्रत्येभाव:"।। 19।।

उत्पन्नस्य क्वचित् सत्त्वनिकाये मृत्वा या पुनरुत्पत्ति स प्रेत्यभाव:, उत्पन्नस्य=संबद्धस्य, संबन्धस्तु देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिवेदनाभि: पुररुपत्ति:=पुनर्देहादिभि: संबन्ध:, पुनरित्यभ्यासाभिधानम्। यत् क्वचित् प्राणभृन्निकाये वर्तमान: पूर्वोपात्ताम् देहादीन् जहाति तत् प्रैति, यत् तत्राऽन्यत्र वा देहादीनऽन्यात् उपादत्ते तद् भवति, प्रेत्यभाव:=मृत्वा पुनर्जन्म, सोयं जन्ममरणप्रबन्धा-भ्यासोऽनादिपरपवर्गान्त: प्रेत्यभावो वेदितव्य इति।।19।।

पुनरुत्पत्ति: punar-utpattiḥ, re-appearance, re-birth; प्रेत्यभाव: pretya-bhāvaḥ, existence after passing away.

19. **Transmigration** means re-births.—19.

Transmigration is the series of births and deaths. Birth is the connection of soul with body, sense-organs, mind, intellect, and sentiments, while death is the soul's separation from them.

प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितोऽर्थ: "फलम्"।। 20।।

सुखदु:खसंवेदन फलम्, सुखविपाकं कर्म दु:खविपाकं च, तत् पुनर्देहेन्द्रियविषयबुद्धिषु सतीषु भवतीति सह देहादिभि: फलमभिप्रेतं तथा हि प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितोऽर्थ: फलम् एतत्सर्वं भवति, तदेतत् फलम् उपात्तमुपात्तं हेयं, त्यक्तं त्यक्तमुपादेयमिति नास्य हानोपादानयोर्निष्ठा पर्यवसानं वास्ति, स खल्वयं फलस्य हानोपादानस्रोतसोह्यते लोक इति।।20।।

प्रवृत्तिदोष जनित: pravṛtti-doṣa-janitaḥ, produced by activity and fault; अर्थ: arthaḥ, object; फलम् phalam, fruit.

20. **Fruit** is the thing produced by activity and faults.—20.

Fruit consists in the enjoyment of pleasure or suffering of pain. All activity and faults end in producing pleasure which is acceptable, and pain which is fit only to be avoided.

अथैतदेव–

बाधनालक्षणं "दु:खम्" इति।। 21।।

बाधना=पीडा=तप इति, तयाऽनुविद्धम्=अनुषक्तम्=अविनिर्भागेन वर्तमानं दु:खयोगाद् दु:खमिति, सोयं सर्वे दु:खेनाऽनुविद्धमिति पश्यन् दु:खं जिहासुर्जन्मनि दु:खदर्शी निर्विद्यते निर्विणो विरज्यते विरक्तो मुच्यते।।21।।

बाधानालक्षणं bādhanā-lakṣaṇaṃ, of which the characteristic is restraint or irritation; दु:खम् duḥkhaṃ, pain.

21. **Pain** has the characteristic of causing uneasiness.—21.

Pain is affliction which every one desires to avoid, the aphorism may also be translated as follows :—

Pain is the mark of hindrance to the soul.

यत्र तु निष्ठा=यत्र तु पर्यवसानं सोयम्–

तदत्यन्तविमोक्ष: "अपवर्ग।"।। 22।।

तेन दु:खेन जन्माऽत्यन्तविमुक्तिरपवर्ग:। कथम्?, उपात्तस्या जन्मनो हानम् अन्यस्य चानुपादानम्, एतावस्थामपर्यन्तामपवर्गं वेदयन्तेऽपवर्गविद:, तद् अभयमऽजरमऽमृत्युपदं ब्रह्म क्षेमप्राप्तिरिति। नित्यं सुखमात्मनो महत्त्ववद् मोक्षे व्यज्यते तेनाभिव्यक्तेनाऽत्यन्तं विमुक्त: सुखी भवतीति केचिन्मन्यन्ते, तेषां प्रमाणाभावादनुपपत्ति:–न प्रत्यक्षं नानुमानं नागमो वा विद्यते–'नित्यं सुखमात्मनो महत्त्ववन्मोक्षेऽभिव्यज्यते' इति।।

नित्यस्याभिव्यक्ति=संवेदनम्, तस्य हतुवचनम्।।

नित्यस्याभिव्यक्ति:=संवेदनम् ज्ञानमिति, तस्य हेतुर्वाच्यो यतस्तदुत्पद्यते इति।।

सुखवन्नित्यमितिचेत्? संसारस्थस्य मुक्तेनाऽविशेष:।।

यथा मुक्त: सुखेन तत्संवेदनेन च सन्नित्येनोपपन्नस्तथा संसारस्थोपि प्रसज्यते इति–उभयस्य नित्यत्वात्।।

अभ्यनुज्ञाने च धर्माधर्मफलेन साहचर्यम्=यौगपद्यं गृह्येत॥

यदिदमुत्पत्तिस्थानेषु धर्माधर्मफलं सुखं दुःखं वा संवेद्यते पर्यायेण तस्य च नित्यसंवेदनस्य च सहभावः=यौगपद्यं गृह्येत, न सुखाभावो नाऽनभिव्यक्तिरस्ति-उभयस्य नित्यत्वात्।

अनित्यत्वे हेतुवचनम्॥

अथ मोक्षे नित्यस्य सुखस्य संवेदनमनित्यम्?, यत उत्पद्यते स हेतुर्वाच्यः॥

आत्ममनःसंयोगस्य निमित्तानतरसहितस्य हेतुत्वम्॥

आत्ममनस्संयोगो हेतुरितिचेत्?. एवमपि तस्य सहकारि निमित्तान्तरं वचनीयमिति॥

धर्मस्य कारणवचनम्॥

यदि धर्मो निमित्तान्तरम्? तस्य हेतुर्वाच्यो यत उत्पद्यते इति॥

योगसमाधिजस्य कार्यावसायविरोधात् प्रक्षये संवेदननिवृत्तिः॥

यदि योगसमाधिजो धर्मो हेतुः? तस्य कार्यावसायविरोधात् प्रक्षये संवेदनमत्यन्तं निवर्ततेति॥

असंवेदने चाऽविद्यमानेनाऽविशेषः॥

यदि धर्मक्षयात् संवेदनोपरमे नित्यं सुखं न संवेद्यते? इति, किं विद्यमानं न संवेद्यते? अथाऽविद्यमानमिति? नानुमानं विशिष्टेऽस्तीति॥

अप्रक्षयश्च धर्मस्य निरनुमानम्–उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्त्वात्॥

योगसमाधिजो धर्मो न क्षीयते इति नास्त्यनुमानम्, उत्पत्तिधर्मकमऽनित्यमिति विपर्ययस्य त्वऽनुमानम्। यस्य तु संवेदनोपरमो नास्ति तेन संवेदनहेतुर्नित्य इत्यनुमेयं नित्ये च मुक्तसंसारस्थयोरविशेष इत्युक्तम्=यथा मुक्तस्य नित्यं सुखं तत्संवेदनहेतुश्च संवेदनस्य तूपरमो नास्ति-कारणस्य नित्यत्त्वात् यथा संसारस्थस्यापीति, एवं च सति धर्माधर्मफलेन सुखदुःसंवेदनेन साहचर्यं गृह्येतेति॥

शरीरादिसंबन्धः प्रतिबनधहेतुरितिचेत्? न-शरीरदीनामुपभोगार्थत्वात्, विपर्ययस्य चाऽननुमानात्॥

स्यान्मतम्-संसारावस्थस्य शरीरादिसंबन्धो नित्यसुखसंवेदनहेतोः प्रतिबन्धकः तेनाऽविशेषो नास्तीति?, एतच्चायुक्तम्-शरीरादय उपभोगार्थास्ते भोगप्रतिबन्धं करीष्यन्तीत्यनुपपन्नम्। न चास्त्यनुमानमशरीरस्यात्मनो भोगः कश्चिदस्तीति॥

इष्टाधिगमार्था प्रवृत्तिरितिचेत्? न–अनिष्टोपरमार्थत्वात्॥

इदमनुमानम्-इष्टाधिगमार्थो मोक्षोपदेशः प्रवृत्तिश्च मुमुक्षूणां नोभयमनर्थकमिति। एतच्चायुक्तम्–अनिष्टोपरमार्थो मोक्षोपदेशः प्रवृत्तिश्च मुमुक्षूणामिति। नेष्टमनिष्टेनाऽननुविद्धं संभवतीति इष्टमप्यनिष्टं संपद्यते, अनिष्टहानाय घटमान इष्टमपि जहाति–विवेकहानस्याऽशक्यवात्॥

दृष्टातिक्रमश्च देहादिषु तुल्यः॥

यथा दृष्टमऽनित्यं सुखं परित्यज्य नित्यसुखं कामयते, एवं देहेन्द्रियबुद्धीरनित्या दृष्टा अतिक्रम्य मुक्तस्य नित्या देहेन्द्रियबुद्धयः कल्पयिव्याः, साधीयश्चैवं मुक्तस्य चैकात्म्यं कल्पितं भवतीति॥

उपपत्तिविरुद्धामितिचेत्? समानम्॥

देहेदीनां नित्यत्वं प्रमाणविरुद्धं कल्पयितुमशक्यमिति समानम्=सुखस्यापि नित्यत्वं प्रमाणविरुद्धं कल्पयितुमशक्यमिति॥

आत्यन्तिके च संसारदुःखाभावे सुखवचनाद् आगमेपि सत्यऽविरोधः॥

यद्यपि कश्चिदागमः स्याद् मुक्तस्याऽऽत्यन्तिकं सुखमिति? सुखशब्द आत्यन्तिके दुःखाभावे प्रयुक्त इत्येवमुपपद्यते-दृष्टो हि दुःखाभावे सुखशब्दप्रयोगो बहुलं लोके इति॥

नित्यसुखरागस्याऽप्रहाणे मोक्षाधिगमाभावः–

रागस्य बन्धनसमाज्ञानात्॥

यद्ययं मोक्षे नित्यं सुखमभिव्यज्यते इति नित्यसुखरागेण मोक्षाय घटमानः? न मोक्षऽधिगच्छेत्=नाधिगन्तुमर्हतीति-बन्धनसमाज्ञातो हि रागः न च बन्धने सत्यपि कश्चिन्मुक्त इत्युपपद्यते इति॥

प्रहाणे नित्यसुखरागस्याऽप्रतिकूलत्वम्॥

अथास्य नित्यसुखरागः प्रहीयते तस्मिन् प्रहीणे नास्य नित्यसुखरागः प्रतिकूलो भवति? यद्येवं? मुक्तस्य नित्यं सुखं भवति अथापि न भवति, नाऽस्योभयोः पक्षयोर्मोक्षाधिगमो विकल्पते इति॥22॥

॥ इति प्रमेयभाष्यम्॥

तदत्यन्तविमोक्षः tat-atyanta-vimokṣaḥ, absolute deliverance from this; अपवर्गः apavargaḥ, attainment of the goal, final release, salvation.

22. **Release** is the absolute deliverance from pain.—22.

A soul which is no longer subject to transmigration is freed from all pains. Transmigration, which consists in the soul's leaving one body and taking another, is the cause of its undergoing pleasure and pain. The soul attains release as soon as there is an end of the body, and, consequently, of pleasure and pain. Those are mistaken who maintain that release enable the soul, not only to get rid of all pains, but also to attain eternal pleasure, for pleasure is as impermanent as pain and the body.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 3 : Definition of Prameya (knowable): Sūtras 9-22.

The pramāṇas make known the soul, the body, the senses, object, cognition, the mind, activity, faults, re-birth, the fruit, pain and release. The soul is the seer of all, the experiencer of all, the all-knower, the all-reacher. The body is the field of its experience. The senses are the instruments of its experience. The objects of the senses are the things to be experienced. The experience is cognition. The senses do not extend to all objects. That which embraces all objects is the inner sense, the mind. Activity and faults are the causes which accomplish the soul's experience of the body, the senses, the objects, cognition, and pleasure. This body is neither its first nor its last. There is no beginning of its past bodies. Its future bodies will end only when release is attained. This is re-birth. The fruit is the action of pleasure and pain with their causes on the soul. Pain is a constant companion of pleasure and enters as an element in its experience. For this reason, and not to ignore the experience of pleasure as an agreeable feeling, pleasure has not been separately mentioned. Release is the negation of all possibility of births and deaths, the total annihilation of all pain. It is the final fruit of a process of self-culture of which the successive stages are withdrawal from the world and concentration upon the self, meditation, thoughtfulness, and dispassion.

There are innumerable prameyas such as substance, attribute, action, genus, species, combination (Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras, I.i.4) and their varieties. In the Nyāya-Sūtras twelve prameyas have been specially taught, because knowledge of the truth about them leads to release, while false knowledge about them leads to the stream of births and deaths.

The soul cannot be apprehended through the contact of the senses. It is known from testimony and from inference by the marks of desire, aversion, activity, pleasure, pain and congnition. Desire, aversion and activity imply recollection of past experiences of pleasure and pain, the power of selection of one particular object out of man as the cause of pleasure or of pain, and the adaptation of activity towards its acquisition or avoidance. They therefore prove the existence of a single enity which witnesses a multitude of objects. Pleasure and pain also persist in memory; the sight of their causes revives their memory. There must be therefore an entity in which pleasure an pain sink into oblivion. Cognition involves doubt and determination. The performer of the two functions must be one and the same.

Some deny the existence of the soul and maintain that there is only a series of conscious state severally corresponding to specific objects. But they also do not admit that the same series re-appears in other bodies. Even so it cannot be said to have influence in the samebody at successive periods of time; for the two cases do not materially differ from each other. In the individual body there is only one soul, for one can recollect only what one has seen, and not what has been seen by another, or has been seen at all. Similary souls are different in defferent bodies, for one does not recollect what has been seen by another. Those who deny the existence of the soul fail to explain these phenomena.

The body is the field or vehicle of the soul's experience, because the movement towards the acquisition or avoidance of an object takes place in the body, because the efficiency to the senses varies according to the health or disease of the body, and because the resonance of pleasure and pain appears in the body.

The instruments of experience, *i.e.,* the senses, are the powers of smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing. The elements of the earth, water, fire, are and either are their respective causes. Smell, taste, sight, touch and sound are respectively the attributes of the objects of the senses.

Cognition is not, as some hold, the modification of an unconscious or insentient instrument or organ called buddhi, intellect. Consciousness cannot spring from unconsciousness. Buddhi, intellect or reason, is not the medium of cognition, but cognition itself.

Memory, inference, testimony, doubt, ready wit, dream, cognition, conjecture, feeling of pleasure, etc. and disire, etc. are marks of the mind. The senses are not their cause. They must have some other cause. That is the mind. Simultaneous non-production of cognitions even while the senses are in contact with their objects is also the mark of the mind.

Activity is the start or action of the body, speech and mind. In the Sūtra (I.i.17) the mind is intended by the word "buddhi".

Faults move the knower to activity. They are attraction, aversion and stupidity. Where there is false knowledge there are attraction and aversion. Their existence in others is known from their acts.

Re-birth or transmigration is connection again with the body, the senses, the mind and cognition, whether here or elsewhere. The condition of recurrent births and deaths has no beginning and ceases on the attainment of rlease.

Fruit is the experience of pleasure or of pain. It is inevitable so long there is connection with the body, the senses, objects and cognition.

The mark of pain is bādhanā, *i.e.*, obstruction or hindrance, suffering, burning. The element of pain is present in all things, the body, the senses, the objects, etc. The mipede the activity of the soul.

Release is everlasting deliverance from birth which is the source of pain. This is the state which arises when the present birth ends and another birth does not take place. This state continuing unlimited is called Apavarga, release. Abhaya. Ajara, Amṛtyupada, Brahmakṣemaprāpti are its other description. Abhaya is fearless: in release there is no longer any fear of saṃsāra. Ajara is undecaying. This disproves the dictrine that Brahman modifies (pariṇāma) as the fabric of the universe of names and forms. If Brahman undergoes modification as a whole, then as a whole it becomes other than it is, and therefore liable to distruction. If, on the other hand, it should modify in part, then being divisible it would be equally liable to destruction. Amṛtyupada is the status of non-death or immortality. This is in answer to the Vaināśikas who hold that release is the extinction of the mind like the extinctiom of a lamp. Brahmakṣemaprāpti is the attainment of the bliss of Brahman.

Some think that permanent pleasure, like the largness of the soul, is manifested in the state of release, and that the absolutely released soul enjoys pleasure as so manifested. But there is no evidence, neither perception, nor inference, nor testimony, that permanent pleasure, like the largeness of the soul, is manifested in the state of release. If manifestation of permanent pleasure takes place at a particular time, then it is a product and therefore requires a cause. If, on the other hand, the manifestation, like pleasure, is ever present, then a soul in bondage will also enjoy it as much as a released soul. If you say that the manifestation of pleasure is a product and that the conjunction of the soul and mind is its cause, then another contributory cause is required. For, in the state of saṃsāra, the conjunction of the soul and mind requires the aid of dharma or acts of virtue to produce the cognition of pleasure. But if in the state of release the conjunction of the soul and mind is an independent cause of the cognition of pleasure, then in the case of the cognition of colour, etc. the senses also will not be needed. If, again dharma or acts of virtue be the contributory cause, then a cause of dharma is required, because it is a product, If, on the other hand, you say that virtue born of Yogic meditation or trance is the cause, then, as a product, it is liable to destruction, and as such it would negate unlimited

enjoyment of pleasure, for, as an effect, the enjoyment will cease with the cessation of it cause. If you say that the manifestaton of pleasure is ever present but that the connection of the soul with the body, etc. presents its experiences in the state of saṃsāra, your position would be untenable. The body, etc. have been created to subserve the purpose of the soul's enjoyment. To say that they would obstruct such enjoyment is a contradiction in terms. On the other hand, there is no reason to infer that a soul a without a body can have any experience. Instructions about release and the activity of the seekers of release do not furnish any such reason. For these are directed not to the attainment of a desired object but to the termination of what is not desired. There is no good which is not interpenetrated with evil. The avoidance of evil therefore necessarily entails the avoidance of good as well. It is impossible to avoid evil separately. If you say that, as a matter of fact, people forsake visible temporary pleasure and long for permanent pleasure, we would rejoin that it would be better to suppose that in the same way after transcending the visible temporary body, senses and cognition, the released soul obtains permanent body, senses and cognition. In this way, the identity of soul in the case of the released will also be accomplished. The eternality of the body, etc. is no more opposed to the pramāṇas and therefore impossible to assume than the eternality of pleasure. When a revealed text predicates everlasting pleasure of a released soul, by pleasure it means non-existence of pain. Instances of such use of the word are plentiful in popular parlance. Should a man strive after release being attraction is a bond, and while the bond, exists no one can be released. Now, if the soul's attraction for eternal pleasure is abandoned, then on its abandonment attraction for eternal pleasure does not become an obstacle. Such being the case eternal pleasure may accrue to the released soul or may not accrue. But the attainment of release does not stand on the horns of dilemmaic doubt.

स्थानवत एव तर्हि संशयस्य लक्षणं वाच्यमिति तदुच्यते–

समानानेकधर्म्मोपपत्तेर्विप्रतिपत्तेरुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थात्तश्च विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः ''संशयः''॥ 23॥

समानधर्मोपपत्तेर्विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः इति=स्याणुपुरुषयोः समानं धर्ममाऽऽरोहपरिणाहौ पश्यन् पूर्वदृष्टं च तयोर्विशेषं बुभुत्समानः किंस्विदित्यनन्तरं नावधारयति तद् अनवधारणं ज्ञानं संशयः। 'समानमनयोर्धममुपलभे विशेषमन्यरतस्य नोपलभे' इत्येषा बुद्धिरपेक्षा संशयस्य प्रवर्तिका वर्तते तेन विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः संशयः।

अनेकधर्मोपपत्तेरिति–समानजातीयमऽसमाजातीयं चाऽनेकं तस्यानेकस्य

धर्मोपपत्तेः-विशेषस्योभयया दृष्टत्वात्=समानजातीयेभ्योऽसमानजातीयेभ्यश्चार्था विशिष्यन्ते (यथा) गन्धवत्त्वात् पृथिवी आवादिभ्यो विशिष्यते गुणकर्मभ्यश्च। अस्ति च शब्दे विभागजत्वं विशेषः तस्मिन् द्रव्यं गुणः कर्म वेति संदेहः-विशेषस्योभयथा दृष्टत्वात्=किं द्रव्यस्य सतो गुणकर्मभ्यो विशेषः? आहोस्विद् गुणस्य सत इति? अथ कर्मणः सत इति? विशेषापेक्षा=अन्यतमस्य व्यवस्थापकं धर्मं नोपलभे इति बुद्धिरिति।

विप्रतिपत्तेरिति-व्याहतमेकार्थदर्शनं विप्रतिपत्तिः=व्याघातः=विरोधः=असहभाव इति, 'अस्त्यात्मा' इत्येकं दर्शनम् 'नास्त्यात्मा' इत्यपरम् न च सद्भावाऽसद्भावौ सहैकत्र संभवतः न चान्यतरसाधको हेतुरुपलभ्यते तत्र तत्त्वानवधारणं संशय इति।

उपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातः खल्वपि-सच्चोदकमुपलभ्यते तडागादिषु मरीचिषु चाविद्यमानमुदकमिती, अतः क्वचिदुपलभ्यमाने तत्त्वव्यवस्थापकस्य प्रमाणस्याऽनुपलब्धेः 'किं सदुपलभ्यते? अथाऽसत्?' इति संशयो भवति।

अनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातः-सच्च नोपलभ्यते मुलकीलकोदकादि असच्चानुत्पन्नं निरुद्धं वा, ततः क्वचिदनुपलभ्यमाने संशयः-किं सन्नोपलभ्यते उताऽसन्निति संशयो भवति, विशेषापेक्षा पूर्ववत्। पूर्वः समानोऽनेकश्च धर्मो ज्ञेयस्थः उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी पुनर्ज्ञातृगते एतावता विशेषेण पुनर्वचनम्। समानधर्माधिगमात्=समानधर्मोपपत्तेर्विशेषस्मृत्यपेक्षो विमर्श इति॥23॥

समानानेकधर्मोपपत्तेः samāna-aneka-dharma-upapatteḥ, from the appearance of several common properties; विप्रतिपत्तेः vipratipatteḥ, contradiction; उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातः upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-avyavasthātaḥ apprehension; विशेषापेक्षः viśeṣa-apekṣaḥ, in which there is need of the distinguishing mark; विमर्शः vimarśaḥ, consideration, judgment; संशय saṃśayaḥ, doubt.

23. **Doubt,** which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, arises from the recognition of properties common to many objects, or of properties not common to any of the objects, from the conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of perception and non-perception.—23.

Doubt is of five kinds, according as it arises from—

(1) *Recognition of common properties, e.g.*, seeing in the twilight at all object we cannot decide whether it is a man or a post, for the property of tallness belongs to both.

(2) *Recognition of properties not common, e.g.*, hearing a sound one questions whether it is eternal or not, for the property of soundness abides neither in man, beast, etc., that are non-eternal, nor in atoms which are eternal.

(3) *Conflicting testimony, e.g.*, merely by study one cannot decide whether the soul exists, for one system of philosophy affirms that it does while another system states that it does not.

(4) *Irregularity of perception, e.g.*, we perceive water in the tank where it really exists, but water appears also to exist in the mirage where it really does not exist.

A question arises whether water is perceived only when it actually exists, or even when it does not exist.

(5) *Irrgularity of non-perception, e.g.*, we do not perceive water the radish where it really exists, and also on dry land where it does not exist.

A question arises whether water is not perceived only when it does not exist, or also when it does exist.

स्थानवतां लक्षणमिति समानम्–

यमर्थमधिकृत्य प्रवर्त्तते तत् ''प्रयोजनम्''॥ 24॥

यमर्थमाप्तव्यं हातव्यं वाऽध्यवसाय तदाप्तिहानोपायमनुतिष्ठति प्रयोजनं तद् वेदितव्यम्, प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वादिममर्थमाप्स्यामि हास्यामि वेति व्यवसायोऽर्थस्याधिकारः, एवं व्यवसीयमानोऽर्थोऽधिक्रियते इति॥24॥

यम् yam, which; अर्थम् artham, object; adhikṛtya, intending; प्रवर्त्तते pravartate, acts; तत् tat, that; प्रयोजनम् prayojanam, purpose.

24. **Purpose** is that with an eye to which one proceeds to act.—24.

Purpose refers to the thing which one endeavours to attain or avoid. [A man collects fuel for the purpose of cooking his food].

लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स ''दृष्टान्तः''॥ 25॥

लोकसामान्यमऽनतीता लौकिकाः=नैसर्गिकं वैनयिकं बुद्ध्यतिशयमप्राप्ताः तद्विपरीताः परीक्षकाः-तर्केण प्रमाणैरर्थं परीक्षतुमर्हन्तीति, यथा यमर्थं लौकिका बुध्यन्ते तथा परीक्षका अपि सोऽर्थो दृष्टान्तः। दृष्टान्तविरोधेन हि प्रतिपक्षाः प्रतिषेद्धंव्या भवन्तीति, दृष्टान्तसमाधिना च स्वपक्षाः स्थापनीया भवन्तीति, अवयवेषु चोदाहरणाय कल्पते इति॥25॥

लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां laukika-parīkṣnkāṇām, of average men and of men possessing discrimination either by nature or as a result of education;

यस्मिन् अर्थे yasmin arthe, in which object; बुद्धिसम्यं buddhi sāmyam, community of idea; सः saḥ, that दृष्टान्तः dṛṣṭāntaḥ, example, familiar instance.

25. **A familiar instance** is the thing about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion.—25.

[With regard to the general proposition, "wherover there is smoke there is fire," the Samiliar instance is a kitchen in which fire and smoke abide together, to the satisfaction of an ordinary man as well as an acute investigator].

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 4 : Definition of the preliminaries of a Nyāya : Sūtras 23-25.

Doubt is consideration in expectation of a distinction. Expectation of a distinction is the cognition that one does not find the characteristic which will determine one or another of two or more possible objectes as a particular object. It arises (1) form the observation of common properties only appertaining (a) to objects of the same class, or (b) to objects of the same and different classes, or (2) from contradiction, *e.g.*, the soul exists, the soul does not exist, or (3) from irregularity of perception and non-perception (for example, see text).

Purpose is the object which is determined as fit to be acquired or fit to be avoided. It is the resolution which induces activity for the acquisition or avoidance of such an object.

An Example is an object which is understood by people of insight in the same way as by common people who do not possess intellectual excellence either by natue or by training.

अथ सिद्धान्तः–इदमित्थम्भूतं चेत्यीयनुज्ञायमानमर्थजातं सिद्धं, सिद्धस्य संस्थितिः सिद्धान्तः, संस्थितिः=इत्थम्भावव्यवस्था=धर्मनियमः। स खल्वयम्–

तन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थितिः "सिद्धान्तः"॥ 26॥

तन्त्रार्थसंस्थितिः तन्त्रसंस्थितिः, तन्त्रम्=इतरेतरभिसंबद्धस्याऽर्थसमूहस्योपदेशः=शास्त्रम्। अधिकरणानुषक्तार्थसंस्थितिः अधिकरणसंस्थितिः। अभ्युपगमसंस्थितिः=अनवधारितार्थपरिग्रहः तद्विशेषपरीक्षणायाऽभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः॥26॥

तन्त्राधिकरणभ्युपगमसंस्थितिः tantra-adhikaraṇa-anhyupagama saṃsthitiḥ, established truth about the subject matter of a tantra or course of teaching about a number of interrelated subjects or of an adhikarana or topic of discussion or of an abhyu, agama or admission without proof; सिद्धान्तः siddhāntaḥ, conclusion, established tenet.

26. **An established tenet** is a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication.—26.

तन्त्रभेदात्तु खलु स चतुर्विधः–

सर्वतन्त्रप्रतितन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थित्यर्थान्तरभावात्॥ 27॥

तत्रैताश्चतस्रः संस्थितयोऽर्थान्तरभूताः॥27॥

सर्वतन्त्र प्रतितन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगम संस्थित्यर्थान्तरभावात् sarva-tantra-pratitantraadhi-karaṇa-abhyupagama-saṃsthiti-artha-antara-bhāvāt, owing to differences as tenets of all the tantras, of a particular tantra, of a topic or of an adminission.

27. The tenet is of four kinds owing to the distinction between *a dogma of all the schools, a dogma peculiar to some school, a hypothetical dogma* and *an implied dogma*.—27.

तासाम्–

सर्वतन्त्राविरुद्धस्तन्त्रेऽधिकृतोऽर्थः "सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः"॥ 28॥

यथा घ्राणादीनीन्द्रियाणि, गन्धादय इन्द्रियार्थाः पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि, प्रमाणैरर्थस्य ग्रहणमिति॥28॥

सर्वतन्त्राविरुद्धः sarva-tantra-aviruddhaḥ, unopposed in all tantras or systems; तन्त्रे tantre, in the particular tantra or system; अधिकृतः adhikṛtaḥ, included, intended, dealt with, treated; सर्वतन्त्र सिद्धान्तः sarva-tantrasiddhāntaḥ, established tenet of all the systems, universal tenet.

28. **A dogma of all the schools** is a tenet which is not opposed by any school and is claimed by at least one school.—28.

The five elements (*viz.*, earth, water, light, air and ether), the five objects of sense (*viz.*, smell, taste, colour, touch and sound), etc., are tenets which are accepted by all the schools.

समानतन्त्रसिद्धः परतन्त्रासिद्धः "प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तः" ॥ 29॥

यथा–नाऽसत आत्मलाभः न सत आत्महानम्, निरतिशयाश्चेतनाः देहेन्द्रियमनस्सु विषयेषु तत्कारणे च विशेष इति सांख्यानाम्, पुरुषकर्मादिनिमित्तो भूतसर्गः कर्महेतवो दोषाः प्रवृत्तिश्च, स्वगुणविशिष्टाश्चेतनाः, असदुत्पद्यते उत्पन्नं निरुध्यते इति योगानाम्॥29॥

समानतन्त्रसिद्धः samāna-tantra-siddaḥ, not accepted in identical or

allied systems; परतन्त्रासिद्ध: para-tantra-asiddhaḥ, not accepted in different systems; प्रतितन्त्र सिद्धान्तः prati-tantra-siddhāntaḥ, established tenet of a particuler system, particular tenet.

29. **A dogma peculiar to some school** is a tenet which is accepted by similar schools, but rejected by opposite schools.—29

"A thing cannot come into existence out of nothing"—this is peculiar dogma of the Sāṅkhyas. [The eternity of sound is a peculiar dogma of the Mīmāṃsakas].

यत्सिद्धावन्यप्रकरणसिद्धिस्स "अधिकरणसिद्धान्तः"॥ 30॥

यस्यार्थस्य सिद्धावन्येऽर्था अनुषज्यन्ते=न तैर्विना सोर्थः सिध्यति तेऽर्था यदधिष्ठाना: सोऽधिकरणसिद्धान्तः यथा-देहेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तो ज्ञाता दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणादिभिः, अत्रानुषङ्गिणोर्थाः-इन्द्रियनानात्वं नियतविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि स्वविषयग्रहणलिङ्गानि ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानसाधनानि, गन्धादिगुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यं गुणाधिकरणम्, अनियतविषयाश्चेतना इति, पूर्वार्थसिद्धावेतेऽर्थाः सिध्यन्ति, न तैर्विना सोर्थः संभवतीति॥30॥

यत्सिद्धौ yat-siddhau, on and in the proof of which; अन्यप्रकरणसिद्धि anya-prakaraṇa-siddhiḥ, another sub-topic is proved and needed; सः saḥ, that अधिकरण सिद्धान्त adhikaraṇa-siddhāntaḥ, established tenet of a topic of discussion.

30. **A hypothetical dogma** is a tenet which, if accepted leads to the acceptance of another tenet.—30.

"There is a soul aprat from the senses, because it can recognise one and the same object by seeing and touching." If you accept this tenet you must also have accepted the following :—(1) That the senses are more than one, (2) that each of the senses has its particular object, (3) that the soul derives its knowledge through the channels of the senses, (4) that a substance which is distinct from its qualities is the abode of them, etc.

अपरीक्षिताभ्युपगमात्तद्विशेषपरीक्षणम् "अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः"॥ 31॥

यत्र किंचिदर्थजातमपरीक्षितमभ्युपगभ्यते-अस्तु द्रव्यं शब्दः स तु नित्यो अथाऽनित्यः? इति द्रव्यस्य सतो नित्यताऽनित्यता वा तद्विशेषः परीक्ष्यते सोऽभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः, स्वबुद्ध्यतिशयचिख्यापयिषया परबुद्ध्यऽवज्ञानाय प्रवर्तते इति॥31॥

अपरीक्षिताभ्युपगमात् a-parīkṣita-abhyupagamāt, after admission of a tenet without proof of examination; तद्विशेष परीक्षणं tat-vśeṣa-parīkṣaṇnam, examination of particulars concerning it; अभ्युपगम सिद्धान्तः abhyupaga-masidhāntaḥ, established tenet of an admission without proof or of a concession.

31. **An implied dogma** is a tenet which is not explicitly declared as such, but which follows from the examination of particulars concerning it.—31.

The discussion, whether sound is eternal or non-eternal, pre-supposes that it is a substance. "That sound is a substance" is here an implied dogma. [The mind has nowhere been stated in the Nyāya-sūtra to be a sense-organ, but it follows from then particulars examined concerning it that it is so].

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 5 : Definition of Siddhānta : Sūtras 26-31.

A tenet is the statement of the complete demonstration of an object as of a particular character. It may relate to the subject matter (1) of a system of knowledge or (2) of a topic of discussion of (3) of an admission made with a view to the examination of its special nature.

The senses are the powers of smell, etc., the objects of the senses are smell, etc., the earth, etc. are the elements, objects are known by the pramāṇas—these are example of tenets common to all systems of knowledge. Non-existence cannot come into existence, existence cannot pass into non-existence, conscious entities do not change, there are intrinsic differences in the objects of the body, senses and mind as well as in their respective causes—these are peculiar to the Sāṁkhyas, while among the special tenets of the Yogas are; elemental creation is due to the act of the puruṣa, the faults and activity are the causes of acts, conscious entites are endowed with their respective attributes, the non-existent can be brought into existence, what is produced can be destroyed.

The knower is other than the body or the senses, because, *e.g.*, the same object is apprehended by sight and touch (III.i.1)—this is the example os a leading or governing tenet. For from its establishment follows the estalishment of the following : the senses are more than one; the apprehension of their own objects, and are the means of the knower's cognition of objects; substance is other than the attributes of smell, etc., and is the substratum of attributes; consciousness comprehends all objects.

The following is an example of an admitted tenet : Let it be assumed

without examination that sound is a substance. Is it eternal or is it non-eternal? Being a substance it must be either eternal or non-eternal. Let us examine its special character.

अथावयवा:—

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि "अवयवा:"॥ 32॥

दशावयवानेके नैयायिका वाक्य संचक्षते–जिज्ञासा संशय: शक्यप्राप्ति: प्रयोजनं संशयव्युदास इति, ते कस्मान्नोच्यन्तु? इति, तत्राऽप्रतीयतानेऽर्थे प्रत्ययार्थस्य प्रवर्तिका जिज्ञासा, अप्रतीयमानमर्थं कस्मात् जिज्ञासते? तं तत्त्वतो ज्ञातं हास्यामि वोपादास्ये उपेक्षिष्ये वेति, ता एता हानोपादानोपेक्षाबुद्धयस्तत्त्वज्ञानस्यार्थ: तदर्थमयं जिज्ञासते सा खल्वियमसाधनमर्थस्येति। जिज्ञासाधिष्ठानं संशयश्च व्याहतधर्मोपसंघातात् क्व तत्त्वज्ञाने प्रत्यासन्न:? व्याहतयोर्हि धर्मयोरन्यतरत् तत्त्वं भवितुमर्हतीति, स पृथगुपदिष्टोप्यऽसाधनमर्थस्येति। प्रभातु: प्रमाणानि प्रमेयाधिगमार्थानि सा शक्यप्राप्तिर्न साधकस्य वाक्यस्य भागेन युज्यते प्रतिज्ञादिवदिति। प्रयोजनं तत्त्वावधारणम् अर्थसाधकस्य वाक्यस्य फलं नैकदेश इति। संशयव्युदास: प्रतिपक्षोपवर्णनं तत्प्रतिषेधे तत्त्वाभ्यनुज्ञानार्थं न त्वयं साधकवाक्यैकदेश इति। प्रकरणे तु जिज्ञासादय: समर्था:-अवधारणीयार्थोपकारात्, तत्त्वार्थसाधकभावात्तु प्रतिज्ञादय: साधकवाक्यस्य भागा:=एकदेशा:=अवयवा इति॥32॥

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि pratijñā-undāharaṇa-upnaya-nigamanāni, proposition, mark, instance, ratiocination and inference; अवयवा: avayavāḥ, members of a syllogism.

32. The **members** (of a syllogism) are proposition, reason, example, application, and conclusion.—32.

[1. Proposition—This hill is fiery,

2. Reason—Because it is smoky,

3. Example—Whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen,

4. Application—So is this hill (smoky),

5. Conclusion—Therefore this hill is fiery.]

Some lay down *five more members* as follows :—

1. (*a*) Inquiry as to the proposition (jijñāsā).—Is this hill fiery in all its parts, or in particular part?

2. (*a*) Questioning the reason (saṃśaya).—That which you call smoke may be nothing but vapour.

3. (*a*) Capacity of the example to warrant the conclusion (śakyaprāpti)—It is true that smoke is always a concomitant of fire? In a kitchen there are of course both smoke and fire, but in a red-hot iron ball there is no smoke.

4. (*a*) Purpose for drawing the conclusion (prayojana)—Purpose consists in the determination of the true conditions of the hill, in order to ascertain whether it is such that one can approach it, or such that one should avoid it, or such that one should maintain an attitude of indifference towards it.

4. (*b*) Dispelling all questions (saṃśayavyudāsa).—It is beyound all question that the hill is smoky, and that smoke is an invariable concomitant of fire.

तेषां तु यथाविभक्तानाम्—

साध्यनिर्देश: "प्रतिज्ञा"॥ 33॥

प्रज्ञापनीयेन धर्मेण धर्मिणो विशिष्टस्य परिग्रहवचनं प्रतिज्ञा=साध्यनिर्देश:-अनित्य: शब्द इति॥33॥

साध्यनिर्देश: sādhya-nirdeśaḥ, declaration of what is to be established; प्रतिज्ञा pratijñā, proposition.

33. **A proposition** is the declaration of what is to be established.—33.

Sound is non-eternal—this is a proposition.

उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनं "हेतु:"॥ 34॥

उदाहरणेन सामान्यात् साध्यस्य धर्मस्य साधनम्=प्रज्ञापनं हेतु:=साध्ये प्रतिसंधाय धर्मम् उदाहरणे च प्रतिसंधाय तस्य साधनतावचनं हेतु:-उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वादिति, उत्पत्तिधर्मकमनित्यं दृष्टमिति॥34॥

उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात् udāharaṇa-sādharmyāt, through similarity to instance साध्य साधनं sādhya-sadhanaṃ, statement of the means of establishing what is to be established; हेतु: hetuḥ, mark.

34. **The reason** is the means for establishing what is to be establisehd through the *homogeneous* or affirmative character of the example.—34.

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason—Because it is produced,

Example (homogeneous)—Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as pot.

The example "pot" possesses the same character as it implied in the reason, *viz*., "being produced," inasmuch as both are non-eternal.

किमेतावद् हेतुलक्षणमिति? नेत्युच्यते, किं तर्हि?–

"तथा" वैधर्म्यात्॥ 35॥

उदाहरणवैधर्म्याच्च साध्यसाधनं हेतुः, कथम्? अनित्यः शब्द उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात्, अनुत्पत्तिधर्मकं नित्यं यथाऽऽत्मादिद्रव्यमिति॥35॥

तथा tathā, likewise वैधर्म्यात् vaidharmyāt, through dissimilarity to instance.

35. Likewise through *heterogeneous* or *negative* characater.—35.

Proposition—Sound is non eternal,

Reason—Because it is produced,

Example (heterogeneous)—Whatever is not non-eternal is not prodecued, as the soul.

The example "soul" possesses a character heterogeneous to that which is implied in the reason, *viz*, "being produced," inasmuch as one is eternal and the other non-eternal.

साध्यसाधमर्यात्तद्धर्म्मभावी दृष्टान्त "उदाहरणम्"॥ 36॥

साध्येन साधर्म्यम्=समानधर्मता, साध्यसाधर्म्यात् कारणात् तद्धर्मभावी दृष्टान्त इति, तस्य धर्मस्तद्धर्मः तस्य=साध्यस्य, साध्यं च द्विविधम्–धर्मिविशिष्टो वा धर्मः–शब्दस्यानित्यत्वम् 1, धर्मविशिष्टो वा धर्मी–अनित्यः शब्द इति 2, इहोत्तरं तद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यते इति, कस्मात्? पृथग्धर्मवचनात्। तस्य धर्मस्तद्धर्मस्तद्धर्मस्य भावस्तद्धर्मभावः स यस्मिन् दृष्टान्ते वर्तते स दृष्टान्तः साध्यसाधर्म्यात् तद्धर्मभावी भवति स चोदाहरणमिष्यते, तत्र यदुत्पद्यते तदुत्पत्तिधर्मकं तच्च भूत्वा न भवति=आत्मानं जहाति=निरुध्यते इत्यऽनित्यम्, एवमुत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वं साधनम् अनित्यत्वं साध्यम्, सोयमेकस्मिन् द्वयोर्धर्मयोः साध्यसाधनभावः साधर्म्यात् व्यवस्थित उपलभ्यते, तं दृष्टान्ते उपलभमानः शब्देप्यनुमिनोति–शब्दोप्युत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वाद् अनित्यः स्थाल्यादिवदिति। उदाहियतेऽनेन धर्मयोः साध्यसाधनभाव इत्युदाहरणम्॥36॥

साध्यसाधर्म्यात् sādhya-sādharmyāt, through similarity to what is to be established तद्धर्मभावी tat-dharma-bhāvī, in which the property of what is to be established exists; दृष्टान्त dṛṣṭāntaḥ, example; उदाहरणम् udāharaṇam, instance.

36. **A homogeneous (or affirmative example** is a familiar instance which is known to possess the property to be established, and which implies that this property is invariably contained in the reason given.—36.

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason—Because it is produced,

Homogeneous example—Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a pot.

Here "pot" is a familiar instance which possesses the property of non-eternality and implies that whatever is "produced" is attended by the same property (non-eternality).

तद्विपर्ययाद्वा "विपरीतम्"॥ 37॥

"दृष्टान्त उदाहरण" इति प्रकृतम्, साध्यवैधर्म्यादऽतद्धर्मभावी दृष्टान्त उदाहरणमिति–अनित्यः शब्द उत्पत्तिधर्मकात्वाद्, अनुत्पत्तिधर्मकं नित्यमात्मादि, सोयमात्मादिर्दृष्टान्त साध्यवैधर्म्यात्=अनुत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात् अतद्धर्मभावी=योऽसौ साध्यस्य धर्मोऽनित्यत्वं स तस्मिन्न भवतीति, अत्रात्मादौ दृष्टान्ते उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वस्याभावादऽनित्यत्वं न भवतीति उपलभमानः शब्दे विपर्ययमनुमिनोति–उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वस्य भावादनित्यः शब्द इति।

साधर्म्योक्तस्य हेतोः साध्यसाधर्म्यात् तद्धर्मभावी दृष्टान्त उदाहरणम्, वैधर्म्योक्तस्य हेतोः साध्यवैधर्म्यादऽतद्धर्मभावी दृष्टान्त उदाहरणम्, पूर्वस्मिन् दृष्टान्ते यौ तौ धर्मौ साध्यसाधनभूतौ पश्यति साध्येपि तयोः साध्यसाधनभावमनुमिनोति, उत्तरस्मिन् दृष्टान्ते ययोर्धर्मयोरेकसयाऽभावादितरस्याभावं पश्यति तयोरेकस्याऽभावादितरस्याभावं साध्येऽनुमिनोतीति, तदेतद् हेत्वाभासेषु न संभवतीत्यऽहेतवो हेत्वाभासाः। तदिदं हेतूदाहरणयोः सामर्थ्यं परमासूक्ष्मं दुःखबोध पण्डितरूपवेदनीयमिति॥37॥

तद्विपर्यात् tat-viparyayāt, through dissimilarity to what is to be established; वा vā, or; विपरीतम् viparītam, contrary, opposite.

37. A heterogeneous (or negative) example is a familiar instance which is known to be devoid of the property to be established and which implies that the absence of this property is invariably rejected in the reason given.—37.

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal.

Reason—Because it is produced,

Heterogeneous example—Whatever is not non-eternal is not produced, as the soul.

Here the "soul" is a familiar instance which is known to be devoid of the property of non-eternality and implies that if anything were produced, it would necessarily be deprived of the quality of eternality, *i.e.* 'being produced' and 'eternal' are imcompatible epithets.

उदाहरणापेक्षस्तथेत्युपसंहारो न तथेति वा साध्यस्य ''उपनय:'' ॥ 38॥

उदाहरणापेक्ष:=उदाहरणतन्त्र:=उदाहरणवश:, वश:=सामर्थ्यम्। साध्यसाधर्म्ययुक्ते उदाहरणे-स्थाल्यादिद्रव्यमुत्पत्तिधर्मकम् अनित्यं दृष्टं तथा शब्द् उत्पत्तिधर्मक इति साध्यस्य शब्दस्योत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वमुपसंह्रियते, साध्यवैधर्म्ययुक्ते पुनरुदाहरणे-आत्मादिद्रव्यमऽनुत्पत्तिधर्मकं नित्यं दृष्टं न च तथा शब्द इत्यऽनुत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वस्यापसंहारप्रतिषेधेन उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वमुपसंह्रियते, तदिदमुपसंहारद्वैतमुदाहरणद्वैताद् भवति। उपसंह्रियतेऽनेनेति चोपसंहारो वेदितव्य इति। द्विविधस्य पुनर्हेतोर्द्विविधस्य चोदाहरणस्योपसंहारद्वैतं च समानम्।।38।।

उदाहरणपेक्ष: udāharaṇa-apekṣaḥ dependent upon instance; तथा tathā, so. उपसंहार upasaṃhāraḥ winding up, conluding न तथा इति na tathā iti, not so; वा vā, or; साध्यस्य sādhyasya, of what is to be established; उपनय: upanayaḥ. ratiocination.

38. **Application** is a winding up, with reference to the example, of what is to be established as being so or not so.—38.

Application is of two kinds : (1) *Affirmative* and (2) *Negative.* The affirmative application, which is expressed by the word "so," occurs when the example is of an affirmative character. The negative, which is expressed by the phrase "not so," occurs when the example is of a negative character.

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason—Because it is produced,

Example—Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a pot,

Affirmative application—So is sound (produced),

Conclusion—Therefore sound is non-eternal.

Or

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason—Because it is produced,

Example—Whatever is eternal is not produced, as the soul,

Negative application—Sound is not so (i.e., sound is not not-produced),

Conclusion—Therefore sound is not eternal.

हेत्वपदेशात्प्रतिज्ञाया: पुनर्वचनं ''निगमनम्''॥ 39॥

साधर्म्योक्ते वा वैधर्म्योक्ते वा यथोदाहरणमुपसंह्रियते-तस्मादुत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वाऽनित्य: शब्द इति निगमनम्, निगम्यन्तेऽनेनति प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनया एकत्रेति निगमनम्, निगम्यन्ते=समर्थ्यन्ते=संबध्यन्ते। तत्र साधर्म्योक्ते तावद् हेतौ वाक्यम्-अनित्य: शब्द इति प्रतिज्ञा, उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वादिति हेतु: उत्पत्तिधर्मकं स्थाल्यादिद्रव्यमऽनित्यमित्युदाहरणम्, तथा चोत्पत्तिधर्मक: शब्द इत्युपनय:, तस्मादुत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वादऽनित्य: शब्द इति निगमनम्, वैधर्म्योक्तेपि-अनित्य: शब्द: 1, उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात् 2, अनुत्पत्तिधर्मकमात्मादिद्रव्यं नित्यं दृष्टाम् 3, न च तथाऽनुत्पत्तिधर्मक: शब्द: 4, तस्मादुत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वादनित्य: शब्द: 5 इति।

अवयवसमुदाये च वाक्ये संभूयेतरेतराभिसंबन्धात् प्रमाणान्यर्थं साधयन्तीति, संभव: तावत् शब्दविषया प्रतिज्ञा आप्तोपदेशस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां प्रतिसंधानात् अनृषेश्च स्वातन्त्र्यानुपपत्तेरनुमानं हेतु:, उदाहरणे सादृश्यप्रतिपत्ते: तच्चोदाहरणभाष्ये व्याख्यात्-व्रत्यक्षविषयमुदाहरणम्-दृष्टेनादृष्टसिद्धे:, उपमानमुपनय:-तथेत्युपसंहारात्, न च तथेति चोपमानधर्मप्रतिषेधे विपरीतधर्मोपसंहारसिद्धे:, सर्वेषामेकार्थप्रतिपत्तौ सामर्थ्यप्रदर्शनं निगमनमिति।

इतरेतराभिसंबन्धोपि-असत्यां प्रतिज्ञायामनाश्रया हेत्वादयो न प्रवर्तेरन्, असति हेतौ कस्य साधनभाव: प्रदर्श्येत उदाहरणे? साध्ये च कस्योपसंहार: स्यात्? कस्य चापदेशात् प्रतिज्ञाया: पुनर्वचनं निगमनं स्यादिति? असत्युदाहणे कने साधर्म्यं वेधर्म्यं वा साध्यसाधनमुपादीयेत? कस्य वा साधर्म्यवशादुपसंहार: प्रवर्तेत?, उपनयं चान्तेरण साध्येऽनुप-संहृत साधको धर्मो नार्थं साधयेत्? निगमनाभावे च नाऽनभिव्यक्तसंबन्धानां प्रतिज्ञादीना-मेकार्थेन प्रतीयेतार्थप्रतिपादकत्वम्? इति।

अथावयत्रार्थ:—साध्यस्य धर्मस्य धर्मिणा संबन्धोपादानं प्रतिज्ञार्थ:, उदाहरणेन समानस्य विपरीतस्य वा साध्यस्य धर्मस्य साधकभाववचनं हेत्वर्थ:, धर्मयो: साध्याधन-भावप्रदर्शनमेकत्र उदाहरणार्थ:, साधनभूतस्य धर्मस्य साध्येन धर्मेण सामानाधिकरण्योप-पदानमुपनयार्थ:, उदाहरणस्थयोर्धर्मयो: साध्यसाधनभावोपपत्तौ साधये विपरीतप्रसङ्गप्रतिषेधार्थं निगमनम्।

न चैतस्यां हेतूदाहरणपरिशुद्धौ सत्यां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानस्य विकल्पात् जातिनिग्रहस्थानबहुत्वं प्रक्रमते-अव्यवस्थाप्य खलु धर्मयो: साध्यसाधनभावमुदाहरणे जातिवादी प्रत्यवतिष्टते, व्यवस्थिते तु खलु धर्मयो: साध्यसाधनभावे दृष्टान्तस्थे गृह्यमाणे साधनभूतस्य धर्मस्य हेतुत्वेनोपादानं न साधर्म्यमात्रस्य न वैधर्म्यमात्रस्य वेति।।39।।

हेत्वपदेशात् hetu-apadeśāt, after statement of the mark; प्रतिज्ञाया: pratijñāyāḥ, of proposition; पुनर्वचनं punaḥ-vachanam, re-statement; निगमनम् nigamanam, inference.

39. **Conclusion** is the re-stating of the proposition, after the reason has been mentioned.—39.

Conclusion is the confirmation of the proposition, after the reason and the example have been mentioned.

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason—Because it is produced,

Example—Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a pot,

Application—So is sound (produced).

Conclusion—Therefore sound is non-eternal.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 6 : Definition of Nyāya : Sūtras 32-39.

The avayavas or members are the integral parts of an argument designed to establish a particular object. They are five in number. Some add five more, *viz.* inquiry, doubt, capacity, purpose and removal of doubt. But they are not integral parts of a Nyāya. Inquiry is for the sake of the true knowledge of an object which is yet unknown. True is for the sake of the acquisition or avoidance of the object or of indifference to it. When one makes such an inquiry another proceeds to demonstrate the object. Inquiry therefore cannot be a part of the argument of demonstration. Similarly, doubt which gives rise to the inquiry, emberaces contradictory attributes and therefore cannot be an antecedent or proximate condition of cognition; for only one or the other of two contradictory attributes can be the truth. Capacity is the capacity of the pramāṇas to make the prameya known to the knower, if the prameya is capable of being known at all. It cannot properly be a part of the demonstrative argument. Purpose is the ascertainment of the truth. It is the result of the argument and not its part. Removal of doubt is the censure of the opposite view and its preclusion for the sake of grasping the truth. It is not a part of the argument. Inquiry and the rest help to fix the object to be ascertained; proposition and the other four members help to demonostrate the truth about it.

Proposition is the enunciation of a thing as possessing the attribute which is going to be demonstrated. *E.g.* Sound is non-eternal.

Reason is the means of the demonstration of the attribute in question through the generic nature of the attribute as shown by its existence in the Exmaple. *E.g.* because it is a product. A product which is non-eternal, has been seen.

The reason may be negative also. *E.g.* Sound is non-eternal, because products which are eternal, are the soul and similar substances,

The sādhya or the thing to be demonstrated may be an attribute, *e.g.* non-etrnality of sound, or a thing prossessing an attribute, *e.g.* non-eternal sound. In the text (I. i. 36) "Tat" refers to the latter as "dharma," attribute, is separately mentioned. A Dṛṣṭānta, Example, becomes an Udāharaṇa, Instance or reference, when it possesses the attribute as possessing which the thing in question is to be demonstrated, as necessary consequence of another attribute which it possesses in common with the thing. The instance therefore is the statement of the relation between the two attributes as of that which is to be demonstrated and that which is the means of its demonstration. *E.g.* The attribute, to be product, is common to sound and pot; in the pot the attribute to be product, is the cause of the attribute, to be non-eternal; the attribute, is to be demonstrated in the case of sound; therefore, a pot possessing the attribute of non-eternality which is to be demonstrated in the case of sound as a necessary consequence of its attribute of being a products which it possesses in common with sound, fulfils the function of an Instance in the argument. Similarly an Instance may be of the negative kind. *E. g.* sound is non-eternal, because it is a product; non-products are eternal, such as the soul, etc. Here the soul, etc. are negative Instances.

The force of the Reason and the Instance is very subtle, difficult to understand, to be comprehended only by great scholars.

Application is the statement which brings forward the attribute as such and such or not as such and such which the thing to be demonstrated possesses in common with the Instance. Application is either positive or negative according as the Instance or the Reason is positive or negative. *E.g.* a pot is a product, non-eternal; so is sound a product. The attribute of sound that it is a product is thus brought forward. Similarly, the soul is not a product, eternal; so is not sound. By the negation its attribute of being a product is brought forward (The Instance shows the universal concomitance of the reason and the thing to be demonstrated. Application is the bringing forward of such a reason in the thing to be established.)

Nigamana or conclusion is the bringing together of the Proposition, Reason, Instance and Application. *E.g.* sound is non-eternal, because it is a product.

In the statement of the argument consisting of the members the pramāṇas appear together and through mutual conection demonstrate

the object. Their concurrence is shown thus : The proposition that sound is non-eternal, comes form Testimony. For, Perception and Inference corroborate it, and he who is not a Ṛṣi, is not independent of them. The Instance is an object of perception. Comparison is the Application. Conclusion is the exhibition of the capacity of all of them to demonstrate one single object. Their mutual connection or inter-relation appears thus : The Proposition renders the operation of the reason, etc. possible. The Reason furnishes the means of demonstration; is brought forward in the Instance and the thing to be demonstrated; and by its predication makes the re-statement of the proposition in the Conclusion possible. The Instance furnishes the resemblance or difference as the means of the demonstration of the thing; and makes Application possible through resemblance to it. Without Application the attribute which is the cause of demonstration cannot be brought forward in the thing, and the it cannot in consequence demonstrate the object. Without Conclusion the proposition, etc., as isolated, cannot operate towards the same end and therefore cannot produce demonstration.

The function of the Proposition is to connect the attribute to be demonstrated with the thing. The function of the Reason is to state that the attribute to be demonstrated, whether it be similar or dissimilar to Instance, is the cause of demonstration. The function of the Instance is to show that the two attributes are related in the same substratum as the thing to be demonstrated and the means of demonstration. The function of Application is the establishment of the co-existence of the attribute which is the means of demonstration with the attribute which is to be demonstrated. Conclustion serves the purpose to exclude contrary suggestion against the establishment of the relation of that which is to be demonstrated and that which is the means of domonstration between the attribute present in the Instance.

On the clear definition of the Reason and Instance there cannot arise multiplicity of Futility and Occasion for Rebuke (*Cf.* I.ii.20) through varieties of opposition by means of resemblance and difference. He who uses Futility offers opposition wihout determining the inferential relation of the two attributes in the Instance. The inferential relation of the two attributes being grapsed as established in the Instance the attribute which is determind as the means of demonstration, is adopted as the reason, and not mere resemblance nor mere difference.

अत ऊर्ध्वं तर्को लक्षणीयस्तर्क इति–

अविज्ञाततत्त्वेऽर्थे कारगोपपत्तितस्तत्त्वज्ञानार्थमूहः "तर्कः"॥ 40॥

अथेदमुच्यते–अविज्ञायमानतत्त्वेऽर्थे जिज्ञासा तावज्जायते–जानीये इममर्थमिति, अथ

जिज्ञासितस्य वस्तुनो व्याहतौ धर्मौ विभागेन विमृशति–किंस्विदित्येवम्? आहोस्विन्नैवम्? इति, विमृश्यमानयोर्धर्मयोरेकं कारणोपपत्त्याऽनुजानाति–संभवत्यस्मिन् कारणम्=प्रमाणम्=हेतुरिति, कारणोपपत्त्या स्यादेवमेतद् नेतरदिति।

तत्र निदर्शनम्–योऽयं ज्ञाता ज्ञातव्यमर्थं जानीते तं च भो तत्त्वतो जानीते इति जिज्ञासा, स किमुत्पत्तिधर्मको वाऽनुत्पत्तिधर्मक इतिः? विमर्शः, विमृश्यमानेऽविज्ञाततत्त्वेऽर्थे यस्य धर्मस्याऽभ्यनुज्ञाकारणमुपपद्यते तमनुजानाति–यद्ययमनुत्पत्तिधर्मकस्ततः स्वकृतस्य कर्मणः फलमनुभवति ज्ञाता, दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरमुत्तरं पूर्वस्य पूर्वस्य कारणम् उत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तराभावादपवर्ग इति स्यातां संसारापवर्गौ, उत्पत्तिधर्मके ज्ञातरि पुनर्न स्याताम्–उत्पन्नः खलु ज्ञाता देहेन्द्रियबुद्धिवेदनाभिः संबध्यते इति नाऽस्येदं स्वकृतस्य कर्मणः फलम्–उत्पन्नश्च भूत्वा न भवतीति तस्याऽविद्यमानस्य निरुद्धस्य वा स्वकृतकर्मणः फलोपभोगो नास्ति तदेवमेकस्याऽनेकशरीरयोगः शरीरवियोगश्चात्यन्तं न स्यादिति। यत्र कारणमनुपपद्यमानं पश्यति तन्नानुजानाति, सोयमेवंलक्षण ऊहस्तर्क इत्युच्यते।

कथं पुनरयं तत्त्वज्ञानार्थे न तत्ज्ञानमेवेति? अनवधारणात्=अनुजानात्ययमेकतरं धर्मं कारणोपपत्त्या, न त्ववधारयति=न व्यवस्यति=न निश्चिनोति–एवमेवेदमिति। कथं तत्त्वज्ञानार्थ इति? तत्त्वज्ञानविषयाभ्यनुज्ञालक्षणादूहाद् भावितात् प्रसन्नादनन्तरं प्रमाणसामर्थ्यात् तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते इत्येवं तत्त्वज्ञानार्थ इति। सोयं तर्कः प्रमाणानि प्रतिसंदधानः प्रमाणाभ्युज्ञानात् प्रमाणसहितो वादे प्रदिष्ट इति अविज्ञाततत्त्वमनुजानाति यथा सोऽर्थो भवति तस्य यथाभावः तत्त्वम्=अविपर्ययः=याथातथ्यंम्॥40॥

अविज्ञाततत्त्वे a-vijñāta-tattve, trune nature of which is not known; अर्थे arthe, in the case of an object; कारणोपपत्तितः kāraṇa-upapatti-taḥ, by showing the appropriateness of the desired causes; तत्त्वज्ञानार्थम् tattva-jñāna-artham, for the purpose of knowledge of ture nature, ऊहः ūhaḥ, reasoning; तर्क tarkaḥ, confutation, reductio ad absurdum.

40. **Confutation,** which is carried on for ascertaining the real character of a thing of which the character is not known, is reasoning which reveals the character by showing the absurdity of all contrary characters.—40.

Is the soul eternal or non-eternal? Here the real character of the soul, *viz.*, whether it is eternal, or non-eternal, is not known. In ascertaining the character, we reason as follows :—if the soul were non-eternal, it would be impossible for it to enjoy the fruits of its won actions, to undergo transmigration, and to attain final release. But such

a conclusion is absurd : such possibilities are known to belong to the soul : therefore, we must admit that the soul is eternal.

अस्मिंश्च तर्कविषये–

विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणं "निर्णयः"॥ 41॥

स्थापना=साधनं प्रतिषेधः=उपालम्भः तौ साधनोपालम्भौ पक्षप्रतिपक्षाश्रयौ व्यतिषक्तावऽनुबन्धेन प्रवर्तमानौ पक्षप्रतिपक्षावित्युच्येते, तयोरन्यतरस्य निवृत्तिरेकतरस्याऽवस्थानमवश्यम्भावि यस्यावस्थानं तस्यावधारणं निर्णयः, नेदं पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणं संभवतीति। एको हि प्रतिज्ञातमर्थं तं हेतुतः स्थापयति प्रतिषिद्धं चोद्धरतीति, द्वितीयस्य द्वितीयेन स्थापनाहेतुः प्रतिषिध्यते तस्यैव प्रतिषेधहेतुश्चोद्ध्रियते स निवर्तते, तस्य निवृतौ योऽवतिष्ठते तेनार्थावधारणं निर्णयः उभाभ्यामेवार्थावधारणमित्याह। कया युक्त्या? एकस्य संभवो द्वितीयस्याऽसंभवः, तावेतौ संभवासंभवौ विमर्शं सह निवर्तयत उभयसंभवे, उभयासंभवे त्वऽनिवृत्तो विमर्श इति। विमृश्येति=विमर्शं कृत्वा, सोयं विमर्शः पक्षप्रतिपक्षावऽवद्योत्य न्यायं प्रवर्तयतीत्युपादीयते इति, एतच्च विरुद्धयोरेकधर्मिस्थयोर्बोद्धव्यम्।

यत्र तु धर्मिसामान्यगतौ विरुद्धौ धर्मौ हेतुतः संभवतस्तत्र समुच्चयः–हेतुतोऽर्थस्य तथाभावोपपत्तेः यथा–'क्रियावद् द्रव्यम्' इतिलक्षणवचने यस्य द्रव्यस्य क्रियायोगो हेततुः संभवति तत् क्रियावत् यस्य न संभवति तदक्रियमिति। एकधर्मिस्थयोश्च विरुद्धयार्धर्मयेरयुगपद्भाविनोः कालविकल्पो यथा–तदेव द्रव्यं क्रियायुक्तं क्रियावत्, अनुत्पन्नोपरतक्रियं पुनरक्रियमिति।

न चायं निर्णये नियमः–विमृश्यैव पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणं निर्णय इति किं तु इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षेऽर्थावधारणं निर्णय इति, परीक्षाविषये तु विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणं निर्णयः, शास्त्रे वादे च विमर्शवर्जम्॥41॥

॥ इति वात्स्यायनीये न्यायभाष्ये प्रथमाऽध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकं समाप्तम्॥

॥ प्रथमाऽध्यायश्च समाप्तः॥

विमृश्य vimṛśya, arguing; पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यां pakṣa-pratipakṣābhyām, from opposite positions; अर्थावधारणं artha-avadhāraṇam, determination object; निर्णयः nirṇayaḥ, ascertainment.

41. **Ascertainment** is the removal of doubt, and the determination of a question, by hearing two opposite sides.—41.

A person wavers and doubts if certain statements are advanced to him by one of two parties, but opposed by the other party. His doubt is not removed until by the application of reason he can vindicate either of the parties. The process by which the vindication is effected is called ascertainment. Ascertainment is not, however, in all case preceded directly. So also we ascertion things directly by the authority of scriptures, or through discussion. But in the case of investigation, doubt must precede ascertainment.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 7 : Definition of the Accessories of a Nyāya : Sūtras 40-41.

Tarka, Hypothesis, is cogtiation or conjecture, for the sake of knowledge of truth, in respect of an unknown object by the elimination of contrary suppositions. To take the example of the soul : Is it a product or a non-product? This is Vimarśa. contraposition of two opposite attributes. Assent is given to the one or the other according as the reason for such assent is forthcoming. If the soul is a non-product, it will experience the fruit of its action, and will on the eradication of the cause of re-birth attain release; saṃsāra and release will thus be possible. If it is a product, these will not be possible. For its connection with the body, etc. will not be the result ot its action. Neither will there be the experience of the fruit of its own action. In this situation one gives one's assent to the supposition which is based on reason, *i.e.* serves to explain the phenomena of re-birth and release. Cogitation or conjecture (Ūha) in this form is called Tarka, hypothesis. This is not knowledge of the truth which ascertains, determines, makes certain that the soul is such and such and nothing else. It is for the purpose of the knowledge of the truth. It leaves the supposition to which assent is given, to hold the field undisputed; after which knowledge of the truth is produced through the force of the pramāṇas..

Ascertainment is the determination of an object, after doubt, by means of the thesis and the counter-thesis. Here thesis means affirmation; and counter-thesis, negation. In a controversy one of these ultimately must cease and the other must stand. Ascertainment is the determination which will stand. But the determination of an object cannot be possible by means of thesis and counter-thesis. What really happens is this : The speaker supports the object proposed with reasons and attacks its negation. The opponent contradicts the reasons put forward by the speaker and repels the attack on the negation urged by himself. In the result the reasons and attacks either of the speaker or of the opponent cease. That which remains, whether the thesis or the counter-thesis, is one, and by means of it the object is determined. Such determination is ascertainment.

Vimarśa, contraposition, helps Nyāya by distinguishing two contrary positions, and has reference to contraries residing in the same substratum. But where contradictory attributes of the individuals, there is not contraposition but collocation. *E.g.* some substances are active, some are inactive. Again, in the same substratum contradictory attributes may appear at different time *E.g.* a substance may be active at one moment and inactive at another moment.

Contraposition is not required in every case of ascertainment. In perception the determination of an object through the contact of the sense and object is ascertainment. Similarly in matters of Śāstra and Discourse there is no room for Contraposition. For Śāstra, *e.g.* by Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice one attains heaven, there can be no doubt. In Discourse both the speaker and the opponent are sure of their grounds. Contraposition applies only in cases of Examination or investigation.

॥ इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने प्रथमस्याऽध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम्॥1॥

BOOK I, CHAPTER II

(प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भस्सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पञ्चावयवोपपन्नः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो "वादः"॥ 1॥)

एकाधिकरणस्थौ विरुद्धौ धर्मौ पक्षप्रतिपक्षौ-प्रत्यनीकभावात्-अस्त्यात्मा नास्त्यात्मेति। नानाधिकरणस्थौ विरुद्धौ न पक्षप्रतिपक्षौ यथा नित्य आत्मा, अनित्यो बुद्धिरिति। परिग्रहः= अभ्युपगमव्यवस्था, सोयं पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वादः तस्य विशेषणम्-प्रमाणतर्क-साधनोपालम्भः=प्रमाणैस्तर्केण च साधनमुपालम्भश्चास्मिन् क्रियते इति। साधनम्=स्थापना, उपालम्भः=प्रतिषेधस्तौ साधनोपालम्भौ उभयोरपि पक्षयोर्व्यतिषक्तौ=अनुबद्धौ यावदेको निवृत्त एकतरो व्यवस्थित इति, निवृत्तस्योपालम्भः व्यवस्थितस्य साधनमिति। जल्पे निग्रहस्थानविनियोगाद् वादे तत्प्रतिषेधः। प्रतिषेधे कस्यचिदभ्यनुज्ञानार्थं सिद्धान्ताऽविरुद्ध इतिवचनम्। सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी विरुद्ध इतिं हेत्वाभासस्य निग्रहस्थानस्याऽभ्यनुज्ञा वादे।

पञ्चावयवोपपन्न इति-"हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन न्यूनम् 5-2-12", "हेतूदाहरणाधिकमधिकम् 5-2-13" इति चैतयोरभ्यनुज्ञानार्थमिति। अवयवेषु प्रमाणतर्कान्तर्भावे पृथक् प्रमाणतर्कग्रहणं साधनोपालम्भव्यतिषङ्गज्ञापनार्थम् अन्यथोभावपि पक्षौ स्थापनाहेतुना प्रवृत्तौ वाद इति स्यात्। अन्तरेणापि चावयवसंबन्धं प्रमाणन्यर्थं साधयन्तीति दृष्टं तेनापि कल्पेन साधनोपालम्भौ वादे भवत इति ज्ञापयति। "छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो जल्पः 2" इतिवचनाद् विनिग्रहो वाद इति मा विज्ञायि=छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानासाधनोपालम्भ एव जल्पः प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भो वाद एवेति मा विज्ञायीत्येवमर्थं पृथक् प्रमाणतर्कग्रहणम्॥1॥

प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भः: pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana-upālambhaḥ, proof and disproof, affirmation and negation, by means of pramāṇas or proofs or instruments of right knowledge and tarka or confutation; सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः: siddhānta-a-viruddhaḥ, not opposed to the established tenets; पञ्चावयपोपपन्नः: pañcha-avayava-upapannaḥ, presenting the five members of the

syllogism; पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रह: pakṣa-pratipakṣa-parigrahaḥ, admission of opposite views on the same subject; वाद: vādaḥ, discussion.

42. **Discussion** is the adoption of one of two opposing sides. What is adopted is analysed in the form of five members, and defended by the aid of any of the means of right knowledge, while its opposite is assailed by confutation, without deviation from the established tenets—1.

[*A dialogue* or *disputation* (kathā) is the adoption of aside by a disputant and its opposite by his opponent. It is of three kinds, *viz. discussion* which aims at ascertaining the truth, *wrangling* which aims at gaining victory, and *cavil* which aims at fiuding mere faults. A *discutient* is one who engages himself in a disputation as a means of seeking the truth].

An instance of discussion is given below :—

Discutient—There is soul.

Opponent—There is no soul.

Discutient—Soul is existent (proposition).

Because it is an abode of consciousness (reason).

Whatever is not existent, is not an abode of consciousness, as a here's horn (negative example).

Soul is not so, that is, should is an abode of consciousness (nagative applicaiton).

Therefore soul is existent (conclusion).

Opponent—Soul is non-existent (proposition).

Because, etc.

Discutient—The scripture which is a verbal testimony declares the existence of soul.

Opponent ... ...

Discutient—If there were no soul, it would not be possible to apprehend one and the same object, through sight and touch.

Opponent ... ...

Discutient—The doctrine of soul harmonises well with the various tenets which we hold, *viz.* that there are eternal things, that everybody

enjoys pleasure or suffers pain, according to his own actions, etc. Therefore, there is soul.

[The discussion will be considerably lengthened if the opponents happens to be a Buddhist, who does not admit the authority of scripture and holds that there are no eternal things, etc.]

यथोक्तोपपन्नश्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो "जल्प:"॥ 2॥

यथोक्तोपपन्न इति प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भ: सिद्धान्ताविरुद्ध: पञ्चवयवोपपन्न: पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रह:। छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानासाधनोपालम्भ इति-छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानै: साधनमुपालम्भश्चस्मिन् क्रियते इत्येवंविशेषणो जल्प:।

न खलु वे छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानै: साधनं कस्यचिदर्थस्य संभवति-प्रतिधार्थतैवैषां सामान्यलक्षणे विशेषलक्षणे च श्रूयते-"वचनविधातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या छलम् 1-2-10" "साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जाति: 1-2-19", "विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिश्च निग्रहस्थानम् 1-2-19" इति, विशेषलक्षणेष्वपि यथास्वमिति? न चेतद्विजानीयात्-प्रतिषेधार्थतयैवार्थं साधयन्तीति, 'छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानोपालम्भो जल्प:' इत्येवमप्युच्यमाने विज्ञायते एतदिति-प्रमाणै: साधनोपालम्भयोश्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानामङ्गभाव: स्वपक्षरक्षणर्थत्वात् न स्वतन्त्राणां साधनभाव:=यत्तत् प्रमाणैरर्थस्य साधनं तत्र छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानामङ्गभावो रक्षणार्थत्वात्-तानि हि प्रयुज्यमानानि परपक्षविघातेन स्वपक्षं रक्षन्ति तथा चोक्तम्-"तत्त्वाधयवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे बीजप्ररोहरक्षणार्थं कण्टकशाखावरणवत् 4-2-50" इति, यश्चासो प्रमाणै: प्रतिपक्षस्योपालम्भस्तस्य चैतानि प्रयुज्यमानानि प्रतिषेध-विघातसहकारीणि भवन्ति, तदेवमङ्गीभूतानां छलादीनामुपादानं जल्पे न स्वतन्त्राणं साधनभाव:, उपालम्भे तु स्वातन्त्र्यमप्यस्तीति॥2॥

यथोक्तोपपन्न: yathā-nakta-upapannaḥ, presented as stated *i.e.* possessing all the characteristics of a discussion; छलजातिनिग्रहस्थान-साधनोपालम्भ: chhala-jāti-nigrahasthāna-sādhana-upālambhaḥ, affirmation and negation by means of quibbling, futility, and opponent's errors; जल्प jalpaḥ, sophistry.

43. **Wrangling**, which aims at gaining victory, is the defence or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid, by quibbles, futilities, and other processes which deserve rebuke—2.

A *wrangler* is one who, engaged in a disputation, aims only at victory, being indifferent whether the arguments which he employs support his own contention or that of his opponent, provided that he

can make : pretext for bragging that he has taken an active part in the disputa.ion.

स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहिनो "वितण्डा" ॥ 3॥

स:=जल्पो वितण्डा भवति, किंविशेषण:? प्रतिपक्षस्थापनया हीन:=यौ तौ समानाधिकरणौ विरुद्धौ धर्मौ पक्षप्रतिपक्षावित्युक्तं तयोरेतरं वैतण्डिको न स्थापयतीति, परपक्षप्रतिषेधेनैव प्रवर्तते इति। अस्तु तर्हि 'स प्रतिपक्षहीनो वितण्डा'? यद्वै खलु तत् परप्रतिषेधलक्षणं वाक्यं स वैतण्डिकस्य पक्ष:, न त्वसो साध्यं कंचिदर्थं प्रतिज्ञाय स्थापयतीति तस्माद् यथान्यासमेवास्त्विति॥3॥

स: saḥ, that, *i.e.* sophistry; प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीन: pratipakṣa sthāpanāhīnaḥ, without the demonstration of one of the opposite views; वितण्डा vitaṇḍā. cavil.

44. **Cavil** is a kind of wrangling, which consists in mere attacks on the opposite side—3.

A caviller does not endeavour to establish anything, but confines himself to mere carping at the arguments of his opponent.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 1 : Definition of Kathā (Discourse) : Sūtras 1-3.

There are three forms of Discourse, Vāda or discussion (with elders), and Jalpa or sophistry and Vitaṇḍā or cavil (among rivals). Vāda consists in the advancement of the thesis and counter-thesis, *i.e.* contradictory attributes residing in the same substratum; *e.g.* the soul exists, the soul does not exist. Such contradictories as reside in different substrata, *e.g.* the soul is eternal, cognition is non-eternal, do not form thesis and counterthesis. In Vāda the thesis is maintained by showing its absurdity, and *vice-versa.* When in the process one is silenced the other is estabilshed. There is no room for the Occasion for Rebuke in Vāda, as its place has been assigned to Jalpa (I. ii 2). One form of Occasion for Rebuke, *viz.* the fallacy of reason called the contradictory (I. ii. 6) is permitted in Vāda, as also are "Saying too little" (V. ii. 12) and "Saying too much" (V. ii. 13). In the text (I. ii. 1), "Pramāṇatarka", though included in "Avayava," are separately mentioned to show that the establishment of the thesis only is to be done b pramāṇas, and the negation by tarka. In Vāda the maintenance of the thesis and the negation of the counter-thesis may be done also by the pramāṇas, *e.g.* perception, etc., independently of the five members of a Nyāya. The maintenance of the thesis and the negation of the counter-thesis are equally the functions of Vāda whereas negation is the main function of Jalpa.

As in Vāda the thesis is maintained by means of pramāṇas and the counter-thesis is negatived by means of tarkas, so in Jalpa these two objects are achieved by means of Chhala, Jāti and Nigrahasthāna. These however fulfil a negatie function, as is clear form their definitions (I. ii. 10,18,19). They therefore, do not directly serve to maintain or establish the thesis. But they do say indirectly by lending support to the pramāṇas establishing the thesis, by the negation of the counter-thesis (vide IV.ii. 50). Jalpa thus subserves Vāda.

Vitaṇḍā, on the other hand, is mere negation. It lends no support to the maintenance either of the thesis or of any counter-thesis. Nor does it seek to establish any thesis of its own. It is not directed to any such end. In this it is distinguished form Jalpa.

हेतुलक्षणभावदहेतवो हेतुसामान्याद् हेतुवादाभासमाना:, ते इमे–

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धप्रकरणसमसाध्यसमकालातीता "हेत्वाभासा:" ॥ 4॥

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धप्रकरणसमसाध्यसमकालातीता: savyabhichāra-virnddha-prakaraṇasama sādhyasama-kālāūṭāḥ, erratic or multifarious, contradictory, synonymous with the prakaraṇa or subject under discussion, synonymous with what is to be established, and time-expired; हेत्वाभासा: hetu-ābhāsāḥ, pseudo-marks.

45. **Fallacies of a reason** are the erratic, the contradictory, the equal to the question, the unproved, and the mistimed.—4.

तेषाम्–

अनैकान्तिक: "सव्यभिचार:" ॥ 5॥

व्यभिचार:=एकत्राऽव्यवस्था, सह व्यभिचारेण वर्तते इति सव्यभिचार:, निदर्शनम्–नित्य: शब्दोऽपर्शतवात्, स्पर्शवान् कुम्भोऽनित्यो दृष्टो न च तथा स्पर्शवान् शब्दस्तस्माद् अस्पर्शत्वात् नित्य: शब्द इति। दृष्टान्ते स्पर्शवत्त्वमनित्यत्वं च धर्मौ न साध्यसाधनभूतौ दृश्येते–स्पर्शवांश्चाऽणुर्नित्यश्चेति। आत्मादौ च दृष्टान्ते "उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनं हेतु: 1-1-34" इति, अस्पर्शत्वादिति हेतुर्नित्यत्वं व्यभिचरति–अस्पर्शा बुद्धिरनित्या चेति, एवं द्विविधेपि दृष्टान्तु व्यभिचारात् साध्यसाधनभावो नास्तीति लक्षणभावादहेतुरिति। नित्यत्वमप्येकोऽन्त: अनित्यत्पमप्येकोऽन्त: एकस्मिन्नन्ते विद्यते इत्येकान्तिको विपर्ययादऽनैकान्तिक:–उभयान्तव्यापकत्वादिति॥5॥

अनैकान्तिकः ana-eka-antikaḥ, not-one-pointed; सव्यभिचारः savyabhichāraḥ, erratic.

46. The **erratic** is the reason which leads to more conclusions than one—5.

An instance of the *erratic* is given below :—

Proposition—Sound is eternal,

Erratic reason—Because it is intangible,

Example—Whatever is intangible is eternal, as atoms,

Applicaiton—So is sound (intangible),

Conclusion—Therefore sound is eternal.

Again :

Propositon—Sound is non-eternal,

Erratic reason—Because it is intangible,

Example—Whatever is intangible, is non-eternal, as intellect,

Application—So is sound (intangible).

Conclusion—Therefore sound is non-eternal.

Here from the reason there have been drawn two opposite conclusions, *viz.*, : that sound is eternal, and that sound is non-eternal. The reason or middle term is erratic when it is not pervaded by the major term, that is, when there is no universal connection between the major term and the middle term, as pervader and pervaded. "Intangible" is pervaded neither by 'eternal' not by 'non-eternal.' In fact, there is no universal connection between 'intangible' and 'eternal' or 'non-eternal.'

सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी "विरुद्धः"। 6॥

तं विरुणद्धीति तद्विरोधी=अभ्युपेतं सिद्धान्तं व्याहन्तीति, यथा-सोऽयं विकारो व्यक्तेरपैति नित्यत्वप्रतिषेधात्, अपेतोप्यस्ति विनाशप्रतिषेधात्, न नित्यो विकार उपपद्यते इत्येवं हेतुः 'व्यक्तेरेतोपि विकारोस्ति' इत्यनेन स्वसिद्धान्तेन विरुध्यते।

कथम्?, व्यक्तिः=आत्मलाभः अपायः=प्रच्युतिः, यद्यात्मलाभात् प्रच्युतो विकारोस्ति? नित्यत्वप्रतिषेधो नोपपद्यते-यद् व्यक्तेरपेतस्यापि विकारस्याऽस्तित्वं तत् खलु नित्यत्वमिति, नित्यत्वप्रतिषेधो नाम विकारस्याऽऽत्मलाभात् प्रच्युतेरुपपत्तिः-यदात्मलाभात् प्रच्यवते तदऽनित्यं दृष्टम्, यदस्ति न तदात्मलाभात् प्रच्युतिरिति विरुद्धावेतौ धर्मौ न सह संभवत इति, सोयं हेतुर्यं सिद्धान्तमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तते तमेव व्याहन्तीति॥6॥

सिद्धान्तम् siddhāntam, established tenet; अभ्युपेत्य abhyupetya,

admitting or depending upon, तद्विरोधी tat-virodhī, contradictory thereof, विरुद्धः viruddhaḥ, contradictory.

47. The **contradictory** is the reason which opposes what is be established—6.

Proposition—A pot is produced,

Contradictory reason—Because it is eternal.

Here the reason is contradictory, because that which is eternal is never produced.

यस्मात्प्रकरणचिन्ता स निर्णयार्थमपदिष्टः "प्रकरणसमः"॥ 7॥

विमर्शाधिष्ठानौ पक्षप्रतिपक्षावुभौ अनवसितौ प्रकरणं तस्य चिन्ता, विमर्शात् प्रभृति प्राङ् निर्णयात् यत् समीक्षणं सा जिज्ञासा यत्कृता स निर्णयार्थं प्रयुक्तः उभयपक्षसाम्यात् प्रकरणमनतिवर्तमानः प्रकरणसमो निर्णयाय न प्रकल्पते। प्रज्ञापनं तु-अनित्यः शब्दो नित्यधर्मानुपलब्धेरिति, अनुपलभ्यमाननित्यधर्मकमऽनित्यं दृष्टं स्थाल्यादि, नित्यः शब्दोऽनित्यधर्मानुपलब्धेः अनुपलभ्यमानाऽनित्यधर्मकं नित्यं दृष्टमाकाशादि (इति)।

यत्र समानो धर्मः संशयकारणं हेतुत्वेनोपादीयते स संशयसमः सव्यभिचार एव, या तु विमर्शस्य विशेषापेक्षिता उभयपक्षविशेषानुपलब्धिश्च सा प्रकरणं प्रवर्तयति-यथा शब्दे नित्यधर्मो नोपलभ्यते एवमनित्पधर्मोपि, सेयमुभयपक्षविशेषानुपलब्धिः प्रकरणचिन्तां प्रवर्यति। कथम्? विपर्यये हि प्रकरणनिवृत्तेः-यदि नित्यधर्मः शब्दे गृह्यते? न स्यात् प्रकरणं, यदि वाऽनित्यधर्मो गृह्येत? एवमपि निवर्तेत प्रकरणम्। सोयं हेतुरुभौ पक्षौ प्रवर्तयन् अन्यतरस्य निर्णयाय न प्रकल्पते॥7॥

यास्मात् yasmāt, whence; प्रकणचिन्ता prakaraṇa-chintā, discussion of the subject; सः saḥ, that; निर्णयार्थम् nirṇaya-artham, for the purpose the inference; अपदिष्ट apadiṣṭaḥ, assigned; प्रकरणसमः prakaraṇa-samaḥ synonysous with the subject under consideration.

48. **Equal to the question** is the reason which provokes the very question, for the solution of which it was employed.—7.

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason which is *equal to the question*—Because it is not possessed the attribute of eternality.

'Non-eternal' is the same as 'not possessed of the attribute of eternality.' In determining the question, whether sound is non-eternal,

the reason given is that sound is non-eternal, or, in other words, the reason begs the question.

साध्याविशिष्टस्साध्यत्वात् "साध्यसम:"॥ 8॥

द्रव्यं छायेति साध्यं गतिमत्त्वादिति हेतु: साध्येनाविशिष्ट:-साधनीयत्वात् साध्यसम:=अयमप्यसिद्धत्वात् साध्यवत् प्रज्ञापयितव्य:, साध्यं तावदेतत् किं पुरुषवच्छायापि गच्छति? आहोस्वित् आवरकद्रव्ये संसर्पति आवरणसंतानादसंनिधिसंतानोयं तेजसो गृह्यते? इति, सर्पता खलु द्रव्येण यो यस्तेजोल्भाग आव्रियते तस्य तस्याऽसंनिधिरेवाऽविच्छिन्नो गृह्यते इति। आवरणं तु प्राप्तिप्रतिषेध:॥8॥

साध्याविशिष्ट: sādhya-aviśiṣṭaḥ, not distinguished from what is to be established; साध्यत्वात् sādhya-tvāt, requiring to be established; साध्यसम: sādhya-samaḥ, synonymous with what is to be established.

49. The **unproved** is the reason which stands in need of proof, in the same way as the proposition does—8.

Proposition—Shadow is a substance.

Unproved reason—Because it possesses motion.

Here, unless it is actually proved that shadow possesses motion, we cannot accept it as the reason for the proposition that shadow is a substance. Just as the proposition stands in need of proof. So does the reason itself. It is possible that the motion belongs to the person who causes that obstruction of light which is called shadow.

कालात्ययापदिष्ट: "कालातीत:"॥ 9॥

कालत्ययेन युक्तो यस्यार्थस्यैकदेशोऽपदिश्यमानस्य स कालात्ययपदिष्ट: कालातीत इत्युच्यते, निदर्शनम्-नित्य: शब्द: संयोगव्यङ्ग्यत्वाद् रूपवत्, प्रागूर्ध्वं च व्यक्तेरवस्थितं रूपं प्रदीपघटसंयोगेन व्यज्यते तथा च शब्दोप्यवस्थितो भेरीदण्डसंयोगेन व्यज्यते दारुपरशुसंयोगेन वा तस्मात् संयोगव्यङ्ग्यत्वात् नित्य: शब्द:. इत्ययमहेतु: कालात्ययापदेशात्= व्यञ्जकस्य संयोगस्य कालं नव्यङ्ग्य रूपस्य व्यक्तिरत्येति-सति प्रदीपघटसंयोगे रूपस्य ग्रहणं भवति, न निवृत्ते संयोगे रूपं गृह्यते, निवृते (तु) दारुपरशुसंयोगे दूरस्थने शब्द: श्रूयते विभागकाले, सेयं शब्दस्य व्यक्ति: संयोगकालमत्येतीति न संयोगनिमित्ता भवति, कस्मात्? कारणाभावाद्धि कार्याभाव इति, एवमुदाहरणसाधर्म्यस्याभावादसाधनमयं हेतुर्हेत्वाभास इति।

अवयवविपर्यासवचनं न सूत्रार्थ:। कस्मात्? "यस्य येनार्थसंबन्धो दूरस्थस्यापि तस्य स: अर्थतो ह्यसमर्थानामानन्तर्यकारणम्" इत्येतद्वचनाद् विपर्यासेनोक्तो हेतुरुदाहरण-

साधर्म्यात् तथा वैधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनं हेतुलक्षणं न जाहाति अजहद्धेतुलक्षणं न हेत्वाभासो भवतीति। "अवयवविपर्यासवचनमप्राप्तकालम् 5-2-11" इतिनिग्रहस्थानमुक्तं तदेवेदं पुनरुच्यते इत्यतस्तन्न सूत्रार्थ:॥9॥

कालात्ययापदिष्ट: kāla atyaya-apadiṣṭaḥ, assigned after lapse of time; कालातीत: kāla-atītaḥ, time-expired, mistimed.

50. The **mistimed** is the reason which is adduced when the time is passed in which it might hold good.—9.

Proposition—Sound is durable.

Mistimed reason—Because it is manifested by union, as a colour.

The colour of a jar is manifested when the jar comes into union with a lamp, but the colour existed before the union took place, and will continue to exist after the union has ceased. Similarly, the sound of a drum is manifested when the drum comes into union with a rod, and the sound must, after the analogy of the colour, be presumed to have existed before the union took place, and to continue to exist after the union has ceased. Hence, sound is durable. The reason adduced here is mistimed, because the manifestation of sound does not take place at the time when the drum comes into union with the rod, but at a subsequent moment when the union has ceased. In the case of colour, however, the manifestation takes place just at the time when the jar comes into union with the lamp. Because the time of their manifestation is different, the analogy between colour and sound is not complete; therefore, the reason is mistimed.

Some interpret the aphorism as follows :—The *mistimed* is the reaon which is adduced in a wrong order among the five members, for instance, as, if the reason is stated before the proposition. But this interpretation, according to Vātsyāyana, is wrong; for a word bears its they are placed at a distance from each other, and, on the other hand, even the closest proximity is of no use if the words are disconnected in their sense[1]. Moreover, the placing of members in a wrong order is noticed in the Nyāya-sūtra as a *nigrahasthāna* (occasion for rebuke), called *aprāpta-kāla* (inopportune). (V.ii. 11.)

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 2 : Definition of Fallacy of Reason: Sūtras : 4-9.

Fallacies of Reason lack the characteristic of a mark of inference

1. Quoted by Vatsyāyana in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, p. 250.

in a given case but appear as such mark as they may be marks of inference in other cases. They fall into five classes : (1) The erratic is not confined to one or the other of two contradictory attributes, *e.g.* where the eternality of sound is to be established, untouchability cannot be the mark of inference, for while a pot which possesses touch is non-eternal, the atoms which also possess touch are eternal. Again, the soul which is without touch is eternal, whereas cognition which is also touchless is non-eternal. (2) The contradictory is the mark which contradicts the very tenet on which it rests. *e.g.* A modification loses its identity as it cannot be eternal; though it loses its identity, it still exists as it cannot be destroyed. The reason that a modification cannot be eternal is contradicted by the speaker's own tenet that a modification which is losing of identity still exists. Existence and loss of identity are contradictory attributes and cannot abide together. (3) Where the subject matter of the topic is advanced as the reason for the desired inference, the mark is said to be identical with the topic, *e.g.* it is not known whether sound is eternal or non-eternal. Eternality and non-eternality are in this case the contradictory attributes the contraposition of which starts the discussion of the topic. To advance as a reason for the desired inference that sound is eternal or that sound is non-eternal is to stop the discussion altogether and to make the determination of the truth impossible. (4) The mark which itself stands in need of proof equally as the subject is called indentical with the subjcet. (For example see text, I. ii. 8). (5) The time-expired mark: the commentary has been fully given in the text.

अथ छलम्—

(वचनविघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या "छलम्")॥ 10॥

न सामान्यलक्षणे छलं शक्यमुदाहर्तुं विभागे तूदारहरणानि॥10॥

वचनविघात: vachana-vighātaḥ, opposition to statement; अर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या artha-vikalpa-upapattyā, by the assumption of an alternative import; छलम् chhalam, quibble, finding fault with.

51. **Quibble** is the opposition offered to a proposition by the assumption of an alternative meaning.—10.

विभागश्च—

"तत्त्रिविधं" वाक्छलं सामान्यच्छलमुपचारच्छलं चेति॥ 11॥

तत् tat, it; त्रिविधं tri-vidham, three-fold; वाकछलं vāk-chhalam, quibble in respect of a word; सामान्यछलं sāmānya-chhalam, quibble in

respect of a genus; उपचारछलं upachāra-chhalam, quibble in respect of a metaphor; चेती cha iti, and.

52. It is of *three* kinds, *viz.*, quibble in respect of a term, quibble in respect of a genus, and quibble in respect of a metaphor.—11.

तेषाम्—

अविशेषाभिहितेऽर्थे वक्तुरभिप्रायादर्थान्तरकल्पना "वाक्छलम्" ॥ 12॥

नवकम्बलोयं माणवक इति प्रयोग: अत्र 'नव: कम्बलोऽस्य' इति वक्तुरभिप्राय:, विग्रहे तु विशेषो न समासे, तत्रायं छलवादी वक्तुरभिप्रायादविवक्षितमन्यार्थम्-'नव कम्बला अस्येति तावदभिहितं भवता' इति कल्पयति, कल्पयित्वा चाऽसंभवेन प्रतिषेधति-'एकोऽस्य कम्बल: कुतो नव कम्बला:' इति, तदिदं सामान्यशब्दे=वाचि छलं वाक्छलमिति।

अस्य प्रत्यवस्थानम्-सामान्यशब्दस्याऽनेकार्थत्वेऽन्यतराभिधानकल्पनायां विशेषवचनम्-'नवकम्बल:' इत्यनेकार्थस्याभिधानम्-'नव: कम्बलोऽस्य' 'नव कम्बला अस्य' इति, एतस्मिन् प्रयुक्ते येयं कल्पना 'नव कम्बला अस्येत्येतद् भवताऽभिहितं तच्च न संभवति' इति एतस्यामन्यतराभिधानकल्पनायां विशेषो वक्तव्य: यस्माद्वि-शेषोऽर्थविशेषेषु विज्ञायते-अयमर्थोऽनेनाभिहित इति, स च विशेषो नास्ति तस्माद् मिथ्यानियोगमात्रमेतदिति। प्रसिद्धश्च लोके शब्दार्थसंबन्धोऽभिधानाभिधेयनियमनियोग:-अस्याभिधानस्याऽयमर्थोऽभिधेय इति, समान: सामान्यशब्दस्य विशेषो विशिष्टशब्दस्य, प्रयुक्तपूर्वाश्चेमे शब्दां अर्थे प्रयुज्यन्ते नाऽप्रयुक्तपूर्वा:, प्रयोगश्चार्थसंप्रत्ययार्थ: अर्थप्रत्यायाच्च व्यवहार इति, तत्रैवमर्थगत्यर्थे शब्दप्रयोगे सामर्थ्यात् सामान्यशब्दस्य प्रयोगनियम: 'अजां ग्रामं नय', 'सर्पिराहर', 'ब्राह्मणं भोजय, इति सामान्यशब्दा: सन्तोऽर्थावयवेषु प्रयुज्यन्ते. सामर्थ्याद् यत्रार्थक्रियादेशना संभवति तत्र प्रवर्तन्ते नार्थसामान्ये-क्रियादेशनाऽसंभवात्, एवमयं सामान्यशब्द: 'नवकम्लब' इति, योऽर्थ: संभवति-'नव: कम्बलोस्य' इति तत्र प्रवर्तते, यस्तु न संभवति-'नव कम्बला अस्य' इति तत्र न प्रवर्तते, सोयमनुपपद्य. मानार्थकल्पनया परवाकयोपालम्भो न कल्पते इति॥12॥

अविशेषाभिहिते a-viśeṣa-abhihite, stated in a general way; अर्थे arthe, in respect of an object: वक्तु: vaktuḥ, speaker's; अभिप्रायात् abhiprāyāt, from the intention; अर्थान्तरकल्पना artha-antara-kalpanā, supposition of a different object; वाक्छलं vāk-chhalam, quibble in respect of words.

53. **Quibble in respect of a term** consists in wilfully taking the term in a sense other than that intended by a speaker who has happened to use it ambiguously.—12.

A speaker says : "This boy is *nava-kambala* (possessed of a new blanket)."

A quibbler replies : "This boy is not certainly *nava-kambala* (possessed of nine blankets), for he has only one blanket."

Here the word *nava,* which is ambiguous, was used by the speaker in the sense of "new" but has been wilfully taken by the quibbler in the sense of "nine."

सम्भवतोऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसम्भूतार्थकल्पना ''सामान्यच्छलम्''॥ 13॥

'अहो खल्वसौ ब्राह्मणो विद्याचरणसंपन्नः' इत्युक्ते कश्चिदाह-'संभवति ब्राह्मणे विद्याचारणसंपत्' इति, अस्य वचनस्य विघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या=असंभूतार्थविकल्पनाया क्रियते-'यदि ब्राह्मणे विद्याचरणसंपत् संभवति? व्रात्येपि संभवेत् व्रात्येपि ब्राह्मणः सोप्यस्तु विद्याचरणसंपन्नः' इति यद् विवक्षितमर्थमाप्नोति चाऽत्येति च तदतिसामान्यं यथा ब्राह्मणत्वं विद्याचरणसंपदं क्वचिदाप्नोति क्वचिदत्येति, सामान्यनिमित्तं छलं सामान्यच्छलमिति।

अस्य च प्रत्यवस्थानम्-अविवक्षितहेतुकस्य विषयानुवादः प्रशंसार्थत्वाद् वाक्यस्य, तदत्रऽसंभूतार्थकल्पनानुपपत्तिः यथा-'संभवन्तस्मिन् क्षेत्रे शालयः' इति, अनराकृतमऽविवक्षितं च बीजजन्म, प्रवृत्तिविषयस्तु क्षेत्रं प्रशस्यते, सोयं क्षेत्रानुवादो नास्मिन् शालयो विधीयन्ते इति, बीजात्तु शलिर्निवृत्तिः सती न विवक्षिता, एवम् ' संभवति ब्राह्मणे विद्याचरणसंपत्' इति संपद्विषयो ब्राह्मणत्वं न संपद्धेतुः, न चात्र हेतुर्विवक्षितः-विषयानुवादस्त्वयं प्रशंसार्थत्वाद् वाक्यस्य। सति ब्राह्मणत्वे संपद्धतुः समर्थ इति विषयं च प्रशंसता वाक्येन यथाहेतु फलनिवृत्तिर्न प्रत्याख्यायते, तदेधं सति वचनविघातोऽसंभूतार्थक पनया नोपपद्यते इति।।13।।

सम्भवतः sambhavataḥ, possible; अर्थस्य arthasya, of import; अतिसामान्ययोगात् atisāmānya-yogāt, from the application of higher genus; असम्भूतार्थकल्पना a-sambhūta-artha-kalpanā, supposition of impossible import; सामान्यछलं sāmānya-chhalam, quibble in respect of a genus.

54. **Quibble in respect of a genus** consists in asserting the impossibility of a thing which is really possible, on the ground that it belongs to a certian genus which is very.—13.

A speaker sayas : "This Brāhmaṇa is possessed of learning and conduct."

An objector replies : "It is impossible, for how can it be inferred that this person is possessed of learning and conduct because he is a Brāhmaṇa? There are little boys who are Brāhmaṇas, yet not possessed of learning and conduct."

Here the objector is a quibbler, for he knows well that possession of learning and conduct was not meant to be an attribute of the whole class of Brāhmaṇas, but it was ascribed to "this" particular Brāhmaṇa who lived long enough in the world to render it possible for him to pursue studies and acquire good morals.

धर्म्मविकल्पनिर्देशेऽर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेध ''उपचारच्छलम्''॥ 14॥

अभिधानस्य धर्मो यथार्थप्रयोगः धर्मविकल्पः= अन्यत्र दृष्टस्यान्यत्र प्रयोगः तस्य निर्देशे= धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशे यथा-'मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति' इति अर्थसद्भावेन प्रतिषेधः-'मञ्चस्थाः पुरुषाः क्रोशन्ति न तु मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति'। का पुनरत्रार्थविकल्पोपपत्तिः? अन्यथा प्रयुक्तस्याऽन्यथाऽर्थकल्पनम्=भक्त्या प्रयोगे प्राधान्येन कल्पनम्। उपचारविषयं छलम् उपचारच्छलम्, उपचारः=नीतार्थः= सहचरणदिनिमित्तेनाऽतद्भावे तद्वदभिधानम् उपचार इति।

अत्र समाधिः-प्रसिद्ध प्रयोगे वक्तुर्यथाभिप्रायं शब्दार्थयोरनुज्ञा प्रतिषेधो वा न छन्दतः, प्रधानभूस्त शब्दस्य भाक्तस्य च गुणभूतस्य प्रयोग उपभयोर्लोकसिद्धः सिद्धप्रयोगे यथा वक्तुभिप्रयायस्तथा शब्दार्थावनुज्ञेयौ प्रतिषेप्रयो वा न छन्दतः, यदि वक्ता प्रधानशब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते? तथाभूतस्याभ्यनुज्ञा प्रतिषेधो वा न छन्दतः, अथ गुणभूतं? तदा गुणभूतस्य, यत्र तु वक्ता गुणभूतं शब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते प्रधानभूतमभिप्रेत्य परः प्रतिषेधति? स्वमनीषया प्रतिषेधोऽसौ भवति न परोपालम्भ इति।।14।।

धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशे dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśe, in the case of transference of epithet; अर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेधः artha-sadbhāva-pratiṣedhaḥ, denial of the possibility of sense; उपचारछलं upachāra-chhalam, quibble in respect of a metaphor.

55. **Quibble in respect of a metaphor** consists in denying the proper meaning of a word by taking it literally, while it was used metaphorically, and *vice versa.*—14.

A speaker says : "It is impossible for scaffolds to cry out, for they are inanimate objects."

Here the objector is a quibbler, for he knew well that the word *scaffolds* was used to signify those standing on the scaffolds.

वाक्छलमेवोपचारच्छलं तदविशेषात्॥ 15॥

न वाक्छलादुपचारच्छलं भिद्यते-तस्याप्यर्थान्तरकल्पनयाऽविशेषात्, इहापि स्थान्यर्थो गुणशब्दः प्रधानशब्दः स्थानार्थ इति कल्पयित्वा प्रतिषिध्यते इति।।15।।

वाक्छलं vāk-chhalam, verbal quibble, playing on words; एव eva, itself; उपचारछलं upachāra-chhalam, metaphorical quibble, playing on metaphors; तदविशेषात् tat-sviśeṣāt, there being no difference from it.

56. It may be said that quibble in respect of a metaphor is in reality quibble in respect of a term, for the first is not different from the second.—15.

न तदर्थान्तरभावात्॥ 16॥

न वाक्छलमेवोपचारच्छलम्-तस्यार्थसद्भावप्रतिषेधस्याऽर्थान्तरभावात्। कुतः?, अर्थान्तरकल्पनात्=अन्या ह्यर्थान्तरकल्पना अन्योऽर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेध इति॥16॥

न na, not; तदर्थान्तरभावात् tat-arthȧ-bhāvāt, being different objects. Denial of the possibility of sense is not the same as the supposition of a different sense.

57. But it is not so, for there is a distinction between them.—16.

Words are taken in their direct (literal) meaning in the case of 'quibble in respect of a term,' while they are taken in their direct (literal) as well as indirect (secondary) meanings in the case of 'quibble in respect of a metaphor.'

अविशेषे वा किञ्चित्साधर्म्यादेकच्छलप्रसङ्गः॥ 17॥

छलस्य द्वित्वमभ्यनुज्ञाय त्रित्वं प्रतिषिध्यते-किंचित्साधर्म्यात्, यथा चायं हेतुस्त्रित्वं प्रतिषेधति तथा द्वित्वमप्यऽभ्यनुज्ञातं प्रतिधेषति-विद्यते हि किंचित्साधर्म्यं द्वयोरपीति। अथ द्वित्वं किंचित्साधर्म्यान्न निवर्तते? त्रित्वमपि न निवर्त्स्यति॥17॥

अविशेषे aviśeṣe, in the absence of distinction; वा vā, or; किञ्चित् साधर्म्यात् kiñchit sādharmyāt, through partial similarity; एकछलप्रसंग eka-chhalaprasaṅgaḥ, one quibble only will result.

58. If you do not admit that one is different from another simply because there is some similarity between them, then we should have only one kind of quibble.—17.

If 'quibble in respect of a metaphor' were not different from 'quibble in respect of a term,' then these two also would not be different from 'quibble in respect of a genus,' because there is some similarity among all of them. This is absurd, hence the three kinds of quibble are different from one another.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 3 : Definition of Quibble : Sūtras : 10-17.

Quibble consists in playing upon (1) words, (2) ideas and (3) metaphors. *E.g.* (1) A quadruped means an animal and not a table. (2) To say that a particular Brāhamaṇa is learned is not say that learning is an attribute of the genus Brāhmaṇa so that all Brāhmaṇas are learned. (3) The scaffolds cry, means that the men on the scaffolds for execution cry, and not the wooden structures. Between verbal and metaphorical quibbles there is this distinction that while in the former there is supposition of a different sense, in the latter there is negation of the exstence of a sense.

अत ऊर्ध्वम्-

(साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं "जातिः")॥ 18॥

प्रयुक्ते हि हेतौ यः प्रसङ्गो जायते स जातिः, स च प्रसङ्गः=साधर्म्यवेधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवास्थानम्=उपालम्भः=प्रतिषेध इति। उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनं हेतुः इत्यस्यो दाहरणवेधर्म्येण प्रत्यवस्थानम्, उदाहरणवैधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनं हेतुः इत्यस्योदाहरणसाधर्म्येण प्रत्यवस्थानम्। प्रत्यनीकभावाज्जायमानोऽर्थो जातिरिति॥18॥

साधर्म्य वैधर्म्याभ्यां sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyām, by means of similarity and dissimilarity; प्रत्यवस्थानं pratyavasthānam, opposition; जातिः jātiḥ, futility.

59. **Futility** consists in offering objections founded on mere similarity or dissimilarity.—18.

A disputant says : "The soul is inactive, because it is all-pervading as ether."

His opponent replies : "If the soul is inactive because it bears similarity to ether as being all-pervading, why is it not active because bears similarity to a pot as being a seat of union?"

The reply is futile, because it overlooks the universal connection between the middle term and the major term which is existent in the arguments of the disputant, but wanting in the arguments of the opponent. Whatever is all-pervading is inavtive, but whatever is a seat of union is not necessarily active.

Or again :

Disputant—Sound is non-eternal, because unlike ether it is a product.

Opponent—If sound is non-etenal because as a product it is

dissimilar to ether, why is it not eternal because as an object of auditory perception it is dissimilar to a pot?

The reply is futile, because it overlooks the universal disconnection between the middle term and the absence of the major term. There is a universal disconnection between "a product" and "not non-eternal," but there is no such disconnection between "an object of auditory perception" and "not eternal."

विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च ''निग्रहस्थानम्''॥ 19॥

विपरीता वा कुत्सिता वा प्रतिपत्तिर्विपतिप्रत्तिः, विप्रतिपद्यमानः पराजयं प्राप्नोति निग्रहस्थानं खलु पराजयप्राप्तिः। अप्रतिपत्तिस्त्वारम्भविषयेप्यऽप्रारम्भः=परेण स्थापितं वा न प्रतिषेधति, प्रतिषेधं वा नोद्धरति। असमासाच्च नैते एव निग्रहस्थाने इति॥19॥

विप्रतिपत्तिः vipratipattiḥ, wrong deduction; अप्रतिपत्तिः apratipattiḥ, indecision; च cha, and; निग्रहस्थानं nigraha-sthānam, occasion for rebuke, ground of defeat.

60. **An occasion for rebuke** arises when one misunderstands, or does not understand at all.—19.

If a person begins to argue in a way which betrays his utter ignorance, or wilfully misunderstands and yet persists in showing that he understands well, it is of no avail to employ counter arguments. He is quite unfit to be argued with, and there is nothing left for his opponent but to turn him out or quit his company, rebuking him as a blockhead or a knave.

An instance of *occasion for rebuke :—*

Whatever is not quality, is substance.

Because there is nothing except colour, etc. (quality)

A person who argues in the above way is to be rebuked as a fool, for his reason (which admits only quality) opposes his proposition (which admits both quality and substance).

Another instance :

Disputant—Fire is not hot.

Opponent—But the evidence of touch disproves such a statement.

Disputant, in order to gain the confidence of the assembled people, says—"O learned audience, listen, I do not say that fire is not hot," etc. It is only meet that the opponent should quit the company of a man who argues in this way.

किं पुनर्दृष्टान्तवज्जातिनिग्रहस्थानयोरभेदोऽय सिद्धान्तवद्भेदः? इत्यत: आह–

तद्विकल्पाज्जातिनिग्रहस्थानबहुत्वम्॥ 20॥

तस्य=साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानस्य विकल्पाज्जातिबहुत्वम्, तयोश्च विप्रतिपत्त्यऽतिपत्त्योर्विकल्पान्निग्रहस्थानबहुत्वम्। नानाकल्पो विकल्पः विविधो वा कल्पो विकल्पः। तत्र–अननुभाषणमऽज्ञानमऽप्रतिभा विक्षेपो मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणमित्यऽप्रतिपत्तिर्ग्रिहस्थानां शेषस्तु विप्रतिपत्तिरिति॥20॥

॥ इति वात्स्यायनीये न्यायभाष्ये प्रथमाऽध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकं समाप्तम् ॥

॥ प्रथमाध्यायश्च समाप्तः॥

तद्विकल्पात् tat-vikalpāt, from their varietiesl; जातिनिग्रहस्थान बहुत्वं jātinigrahasthāna-bahutvam, multiplicity of futility and ground of defeat.

61. Owing to the variety of kinds, there is multiplicity of futilities and occasions for rebuke.—20.

There are 24 kinds of futility and 22 kinds of occasion for rebuke which will be treated respectively in Chapter I and Chapter II of Book V.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 4 : Definition of General Faults in Marks of Inference due to incapacity of the speaker : Sūtras : 18-20.

These are Jāti and Nigrahasthāna. Jāti literally means that which is born. Here it means whatever reply is provoked or called into being by the reason advanced by the opponent. It is applied to negative the opponet's reason through resemblance and difference. Where the reason brings forward the resemblance to the Instance, Jāti opposes the reason by bringing forward the difference form the Instance, and *vice-versa.*

Nigrahasthāna is ground of defeat. Examples of Nigrahasthāna are self-contradictory or wrong conclusion, failure to reply, etc.

The varieties of Jāti and Nigrahasthāna are manifold (see I. ii. 20, V. i.1 and V. ii. 1).

॥ इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने प्रथमस्याऽध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम्॥2॥

Book II, Chapter I

अत ऊर्ध्वं प्रमाणादिपरीक्षा सा च "विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणं निर्णयः 1.1.41" इत्यग्रे विमर्श एव परीक्ष्यते–

समानानेकधर्म्माध्यवसायादन्यतरधर्म्माध्यवसायाद्वा न संशयः॥ 1॥

समानस्य धर्मस्याऽध्यवसायात् संशयो न धर्ममात्रात्, अथ वा 'समानमनयोर्धर्ममुपलभे' इति धर्मधर्मिग्रहणे संशयाभाव इति, अथ वा समानधर्माध्यवसायादर्थान्तरभूते धर्मिणि संशयोऽनुपपन्नः–न जातु रूपस्यार्थान्तरभूतस्याऽध्यवसायादर्थान्तरभूते स्पर्शे संशय इति, अथ वा नाऽध्यवसायात्=अर्थावधारणादऽनवधारणज्ञानं संशय उपपद्यते–कार्यकारणयोः सारूप्याभवादिति। एतेन "अनेकधर्माध्यवसायात्" इति व्याख्यातम्। अन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायाच्च संशयो न भवति–ततो ह्यन्यतरावाधारणमेवेति॥1॥

समानानेक धर्माध्यवसायात् samāna-aneka-dharma-adhyavasāyāt, from the ascertainment of common or more than one attributes of two objects; अन्यतरधर्म्याध्यवसायात् anyatara-dharma-adhyavasāyāt, from the ascertainment of the attributes of one of them; वा vā, or; न na, not; संशयः saṃśayaḥ, doubt.

62. Some say that doubt cannot arise from the recognition of common and uncommon properties, whether conjointly or separately.—1.

Conjointly—It is said that doubt about an object is never produced if *both* the common and uncommon properties of the object are recognised. For instance, if we see in the twilight a tall object which moves, we do not doubt whether it is a man or a post. We at once decide that it is a man, for though tallness is a property possessed in common by man and post, locomotion is a property which distinguishes a man from a post.

Separately—Likewise, doubt about an object is said never to be produced if *only* the common or the uncommon properties are recognised. For instance, if we see a tall object in the twilight, we have no reason to doubt whether it is a man or a post. Tallness is certainly a

property possessed in common by man and post, but the tallness of a man is not identical with that of a post : it merely resembles it. Now, the knowledge of similarity between the tallness of a man and that of a post presupposes a knowledge of the man and the post, of which two kinds of tallness are attributes. If there is already a knowledge of the man and the post, there cannot be any doubt about them, for knowledge is the vanquisher of doubt.

विप्रतिपत्त्यव्यवस्थाध्यवसायाच्च॥ 2॥

न विप्रतिपत्तिमात्रादव्यवस्थामात्राद्वा संशयः, किं तर्हि? विप्रतिपत्तिमुपलभमानस्य संशयः, एवमव्यवस्थायामपीति। अथ वा 'अस्त्यामा' इत्येके 'नास्त्यात्मा' इत्यपरे मन्यन्ते इत्युपलब्धेः कथं संशयः स्यात्? इति। तथोलब्धिरव्यवस्थिता अनुपलब्धिश्चाव्यवस्थितेति विभागेनाध्यवसिते संशयो नोपपद्यते इति॥2॥

विप्रतिपत्त्यव्यवस्थाध्यवसायात् vipratipatti-avyavasthā-adhyavasāyāt, from the ascertainment of contradiction or of irregularity of perception and non-perception; च cha, and.

63. It is further said that doubt cannot arise, either from conflicting testimony, or from the irregularity of perception and non-perception.—2.

विप्रतिपत्तौ च सम्प्रतिपत्तेः॥ 3॥

यां च विप्रतिपत्तिं भवान् संशयहेतुं मन्यते सा संप्रतिपत्तिः–सा हि द्वयोः प्रत्यनीकधर्म-विषया, तत्र यदि विप्रत्तिपत्तेः संशयः? संप्रतिपत्तेरेव संशय इति॥3॥

विप्रतिपत्ते vipratipattau, if contradiction be a cause of doubt; च cha, also; सम्प्रतिपत्तौः sampratipatteḥ, from agreement.

64. In the case of conflicting testimony there is, according to them, a strong conviction (on each side).—3.

Suppose a disputant (Naiyāyika) says : there is soul. His opponent (Buddhist) replies : there is no soul.

The disputant and his opponent are quite sure that their respective statements are correct. Hence there is no doubt, but on the contrary there is conviction, in the minds of both.

अव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्थितत्वाच्चाव्यवस्थायाः॥ 4॥

न संशयः, यदि तावदियमव्यवस्था आत्मन्येव व्यवस्थिता? व्यवस्थानादव्यवस्था

न भवतीत्यनुपपन्नः संशयः, अथाऽव्यवस्थाऽऽत्मनि न व्यवस्थिता? एवमतादात्म्यादव्यवस्था न भवतीति संशयाभाव इति॥4॥

अव्यवस्था avyavasthā, irregularity; आत्मनि ātmani, in itself; व्यवस्थितत्वात् vyavasthita-tvāt, being regular; च cha, and; अव्यवस्थायाः a-vyavasthāyāḥ, from irrgularity.

65. **Doubt**, they say, does not arise from the irregularity of perception and non-perception, because in the irregularity itself there is regularity.—4.

An irregularity may be designated as such with reference to something else, but with reference to itself it is a settled fact. If the irregularity is settled in itself, it is regular and cannot cause doubt. On the other hand, if the irregularity is not settled in itself, it is devoid of its own character and cannot cause doubt.

तथाऽत्यन्तसंशयस्तद्धर्म्मसातत्योपपत्तेः॥ 5॥

येन कल्पेन भवान् समानधर्मोपपत्तेः संशय इति मन्यते तेन खल्वऽत्यन्तसंशयः प्रसज्यते-समानधर्मोपपत्तेरनुच्छेदात् संशयानुच्छेदः-नायमतद्धर्मी धर्मो विमृश्यमानो गृह्यते सततं तु तद्धर्मा भवतीति॥5॥

तथा tathā, similarly; अत्यन्त संशयः atyanta-saṃśayaḥ, endless doubt; तद्धधर्मसातत्योपपत्तेः tat-dharma-sātatya-upapatteḥ, from continuous existence of the attributes thereof.

66. Likewise, there is, they say, the chance of an endless doubt, owing to the continuity of its cause.—5.

Recognition of properties common to many objects is, for instance, a cause of doubt. The common properties continue to exist, and hence there will, they say, be no cessation of doubt.

अस्य प्रतिषेधप्रपञ्च संक्षेपेणोद्धारः—

यथोक्ताध्यवसायादेव तद्विशेषापेक्षात्संशयेनासंशयो नात्यन्तसंशयो वा॥ 6॥

न संशयानुत्पत्तिः संशयानुच्छेदश्च प्रसज्यते, कथम्? यत्तावत्-'समानधर्माध्यवसायः संशयहतुः न समानधर्ममात्रमिति,' एवमेतत्। कस्मादेवं नोच्यते? इति, ''विशेषापेक्षः'' इतिवचनात् तत्सिद्धेः विशेषस्यापेक्षा=आकाङ्क्षा सा चानुपलभ्यमाने विशेषे समर्था। न

चोक्तम्-'समानाधर्मापेक्षः' इति। समाने च धर्मे कथमाकाङ्क्षा न भवेद् यद्ययमप्रत्यक्षः स्यात्, एतेन सामर्थ्येन विज्ञायते-'समानधर्माध्यवसायात्' इति।

उपपत्तिवचनाद्वो।

समानाधर्मोपपत्तेरित्युच्यते, न चान्या सद्भावसंवेदनादृते समानधर्मोपपत्तिरस्ति, अनुपलभ्यमानसद्भावो हि समानो धर्मोऽविद्यमानवद् भवतीति।

विषयशब्देन वा विषयिणः प्रत्ययस्याभिधानं यथा लोके 'धूमेनाग्निरनुमीयते' इत्युक्ते 'धूमदर्शनेनाग्निरनुमीयते' इतिज्ञायते, कथम्? दृष्ट्वा हि धूममथाग्निमनुमिनोति नाऽदृष्टे, न च वाक्ये दर्शनशब्दः श्रूयते, अनुजानाति च वाकयस्यार्थप्रत्यायकत्वं तेन मन्यामहे-विषयशब्देन विषयिणः प्रत्ययस्याभिधानं बोद्धाऽनुजानाति, एवमिहापि समानधर्मशब्देन समानधर्माध्यवसायमाहेति।

यदुक्तम्-'समानमनयोधर्ममुपलभे इति धर्मधर्मिग्रहणे संशयाभावः' इति, पूर्वदृष्टविषयमेतत्=यावहमर्थौ पूर्वमद्राक्षं तयोः समानं धर्ममुपलभे विशेषं नोपलभे इति, कथं नु विशेषं पश्येयं येनाऽन्यतरमवधारयेयमिति, न चैतत् समानधर्मोपलब्धौ धर्मधर्मिग्रहणमात्रेण निवर्तते इति।

यच्चोक्तम्-नार्थान्तराध्यवसायादन्यत्र संशय इति, यो ह्यर्थान्तराध्यवसायमात्रं संशय हेतुमुपाददीत स एवं वाच्य इति।

यत्पुनरेतत्-कार्यकारणयोः सारूप्याभावादिति, कारणस्य भावाभावयोः कार्यस्य भावाभावौ कार्यकारणयोः सारूप्यम्=यस्योत्पादाद् यदुत्पद्यते यस्य चानुतदाद् यन्नोत्पद्यते तत् कारणं कार्यमितरद् इत्येतत्सारूप्यम् अस्ति च संशयकारणे संशये चैतदिति। एतेन अनेकधर्माध्यवसायादिति प्रतिषेधः परिहृत इति।

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम्-विप्रतिपत्त्यव्यवस्थाध्यवसायाच्च न संशय इति, पृथक्प्रवादयो-र्व्याहतमर्थमुपलभे विशेषं च न जानामि=नोपलभे येनान्यतरमवधारयेयं तत्कोत्र विशेषः स्याद् येनैकतरमवधारयेयमिति संशयो विप्रतिपत्तिजनितोयं न शक्यो विप्रतिपत्तिमात्रेण निवर्तयितुमिति। एवम् उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थाकृते संशये वेदितव्यमिति।

यत्पुनरेतत्-''विप्रतिपत्तौ च संप्रतिपत्तेः 3'' इति, विप्रतिपत्तिशब्दस्य योर्थः तदध्यवसायो विशेषापेक्षः संशयहेतुस्तस्य च समाख्यान्तरेण न निवृत्तिः=समानेऽधिकरणे व्याहतार्थौ प्रवादौ विप्रतिपत्तिशब्दस्यार्थः तदध्यवसायश्च विशेषापेक्षः संशयहेतुः न चास्य संप्रतिपत्तिशब्दे समाख्यान्तरे योज्यमाने संशयहेतुत्वं निवर्तते, तदिदमकृतबुद्धिसंमोहनमिति।

यत्पुनः ''अव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्थितत्वाच्चाव्यवस्थायाः 4'' इति, संशहेतोरर्थस्या-ऽप्रतिषेधात् अव्यवस्थाभ्यनुज्ञानाच्च निमित्तान्तरेण शब्दान्तरकल्पना व्यर्था, शब्दान्तरकल्पना-'अव्यवस्था खल्वऽव्यवस्था न भवति-अव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्थितत्वादिति'। नाऽनयोरुप-

लब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्योः सदसद्विषयत्वं विशेषापेक्षं संशयहेतुर्न भवतीति प्रतिषिध्यते। यावता चाव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्थिता न तावताऽऽत्मानं जहाति तावता ह्यनुज्ञाता भवत्यव्यवस्था, एवमियं क्रियमाणापि शब्दान्तरकल्पना नार्थान्तरं साधयतीति।

यत्पुनरेतत्–"तथात्यन्तसंशयस्तद्धर्मसातत्योपपत्तेः 5" इति, नायं समानधर्मादिभ्य एव संशयः। किं तर्हि?, तद्विषयाध्यवसायाद् विशेषस्मृतिसहितात् इति, अतो नात्यन्तसंशय इति।

"अन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायाद्वा न संशयः 6" इति, तन्न युक्तम्–विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः संशयः इतिवचनात्, विशेषश्चान्यतरधर्मो न तस्मिन्नऽध्यवसीयमाने विशेषापेक्षा संभवतीति॥6॥

यथोक्ताध्यवसायात् yathā-ukta-adhyavasāyāt, from the ascertainment as stated by the opponent; एव eva, certainly; तद्विशेषापेक्षात् tat-viśeṣa-apekṣāt, in which there is need of the differentia; संशये saṃśaye, doubt arising; न na, not; असंशयः a-saṃśayaḥ, absence of doubt; न na, not; अत्यन्त संशयः atyanta-saṃśayaḥ, endless doubt; वा vā, or.

67. In reply, it is stated that the recognition of properties common to many objects, etc., are certainly causes of doubt, if there is no reference to the precise characters of the objects : there is no chance of *no*-doubt or of *endless*-doubt.—6.

It is admitted that doubt does not arise from the recognition of common and uncommon properties conjointly. Aphorism 2-1-1 brings forth the objection that doubt is not produced even by the recognition of common or uncommon properties alone. It is said that, while we see a tall object in the twilight, we at once think of a man and a post, both of which are tall. Thus, there is knowledge rather than doubt about the man and post suggested by the tall object. The present aphorism dismisses the objection, by stating that there is certinly a common (non-distinctive) knowledge about a man and a post suggested by the tall object, but there is no precise (distinctive) knowledge about them. Precise knowledge (that is, knowledge of the precise character which distinguishes a man from a post) being absent, doubt must arise. Similar arguments will apply to doubt arising from the recognition of non-common properties alone.

Aphorisms 2-1-2 and 2-1-3 raise the objection that doubt does not arise from conflicting testimony, as the disputant and his opponent are both confident of their respective contentions. The present aphorism disposes of the objection, by pointing out that, in the case of conflicting

statements, one is led to believe that both statements are worth consideration, but is unable to penetrate into the precise characters of the statements. Hence, though the disputant and his opponent remain fixed, the umpire and the audience are thrown into doubt by their conflicting statements.

Aphorism 2-1-4 raises the objection that doubt cannot arise form the irregularity of perception and non-perception, as the irregularity is settled in itself. The present aphorism meets the objection by stating that the irregularity cannot be concealed by mere verbal tricks. The irregularity, though settled in itself, does not lose its own character until the objects which cause it are removed.

Aphorism 2-1-5 gives rise to the fear that there is the possibility of an endless doubt, inasmuch as the cause is continuous. The present aphorism removes the fear by stating that, though materials of doubt, such as common properties, etc., continue to exist, we do not always recognise them. Unless there is recognition of the common properties, etc., there cannot be doubt.

यत्र संशयस्तत्रैवमुत्तरोत्तरप्रसङ्गः॥ 7॥

यत्र यत्र संशयपूर्विका परीक्षा शास्त्रे कथायां वा तत्र तत्रैवं संशये परेण प्रतिषिद्धे समाधिर्वाच्य इति, अतः सर्वपरीक्षाव्यापित्वात् प्रथमं संशयः परीक्षित इति॥7॥

यत्र yatra, wherever; संशयः saṃśayaḥ, doubt; तत्र tatra, there; एवं evam, in this way; उत्तरोत्तरप्रसङ्गः uttara-uttara-prasaṅgaḥ, sequence of arguments one after another.

68. Examinaiton should be made in this way of each case where there is room for doubt.—7.

It has been stated that knowledge about the true nature of the categories consists in the true knowledge of their enunciation, definition, and examination. In case of well-known facts admitted by all, there should be no examination. We are to examine only those cases where there is room for doubt. The author explains, therefore, first the nature of doubt, and then proceeds to examine the other categories, least there should be any room for doubt in them.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 1: Doubt: Sūtras : 1-7.

Ascertainmnt has been defined (Sūtra I.i.41) as the determination, after raising doubts, of an object by means of thesis and counter-thesis. Doubt has been defined in Sūtra I. i. 23. But some doubt the possibility of doubt. Their arguments are stated below :

(1) An attribute belonging to objects of the same class which is either wholly unknown or wholly known cannot cause doubt.

(2) An attribute which is cognised as belonging to two definite objects of the same class cannot cause doubt, because the objects are there by cognised.

(3) Cognition of a common attribute cannot raise doubt in respect of the object possising the attribute, as an attribute is different from an object.

(4) Cognition of a common attribute cannot cause doubt because cognition is opposed to doubt.

(5)-(8) The same objections apply *mutatis mutandis* to the case of an attribute belonging to objects of different classes.

(9) Cognition of the attribute of one of two possible objects, *e.g.*, "Be it a man or a post;" also canot cause doubt, because cognition of the attribute means cognition of the object.

(10) Differences of opinion and irregularity of perception and non-perception also cannot be the cause of doubt unless one becomes aware of these differences and of the irregularity, and when one becomes aware of them he has cognition of them and cognition is opposed to doubt.

(11) Those who hold different opinions in respect of an object are retrain about their own opinions.

(12) The irregularity of perception and non-prception is also fixed in itself.

(13) If cognition of common attributes be a cause of doubt then doubt will never cease, because even when the objects are determined the common attributes will still belong to them and enter into cognition along with them.

To the above our reply is as follows :

(1) The Sūtra (I.i.23) does not mean that common attributes themselves are causes of doubt. It means that cognition of common attributes causes doubt. This is clear from the expressions "Apekṣā","Upapatti" and "Dharma". Apekṣā is need, expectancy, of cognition. Upaptti is existence, the cogniton that common attributes are present. Dharma, attribute, is an object and implies the cogniser.

(2) That an attribute is common to two objects of the same class refers to a previous experience when the two object were cognised. The cognition of the attribute subsequently fails to decide which of the objects

is the thing that now stands before the eyes. This decision can be arrived at by the cognition of the attribute which differentiates one of the objects from the other. Hence, there is room for doubt.

(3) The Sūtrā does not say that the cognition of one object is the cause of doubt in respect of a different object.

(4) It is true that cognition is opposed to doubt. But the cause of doubt is not the cognition of the common attribute but non-cognition *i.e.*, uncertainty, as to the distinctive attribute.

(5)-(8) The same replies apply to the objection in regard to thedoubt caused by the cognition of the common attribute of hetergeneous objects.

(9) When an object is cognised as such its specific character is cognised. For this reason, doubt does not arise in respect of it.

(10)-(12). As regards differences of opinion and irregularity of perception and non-perception, their certainty and fixity cannot prevent doubt, because what is wanted to be known is the specific character which will determine which opinion and which perception and non-perception are true. So long as this distinctive attribute is not cognised there must be doubt.

(13) The Sūtra does not say that the cognition of common attributes alone causes doubt. Doubt depends upon the non-cognition of the distinctive attribute. When this is known doubt ceases. Hence, perpetual doubt is not entailed.

In every critical examination of an object the thesis and counter thesis should be thus established first by the removal of objections to them.

अथ प्रमाणपरीक्षा–

प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यं त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः।। 8।।

प्रत्यक्षदीनां प्रमाण्यं नास्ति–त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः=पूर्वापरसहभावानुपपत्तेरिति।।8।।

प्रत्यक्षादीनां pratyakṣa-ādīnām, of perception and the rest; अप्रामाण्यं a-prāmāṇyam, absence of the characteristic of being the means of right knowledge; त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः traikālya-asiddheḥ, because of their non-operation in any of the three divisions of time, past, present, and future.

69. Perception and other means of knowledge, says an objector, are invalid, as they are impossible at all the three times.—8.

According to the objector, perception is impossible at the present,

past and future times, or, in other words, perception can neither be prior to, nor posterior to, nor simultaneous with, the objects of sense.

अथ सामान्यवचनस्यार्थविभाग:–

पूर्व्वं हि प्रमाणसिद्धौ नेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात्प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्ति:॥ 9॥

गन्धादिविषयं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं तद् यदि पूर्वं पश्चाद् गन्धादीनां सिद्धि:? नेदं गन्धादि संनिकर्षादुत्पद्यते इति॥9॥

पूर्वं pūrvam, before; हि hi, because; प्रमाणसिद्धौ pramāṇa-siddhau, if the means of right knowledge, perception, etc., come into existence; न na, not; इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात् indriya-artha-sannikarṣāt, from the contact of the sense and object; प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्ति: pratyakṣa-utpattiḥ, production of perception.

70. If perception occurred anteriorly it could not, he says, have arisen from the contact of a sense with its object.—9.

With reference to the perception of colour, for instance, it is asked whether the colour precedes perception or the perception precedes colour. If you say that perception occutted anteriorly or preceded the colour, you must give up your definition of perception, *viz.*, that perception arises from the contact of a sense with its object.

पश्चात्सिद्धौ न प्रमाणेभ्य: प्रमेयसिद्धि:॥ 10॥

असति प्रमाणे केन प्रमीयमाणोऽर्थ: प्रमेय: स्यात्?, प्रमाणेन खलु प्रमीयमाणोऽर्थ: प्रमेयम् इत्येतत् सिध्यति॥10॥

पश्चात् paśchāt, after; सिद्धौ siddhau, if it comes into existence; न na not; प्रमाणेभ्य: pramāṇebhyaḥ, from the means of right knowledge; प्रमेयसिद्धि: prameya-siddhiḥ, establishment of what is to be proved.

71. If perception is supposed to occur posteriorly you cannot, he continues, maintain the conclusion that objects of sense are established by perception.—10.

The objection stands thus :—The means of right knowledge are stated by you to be perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. All objects of right knowledge are said to be established by them. The objects of sense, for instance, are supposed to be established

by visual perception. This conclusion will have to be abandoned if you say that perception occurs posteriorly to the objects.

युगपत्सिद्धौ प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात्क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावो बुद्धीनाम्॥ 11॥

यदि प्रमाणं प्रमेयं च युगपद् भवत:? एवमपि गन्धादिष्विन्द्रियार्थेषु ज्ञानानि प्रत्यर्थनियतानि युगपद् संभवन्तीदति ज्ञानानां प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात् क्रमवृत्तित्वाभाव:=या इमा बुद्धय: क्रमेणार्थेषु वर्तन्ते तासां क्रमवृत्तित्वं न संभवतीति। व्याघातश्च–"युगपद् ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् 1-1-16" इति, एतावांश्च प्रमाणप्रमेययो: सद्भावविषय: स चानुपपन्न इति, तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रमाणत्वं न संभवतीति॥11॥

अस्य समाधि:–

उपलब्धिहेतोरुपलब्धिविषयस्य चार्थस्य पूर्वापरसहभावाऽनियामाद् यथादर्शनं विभागवचनम्।

क्वचिदुपलब्धिहेतु: पूर्वं पश्चादुपलब्धिविषयो यथाऽऽदित्यस्य प्रकाश:, उत्पद्यमानानां क्वचित् पूर्वमुपलब्धिविषय: पश्चादुपलब्धिधहेतुर्यथाऽवस्थितानां प्रदीप:, क्वचिदुपलब्धि-हेतुरुपलब्धिविषयश्च सह भवतो यथा धूमेनाग्नेर्ग्रहणमिति। उपलब्धिहेतुश्च प्रमाणं प्रमेयं तूपलब्धिविषय:। एवं प्रमाणप्रमेययो: पूर्वापरसहभावेऽनियते यथाऽर्थो दृश्यते तथा विभज्य वचनीय इति, तत्रैकान्तेन प्रतिषेधानुपपत्ति:–सामान्येन खलु विभज्य प्रतिषेध उक्त इति।

समाख्याहेतोस्त्रैकाल्ययोगात् तथाभूता समाख्या।

युत्पनरिदम्–'पश्चात्सिद्धौ=असति प्रमाणे प्रमेयं न सिध्यति–प्रमाणेन प्रमीयमाणोऽर्थ: प्रमेयमिति विज्ञायते' इति, प्रमाणमित्येतस्या: समाख्याया उपलब्धिहेतुत्वं विमित्तं तस्य त्रैकाल्ययोग:–'उपलब्धिमकार्षीत्' 'उपलब्धिं करोति' 'उपलब्धिं करिष्यति' इति समाख्या-हेतो: त्रैकाल्ययोगात् समाख्या तथाभूता, प्रमितोऽनेनार्थ: प्रमीयते प्रमास्यते इति प्रमाणम्, प्रमितं प्रमीयते प्रसास्यते इति च प्रमेयम्, एवं सति भविष्यत्यस्मिन् हेतुत उपलब्धि:= प्रमास्यतेऽयमर्थ: प्रमेयमिदम् इत्येतत्सर्वं भवतीति।

त्रैकाल्यानभ्यनुज्ञाने च व्यवहारानुपपत्ति:।

यश्चैवं नाभ्यनुजानीयात् तस्य 'पाचकमानय पक्ष्यति' 'लावकमानय लविष्यति' इतिव्यवहारो नोपपद्यते इति। "प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यं त्रैकाल्यासिद्धे: 2-1-8" इत्येवमादिवाक्यं प्रमाणप्रतिषेध:. तत्रायं प्रष्टव्य:–अथाऽनेन प्रतिषेधेन भवता किं क्रियते इति, किं संभवो निवर्त्यते? अभाऽसंभावो ज्ञाप्यते? इति, तद् यदि संभवो निवर्त्यते? सति संभवे प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रतिषेधानुपपत्ति:, अथाऽसंभवो ज्ञाप्यते? प्रमाणलक्षणं प्राप्तस्तर्हि प्रतिषेध:–प्रमाणासंभवस्योपलब्धिहेतुत्वादिति॥11॥

युगपत् yugapat simultaneously; सिद्धौ siddhau, if it comes into existence; प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात् prati-artha-niyata-tvāt, being restricted to each object; क्रमवृत्तित्वाभाव: krama-vṛtti-tva-abhāvaḥ, absence of the characteristic of being in successive order; बुद्धीनाम् buddhūnām, of cognitions.

72. If perception were simultaneous with its object there would not, says the objector, be any order of succession in our cognitions, as there is no such order in their corresponding objects.—11.

Various objects of sense can exist at one time, *e.g.*, colour and smell exist in a flower at the same time. If we hold that perception is simultaneous with its object, we must admit that the colour and the smell can be perceived at the same time, that is, our perception of colour must be admitted to be simultaneous with our perception of smell. This is absurd, because two acts of perception, nay, two cognitions cannot take place at the same time. As there is an order of succession in our cognitions, perception cannot be simultaneous with its object. The aphorism may also be explained as follows :—

In knowing a colour we perform, we may say, two kinds of knowledge simultaneously, *viz.*, perception and inference. As soon as our eye comes in contact with the colour, perception results which does not, however, enable us to be aware of the colour. The colour is brought home to us by inference which, we may say, is performed simultaneously with the perception. Now, says the objector, perception and inference being two different kinds of knowledge cannot be simultaneous, as the mind which is an atomic substance cannot be instrumental in producing more than one kind of knowledge at a time.

किं चात:—

त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः॥ 12॥

अस्य तु विभाग:-पूर्वं हि प्रतिषेधसिद्धावसति प्रतिषेध्ये किमनेन प्रतिषिध्यते?, पश्चात् सिद्धो प्रतिषेधासिद्धि:-प्रतिषेधाभावादिति, युगपत्सिद्धौ प्रतिषेध्यसिद्ध्यभ्यनुज्ञानादनर्थक: प्रतिषेध इति, प्रतिषेधलक्षणे च वाक्येऽनुपपद्यमाने सिद्धं प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रमाणत्वमिति॥12॥

त्रैकाल्यासिद्धे traikālya-asiddheḥ, from the non-existence (of the means of right knowledge) in all the three times; प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः pratiṣedha-an-upapattiḥ, non-establishment of denial or negation.

73. In reply, it is stated that if perception and other means of right knowledge are impossible, the denial of them is also impossible.—12.

Owing to absence of the matter to be denied, the denial is inoperative.

सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधाच्च प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः॥ 13॥

कथम्? "त्रैकाल्यासिद्धे:" इत्यस्य हेतोर्यद्युदाहरणमुपादीयते? हेत्वर्थस्य साधकत्वं दृष्टांत दर्शयितव्यमिति, न च तर्हि प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यम्, अथ प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यम्?, उपादीयमानमप्युदाहरणं नार्थे साधयिष्यतीति. सोयं सर्वप्रमाणैर्व्याहतो हेतुरहेतु:-"सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी विरुद्ध: 1-2-6" इति, वाक्यार्थो ह्यस्य सिद्धान्त: स च वाक्यार्थ:-'प्रत्यक्षादीनि नार्थं साधयन्ति' इति, इदं चावयवानामुपादानमर्थस्य साधनायेति। अथ नोपादीयते? अप्रदर्शितहेत्वर्थस्य दृष्टान्ते न साधकत्वमिति प्रतिषेधो नोपपद्यते-हेतुत्वासिद्धेरिति॥13॥

सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधात् sarva-pramāṇa pratiṣedhāt, owing to the denial of all the means of right knowledge; च cha, and; प्रतिषेधानुपपत्ति: pratiṣedha-an-upapattiḥ, non-exitence of denial.

74. Moreover, the denial itself cannot be established, if you deny all means of right knowledge.—13.

If you are to establish anything (*e.g.*, denial), you can do so only by one or more of the means of right knowledge, *viz.*, perception, inference, comparison, etc. If you deny them, there will be left nothing which will lead you to the establishment of the thing. Hence you will not be able to establish the denial itself.

तत्प्रामाण्ये वा न सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषेधः॥ 14॥

प्रतिषेधलक्षणे स्ववाक्ये तेषामवयवाश्रितानां प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रामाण्येऽभ्यनुज्ञायमाने परवाक्येप्यवयवाश्रितानां प्रमाण्यं प्रसज्यते-अविशेषादिति, एवं च न सर्वाणि प्रमाणानि प्रतिषिध्यन्ते इति। "विप्रतिषेध:" इति वीत्ययमुपसर्ग: संप्रतिपत्त्यर्थे न व्याघाते-अर्थाभावादिति॥14॥

तत्प्रामाण्ये tat-prāmāṇye, if denial is valid; वा vā, or; न na, not; सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषेध: sarva-pramāṇa-vipratiṣehaḥ, denial of all the means of right knowledge.

75. If you say that your denial is based on a certian

means of right knowledge, you do thereby acknowledge the validity of the means.—14.

Suppose you deny a thing, because it is not perceived. You do thereby acknowledge that perception is a means of right knowledge. Similarly, inference, etc., are also to be acknowledge as means of right knowledge.

त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधश्च शब्दादातोद्यसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धेः॥ 15॥

किमर्थं पुनरिदमुच्यते? पूर्वोक्तनिबन्धनार्थम्, यत्तावत् पूर्वोक्तम्-'उपलब्धि-हेतोरुपलब्धिविषयस्य चार्थस्य पूर्वापरसहभावानियामाद् यथादर्शनं विभागवचनम्' इति तदितः समुत्थानं यथा विज्ञायेत। अनियमदर्शी खल्वयं कृषिर्नियमेन प्रतिषेधं प्रत्याचष्टे-त्रैकाल्यस्य चायुक्तः प्रतिषेध इति।

तत्रैकां विधामुदाहरति—शब्दादातोद्यसिद्धिवदिति, यथा पश्चात् सिद्धेन शब्देन पूर्वसिद्ध-मातोद्यमनुमीयते, साध्यं चातोद्यं साधनं च शब्दः, अन्तर्हिते ह्यातोद्ये स्वनतोऽनुमानं भवतीति-वीणा वाद्यते वेणुः पूर्यते इति स्वनविशेषणातोद्यविशेषं प्रतिपद्यते, तथा पूर्वसिद्धमुपलब्धिविषयं पश्चात्सिद्धेनोपलब्धिहेतुना प्रतिपद्यते इति, निदर्शनार्थत्वाच्चास्य शेषयोर्विधयोर्यथोक्तमुदाहरणं वेदितव्यमिति। कस्मात् पुनरिह तन्नोच्यते पूर्वोक्तमुपपाद्यते? इति, सर्वथा तावदयमर्थः प्रकाशयितव्यः स इह वा प्रकाश्येत तत्र वा न कश्चिद्विशेष इति। प्रमाणं प्रमेयमिति च समाख्या समावेशेन वर्तते—समाख्यानिमित्तवशात्, समाख्यानिमित्तं तूपलब्धिसाधनं प्रमाणम् उपलब्धिविषयश्च प्रमेयमिति, यदा चोपलब्धिविषयः क्वचिदुप-लब्धिसानं भवति तदा प्रमाणं प्रमेयमिति चैकोऽर्थोऽभिधीयते॥15॥

त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधः trai-kālya-apratiṣedhaḥ, non-denial by reference to three times; च cha, and; शब्दात् śabdāt, form sound; आतोद्यसिद्धिवत् ātodyasidhivat, like the proof of the existence of the drum; तत्सिद्धेः tat-siddheḥ, from the poof of their existence.

76. The means of right knowledge cannot, therefore, be denied. They are established in the manner that a drum is proved by its sound.—15.

There is, says Vātsyāyana, no fixed rule that the means of right knowledge should precede objects of right knowledge or should succeed them or be simultaneous with them. The order of precedence is never uniform. Look at the analogous cases: a drum nprecedes its sound, and illumination succeeds the sun, while smoke is synchronous with fire.

अस्यार्थस्यावद्योतनार्थमिदमुच्यते—

प्रमेया च तुलाप्रामाण्यवत्॥ 16॥

गुरुत्वपरिमाणज्ञानसाधनं तुला प्रमाणम्, ज्ञानविषयो गुरुद्रव्यं सुवर्णादि प्रमेयम्, यदा (च) सुवर्णादिना तुलान्तरं व्यवस्थाप्यते तदा तुलान्तरप्रतिपत्तौ सुवर्णादि प्रमाणं तुलान्तरं प्रमेयमिति, एवमनवयवेन तन्त्रार्थ उद्दिष्टो वेदितव्यः-आत्मा तावदुपलब्धिविषयत्वात् प्रमेये परिपठितः उपलब्धौ च स्वातन्त्र्यात् प्रमाता, बुद्धिरुपलब्धिसाधनत्वात् प्रमाणम्, उपलब्धिविषयत्वात् प्रमेयम्, उभयाभावात् प्रमितिः, एवमर्थविशेषे समाख्यासमावेशो योज्यः।

तथा च कारकशब्दा निमित्तवशात् समावेशेन वर्तन्ते इति। 'वृक्षस्तिष्ठति' इति स्वस्थितौ स्वातन्त्र्यात् कर्ता, 'वृक्षं पश्यति' इतिदर्शनेनाप्तुमिष्यामाणत्वात् कर्म, 'वृक्षेण चन्द्रमसं ज्ञापयति' इति ज्ञापकस्य साधकतमत्वात् करणम्, 'वृक्षायोदकमासिञ्चति' इति आसिच्यमानेनोदकेन वृक्षमभिप्रैतीति संप्रदानम्, 'वृक्षात् पर्णं पतति' इति "ध्रुवमपायेऽपादानम्" इत्यपादानम्, 'वृक्षे वयांसि सन्ति' इति "आधारोऽधिकरणम्" इत्यधिकरणम्, एवं च सति च द्रव्यमात्रं कारकं न वा क्रियामात्रम्। किं तर्हि? क्रियासाधनं क्रियाविशेषयुक्तं कारकम्-यत् क्रियासाधनं स्वतन्त्रः स कर्ता, न द्रव्यमात्रं न क्रियामात्रम्, क्रियया व्याप्तुमिष्यमाणतमं कर्म, न द्रव्यमात्रं न क्रियामात्रम्, एवं साधमतमादिष्वपि, एवं च कारकाऽन्वाख्यानं यथैवोपपत्तित एवं लक्षणतः कारकाऽन्वाख्यानमपि न द्रव्यमात्रेण न क्रियया वा किं तर्हि? क्रियासाधने क्रियाविशेषयुक्त इति, कारकशब्दश्चायं प्रमाणं प्रमेयमिति स च कारकधर्मं न हातुमर्हति, अस्ति भो कारकशब्दानां निमित्तवशात् समावेशः प्रत्यक्षादीनि च प्रमाणानि-उपलब्धिहेतुत्वात्, प्रमेयं च-उपलब्धिविषयत्वात्, संवेद्यानि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि च-'प्रत्यक्षेणोपलभे अनुमानेनापलभे उपमानेनोपलभे आगमेनोपलभे, प्रत्यक्षं मे ज्ञानम् आनुमानिकं मे ज्ञानम् औपमानिकं मे ज्ञानम् आगमिकं मे ज्ञानम्' इति विशेषा गृह्यन्ते, लक्षणतश्च ज्ञाप्यमानानि ज्ञायन्ते विशेषेण-'इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानम्' इत्येवामादिना॥16॥

प्रमेया prameyā, what is to be established; च cha, and; तुला tulā something possessing weight, a pair of scales, a measure of weight; प्रामाण्यवत् prāmāṇya-vat, like its being a means of right knowledge by being used as a weight.

77. The character of an object of right knoweldge resembles that of a balance by which a thing is weighed.—16.

Just as balance is an instrument for measuring weight, but is a measured object when it is itself weighed in another balance, so the senses, etc., are said to be instruments of right knowledge from one point of view, and objects of right knowledge form another point of

view. The eye, for instance, is an instrument of perception as well as an object of perception. So also the means of right knowledge may, if occasion arises, be also regarded as objects of right knowledge.

सेयमुपलब्धि: प्रत्यक्षादिविषया किं प्रमाणान्तरत:? अथाऽन्तरेण प्रमाणम्=असाधना? इति, कश्चात्र विशेष:?

प्रमाणतस्सिद्धे: प्रमाणानां प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धिप्रसङ्ग:।। 17।।

यदि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यन्ते? येन प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यन्ते तत् प्रमाणान्तरमस्तीति प्रमाणन्तरसद्भाव: प्रसजयते इत्यनवस्थामाह-तस्याप्यन्येन तस्याप्यन्येनेति, न चानवस्था शक्याऽनुज्ञातुम्-अनुपपत्तेरिति।।17।।

प्रमाणत: pranāṇt-taḥ, from the means of right knowledge; सिद्धे: siddheḥ, knowledge or proof being; प्रमाणानां pramāṇām, of the means of right knowledge; प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धिप्रसङ्ग: pramāna-antara-siddhi-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of the existence of other means of right knowledge.

78. If an object of right knowledge, continues the objector, is to be established by a means of right knowledge, this latter needs also to be established by another means of right knowledge.—17.

The objection stands thus :—

You say that an objection of right knowledge is to be established by a means of right knowledge. I admit this, and ask how you establish the means of right knowledge itself. Since a means of right knowledge may also be regarded as an object of right knowledge may also be regarded as an object of right knowledge, you are required to establish the so-called means of right knowledge. By another means of right knowledge, and so on.

तद्विनिवृत्तेर्वा प्रमाणसिद्धिवत्प्रमेयसिद्धि:।। 18।।

यदि प्रत्यक्षाद्युपलब्धो प्रमाणान्तरं निवर्तते? आत्मेत्युलब्धावपि प्रमाणान्तरं निवर्त्स्यति-अविशेषात्, एवं च सर्वप्रमाणविलोप इति।।18।।

तद्विनिवृत्ते: tat- vinivṛttehḥ, in case of the cessation of the other means after the cognition of the means of right knowledge; वा vā, on the other hand; प्रमाणसिद्धिवत् pramāṇa-siddhi-vat, as in the case of the proof or knowledge of the means of right knowledge; प्रमेयसिद्धि: prameya-siddhiḥ, proof of the object of right knowledge.

79. Or, he continues, if a means of right knowledge does not require another means of right knowledge for its establish-ment, let an object of right knowledge be also established without any means of knowledge.—18.

A means of right knowledge stands in the same category as an object of right knowledge, if you are to establish either of them. If the means of right knowledge is accepted as self-established the object of right knowledge must also, according to the objector, be accepted as self-established. In such a contingency perception, inference, etc., will be superfluous.

अत आह—

न प्रदीपप्रकाशसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धे:।। 19।।

यथा प्रदीपप्रकाश: प्रत्यक्षाङ्गत्वाद् दृश्यदर्शने प्रमाणं स च प्रत्यक्षान्तरेण=चक्षुष: संनिकर्षेण गृह्यते, प्रदीपभावाभावयोर्दर्शनस्य तथाभावाद् दर्शनहेतुरनुमीयते, 'तमसि प्रदीपमुपाददीया:' इत्याप्तोपदेशनापि प्रतिपद्यते, एवं प्रत्यक्षादीनां यथादर्शनं प्रत्यक्षादिभिरेवोपसब्धि:।

इन्द्रियाणि तावात् स्वविषयग्रहणेनैवानुमीयन्ते, अर्था: प्रत्यक्षतो गृह्यन्ते, इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षास्त्वावरणेन लिङ्गेनानुमीयन्ते, इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमात्ममनसो: संयोगविशेषादात्मसमवाचाच्च सुखदिवद् गृह्यते, एवं प्रमाणविशेषे विभज्य वचनीय: यथा च दृश्य: सन् प्रदीपप्रकाशो दृश्यान्तराणां दर्शनहेतुरिति दृश्यदर्शनव्यवस्थां लभते एवं प्रमेयं सत् किंचिदर्थजातमुपलब्धिहेतुत्वात् प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवस्थां लभते, सेयं प्रत्यक्षदिभिरेव प्रत्यक्षादीनां यथादर्शनमुपलब्धिर्न प्रमाणान्तरतो न च प्रमाणमन्तेरण निस्साधनेति।।

तेनैव तस्याऽग्रहणमिति चेत्? न-अर्थभेदस्य लक्षणसामान्यात्।

प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रत्यक्षादिभिरेव ग्रहणमितयुक्तम्-अन्येन ह्यन्यस्य ग्रहणं दृष्टमिति, न-अर्थभेदस्य लक्षणसामान्यात्=प्रत्यक्षलक्षणेनाऽनेकोर्थ: संगृहीतस्तत्र केन चित् कस्यचिद् ग्रहणमित्यदोष: एवमनुमानादिष्वपीति, यथोद्धृतेनोदकेनाऽऽशयस्थस्य ग्रहणमिति।।

ज्ञातृमनसोश्च दर्शनात्।

'अहं सुखी अहं दु:खी च' इति तेनैव ज्ञात्रा तस्येव ग्रहणं दृश्यते, ''युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम्'' इति च तेनेव मनसा तस्यैवानुमानं दृश्यते, ज्ञातुर्ज्ञेयस्य चाभेदो ग्रहणस्य ग्राह्यस्य चाभेद इति।।

निमित्तभेदोऽत्रेति चेत्? समानम्।

न निमित्तान्तरेण बिना ज्ञाताऽऽत्मानं जानीते, न च निमित्तान्तरेण बिना मनसा

मना गृह्यते इति, समानमेतत्=प्रत्यक्षादिभि: प्रत्यक्षादीनां ग्रहणम् इत्यत्राप्यर्थभेदो न गृह्यते इति।।

प्रत्यक्षादीनां चाविषयस्यानुपपत्तेः।

यदि स्यात् किंचिदर्थजातं प्रत्यक्षादीनामविषय: यत् प्रत्यक्षादिभिर्न शक्यं ग्रहीतुं तस्य ग्रहणाय प्रमाणन्तरमुपादीयेत तत्तु न शक्यं केन चिदुपपादयितुमिति, प्रत्यक्षदीनां यथादर्शनमेवेदं सच्चाऽसच्च सर्वं विषय इति।।19।।

न na, no; प्रदीपप्रकाशसिद्धिवत् pradīpa-prakāśa-siddhi-vat, like proof of illumination of the lamp; तत्सिद्धेः tat-siddheḥ, because of the proof thereof i.e. the means of right knowledge.

80. It is not so : the means of right knwoledge are established like the illumination of a lamp.—19.

A lamp illumines a jar and our eye illumines the lamp. Though it is sometimes the lamp, ans sometimes the eye, that illumines, you are bound to admit a general notion of illuminator. Similarly, you must admit a general notion of the means of right knowledge as distinguished from that of the objects of right knowledge. The means will not, of course, be regarded as such when included under the category of an object.

[The aphorism is also interpteted as follows :—Just as a lamp illumines itself and the other objects, the means of right knowledge establish themselves and the objects of right knowledge. Hence perception establishes itself and the objects of sense].

Note—Objections raised in aphorisms 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, and 18 emanated from the Buddhist philosophy. The reply given in aphorisms 12, 13, 14, 15 and 19, represents the views of Brāhmanic philosophers who regard perception as a real act and objects as self-existent entities. According to the Buddhist philosophers, however, neither perception nor objects have any self-existence. They acquire an apparent or conditional existence, in virtue of a certain relation which exists between them. Cause and effect, long and short, prior and posterior, etc., are all relative terms. The whole world is a net-work of relations. The relations themselves are illusory, as the objects which are related have no self-existence. Hence, the world is an illusion, or has a mere conditional existence. But where there is conditionality, there is no truth. Truth and conditionality are incompatible terms. That which neutralises all relations is the void or absolute which lies beyond the conditional world. To speak the truth, the world is an absolute nothing, though it has a conditional existence. *Vide* my Translation of the Mādhyamika aphorisms in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta, for 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898 and 1899.

केचितु दृष्टान्तमपरिगृहीतं हेतुना=विशेषहेतुमन्तरेण साध्यसाधनायोपाददते यथा प्रदीपप्रकाश: प्रदीपान्तरप्रकाशमन्तरेण गृह्यते तथा प्रमाणानि प्रमाणानतरमन्तरेण गृह्यन्ते इति। स चायम्—

क्वचिन्निवृत्तिदर्शनादनिवृत्तिदर्शनाच्च क्वचिदनेकान्तः।। 20।।

यथाऽयं प्रसङ्गो निवृत्तिदर्शनात् प्रमाणसाधनायापादीयते एव प्रमेयसाधनायाप्युपादेयः:- अविशेषहेतुत्वात्, यथा स्थाल्यादिरूपग्रहणे प्रदीपप्रकाश: प्रमेयसाधनायोपादीयते एव प्रमाण साधनायाप्युपादेय:-विशेषहेत्वभावात्, सोयं विशेषहेतुपरिग्रहमन्तरेण दृष्टान्त एकस्मिन् पक्षे उपादेयो न प्रतिपक्षे इत्यनेकान्त:=एकस्मिंश्च पक्षे दृष्टान्त इत्यनेकान्त:-विशेष-हेत्वभावादिति।।

विशेषहेतुपरिग्रहे सति उपसंहाराभ्यनुज्ञानादप्रतिषेधः।

विशेषहेतुपरिगृहीतस्तु दृष्टान्त एकस्मिन् पक्षे उपसंह्रियमाणो न शक्योऽननुज्ञातुम् एवं च सति 'अनेकानत:' इत्ययं प्रतिषेधो न भवति।

प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रत्यक्षादिभिरुपलब्धावऽनवस्थेतिचेत्? न-संविद्विषयनिमित्तानामुपलब्ध्या व्यवहारोपपत्तेः।

प्रत्यक्षेणार्थमुपलभे अनुमानेनार्थमुपलभे उपमानेनार्थमुपलभे आगमेनार्थमुपलभे इति, प्रयत्क्षं मे ज्ञानम् आनुमानिकं में ज्ञानम् औपमानिकं मे ज्ञानम् आगमिकं में ज्ञानमिति संविद्विषयं संविन्निमित्तं चोपलभमानस्या धर्मार्थसुखापवर्गप्रयोजन: तत्प्रत्यनीकपरिवर्जन-प्रयोजनश्च व्यवहार उपपद्यते सोयं तावत्येव निर्वर्तते, न चास्ति व्यवहारान्तरमनवसीसाधनीयं येन प्रयुक्तोऽनवस्थामुपाददीतेति।।20।।

क्वचित् kvachit, in some cases, *e.g.* lamp; निवृत्तिदर्शनात् nivṛtti-darśanāt, from the observation of cessation; अनिवृत्तिदर्शनात् anivṛtti-darśanāt, from the observation of non-cessation or non-absence; च cha, and; क्वचित् kvachit, in some cases, *e.g.* jar; अनेकान्त: an-eka-antaḥ, not-one-ended, uncertain.

81. Seeing that in some cases other proofs are not required and that in some cases there is need of other proofs, you argument indecisive—20.

This is in reply to those who argue that just as a light does not

require another light ot illuminate it, even sothe proofs, *i.e.* the means of right knowledge also may not require anything else to prove them; in other words, that every means of right knowledge is also the means of its own right knowledge. The reply is that the example cannot be stretched so far, because there is nothing to distingush the hetu (reason), *viz.* to be the illuminator, from the udāharaṇa (example), *viz.* the lamp, in this respect. The means of right knowledge and a lamp both illuminate objects; a lamp also illuminated by another lamp; and it would then follow on the same analogy that the means of right knowledge which illuminates objects, may be also illuminated by other means. Thus your argument leads to opposite conclusions.

सामान्येन प्रमाणनि परीक्ष्य विशेषेण परीक्ष्यन्ते, तत्र–

प्रत्यक्षलक्षणानुपपत्तिरसमग्रवचनात्।। 21।।

आत्ममनस्संनिकर्षो हि कारणान्तरं नोक्तमिति, न चासंयुक्ते द्रव्ये संयोगजन्यस्य गुणस्योत्पत्तिरिति, ज्ञानोत्पत्तिदर्शनादात्ममनस्संनिकर्षः कारणम्। मनस्संनिकर्षानपेक्षस्य चेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षस्य ज्ञानकरणत्वे युगपदुत्पद्येरन् बुद्धय इति मनस्संनिकर्षोपि कारणम्।।21।।

प्रत्यक्षलक्षणानुपपत्तिः pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-an-upapattiḥ, non-establishment of the definition of perception; असमग्रवचनात् A-samagra-vachanāt, from incomplete statement.

82. An objector may say that the definition of perception as given before is untenable, because incomplete.—21.

Perception has been defined as knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with tis object. This definition is said to be defective, because it does not notice the conjunction of soul with mind, and of mind with sense, which are also causes of perception.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 2 : The Pramāṇas in general : Sūtras : 8-21.

Some thinkers maintain that Perception, Inference, Comparison and Word are not pramāṇas (sources of knowledge) because it cannot be shown that they exist before, after, or along with, the prameyas (objects of knowledge). If perception, *e.g.* cognition of small, etc. by the senses, exists as a pramāṇa before the existence of the smell, etc., then the definition of Perception as cognition produced from the contact of the senses and objects does not hold good. On the other hand, if Perception as a pramāṇa comes after the cognition of the prameya, then

it is useless as the prameya has already been otherwise cognised. Lastly, if the pramāṇas co-exist with the prameyas then there would be simultaneity of several cognition and the inference of the mind by the non-simulateneity of cognitions would be demolished.

To the above objection, we reply as follows :—

The fallacy of the objector's reasoning lies in this that he has distributed the pramāṇas, and has compounded the the prameyas, in respect of time. Tthe prameyas (like the pramāṇas) do some come before, some after and some along with, the pramāṇas. Thus, the sun's rays appear before their effect, the blooming of the lotus; a lamp which illumines an object in a dark room comes after the object; where the existence of fire is inferred by the existene of the smoke the cause and object of cognition appear at the same time. There is therefore no hard and fast rule as to the relative position of the pramāṇas and the prameyas in time. Moreover, pramāṇa and prameya are correlative terms as the cause and the object of cognition. Where the pramāṇa follows the prameya the correlation still exists, as a "cook" is always a cook even when he is not actually cooking.

Then, what does the objection establish? Is it the negation of the existence of the pramāṇas or the knowledge of their non-existence? It cannot be the former because when you proceed to negate their existence you thereby admit their existence, for what is non-existent cannot be negated. It cannot be the latter, because your very argument becomes a pramāṇa as it makes known the non-existence of the pramāṇas, Perception, etc.

The reason advanced by the objector again can be turned equally against himself. The reason is "non-existence in the past, future and present". The negation cannot precede the thing to be negated, *i. e.* the pramāṇas, because there is then nothing to be negated. If it follows, then in the absence of the negation, the pramāṇas cannot be called the thing to be negated. If it co-exists with the pramāṇas then the existence of the thing to be negated being adimitted the negation becomes useless.

Again, the opponent's reasoning is invalid if he cannot cite a familiar instance (I.i. 32) in support of the reason. If he cite a familiar instance then this being an object of perception, Perception as a pramāṇa is admitted by him and his negation of all pramāṇas falls to the ground. The reason thus becomes what is known as the fallacy of the contradictory reason (I. ii. 6.). Further, we have already shown that in the reasoning of five members all the pramāṇas are combined. The opponent cannot

say that the pramāṇas are valid in his reasoning and not in the reasoning of others.

The reason, "non-existence in the past, future and present" advanced by the opponent, does not also stand scrutiny. For pramāṇas do operate subsequently as when the existence of a flute is inferred by its tune.

The pramāṇas are thus established. Pramāṇa and prameya are, however, correlative terms. Whatever is the cause of cognition is pramāṇa; whatever is the object of cognition is prameya. When the nature, character and strength of a pramāṇa is under examination it is a prameya, just as scales and weights by which things are measured may themselves be objects of measurement. Thus the soul, being the object of cognition, is a prameya (knowable) : as it is an independent agent in the act of cognition, it is the knower. Cognition being the cause of apprehension, is pramāṇa; as an object of apprehension, it is a prameya. Where it is neither pramāṇa nor a prameya it is pramiti (knowledge).

Now, admitting all this, asks the opponent, are the pramāṇas, Perception, etc., established by other pramāṇas or are they independent of any pramāṇa? Our answer is that to admit the need of other pramāṇas would entail infinite regression which is illogical, while to say that the pramāṇas do not stand in need of establishment would imply that the soul and other prameyas also do not require to be established and that the pramāṇas themselves are futile. Our reply therefore is that just as a lamp which is a also a cause of perception is itself made known by the contact of the eye which is also a cause of perception, in other words, just as Perception is the pramāṇa of Preception, so the pramāṇas, Preception, etc., are established by themselves mutually. It is not necessary that pramāṇa and prameya should belong to different classes of objects. It is seen that the soul knows itself by itself in such cases as "I feel pleasure, I feel pain." So also is the mind inferred by the mind, non-simultaneity of heterogeneous cognition being the mark of its inference. Moreover, nothing is known to exist which cannot be cognised by the four pramāṇas. There is therefore no reason to assume other pramāṇas.

Some are of opinion that just as lamp reveals itself as well an object without the aid of another lamp so the pramāṇas reveal themselves as well as their objects and do not require the aid of other pramāṇas. This view cannot be accepted. For there are objects such as a pot which do not reveal themselves but require pramāṇas. Is there any special

reason to account for the difference in the two cases? If there is no such reason, the example cited leads to no conclusion but stands by itself. If there is such a reason then the example presents a special case and does not establish a general rule.

नात्ममनसोस्सन्निकर्षाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः॥ 22॥

आत्ममनसो: संनिकर्षाभावे नोत्पद्यते प्रत्यक्षम् इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षाभाववदिति, सति चेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षे ज्ञानोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् कारणभावं ब्रुवते।।22।।

न na, not; आत्ममनस: ātma-mansaḥ, of soul and mind; सिन्नकर्षाभावे sannikarṣa-abhāve, in the absence of contact; प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्ति: pratyakṣautpattih, production of perception.

83. **Perception**, it is said, cannot arise unless there is conjunction of soul with mind.—22.

From the contact of a sense with its object no knowledge arises unless; it is said, there is also conjunction of soul with mind. A sense coming in contact with its object produces knowledge in our soul, only if the sense is conjoined with the mind. Hence, the conjunction of soul with mind should be mentioned as a necessary element in the definition of perception.

दिग्देशकालाकाशेष्वप्येवं प्रसङ्गः॥ 23॥

दिगादिषु सत्सु ज्ञानभावत् तान्यपि कारणानीति, अकारणभावेपि ज्ञानोत्पत्तेर्दिगासिंनि-धेरवर्जनीयत्वात्=यदाप्यकारणं दिगादीनि ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ तदापि सत्सु दिगादिषु ज्ञानेन भवितव्यं न हि दिगादीनां संनिधिः शक्य: परिवर्जयितुमिति। तत्र कारणभावे हेतुवचनम्-एतस्माद् हेतोर्दिगादीनि ज्ञानकारणानीति। आत्ममनस्संनिकर्षस्तुर्ह्युपसंख्येय इति।।23।।

दिग्देशकालाकाशेषु dik-deśa-kāla-ākāśeṣu, in respect of direction, space, time and ether; अपि api, also; एवं evam, similar; प्रसंग: prasaṅgaḥ, implication.

84. Were it so, observes one of the assembly then direction, space, time and ether should also be enumerated among the causes of perception.—23.

Direction, space, time and ether are also indispensable conditions in the production of knowledge. But even the objector does not feel the necessity of enumerating these among the causes of perception.

ज्ञानलिङ्गत्वादात्मनो नानवरोधः॥ 24॥

ज्ञानमात्मलिङ्गम्–तद्गुणत्वात्, न चासंयुक्ते द्रव्ये संयोगजस्य गुणस्योत्पत्तिरस्तीति॥24॥

ज्ञानलिङ्गत्वात् jñāna-liṅga-tvāt, because cognition or knowledge is its mark; आत्मनः ātmanaḥ, of soul; न na, not; अनवरोधः anavarodhaḥ, non-exclusion.

85. The soul, we point out, has not been excluded from our definition, inasmuch as knowledge is a mark of the soul.—24.

Perception has been described as knowledge, and knowledge implies the soul which is its abode. Consequently, in speaking of knowledge, the soul has, by implication, been mentioned as a condition in the production of perception.

तदयौगपदयलिङ्गत्वान्न मनसः॥ 25॥

अनवरोध इति वर्तते, "युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् 1-1-16" इत्युच्यमाने सिध्यत्येव मनस्संनिकर्षापेक्ष इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षो ज्ञानकारणमिति॥25॥

तदयौगपद्यलिङ्गत्वात् tat-ayaugapadya-liṅga-tvāt, because non-simultaneity of cognitions is its mark; च cha, and; न na, not; मनसः manasaḥ, of mind.

86. The mind, too, has not been omitted from our definition, inasmuch as we have spoken of the non-simultaneity of acts of knowledge.—25.

Perception has been defined as knowledge. An essential characteristic of knowledge is that more than one act of knowing cannot take place at a time. This characteristic is due to the mind, an atomic substance, which is conjoined with the sense, when knowledge is produced. Hence, in speaking of knowledge, we have, by implication, mentioned the mind as a condition of perception.

प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तत्वाच्चेन्द्रियार्थयोस्सन्निकर्षस्य स्वशब्देन वचनम्॥ 26॥

प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दानां निमित्तमात्ममनस्संनिकर्षः, प्रत्यक्षस्यैवेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष इत्यऽसमानोऽसतानज्वाज् तस्य ग्रहणम्॥26॥

प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तत्वात् pratyakṣa nimitta-tvāt, because it is the condition

of perception; इन्द्रियार्थयोः indriya-arthayoḥ, of sense and object; सन्निकर्षस्य sannikarṣasya, of contact; स्वशब्देन sva-śabdena, by identical term, specific; वचनं vachanam, statement.

87. The contact of a sense with its object is mentioned as the special cause of perception.—26.

There are many kinds of knowledge, such as perception, recollection etc. Conjunction of soul with mind is a cause which operates in the production of all kinds of knowledge, while the contact of a sense with its object is the cause which operates only in perception. In our definition of perception we have mentioned only the special cause, and have omitted the common causes which precede not only perception, but also other kinds of knowledge.

प्राधान्ये च हेत्वन्तरम्–

सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसाञ्चेन्द्रियार्थयोस्सन्निकर्सनिमित्तत्वात्॥ 27॥

इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षस्य ग्रहणं नात्ममनसोः संनिकर्षस्येति, एकदा खल्वयं प्रबोधकालं प्रणिधाय सुप्तः प्रणिधानवशात् प्रबुध्यते, यदा तु तीव्रौ ध्वनिस्पर्शौ प्रबोधकारणं भवतस्तदा प्रसुप्तस्येन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षनिमित्तं प्रबोधज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तत्र न ज्ञातुर्मनसश्च संनिकर्षस्य प्राधान्यं भवति, किं तर्हि? इन्द्रियार्थयोः संनिकर्षस्य–नह्यात्मा जिज्ञासमानः प्रयत्नेन मनस्तदा प्रेरयतीति। एकदा खल्वयं विषयान्तराऽव्यासक्तमनाः संकल्पवशाद् विषयान्तरं जिज्ञासमानः प्रयत्नप्रेरितेन मनसा इन्द्रियं संयाज्य तद् विषयान्तरं जानीते, यदा तु खल्वस्य निस्संकल्पस्य निर्जिज्ञासस्य च व्यासक्तमनसो बाह्यविषयोपनिपातनाद् ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षस्य प्राधान्यम्–न ह्यत्रासौ जिज्ञासमानः प्रयत्नेन मनः प्रेरयतीति। प्राधान्याच्चेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षस्य ग्रहणं कार्ये गुणत्वान्नात्ममनसोः संनिकर्षस्येति॥27॥

सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसां supta-vyāsakta-manasām, of minds asleep and inattentive; च cha, and; इन्द्रियार्थयोः indriya-arthayoḥ, of sense and object; सन्निकर्ष निमित्तत्वात् sannikarṣa-nimitta-tvāt, because contact is the condition.

88. The contact of a sense with its object is certainly the main cause, as perception is produced even when one is asleep or inattentive.—27.

Even a sleeping person hears the thundering of a cloud if his ear is open to it, and a careless person experiences heat if his skin is exposed to it.

तैश्चापदेशो ज्ञानविशेषाणाम्।। 28।।

तै:=इन्द्रियैरर्थैश्च व्यपदिश्यन्ते ज्ञानविशेष:, कथम्? 'घ्राणेन जिघ्रति' 'चक्षुषा पश्यति' 'रसनया रसयति' इति, 'घ्राणविज्ञानं चक्षुर्विज्ञानं चक्षुर्विज्ञानं रसनविज्ञानम्' 'गन्धविज्ञानं रूपविज्ञानं रसविज्ञानम्' इति च, इन्द्रियविषयविशेषाच्च पञ्चधा बुद्धिर्भवति अत: प्राधन्यमिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षस्येति।।28।।

तै: taiḥ, by these; च cha, also; अपदेश: apadeśaḥ differenciation ज्ञानविशेषाणां jñāna-viśeṣāṇām, of particular cognitions.

89. By the senses and their objects are also distinguished special kinds of knowledge.—28.

The special kinds of knowledge are the five varieties of perceptors *viz,*, by sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These are distinguished by the senses in whose spheres they lie, or by the objects which they illumine. Thus, the visual perception is called eye-knowledge or colour-knowledge, the auditory perception is called ear-knowledge or sound-knowledge, the olfactory perception is called nose-knowledge or smell-knowledge, the gustatory perception is called tongue-knowledge or taste-knowledge and the tactual perception is called skin-knowledge or touch-knowledge.

यदुक्तम्-'इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षग्रहणं कार्यं नात्ममनसो: संनिकर्षस्येति, कस्मात्? सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसामिन्द्रियार्थयो: संनिकर्षस्य ज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात्' इति, सोयम्–

व्याहतत्वादहेतु:।। 29।।

यदि तावत् क्वचिदात्ममनसो: संनिकर्षस्य ज्ञानकारणत्वं नेष्यते? तदा "युगपज्ज्ञाना-नुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् 1-1-16" इति व्याहन्येत, नेदानीं मनस: संनिकर्षमिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षो-ऽपेक्षते, मनस्संयोगानपेक्षायां च युगपज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग:। अथ मा भूद् व्याघात इति सर्व-विज्ञानानामात्ममनसो: संनिकर्ष: कारणमिष्यते? तदवस्थमेवेदं भवति-'ज्ञानकारणत्वादात्म-मनसो: संनिकर्षस्य ग्रहणं कार्यम्' इति।।29।।

व्याहतत्वात् vyāhata-tvāt, becuase it is precluded or obstructed; अहेतु: a-hetuḥ, no argument.

90. (The above, says the objector, is) no argument, because it is precluded.—29.

The conclusion reached in the preceding three aphorisms is that the contact of the sense and the object, and not the contact of the sense and mind not the contact of the soul and mind, should be stated to be

the cause of perception. To this the objector puts in a rejoinder. The meaning is that if in certain circumstances, *e.g.* where the person is asleep or inattentive, perception takes place without the contact of the soul and mind, then there would be nothing to prevent several congnitions from being produced at one and the same time, and thus the tenet that the non-production of several cognitions simultaneously is the mark of the mind (Nyāya-sūtra, I. i. 16) would be violated. Therefore, the sūtra I. i. 16. precludes, or is precluded by, the argument advanced in the preceding three aphorisms.

नार्थविशेषप्राबलयात्।। 30।।

नास्ति व्याघात:-न ह्यात्ममनस्संनिकर्षस्य ज्ञानकारणत्वं व्यभिचरति, इन्द्रियार्थ-संनिकर्षस्य प्राधान्यमुपादीयते-अर्थविशेषप्राबल्याद्धि सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसां ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरेकदा भवति। अर्थविशेष: कश्चिदेवेन्द्रियार्थस्तस्य प्राबन्यं तीव्रतापटुते, तच्चार्थविशेषप्राबलय-मिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षविषयं नात्ममनसो: संनिकर्षविषयं तस्मादिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष: प्रधानमिति।

असति प्रणिधाने संकल्पे चाऽसति सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसां यद् इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षादुत्पद्यते ज्ञानं तत्र मनस्संयोगोपि कारणमिति मनसि क्रियाकारणं वाच्यमिति, यथैव ज्ञातु: खल्वयमिच्छाजनित: प्रयत्नो मनस: प्रेरक आत्मगुण एवमात्मनि गुणान्तरं सर्वस्य साधकं प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितमस्ति येन प्रेरितं मन इन्द्रियेण संबध्यते, तेन ह्यऽप्रेर्यमाणे मनसि संयोगाभावात् ज्ञानानुत्पत्तौ सर्वार्थताऽस्य निवर्तते, एषितव्यं चास्य गुणान्तरस्य द्रव्यगुणकर्मकारकत्वम् अन्यथा हि चतुर्विधानामणूनां भूतसूक्ष्माणां मनसां च ततोऽन्यस्य क्रियाहेतोरसंभवात् शरीरेन्द्रियविषयाणामनुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग:।।30।।

न no, not; अर्थविशेषप्राबल्यात् artha viśeṣ-prābalyāt, on account of the prevalence or intensity of a particular percept or sensible object.

91. (We reply that there is) no (such preclusion or violation). (In the case of a person who is asleep or inattentive perception takes place) through the intensity of the sensible object.—30.

The three aphorisms in question, Nos. 87-89, do not imply that the contact of the soul and mind sometimes is, and sometimes is not, the cause of perception. They merely emphasise the fact that the contact of the sense and object is the principle cause of perceptual cognition. For the intensity of the object and the keenness of the sense directly establish contact of the object with the sense, and not of the sense with mind and the soul.

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमेकदेशग्रहणादुपलब्धेः॥ 31॥

यदिदमिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षादुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् 'वृक्षः' इति एतत् किल प्रत्यक्षं तत्खल्वनुमानमेव, कस्मात्? एकदेशग्रहणाद् वृक्षास्यापलब्धेः=अर्वाग्भागमयं गृहीत्वा वृक्षमुपलभते न चैकदेशो वृक्षः, तत्र यथा धूमं गृहीत्वा वह्निमनुमिनोति तादृगेव तद् भवति।

किं पुनर्गृह्यमाणदेकदेशाद् अर्थान्तरमनुमेयं मन्यसे? अवयवसमूहपक्षे अवयवान्तराणि द्रव्योत्पत्तिपक्षे तानि चाऽवयवी चेति। अवयवसमूहपक्षे तावदेकदेशग्रहणाद् वृक्षबुद्धरभावः- न ह्यऽगृह्यमाणमेकदेशान्तरं वृक्षो गृह्यमाणैकदेशवदिति। अथ एकदेशग्रहणादेकदेशान्तरानुमाने समुदायप्रतिसंधानात् तत्र वृक्षबुद्धिः?, न तर्हि वृक्षबुद्धिरनुमानमेवं सति भवितुमर्हतीति। द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिपक्षे नाऽवयव्यऽनुमेयः-अस्येकदेशसंबद्धस्याग्रहणाद् ग्रहणे चाविशेषादनुमेय-त्वाभावः, तस्माद् वृक्षबुद्धिरनुमानं न भवति॥31॥

प्रत्यक्षं pratyakṣam, perception; अनुमानं anumānam, inference; एकदेशग्रहणात् eka-deśa-grahaṇāt, because of apprehension of a part; उपलब्धेः upalabdheḥ, of cognition.

92. Perception, it may be urged, is inference, because it illumines only a part as a mark of the whole.—31.

We are said to perceive a tree, while we really perceive only a part of it. This knowledge of the tree, as a whole, derived from the knowledge of a part of it is, according to the objectors, a case of inference.

एकदेशग्रहणमाश्रित्य प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानत्वमुपपाद्यते तच्च–

न प्रत्यक्षेण यावत्तावदप्युपलम्भात्॥ 32॥

न प्रत्यक्षमनुमानम्, कस्मात्? प्रत्यक्षेणेवोपलम्भात्=यत् तदेकदेशग्रहणमाश्रीयते प्रत्यक्षेणासावृपलम्भः, न चोपलम्भो निर्विषयोस्ति चावच्चार्थजातं तस्य विषयस्तावदभ्यनु-ज्ञायमानं प्रत्यक्षव्यवस्थापकं भवति। किं पुनस्ततोऽन्यदर्थजाम्? अवयवी समुदायो वा। न चैकदेशग्रहणम् अनुमानं भावयितुं शक्यम्-हेत्वभावादिति॥

अन्यथापि च प्रत्यक्षस्य नानुमानतवप्रसङ्गः-तत्पूर्वकत्वात्।

प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकमनुमानम्-संबद्धावग्निधूमौ प्रत्यक्षतो दृष्टवतो धूमप्रत्यक्षदर्शनाद् अग्नावनुमानं भवति, यच्च संबद्धयोर्लिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः प्रत्यक्षं यच्च लिङ्गमात्रप्रत्यक्षग्रहण नैतदनतरेणानु मानस्य प्रवृत्तिरस्ति न त्वेतदनुमानम्–इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षजत्वात्, न चानुमेयस्येन्द्रियेण संनिकर्षादनुमानं भवति, सोयं प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्लक्षणभेदो महानाश्रयितव्य इति॥32॥

न na, no; प्रत्यक्षेण pratyakṣeṇa, by perception; यावत् तावत् yāvat tāvat, so much as that; अपि api, even; उपलम्भात् upalambhāt, because thete cognition.

93. But this is not so, for perception is admitted of at least that portion which it actually illumines.—32.

The objectors themselves admit that a part is actually perceived. Hence, perception as a means of knowledge is not altogether denied, and it is accepted as different from inference.

न चैकदेशोपलब्धिरवयविसद्भावात्॥ 33॥

न चैकदेशोपलब्धिमात्रम्, किं तर्हि? एकदेशोपलब्धिः तत्सहचरिताऽवयव्युपलब्धिश्च, कस्मात्? अवयविसद्भावात्=अस्ति ह्ययमेकदेशव्यतिरिक्तोऽवयवी, तस्यावयवस्थानस्योप-लब्धिकारणप्राप्तस्य एकदेशोपलब्धौ अनुपलब्धिरनुपपन्नेति॥

अकृत्स्नग्रहणादितिचेत्? न–कारणतोऽन्यस्यैकदेशस्याभावात्।

न चावयवाः कृत्स्ना गृह्यन्ते–अवयवैरेवाऽवयवान्तरव्यवधानात्, नावयवी कृत्स्नो गृह्यते इति–नायं गृह्यमाणेष्ववयवेषु परिसमाप्त इति, सेयमेकदेशोपलब्धिरनिवृत्तैवेति। कृत्स्नमिति वै खल्वशेषतायां सत्यां भवति, अकृत्स्नमिति शेषे सति, तच्चैतद् अवयवेषु बहुष्वस्ति–अव्यवधाने ग्रहणाद् व्यवधाने चाग्रहणादिति।

अङ्ग तु भवान् पृष्टो व्याचष्टाम्–गृह्यमाणस्यावयविनः किमगृहीतं मन्यसे? येनैकदेशो-पलब्धिः स्यादिति, न ह्यस्य कारणेभ्योऽन्ये एकदेशा भवन्तीति, तत्रावयववृत्तं नोपपद्यते इति। इदं तस्य वृत्तम्–येषामिन्द्रियसंनिकर्षाद् ग्रहणमवयवानां तैः सह गृह्यते येषामवयवानां व्यवधानादग्रहणं तैः सह न गृह्यते। न चैतत्कृतोस्ति भेद इति। समुदायोप्यशेषता वा समुदायो वृक्षः स्यात्? तत्प्राप्तिर्वा? उभयथा ग्रहणाभावः=मूलस्कन्धशाखापलाशादीनामशेषता वा समुदायो वृक्ष इति स्यात्? प्राप्तिर्वा समुदायिनामिति? उभयथा (अपि) समुदायभूतस्य वृक्षस्य ग्रहणं नोपपद्यते इति=अवयवैस्तावदयवान्तरस्य व्यवधानादशेषग्रहणं नोपपद्यते प्राप्तिग्रहणमपि नोपपद्यते–प्राप्तिमतामग्रहणात्, सेयमेकदेशग्रहणसहचरिता वृक्षबुद्धिर्द्रव्यान्त-रोत्पत्तौ कल्पते न समुदायमात्रे इति॥33॥

94. Moreover, the perception is not merely of a part, for there is a whole behind the part.—33

The perception of a part does not exculde perception of the whole, of which it is a part. If you touch the hand, leg or any other limb of a reason, you are said to touch the person. Similarly, if you perceive a part of a thing, you are said to perceive the thing. A part implies the whole, and perception of a part implies perception of the whole.

साध्यत्वादवयविनि सन्देहः॥ 34॥

"अवयविसद्भावात्" इत्ययमहेतुः-साध्यत्वात्=साध्यं तावदेतत्-कारणेभ्यो द्रव्यान्तरमुत्पद्यते इति, अनुपपादितमेतत्, एवं च सति विप्रतिपत्तिमात्रं भवति विप्रतिपत्ते श्चावयविनि संशय इति॥34॥

साध्यत्वात् sādhya-tvāt, because it is what is to be established अवयाविनि avayāvini, in respect of the whole; सन्देह: sandehaḥ, doubt.

95. There is some say, doubt about the whole, because the whole has yet to be established.—34.

The objectors say that parts alone are realities and that there is no whole behind them. A tree, for instance, is yellow in some parts and green in other parts. If the tree was one whole, then the contradictor qualities of yellowness and greenness could not have belonged to it simultaneously. Hence, the parts alone must, according to them, be regarded as real.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 3 : Of Perception : Sūtras : 22-34.

Some think that the definition of Preception (I.i.4) is incomplete as it does not include the contact of the soul and the mind,whereas in the absence of such contact there can be no preception. We also hold that the contact of the soul and the mind is also necessary for the production of perception. Others think that the contact of the sense and the object is the cause of perception because the one precedes the other. In that case space, position, time and ether would also be the cause of perception for they always precede it. But they are not. Let us now explain why the contact of the soul and the mind and the contact of the mind and the sense have not been included in the definition of perception. Cognition is an attribute of the soul and is the mark of its existence. (I.i.10), and non-simultaneity of cognitions has been assigned as the mark of the existence of the mind (I.i. 16). It has thus been mentioned that the contact of the soul and the mind (I. i. 16). It has thus been mentioned that the contact of the soul and the mind and of the and the mind and the sense is also a cause of perception. The cantact of the soul and the mind is not only a cause of perception but also of inference, comparison and verbal cognition. But the contact of the sense and the object is the specific cause of perception alone. Hence, it has been expressly mentioned. Not only is it the specific cause, it is also the dominant cause of perception as evidenced in the case where a loud sound or the like forces itself upon the notice of a man in sleep or

absorbed in other things. Moreover, it is by reference to the senses and the objects that cognitions are differenciated as tactual, ocular, olfactory, etc.

When a perception forces itself into the soul during sleep or distraction the contact of the mind with the soul and the sense surely takes place. This contact is not due to the volition and attention of the soul. But in the soul abides another attributes namely adṛṣṭa produced by Activity and the Faults, which accomplishes all things. Directed by adṛṣṭa the mind comes into contact with the sense. Adṛṣṭa it is which produces substances, attributes and actions, induces action in the four classes of atoms and in the mind, and produces bodies, senses and objects.

Some argue that Perception is really inference, because in it from the apprehension of a part the whole is cognised. For instances, the eye sees a part of the tree and the cognition of the tree is produced. Let us consider this objection to our doctrine of Perception as a separate pramāṇa. The tree is either a mass of atoms or an organised whole different from the atoms. In the former case neither the part apprehended nor the other part is the tree; hence, there can be no inference from the one to the other. If it is said that from the one part the other part is inferred and then the two parts are integrated producing the cognition of the tree, then the cause of the cognition of the tree is not inference but something else. In the latter case as in the opinion of the opponent the whole is not present in the part apprehended it is not apprehended and even if it is apprehended then there is no occasion for its inference. Moreover, the reason advanced by the opponent, namely apprehension of the part, disproves his case, for at least the part is the object of perception. Lastly inference is based on Perception, *e.g.* of fire and smoke as connected.

What is then the object other than the part? Is it a whole or an aggregate of atoms? By a whole we mean a unity, the product as distinguished from its constituent parts, of which the parts are the substratum and in which the causes of apprehension are present. Every product is such a whole and not a mere aggregate of atoms. Such being the case thee is not merely the apprehension of a parts only but also of the whole associated with the part. To this the opponent replies by saying that as the whole by its very conception covers all the pats and is not limited to any single part it is impossible that there should be the apprehension of the whole in the apprehension of a part. We reply that partial apprehension in intelligible in the case of the parts which by

their nature are disconnected and mutually exclude one another. But in the case of the whole such partial apprehension is impossible becuase it is an indivisible unity and has no part except its constituents from which it is distinct. By its nature the whole is apprehended as a whole along with the parts which are apprehended and is not apprehended with the parts which are not apprehended.

सर्व्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धेः॥ 35॥

यद्यवयवी नास्ति? सर्वस्य ग्रहणं नोपपद्यते। किं तत् सर्वम्?, द्रव्यगुणकर्मसमान्य-विशेषसमवायाः। कथं कृत्वा? परमाणुसमवस्थानां तावद् दर्शनविषयो न भवति-अतीन्द्रियत्वादणूनाम्, द्रव्यान्तरं चावयविभूतं दर्शनविषयो नास्ति, दर्शनविषयाश्चेमे द्रव्यादयो गृह्यन्ते ते निरधिष्ठाना न गृह्येरन् गृह्यन्ते तु-'कुम्भोयं श्याम एको महान् संयुक्तः स्पन्दते अस्ति मृन्मयश्च' इति, सन्ति चेमे गुणादयो धर्मा इति, तेन सर्वस्य ग्रहणात् पश्यामोऽस्ति द्रव्यान्तरभूतोऽवयवीति॥35॥

सर्वाग्रहणं sarva-agrahaṇam, non-apprehension of all; अवयव्यसिद्धेः avayavi-asiddheḥ, in case of non-existence of the whole.

96. If there were no whole, there would, it is replied, be non-perception of all.—35.

All signifies substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and intimate relation. None of these would be perceptible, if the whole were denied. Suppose that the parts alone are real. Then, since a part is not of fixed dimension, it may itself be divided into parts, these latter again into further parts, and so on, until we reach the atoms which are the ultimate parts. Now, the atoms which possess no bulk are not perceptible. Similarly, the quality, action, etc., which inhere in the atoms, are also not substance nor quality, etc., would be perceptible.

धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेश्च॥ 36॥

अवयव्यऽर्थान्तरभूत इति, संग्रहकारिते वै धारणकर्षणे, संग्रहो नाम संयोगसहचारितं गुणान्तरं स्नेहदवत्वकारितम् अपां संयोगादामे कुम्भे अग्निसंयोगात् पक्वे। यदिववयवकारिते। अभविष्यताम्? पांशुराशिप्रभृतिष्वप्यज्ञास्येताम्, द्रव्यान्तरानुत्पत्तौ च तृणोपलकाष्ठादिषु जतुसंगृहीतेष्वशि नाभविष्यतामिति।

अथाऽवयविनं प्रत्याचक्षाणकः 'मा भूत् प्रत्यक्षलोपः' इत्यणुसञ्चयं दर्शनविषयं प्रतिजानानः किमनुयोक्तव्यः? इति, 'एकमिदं द्रव्यम्' इत्येकबुद्धेर्विषयं पर्येनुयोज्यः= किमेकबुद्धिरभिन्नर्थाविषया? आहो भिन्नार्थविषया? इति, अभिन्नार्थविषयेति चेत्?

अर्थान्तरानुज्ञानादवयविसिद्धिः, नानार्थविषयेति चेत्? भिन्नेष्वेकदर्शनानुपपत्तिः=अनेकस्मिन् एक इति व्याहता बुद्धिर्न दृश्यते इति॥36॥

धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेः dhāraṇa-ākarṣaṇa upapatteḥ, because of the fact of holding and pulling; च cha, and.

97. There is a *whole*, because we can hold, pull, etc.—36.

If there were no whole, we could not have held or pulled an entire thing by holding or pulling a part of it. We say, 'one jar,' 'one man,' etc. This use of 'one' would vanish, if there were no whole.

सेनावनवद्ग्रहणमिति चेन्नातीन्द्रियत्वादणूनाम्॥ 37॥

यथा सेनाङ्गेषु वानङ्गेषु च दूरादगृह्यमाणपृथक्त्वेषु 'एकम्' इत्युपपद्यते बुद्धिः एवमणुषु संचितेष्वगृह्यमाणपृथक्त्वेषु 'एकम्' इत्युपपद्यते बुद्धिरिति। यथाऽगृह्यमाणपृथक्त्वानां सेनावनाङ्गानाम् आरात् कारणान्तरतः पृथक्त्वस्याग्रहणं यथाऽगृह्यमाणजातीनां पलाश इति वा खदिर इति वा नाऽऽरात् जातिग्रहणं भवति यथाऽगृह्यमाणप्रस्पन्दानां नाऽऽरात् स्पन्दग्रहणम्, गृह्यमाणे चार्थजाते पृथक्त्वास्याऽग्रहणात् 'एकम्' इति भाक्तः प्रत्ययो भवति, न त्वणूनां गृह्यमाणपृथक्त्वानां कारणतः पृथक्त्वस्याग्रहणाद् भाक्त एकप्रत्ययः-अतीन्द्रियत्वादणूनामिति। इदमेव परीक्ष्यते-किमेकप्रत्ययोऽणुसंचयविषयः? आहो स्विन्न? इति, अणुसंचय एव सेनावनाङ्गानि, न च परीक्ष्यमाणमुदाहरणमिति युक्तम्-साध्यत्वादिति॥

दृष्टमितिचेत्? न-तद्विषयस्य परीक्षोपपत्तेः।

यदपि मन्येत-दृष्टमिदं सेनावनाङ्गानां पृथक्त्वस्याऽग्रहणादभेदेन 'एकम्' इतिग्रहणं न च दृष्टं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुमिति। तच्च नैवम्-तद्विषयस्य परीक्षोपपत्तेः=दर्शनविषय एवायं परीक्ष्यते=योयमेकमिति प्रत्ययो दृश्यते स परीक्ष्यते-किं द्रव्यान्तरविषयो वा? अथाणुसंचयविषयः? इति, अत्र दर्शनमन्यतरस्य साधकं न भवति। नानाभावे चाणूनां पृथक्त्वस्याऽग्रहणादभेदेन 'एकम्' इतिग्रहणम् अतस्मिंस्तदितिप्रत्ययो यथा स्थाणौ पुरुष इति। ततः किम्? अतस्मिंस्तदितिप्रत्ययस्य प्रधानापेक्षित्वात् प्रधानसिद्धिः। स्थाणौ पुरुष इति प्रत्ययस्य किं प्रधानम्? योऽसौ पुरुषे पुरुषप्रत्ययः तस्मिन् सति पुरुषसामान्यग्रहणात् स्थाणौ पुरुषोयमिति, एव नानाभूतेषु 'एकम्' इति सामान्यग्रहणात् प्रधाने सति भवितुमर्हति प्रधानं च सर्वस्याग्रहणाद् नोपपद्यते इति, तस्मादभिन्ने एवायमभेदप्रत्ययः-'एकम्' इति॥

इन्द्रियान्तरविषयेष्वभेदप्रत्ययः प्रधानमितिचेत्?
न-विशेषहेत्वाभावाद् दृष्टान्ताव्यवस्था।

श्रोतादिविषयेषु शब्दादिष्वभिन्नेषु एकप्रत्ययः प्रधानमऽनेकस्मिन्नेकप्रत्ययस्येति। एवं च सति दृष्टान्तोपादानं न व्यवतिष्ठते-विशेषहेत्वभावात् अणुषु संचितेष्वेकप्रत्ययः

किमनस्मिंस्तदितिप्रत्ययः स्थाणौ पुरुषप्रत्ययवत्? अथार्थस्य तथाभावात् तस्मिंस्ततदितिप्रत्ययो यथा शब्दस्यैकत्वादेकः शब्द इति?, विशेषहेतुपरिग्रहमन्तरेण दृष्टान्तौ संशयमापादयत इति। कुम्भवत् संचयमात्रं गन्धादयोपीत्यनुदाहरणं गन्धादय इति। एवं परिमाणसंयोगस्पन्द-जातिविशेषप्रत्ययानप्यनुयोक्तव्यः तेषु चैवं प्रसङ्ग इति।।

एकत्वबुद्धिस्तस्मिंस्तदितिप्रत्यय इति विशेषहेतुः-महदितिप्रत्येन सामानाधि-करण्यात्।

'एकमिदं महच्च' इत्येकविषयौ प्रत्ययौ समानाधिकरणो भवतस्तेन विज्ञायते-यन्महत् तदेकमिति। अणुसमुहाविशयग्रहणं महत्प्रत्यय इतिचेत्? सोयमऽमहत्स्वणुषु महत्प्रत्ययो-ऽतस्मिंस्तदितिप्रत्ययो भवतीति। किं चातः? अतस्मिंस्तदितिप्रत्ययस्य प्रधानापेक्षित्वात् प्रधानसिद्धिरिति=भवितव्यं महत्येव महत्प्रत्ययेनेति।।

अणुः शब्दो महानिति च व्यवसायात् प्रधानसिद्धिरितिचेत्?
न-मन्दतीव्रताग्रहणमियत्तानवधारणाद् यथा द्रव्ये।

'अणु शब्दोऽल्पो मन्दः' इत्येतस्य ग्रहणम् 'महान् शब्दः पटुस्तीव्रः' इत्येतस्य ग्रहणम्, कस्मात्? इयत्तानवधारणात्=न ह्ययम् 'महान् शब्दः' इतिव्यवस्यन् 'इयानयम्' इत्यवधारयति यथा बदरामलकबिल्वादीतिन। 'संयुक्ते इमे' इति च द्वित्वसमानाश्रय-प्राप्तिग्रहणम्।।

द्वौ समुदायावाऽऽश्रयः संयोगस्येतिचेत्?

कोयं समुदायः? प्राप्तिरनेकस्य? अनेका वा प्राप्तिरेकस्य समुदाय इतिचेत्?

प्राप्तेरग्रहणं प्राप्तयाश्रितायाः।

'सयुक्ते इमे वस्तुनी' इति नात्र द्वे प्राप्ती संयुक्ते गृह्येते।।

अनेकसमूहः समुदाय इतिचेत्? न-द्वित्वेन
सामानाधिकरण्यस्य ग्रहणात्।

'द्वाविमौ संयुक्तावर्थौ' इति ग्रहणे सति नाऽनेकसमूहाश्रयः संयोगो गृह्यते न च द्वयोरण्वोर्ग्रहणमस्ति तस्मान्महती द्वित्वाश्रयभूते द्रव्ये संयोगस्य स्थानामिति।।

प्रत्यासत्तिः प्रतीघातावसाना संयोगो नार्थान्तरमितिचेत्?
न-अर्थान्तरहेतुत्वात् संयोगस्य।

शब्दरूपादिस्पन्दानां हेतुः संयोगः-न च द्रव्योर्गुणान्तरोपजननमन्तरेण शब्दे रूपादिषु स्पन्दे च कारणत्वं गृह्यते तस्माद् गुणान्तरम्।

प्रत्ययविषयश्चाऽर्थान्तरं तत्प्रतिषेधो वा।

'कुण्डली गुरुः अकुण्डलश्छात्रः' इति संयोगबुद्धेश्च यद्यर्थान्तरं न विषयः? अर्थान्तरप्रतिषेधस्तर्हि विषयस्तत्र-

प्रतिषिध्यमानवचनम्।

'संयुक्ते द्रव्ये' इति यदर्थान्तरमन्यत्र दृष्टमिह प्रतिषिध्यते तद् वक्तव्यमिति। द्वयोर्महतोरारितस्य ग्रहणाद् नाऽण्वाश्रय इति।।

जातिविशेषस्य प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिलिङ्गस्याऽप्रत्याख्यानम्, प्रत्याख्याने वा प्रत्यय-व्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः।

व्यधिकरणस्याऽनभिव्यक्तेरधिकरणवचनम्।

अणुसमवस्थानां विषय इतिचेत्?-

ग्राप्ताप्राप्तसामर्थ्यवचनम्।

किमप्राप्ते अणुसमवस्थाने तदाश्रयो जातिविशेषो गृह्यते? अथ प्राप्ते? इति।

अप्राप्ते ग्रहणमितिचेत्? व्यवहितस्याणुसमवस्थानस्याप्युपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः= व्यवहिते-ऽणुसमवस्थाने तदाश्रयो जातिविशेषो गृह्येत। प्राप्ते ग्रहणमितिचेत्? मध्यपरभागयोरप्राप्तौ अनभिव्यक्तिः। यावत् प्राप्तं भवति तावत्यभिव्यक्तिरितिचेत्? तावतोऽधिकरणत्वमणु-समवस्थानस्य=यावति प्राप्ते जातिविशेषो गृह्यते तावदस्याऽधिकरणमिति प्राप्तं भवति तत्र-

एकसमुदाये प्रतीयमानेऽर्थभेदः।

एवं च सति योऽणुसमुदरयो वृक्ष इति प्रतियते तत्र वृक्षबहुत्वं प्रतीयेत=यत्र यत्र ह्यणुसमुदायस्य भागे वृक्षत्वं गृह्यते स स वृक्ष इति, तस्मात् समुदिताण समवस्थानस्या-ऽर्थान्तरस्य जातिविशेषाभिव्यक्तिविषयत्वाद् अवयव्यऽर्थान्तरभूति इति।।37।।

।। परीक्षितं प्रत्यक्षम्।।

सेनावनवत् senā-vana-vat, like an army and a forest; ग्रहणं grahaṇam, apprehension; इति iti, so; चेत् chet, if; न na no; अतीन्द्रियत्वात् ati-indriya-tvāt, because of their being beyond the senses; अनूणां aṇūnām, of the atoms.

98. The illustration form an army or a forest does not hold good, for atoms cannot be detected by the senses.—37.

If anyone were to say that just as a single soldier or a single tree may not be seen from a distance, but an army consisting of anumerous soldiers or a forest consisting of numerous trees is seen, so a single atom may not be perceptible, but a jar consisting of numerous atoms will be perceptible, and these atoms being called 'one jar,' the use of 'one' will not vanish, the analogy, we reply, does does not hld good, because the soldier and trees possess bulk and so are precetible, where

as the atoms do not possess bulk and so are individually not perceptible. It is absurd to argue that, because soldiers and trees are perceptible in the mass, atoms are perceptible in the mass also : to avoid this conclusion, we must admit the existence of a whole byond the parts.

अनुमानमिदानीं परीक्षते—

रोधोपघातसादृश्येभ्यो व्यभिचारादनुमानमप्रमाणम्॥ 38॥

अप्रमाणमिति=एकदाप्यर्थस्य न प्रतिपादकमिति रोधादपि नही पूर्णा गृह्यते तदा च 'उपरिष्ठाद् वृष्टो देवः' इति मिथ्यानुमानम्, नीडोपघातादपि पिपीलिकाण्डसंचारो भवति तदा च 'भविष्यति वृष्टिः' इति मिथ्यानुमानमिति, पुरुषोपि मयूरवाशितमनुकरोति तदापि शब्द सादृश्याद् मिथ्यानुमानं भवति॥38॥

रोधोपघातसादृश्येभ्या: rodha-upaghāta-sādṛśyebhyaḥ, from obstruction (as in the case of a stream), disturbance (as in the case of an ants' nest) and (arrificial) similarity; व्यभिचारात् vyabhichārāt, as it errs; अनुमानं anumānam, inference; अप्रमाणं apramāṇm not a means of right knowledge.

99. **Inference,** some say, is not a means of right knowledge, as it errs in certain cases, *e.g.* when a river is banked, when something is damaged, and when similarity misleads, etc.—38.

If we see a river swollen, we inter that there has been rain; if we see the ants carrying off their eggs, we infer that there will be rain; and if we hear a peacock scream, we infer that clouds are gathering. These inferences, says an objector, are not necessarily correct, for a river may be swollen because embanked, the ants may carry off their eggs because their nests have been damaged, and the so-called screaming of a peacock may be nothing but the voice if a man.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 4 : Of the Whole (Avayavī) : Sūtras : 35-38.

The doubt as to the existence of the whole as distinct from its constituent parts not justified. These constituent parts, *viz.*, the atoms, are themselves imperceptible. And if the whole did not exist there would be non-apprehension of "all," that is, substance, attribute, action, genus, species, and combination (vide Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra, I. i. 4). But these are actually apprehended, *e.g.* the pot (substance) is dark, one, large, connected with the floor (attributes) is shakes (action), exists (genus), is earthen (species) (the attributes inhering in it by combination). The whole therefore exists. The Sūtra (II.i. 37) also supports the existence of the whole by the argument that without there being a whole the parts

could not hold together nor could the thing be capable to being pulled, etc. This reasoning may not be convincing. For the holding pulling, etc. are due to cohesion (saṅgraha, integration). Cohesion is a distinct attribute co-existing with the conjunction of the part and produced by moistness as in the case of an unburnt pot, and by melting as in the case of the burnt with the whole as their cause these should have been possible in the case of a heap of dust. And where no such whole is produced, as, *e.g.*, when pieces of wood are glued together, even there they should not have held together and been capable of being pulled.

Those who maintain that the object of perception is not the whole but the aggregate of atoms should, on the contrary, be asked : when you apprehend the object as one, what is your idea of unity? Do you mean by it identity or plurality of objcts? If you say that unity is the identity of the object, then such unity is distinct from the diversity of the atoms, and the whole is thus established. If, on the other hand, you say that the idea that the object is one is in respect of the plurality of atoms constituting the objcet, then the idea is self-contradictory.

The opponent may rejoin that a plurality can by reason of distance give rise to the idea of unity as in the case of an army or a forest. We reply that this cannot be, for the reason that while diversity of the units composing an army or a forest can be apprehended on nearer approach, the diversity of the individual atoms can never be so apprehended, so that the error as to the apparent unity of an army or a forest cannot arise in regard to an assembly of atoms.

Again, an army or a forest is, on the theory of the opponent, nothing but an aggregate of atoms, and the unity of such aggregates is the very thing which is undet examination. The instances cited are therefore themselves in need of proof.

Then, error presupposes correct cognition. It is possible to mistake a post for a man only when one possessed cognition of a real man. Similarly, the erroneous idea of unity in respect of an aggregate of atoms presupposes the existence of unity somewhere. It cannot exist in the aggregate for the aggregate is a plurality. It must therefore exist in something distinct from the plural aggregate, *i.e.*, the whole. Hence, a pot is not a mere collection of atoms but is a whole, as otherwise it could not be perceived as one.

It may be argued that the idea of unity derived from the apprehension of sound, touch, smell, etc., as one may account for the apprehension of an aggregate of atoms as one. But the argument is not supported

by any special reason which would show that the apprehension of a pot as one is erroneous and not correct. Moreover, sound, touch, smell, etc., are also of a composite character like a pot.

Unity and magnitude co-exist. The atoms have no magnitude. Yet a pot constituted by them possesses magnitude. Similarly a pot possesses unity. In respect of magnitude also a pot bears no analogy to sound which is known as minute and large, for sound has no extension which can be delimited like the extension of pot. Again, the conjunction of two gates of atoms instead of unities. Conjunction is a distinct attribute and not unreal. It develops a new attribute in the conjoint object ; a flagged staff is neither a staff nor a flag. The cause of the cognition of the saff as thus qualified object. It cannot belong to atoms or collection of atoms as in the case it could not be apprehended.

The existence of natural kinds such as cow-ness, horse-ness, tree-ness, etc. which cannot be ignored, also proves the existence of an object which is present in the aggregates of atoms and is yet different from them. These distinct objects are the unitary wholes.

नैकदेशत्राससादृश्येभ्योऽर्थान्तरभावात्॥ 39॥

नायमनुमानव्यभिचार: अननुमानें तु खल्यमनुमानभिमान:। कथम्? नाऽविशिष्टो लिङ्गं भवितुमर्हति, पूर्वोदकविशिष्टं खलु वर्षोदकं शीघ्रतरत्वं स्रोतसो बहुतरफेनफलपर्ण–काष्ठादिवहनं चोपलभमान: पूर्णत्वेन नद्या: 'उपरि वृष्टो देव:' इत्यनुमिनोति नोदकवृद्धिमात्रेणं पिपीलिकाप्रायस्याण्डसंचारे 'भविष्यति वृष्टि:' इत्यनुमीयते न कासां चिदिति। 'नेदं मयूरवाशितं तत्सदृशोयं शब्द:' इतिविशेषापरिज्ञानाद् मिथ्यानुमानमिति, यस्तु विशिष्टाच्छब्दाद् विशिष्टमयूरवाशितं गृह्णाति तस्य विशिष्टाऽर्थो गृह्यमाणो लिङ्गं यथा सर्पादीामिति। सोयमनुमातुरपराधो नानुमानस्य योऽर्थविशेषेणानुमेयमर्थम् अविशिष्टार्थदर्शनेन बुभुत्सते इति।।39।।

न na, no; एकदेशत्राससादृश्येभ्य: ekadeśa-trāsa-sādṛśyebhyaḥ, from the part, fear, and similarity; अर्थान्तरभावात् artha antara-bhāvāt, because it is something different.

100. It is not so because our inference is based on something else than the part, fear and likeness.—39.

The swellig of a river caused by rain is different from that which results form the embaukment of a part of it; the former is attended by a great repidity of currents, an abundance of foam, a mass of floating fruits, leaves, wood, etc. The manner in which ants carry off their eggs

just before rain is quite different from the manner in which they do so when their nests are damaged. The ants run away quickly in a steady line when ran is immunent, but fear make them fly in disorder when their nests are damaged. The screaming of a peacock which suggests gathering clouds, is quite different form a man's limitation of it, for the latter is not natural. If is such cases any wrong inference is drawn, the fault is in the person, not in the process.

त्रिकालविषयमनुमानम्-त्रैकाल्यग्रहणादित्युक्तम् अत्रच–

वर्त्तमानाभाव: पतत: पतितपतितव्यकालोपपत्ते:॥ 40॥

वृन्तात् प्रच्युतस्य फलस्य भूमौ प्रत्यासीदतो यद् ऊर्ध्वं स पतितोऽध्वा तत्संयुक्त: पतितकाल: योऽधस्तात् स पतितव्योऽध्वा तत्संयुक्त: काल: पतितव्यकाल:, नेदानीं तृतीयोऽध्वा विद्यते यत्र पततीति वर्तमान: कालो गृह्येत, तस्माद् वर्तमान: कालो न विद्यते इति।।40।।

वर्त्तमानाभाव: vartamāna-abhāvaḥ, non-existence of present time; पतत: patataḥ, of the falling; पतितपतितव्यकालोपपत्ते: patita-patitavya-kāla upapatteḥ, because of proof of the time through which it has fallen and the time through which it will fall.

101. There is, some say, no present time because when a thing falls, we can know only the time through which it has fallen and the time through which it will yet fall.—40.

Inference has reference to three times. In the *a priori* inference we pas from the past to the present, in the *a posteriori* from the present to the past, and in the '*commonly seen*' from the present to the present. It is, therefore, proper that we should examine the three times. The reason which leads some peoper to deny the present time is that when a fruit, for instance, falls from a tree, we recognise only the past time taken up by the fruit in traversing a certain distance and the future time which will yet be taken up by the fruit in traversing the remaining distance. There is no intervening distance which the fruit can traverse at the so-called present time. Hence, they say, there is no present time.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 5 : of Inference : Sūtras : 39-40.

Some say that Inference can never be an instrument of true cognition because, *e.g.*, the sweeling of a river may be due to obstrucfion as well as to rain, the carrying off of eggs by ants may be due to disturbance of their nests as well as to immінence of rain and the scream-

ing of the peacock may be imitative as well as real, so that the inference by means of these marks, namely that rain has fallen, that rain will fall and that rain is falling, may be all incorrect. To this we reply that this is not so, that is, that inference as an instrument of right cognition is not invalid, and that incorrectness of the inference in the cases cited is due not to the defective nature of the process of Inference but is due to the fallacious character of the marks. It is because the man mistakes pseudeo-marks for true marks that he falls into error.

तयोरप्यभावो वर्तमानाभावे तदपेक्षत्वात्।। 41।।

नाध्वव्यङ्ग्यः कालः, किं तर्हि? क्रियाव्यङ्ग्यः=पततीति यदा पतनक्रिया व्युपरता भवति स कालः पतितकालः, यदोत्पत्स्यते स पतितव्यकालः, यदा द्रव्ये वर्तमाना क्रिया गृह्यते स वर्तमानः कालः, यदि चायं द्रव्ये वर्तमानं पतनं न गृह्णाति कस्य उपरमम् उत्पत्स्यमानतां वा प्रतिपद्यते? पतितः काल इति भूता क्रिया, पतितव्यः काल इति चोत्पत्स्यमाना क्रिया, उभयोः कालयोः क्रियाहीनं द्रव्यम्, अधः पततीति क्रियासंबद्धम्, सोयं क्रियाद्रव्ययोः संबन्धं गृह्णाति वर्तमानः कालः तदाश्रयौ चेतरौ कालौ तदभावे न स्यातामिति।।41।।

तयो tayoḥ, of these two; अपि api, also; अभावः abhāvaḥ non-existence; वर्तमानाभावे vartamāna-abhāve, in the case of the non-existence of the present; तदपेक्षत्वात् tat-apekṣa-tvāt, because of being related to it.

102. If there is no present time, there will, it is replied, be no past and future times, because they are related to it.—41.

The past is that which precedes the present, and the future is that which succeeds it. Hence, if there is no present time, there cannot be any past or future time.

अथापि—

नातीतानागतयोरितरेतरापेक्षासिद्धिः।। 42।।

यद्यऽतीतानागतौ इतरेतरापेक्षौ सिध्येताम्? प्रतिपद्येमहि वर्तमानविलोपम्, नाऽतीतापेक्षाऽनागतसिद्धिः नाप्यनागतापेक्षाऽतीतसिद्धिः। कया युक्त्या=केन कल्पेन अतीतः, कथमतीतापेक्षाऽनागतसिद्धिः? केन च कल्पेनाऽनागतः? इति, नैतच्छक्यं निर्वक्तुम्=अव्याकरणीयमेतद् वर्तमानलोपे इति।

यच्च मन्येत–ह्रस्वदीर्घयोः स्थलनिम्नयोः छायातपयोश्च यथेतरेपरापेक्षया सिद्धिरेवम् अतीतानागतयोरिति, तन्नोपपद्यते–विशेषहेत्वभावात्, दृष्टान्तवत् प्रतिदृष्टान्तोपि प्रसज्यते–यथा रूपस्पर्शौ नेतरेतरापेक्षौ सिध्यतः एवमतीतानागताविति नेतरेतरापेक्षा कस्यचित् सिद्धिरिति।

यस्मादेकाभावेऽन्यतराभावादुभयाभावः।

यद्येकस्याऽन्यतरापेक्षा सिद्धिः? अन्यन्तरस्येदानीं किमपेक्षा? यद्यन्यतरस्यैकापेक्षा सिद्धिः? एकस्येदानीं किमपेक्षा? एवमेकस्याभावे अन्यतरन्न सिध्यतीति उभयाभावः प्रसज्यते। अर्थसद्भावव्यङ्ग्यश्चायं वर्तमानः कालः–'विद्यते द्रव्यम्', 'विद्यते गुणः', 'विद्यते कर्म' इति।।42।।

न na, not; अतीतानागतयोः atīta-anāgatayoḥ, of the past and the future; इतरेतरापेक्षसिद्धिः itara-itara-apekṣā-siddhiḥ, establishment by mutal dependence.

103. The past and future cannot be established by a mere mutual reference.—42.

If the past is defined as that which is not the future and the future is defined as that which is not past, the definition would involve a fallacy of mutual dependency. Hence, we must admit the present time, to which the past and future are related.

यस्य चायं नास्ति तस्य–

वर्तमानाभावे सर्व्वाग्रहणम्प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेः।। 43।।

प्रत्यक्षम् इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षजं, न चाऽविद्यमानम्=असद् इन्द्रियेण संनिकृष्यते, न चायं विद्यमानम्=सत् किंचिदनुजानातीति प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तं प्रत्यक्षविषयः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं सर्वं नापपद्यते, प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तौ तत्पूर्वकम्वाद् अनुमानागमयोरनुपपत्तिः सर्वप्रमाणविलोपे सर्वग्रहणं न भवतीति।

उभयथा व वर्तमानः कालो गृह्यते–क्वचिदर्थसद्भावव्यङ्ग्यो यथा 'अस्ति द्रव्यम्' इति, क्वचित् क्रियासंतानव्यङ्ग्यो यथा 'पचति छिनत्ति' इति, नानाविधा चैकार्था क्रिया क्रियासंतानः क्रियाभ्यासश्च, नानाविधा चैकार्था क्रिया 'पचति' इति=स्थाल्यधिश्रयणम् उदकासेचनं तण्डुलावपनम् एधोपसर्पणम् अग्न्यभिज्वालनं दर्वीघट्टनं मण्डस्रावणम् अधोवतारणमिति, छिनत्तीति क्रियाभ्यासः–उद्यम्योद्यम्य परशुं दारुणि निपातयन् छिनत्तीत्युच्यते।।43।।

वर्तमानाभावे vartamāna-abhāve, in the case of the non-existence of the present; सर्व्वाग्रहणं sarva-agrahaṇam, non-apprehension of all; प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेः pratyakṣa-an-upapatteḥ, owing to impossibility of perception.

104. If there were no present time, sense perception would be impossible, knowledge would be impossible.—43.

If you deny the present time, there cannot be any perception which

illumines only what is present in time; and, in the absence of perception, all kinds of knowledge would be impossible. Hence, the present time is established by confutation or the principle of *reductio ad absurdum*.

यच्चेदं पच्यमानं छिद्यमानं च तत् क्रियमाणं तस्मिन् क्रियमाणे–

कृतताकर्तव्यतोपपत्तेरुभयथा ग्रहणम्।। 44।।

क्रियासंतानोऽनारब्धश्चिकीर्षितोऽनागतः कालः 'पक्ष्यति' इति, प्रयोजनावसानः क्रियासंतानोपरमोऽतीतः कालः 'अपाक्षीत्' इति, आरब्धक्रियासंतानो वर्तमानः कालः 'पचति' इति, तत्र या उपरता सा कृतता या चिकीर्षिता सा कर्तव्यता या विद्यमाना सा क्रियमाणता, तदेवं क्रियासंतानस्थः त्रैकाल्यसमाहारः 'पचति पच्यते' इति वर्तमानग्रहणेन गृह्यते–क्रियासंतानस्य ह्यत्राविच्छेदो विधीयते नारम्भो नोपरम इति। सोयमुभयथिा वर्तमानो गृह्यते–अपवृक्तो व्यपवृक्तश्च अतीतानागताभ्याम्, स्थितिव्यङ्ग्यः–'विद्यते द्रव्यम्' इति, क्रियासंतानाऽविच्छेदाऽभिधायी च त्रैकाल्यान्वितः–'पचति छिनत्ति' इति। अन्यश्च प्रत्यासत्ति-प्रभृतेरर्थस्य विवक्षायां तदभिधायी बहुप्रकारो लोकेषूत्प्रेक्षितव्यः, तस्माद्स्ति वर्तमानः काल इति।।44।।

कृतताकर्तव्यतोपपत्ते: kṛtatā-kartavyatā-upapatteḥ, from the possiblity of a thing having been accomplished and remaining to be accomplished; उभयथा ubhayathā, bothways; ग्रहणं grahaṇam, apprehension.

105. We can know both the past and the future, for we can conceive of thing as made and as about to be made—44.

The present time is indicated by what continues, the past by what has been finished, and the future by what has not yet begun.

अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशयसाधर्म्यादुपमानासिद्धिः।। 45।।

अत्यन्तसाधर्म्यादुपमानं न सिध्यति–न चैवं भवति 'यथा गौरवं गौः' इति, प्रायस्साधर्म्यादुपमानं न सिध्यति–नहि भवति 'यथाऽनड्वानेवं महिषः' इति, एकदेश-साधर्म्यादुपमानं सिध्यति–न हि सर्वेण सर्वमुपमीयते इति।।45।।

अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशयसाधर्म्यात् atyantaprāya-ekadeśa-sādharmyāt, from absolute, almost complete or partial similarity; उपमानासिद्धिः upamāna-asiddiḥ, non-establishment of comparision.

106. **Comparision,** some say, is not a means of right knowledge as it cannot be established either through complete or considerable or partial similarity.—45.

On the ground of complete similarity we never say "a cow is like

a cow," on the ground of considerable similiarity we do not say that "a buffalo is like a cow," and on the ground of partial similarity we do not say that "a mustard seed is like Mount Meru." Hence, comparison is regarded by some as not a means of right knowledge, for it has no precise standerd.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 6 : Of the Present Time : Sūtras : 41-45.

We have said that inference operates in respect of matters past, future and present. But the opponet denies the existence of the time present. His arguments that when a falling fruit detached from the stem approaches towards the ground all that can be seen is the distance it has fallen and the distance it has to fall and not any intervening distance which can give the idea of the present that it fall or falling. We reply that time is manifested not by distance (space) but by action. The past is the time where action has ceased; the future, where it will take place; and the present, where action is apprehended in the object. Thus, the past and the future depend upon the present. They cannot be a pair of correlated duals like long and short, light and shade, for there is no reason for such correlation; nor is the past or the future itself established otherwise then by reference to the present. Moreover, there is no universal correlation of duals; *e.g.* colour and touch, smell and tase are to correlatives. Further, the past and the future cannot be mutually the case of each other, for so long as one of them is not established it cannot serve as the cause of the other, and *vice-versa*. The truth is that present is manifested by the existence of the object; substance exists, attribute exsts, action exists. He who denies this denies the possiblity of Perception, for Perception requires contact of the senses with objects which exist, are present. Inference, etc. depend upon Perception. The denial of the present therefore amounts to a denial of knowledge itself. Again, we have apprehension of the present alone as well as in association with the past and the future. For action may be continuous as in cooking or repeated as in cutting down a tree. In these cases all the three times are associated; *e.g.* the cooking commenced, the cooking is going on, the cooking will be completed. The object exists, is the instance of the appehension of the present by itself.

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादुपमानसिद्धेर्यथोक्तदोषानुपपत्तिः।। 46।।

न साधर्म्यस्य कृत्स्नप्रायाल्पभावमाश्रित्योपमानं प्रवर्तते, किं तर्हि? प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनभावमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तते, यत्र चेतदस्ति न तत्रेपमानं प्रतिषेद्धुं शक्यं तस्माद् यथोक्तदोषो नोपपद्यते इति।।46।।

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् prasiddha-sādharmyāt, from well known similarity; उपमानसिद्धेः upamāna-siddheḥ, because of establishment of comparison; उक्तदोषानुपपत्तिः ukta-doṣa-anupapattiḥ, non-application of the defect urged.

107. This objection does not hold good, for comparison is established through similarity in a high degree.—46.

The similarity in a high degree exists between such well-known objects as a cow and a bos gavaeus, etc.

अस्तु तर्ह्युपमानमनुमानम्–

प्रत्यक्षेणाप्रत्यक्षसिद्धेः॥ 47॥

यथा धूमेन प्रत्यक्षेणाऽप्रत्यक्षस्य वह्नेर्ग्रहणमनुमानम् एवं गवा प्रत्यक्षेणाऽप्रत्यक्षस्य गवयस्य ग्रहणमिति नेदमनुमानाद् विशिष्ठते॥47॥

प्रत्यक्षेणा pratyakṣeṇā, by perception; अप्रत्यक्षसिद्धेः apratyakṣa-siddheḥ, because of establishment of what is not a object of perception.

108. Comparison, some say, is not different from inference, for both seek to establish the unperceived by means of the perceived—47.

We recognise a bos gavaeus at first sight through its special similarity to a cow which we ahve often perceived. This knowledge of a previously unperceived object derived through its similarity to a perceived object is, it has been said, nothing but a case of inference.

विशिष्यते इत्याह, कया युक्त्या?–

नाप्रत्यक्षे गवये प्रमाणार्थमुपमानस्य पश्यामः॥ 48॥

यदा ह्ययमुपयुकतोपमानो गोदर्शी गवा समानमर्थं पश्यति तदा अयं गवय इत्यस्य संज्ञाशब्दस्य व्यवस्थां प्रतिपद्यते न चेवमनुमानमिति। परार्थं चोपमानम्–यस्य ह्युपमेयमप्रसिद्धं तदर्थं प्रसिद्धोपमेयेन क्रियते इति। परार्थमुपमानमितिचेत्? न–स्वयमध्यवसायात्=भवति षे भोः स्वयमध्यवसायः–यथा गौरेवं गवय इति। नाध्यवसायः प्रतिषिध्यते उपमानं तु तत्र भवति–"प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनमुपमानम् 1-1-6" न च यस्योपमेयं प्रसिद्धं तं प्रति साध्यसाधनभावो विद्यते इति॥48॥

न na, not; अप्रत्यक्षे apratyakṣe, unperceived; गवये gavaye, in a bos gavaeus; प्रमाणार्थम् pramāna-artham, the purpose of proof, utility as proof; उपमानस्य upamānasya, of comparison; पश्याम: paśyāmaḥ, we see.

109. It is not in a *bos gavaeus unperceived* that we find the real matter of comparison.—48.

The matter of comparison is similarity. *e.g.*, between a cow and a *bos gavaeus*. The *bos gavaeus* in which we notice the similarity is first perceived, that is, on perceiving a bos gavaeus we notice its similarity to a cow. Hence, comparison supplies us with knowledge of a *perceived* thing, through its similarity to another thing also *perceived*. This characteristic distinguishes it from inference, which furnishes us with knowledge of an *unperceived* thing through that of a thing *perceived*.

अथापि–

तथेत्युपसंहारादुपमानसिद्धेर्नाविशेषः॥ 49॥

तथेतिसमानधर्मोपसंहारादुपमानं सिध्यति नानुमानम्–अयं चानयोर्विशेष इति॥49

तथा tathā, iti, and thus; उपसंहारात् upasaṃhārāt, from conclusion, summation; उपमानसिद्धेः upamāna-siddeḥ, from the establishment of comparison; न na, not; अविशेषः a-viśeṣaḥ, non-difference.

110. There is non-difference, inasmuch as comparison is established through the compendious expression "so".—49.

It is not true that comparison is identical which inference, because the former is established through the compendious expression "so". 'As is a cow, *so* is a bos gavaeus'—this is an instance of comparison. This use of 'so' makes it clear that comparison is a distinct means of right knowledge.

(अथ शब्दप्रमाणपरीक्षा-)

शब्दोऽनुमानमर्थस्यानुपलब्धेरनुमेयत्वात्॥ 50॥

शब्दोऽनुमानं न प्रमाणान्तरम्? कस्मात्? शब्दार्थस्यानुमेयत्वात्, कथमनुमेयत्वम्? प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धेः, यथाऽनुपलभ्यमानो लिङ्गी मितेन लिङ्गेन पश्चाद् मीयते इत्यनुमानम् एवं मितेन शब्देन पश्चाद् मीयतेऽर्थोऽनुपलभ्यमान इत्यनुमानं शब्दः॥50॥

शब्दः śabdaḥ, word; अनुमानं anumānam, inference; अर्थस्य arthasya, of the object; अनुपलब्धेः an-upalabdheḥ, because of non-cognition; अनुमेयत्वात् anumeyatvāt, because of its having to be inferred.

111. **Verbal testimony,** say some, is inference, because the object revealed by it is not perceived but inferred.—50.

Inference gives us the knowledge of an unperceived object, **through**

the knowledge of an object which is perceived. Similarity, verbal testimony enables us to acquire the knowledge of an unperceived object through the knowledge of a word which is perceived. The verbal testimony is, therefore, supposed by some to be inference, as the object reveald by both is unperceived.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 7 : Of Comparison : Sutras : 46-50.

Comparison (*vide* Sūtra I.i.6), says the opponent, fails as an instrument of true cognition in any case; for if the resemblance is complete the cognition will be "As a cow so a cow" ; if it is incomplete, the cognition will be, "As a bull so a buffalo"; and if it is partial the cognition will be "As one thing so anything else," which are all absured. To this we reply that Comparison does not proceed on mere resemblance but on the well-known resemblance, that is, on the resemblance which is definitely known to be the means of establishing cognition of an object. Let then Comparisón be a form of Inference, rejoins the opponent, as in both cases there is cognition of the unknown by the known. We reply that Comparison is distinguished from Inference in this that in the former it is necessary while in Inferenece it is not necessary, to see the object to be known. *E.g.* the bos gavaeus must be seen before it can be known as such by its resemblance to the cow. Moreover, in Comparison the resemblance must be pointed out by one to another. The man who known both the cow and the bos gavaeus points out the resemblance to the man who knows the cow but does not know the bos gaveaus. Lastly, the conclusion in Comparison takes the form "as the cow so the *bos gavaeus* " but the conclusion in Inference is not of this form "As the smoke, so the fire."

इतश्चानुमानं शब्दः–

उपलब्धेरद्विप्रवृत्तित्वात्॥ 51॥

प्रमाणान्तरभावे द्विप्रवृत्तिरुपलब्धिः=अन्यथा ह्युपलब्धिरनुमाने अन्यथोपमाने तद् व्याख्यातम्, शब्दानुमानयोस्तूपलब्धिरद्विप्रवृत्तिः यथाऽनुमाने प्रवर्तते तथा शब्देपि, विशेषाभावादनुमानं शब्द इति॥51॥

उपलब्धेः upalabdheḥ, of consciousness, cognition, apprehension; अद्विप्रवृत्तित्वात् a-dvi-pravṛtti-tvāt, not having a dual application.

112. In respect of perceptibility the two cases are not, continues the objector, different.—51.

In inference as well as in verbal testimony we pass to an

unperceived object through an object which is perceived. In respect of perceptibility of the object through which we pass, the inference does not, continues the objector, differ from the verbal testimony.

सम्बन्धाच्च॥ 52॥

"शब्दोनुमानम्" इति वर्तते, संबद्धयोश्च शब्दार्थयोः संबन्धप्रसिद्धौ शब्दोपलब्धेरर्थग्रहणं यथा संबद्धयोर्लिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः संबन्धप्रतीतौ लिङ्गोपलब्धौ लिङ्गिग्रहणमिति॥52॥

सम्बन्धात् sambandhāt, from relation or connection; च cha, and.

113. There is, moreover, adds the objector, the same connection.—52.

Just as in inference there is a certain connection between a sign (*e.g.*, smoke) and the thing signified by it (*e.g.*, fire), so in verbal testimony there is connection between a word and the object signified by it. So inference, says the objector, is not different from verbal testmony.

यत्तावत् 'अर्थस्यानुमेयत्वात्' इति तन्न–

आप्तोपदेशसामर्थ्याच्छब्दादर्थसम्प्रत्ययः॥ 53॥

'स्वर्गः अप्सरसः उत्तराः कुरवः सप्त द्वीपाः समुद्रो लोकसंनिवेशः' इत्येवमादेरप्रत्यक्षस्यार्थस्य न शब्दमात्रात् प्रत्ययः, किं तर्हि? 'आप्तैरयमुक्तः शब्दः' इत्यतः संप्रत्ययः– विपर्ययेण संप्रत्ययाभावात् न त्वेवमनुमानमिति।

यत् पुनः–"उपलब्धेरद्विप्रवृत्तित्वात् 2-1-51" इति, अयमेव शब्दानुमानयोरुपलब्धेः प्रवृत्तिभेदः तत्र विशेषे सत्यऽहेतुः–'विशेषाभवात्' इति॥53॥

आप्तोपदेशसामर्थ्यात् āpta-upadeśa-sāmarthyāt, through force derived from the declaration by a reliable person; शब्दार्थसंप्रत्ययः śabda-artha-sampratyayaḥ, complete intuition of the object from the word.

114. In reply, we say that there is reliance on the matter signified by a word, because the word has been used by reliable person.—53.

In reference to the objections raised in aphorisms 51 and 52, we say that we rely on unseen matter, not simply because it is signified by words, but because they are spoken by a reliable person. There are, some say, paradise, nymphs, Uttarakurus, seven islands, ocean human settlements, etc. We accept them as realities, not because they are known through words, but because they are spoken of by persons who are

reliable. Hence, verbal testimony is not inference. The two agree in conveying knowledge of an object through its sign, but the sign in one is different from the sign in the other. In the case of verbal testimony, the special point is to decide whether the sign (word) comes from a reliable person.

Aphorism 53 speaks of a certain connection between a word and the object signified by it. The present aphorism points out that the connection is not a natural one. We acknowledge that a word indicates a certain object, but we deny that the object is naturally or necessarily connected with the word. Hearing, for instance, the word "cow," we think of the animal signified by it, nevertheless the word and the animal are not connected with each other by nature or necessity. In the case of inference, however, the connection between a sign (*e.g.*, smoke) and the thing signified (*e.g.*, fire) is natural and necessary. Therefore, the connection involved in inference is not of the same kind as that involved in verbal testimony.

यत् पुनरिदम्–"संबन्धाच्च" इति, अस्ति च शब्दार्थयोः संबन्धोऽनुज्ञातः अस्ति च प्रतिषिद्धः='अस्येदम्' इतिषष्ठीविशिष्टस्य वाक्यस्यार्थविशेषोऽनुज्ञातः प्राप्तिलक्षणस्तु शब्दार्थयोः संबन्ध प्रतिषिद्धः। कस्मात्?

प्रमाणतोऽनुपलब्धेः॥ 54॥

प्रत्यक्षतस्तावत् शब्दार्थप्राप्तेर्नोपलब्धिः–अतीन्द्रियत्वात्=येनेन्द्रियेण गृह्यते शब्दस्तस्य विषयभावमतिवृत्तोऽर्थो न गृह्यते, अस्ति चातीन्द्रियविषयभूतोप्यर्थः, समानेन चेन्द्रियेण गृह्यमाणयोः प्राप्तिर्गृह्यते इति। प्राप्तिलक्षणे च गृह्यमाणे संबन्धे शब्दार्थयोः शब्दान्तिके वार्थः स्यात् अर्थान्तिके वा शब्दः स्यात् उभयं वोभयत्र॥54॥

115. There is, in the case of verbal testimony, no perception of the connection.—54.

The connection between a sign and the thing signified, which is the basis of inference, is obvious to perception. For instance, the inference that "the hill is fiery, because it is smoky" is based on a certain connection between smoke and fire which is actually perceived in a kitchen or elsewhere. The connection between a word and the objects signified by it, which is the basis of verbal testimony, is not obvious to perception. The word Uttarakuru, for instance, signifies the country of the name, but the connection between the word and the country is not perceived, as the latter lies beyond our observation. Hence, verbal testimony is not inference.

अथ खल्वयम्–

पूरणप्रदाहपाटनानुपलब्धेश्च सम्बन्धाभावः॥ 55॥

स्थानकरणाभावादिति चार्थः। न चायमनुमानतोप्युपलभ्यते–शब्दान्तिकेऽर्थ इति। एतस्मिन् पक्षेप्याऽऽस्यस्थानकरणोच्चारणीयः शब्दस्तदन्तिकेऽर्थ इति अन्नाऽग्न्यऽसि-शब्दोच्चारणे पूरणप्रदाहपाटनानि गृह्येरन्, अग्रहणान्नानुमेयः प्राप्तिलक्षणः संबन्धः। अर्थान्तिके शब्द इति–स्थानकरणासंभवाद् अनुच्चारणम् स्थानं कण्ठादयः करणं प्रयत्नविशेषः तस्यार्थान्तिकेऽनुपपत्तिरिति। उभयप्रतिषेधाच्च नोभयम्। तस्मान्न शब्देनार्थ प्राप्त इति॥55॥

पूरणप्रदाहपाटनानुपलब्धेः pūraṇa-pradāha-pāṭana-anupalabdheḥ, from non-apprehension of filling, burning, and splitting; च cha, and; सम्बन्धाभावः sambandha-abhāvaḥ, non-existence of connection.

116. There is no natural connection between a word and the object signified by it, as we do not find that the words food, fire and hatchet, are acompanied by the actions filling burning and splitting.—55.

If a word wer naturally connected with the object signified by it, then by uttering the words food, fire and hatchet we should have found our mouth filled up (with food), burnt (with fire) and split (by a hatchet). But such is never the case. Hence there is no natural connection between a word and the object signified by it, and consequently verbal testimony is not inference.

शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानादप्रतिषेधः॥ 56॥

शब्दार्थप्रत्ययस्य व्यवस्थादर्शनाद् अनुमीयते–अस्ति शब्दार्थसंबन्धो व्यवस्थाकारणम्, असंबन्धे हि शब्दमात्रादर्थमात्रे प्रत्ययप्रसङ्गः तस्मादप्रतिषेधः संबन्धस्येति॥56॥

शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानात् śabda-artha-vyavasthānāt, from the fixity of (the intuition) of object from word; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

117. It cannot, says an objector, be denied that there is a fixed connection between words and their meanings.—56.

A particular word denotes a particular meaning *e.g.*, the word 'cow' denotes the animal of that name, but it does not denote a horse, a jar, or any other thing. There is, therefore, in the case of verbal testimony, a fixed connection between a word and its meaning as there is in the case of inference a fixed connection between a sign and the thingsignified. Hence, verbal testimony is considered by the objector to be a case of inference.

अत्र समाधिः—

न सामयिकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य॥ 57॥

न संबन्धकारितं शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानम्, किं तर्हि? समयकारितं यत्तदवोचाम- 'अस्येदमिति षष्ठीविशिष्टस्य वाक्यस्यार्थविशेषोऽनुज्ञातः शब्दार्थयोः संबन्धः' इति समयं तमवोचाम इति।

कः पुनरयं समयः?, 'अस्य शब्दस्येदमर्थजातमभिधेयम्' इत्यभिधानाभिधेय-नियमनियोगः, तस्मिन्नुपयुक्ते शब्दादर्थसंप्रत्ययो भवति, विपर्यये हि शब्दश्रवणेपि प्रत्ययाभावः, संबन्धवादिनापि चायमवर्जनीय इति। प्रयुज्यमानग्रहणाच्च समयोपयोगो लोकिकानाम्, समयपालनार्थं चेदं पदलक्षणाया वाचोऽन्वाख्यानं व्याकरणम्, व्याक्यलक्षणाया वाचोऽर्थ-लक्षणम्, पदसमूहो वाक्यम् अर्थपरिसमाप्ताविति। तदेवं प्राप्तिलक्षणस्य शब्दार्थसंबन्धास्या-ऽर्थतुपोपि अनुमानहेतुर्न भवतीति।।57।।

न na not; सामयिकत्वात् sāmayika-tvāt, from being conventional; शब्दार्थसंप्रत्ययस्य śabda-artha-sampratyayasya, of the intuition of object form word.

118. We reply, it is through convention that the meaning of a word is understood.—57.

The connection between a word and its meaning is conventional and not natural. The connection, through fixed by man, is not inseparable and cannot therefore be the basis of an inference.

जातिविशेषे चानियमात्॥ 58॥

सामयिकः शब्दादर्थसंप्रत्ययो न स्वभाविकः-ऋष्यार्यम्लेच्छानां यथाकामं शब्दप्रयोगो-ऽर्थप्रत्यायनाय प्रवर्तते, स्वाभाविके हि शब्दस्यार्थप्रत्यायकत्वे यथाकामं न स्यात्, यथा तैजसस्य प्रकाशस्य रूपप्रत्ययहेतुत्वं न जातिविशेषं व्यभिचरतीति।।58।।

जातिविशेषे jāti-viśeṣe, with particular classes; च cha, and; अनियमात् aniyamāt, from absence of natural uniformity.

119. There is no universal uniformity of connection between a word and its meaning.—58.

The ṛṣis, āryas and mlechchhas use the same word in different senses, *e.g.*, the word "yava" is used by the āryas to denote a long-awned grain, but by the mlechchhas to denote a panic-seed. So, the connection between a word and its meaning is not everywhere uniform, and consequently verbal testimony cannot be considered as inference.

तदप्रामाण्यमनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्यः॥ 59॥

पुत्रकामेष्टिहवनाभ्यासेपु, तस्येति शब्दविशेषमेवाधिकुरुते भगवान् ऋषिः। शब्दस्य प्रमाणत्वं न संभवति, कस्मात्? अनृतदोषात्-पुत्रकामेष्टौ-"पुत्रकामः पुत्रेष्ट्या यजेत" इति, नेष्टौ संस्थितायां पुत्रजन्य दृश्यते, दृष्टार्थस्य वाक्यस्याऽनृतत्वाद् अदृष्टार्थमपि वाक्यम्-"अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः" इत्याद्यऽनृतमिति ज्ञायते। विहितव्याघात-दोषाच्च-हवने "उदिते होतव्यम्", "अनुदिते होतव्यम", "समयाध्युषिते होतव्यम्" इति विधाय विहितं व्याहनित-"श्यावोऽस्याहुतिमभ्यवहरति य उदिते जुहोति", "शबलो-ऽस्याहुतिमभ्यवहरति योऽनुदिते जुहोति", "श्यावशबलौ वास्याहुतिमभ्यवहरतो यः समायाध्युषिते जुहोति" (इति) व्याघाताच्चान्यतरद् मित्येति। पुनरुक्तदोषाच्च-अभ्यासे देश्यमाने "त्रिः प्रथमामन्वाह त्रिरुत्तमाम्" इति पुनरुक्तदोषो भवति, पुनरुक्त च प्रमत्त-वाक्यमिति, तस्मादप्रमाणं शब्दः-अनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्य इति।।59।।

तत् tat, that, word; अप्रामाण्यं a-prāmāṇyam, not a means of right knowledge, invalid; अनृतव्याघत पनुरुक्त दोषेभ्यः anṛta-vyāghāta-punarukta-doṣebhyaḥ, owing to the defects of falsity, futility and repetition.

120. The **Veda**, some say, is unreliable, as it involves the faults of untruth, contradiction and tautology.—59.

The Veda, which is a kind of verbal testimony, is not, some say, means of right knowledge. It is supposed by them to be tainted with the faults of untruth, contradiction and tautology. For instance, the Veda affirms that a son is produced when the sacrifice for the sake of a son is performed. It often happens that the son is not produced, through the sacrifice has been performed.

There are many contradictory-injunctions in the Veda, *e.g.*, it declares "let one sacrifice when the sun has risen," also "let one sacrifice when the sun has not risen," etc. There is such tautology as "let the first hymn be recited thrice," "let the last hyman be recited thrice," etc.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 8 : Of the Word in general : Sūtras : 51-59.

The opponent says that Testimony is not different form Inference, because (1) the meaning which is not known and which is not an object of perception is known by means of the word which is known, as in Inference the unknown is known by means of the known, (2) cognition from Testimony does not, as does cognition from Comparison, differ from cognition from Inference, and (3) there is universal concomitance of the word and its meaning. To this we reply that in Testimony the

word by itself is not competent to produce cognition of truth, and that it derives the force to produce such a cognition only from its being spoken by an āpta or truth knowing benevolent person, as in the case of "heaven," "apsaras," "uttara kurus," "seven islands and seven oceans," "the worlds Bhūḥ, Bhuvah, Svar, etc.," and so on. Inference is not so dependent upon an āpta. This also constitutes the differenee of cognition from Testimony to cognition from Inference. Again, the relation of the word and the meaning is that of the signifier and the significate, and is not natural (dependent on and following from a law of nature). Natural concomitance exists between two object when both are perceptible to the senses, as in the case of fore and smoke. But object denoted by words are not perceived by Hearing, and there are objects denoted by words which are not preceptible by any sense. Therefore, the supposed natural connection of the word and meaning cannot be established by any means. It cannot be said that the meaning always accompanies the word, for in that case whenever the words food, fire, and sword are uttered the mouth should be filled with food, burnt with fire and cut with sword. Neither can it be said that the word always accompanies the meaning, for in that case the vocal aparatus should be found near the pot and other object. It is true there is a uniformity in the relation of the word and the meaning. But this uniformity is due to convention created by the will of man and handed down from generation to generation. This is clear from the fact that the same word conveys different meanings among different races of mankind.

न कर्मकर्त्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात्।। 60।।

नानृतदोषः पुत्रकामेष्टौ, कस्मात्?, कर्मकर्तृसाधनवेगुण्यात्, इष्ट्या पितरौ संयुज्यमानौ पुत्रं जनयत इति, इष्टिः करणम्= साधनं, पितरो कर्तारौ, संयोगः कर्म, त्रयाणां गुणयोगात् पुत्रजन्म, वैगुण्याद् विपर्ययः, इष्ट्याश्रयं तावत् कर्मवैगुण्यं समीहाभ्रेषः, कर्तृवैगुण्यम् अविद्वान् प्रयोक्ता कपूयाचरणश्च, साधनवेगुण्यं हविरसंस्कृतम् उपहतमिति, मन्त्रा न्यूनाधिकाः स्वरवर्णहीना इति, दक्षिणा दुरागता हीना निन्दिता चेति। अथोपजनाश्रयं कर्मवैगुण्यं मिथ्यासंप्रयोगः, कर्तृवैगुण्यं योनिव्यापादो बीजोपघातश्चेति, साधनवैगुण्यम् इष्टावऽभिहितम्। लोके च 'अग्निकामो दारुणी मथ्नीयात्' इति विधिवाक्यम् तत्र कर्मवैगुण्यं मिथ्याभिमन्थनम्, कर्तृवैगुण्यं प्रज्ञाप्रयत्नगतः प्रसाद, साधनवैगुण्यम् आर्द्रं सुषिरं दारु इति, तत्र फलं न निष्पद्यते इति नाऽनृतदोषः, गुणयोगेन फलनिष्पत्तिदर्शनात्, न चेदं लौकिकाद् भिद्यते-"पुत्रकामः पुत्रेष्ट्या यजेत" इति।।60।।

न na, not ; कर्मकर्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात् karma-kartṛ-sādhana-vaiguṇyāt, from defect in the act, agent, or materials.

121. The so called untruth in the Veda comes from some defect in the act, operator or materials of sacrifice.—60.

Defect in the act consists in sacrificing not according to rules, defect in the operator (officiating priest) consists in his not being a learned man, and defect in the materials consists in the fuel being wet, butter being not fresh, remuneration (to the officiating priest) being small, etc. A son is sure to be produced as a result of performing the sacrifice, if these defects are avoided. Therefore, there is no untruth in the Veda.

अभ्युपेत्य कालभेदे दोषवचनात्।। 61।।

'न व्याघातो हवने' इत्यनुवर्तते, योऽभ्युपगतं हवनकालं भिनत्ति=ततोऽन्यत्र जुहोति तत्रायमभ्युपगतकालभेदे दोष उच्यते-"श्यावोऽस्याहुतिमभ्यवहरति य उदिते जुहोति" तदिदं विधिभ्रेषे निन्दावचनमिति।।61।।

अभ्युपेत्य abhyupetya, arriving at a decision; कालभेदे kāla-bhede, in the case of alteration of the time; दोषवचनात् doṣe-vachanāt, there being the declaration of the defect.

122. Contradiction would occur if there were alteration of the time agreed upon.—61.

Let a person perform sacrifice before sunrise or after sunrise if he has agreed upon doing it at either of the times. Two alternative courses being open to him, he can perform the sacrifice before sunrise or after sunrise, according to his agreement or desire. The Veda cannot be charged with the fault of contradiction, if it enjoins such alternative courses.

अनुवादोपपत्तेश्च।। 62।।

'पुनरुक्तदोषोऽभ्यासेन' इतिप्रकृतम्,, अनर्थकोऽभ्यासः पुनरुक्तः, अर्थवानभ्यासो-ऽनुवादः, योऽयमभ्यासः-"त्रिः प्रथमामन्वाह त्रिरुत्तमाम्" इति अनुवाद उपपद्यतो-अर्थवत्त्वात्, त्रिर्वचनेन हि प्रथमोत्तेमयोः पञ्चदशत्वं सामधेनीनां भवति तथा च मन्त्राभिवादः-"इदमहं भ्रातृव्यं पञ्चदशारेण वाग्वज्रेण बाधे योऽस्मान् द्वेष्टि यं च वयं द्विष्मः" इति पञ्चदशसामिधेनीवज्रं मन्त्रोऽभिवदति तदभ्यासमन्तरेण न स्यादिति।।62।।

अनुवादोपपत्तेः anuvāda-upapatteḥ, from the possibility of its being a re-inculcation; च cha, and.

122. There is no tautology, because re-inculcation is of advantage.—62.

Tautology means a useless repetition, which never occurs in the Veda. If there is any repetition there, it is either for completing a certain "Let the first hymn be recited thrice," "let the last hymn be recited thrice"—such instances embody a useful repetition.

वाक्याविभागस्य चार्थग्रहणात्।। 63।।

प्रमाणं शब्दो यथा लोके।।63।।

वाक्याविभागस्य vākya-vibhāgasya, of the devision of speech; च cha, and; अर्थग्रहणात् artha-grahaṇāt, from apprehension of different objects.

124. And because there is necessity for the classification Vedic speech.—63.

It is necessary to divide the Vedic the Vedic speech into classes based on special characters.

विभागश्च ब्राह्मणवाक्यानां त्रिविधः-

विध्यर्थवादानुवादवचनविनियोगात्।। 64।।

त्रिधा खलु ब्राह्मणवाक्यानि विनियुक्तानि-विधिवचनानि अर्थवादवचनानि अनुवादवचनातीति।।64।।

विध्यर्थवादानुवादवचनविनियोगात् vidhi-arthavāda-anuvāda-vachana-viniyogāt, from the distribution of speech as injunction, persuasion and re-inculcation.

125. The Vedic speech being divided on the principle of **injunction**, persuasion and re-inculcation.—64.

The two main divisions of the Veda are : (1) hymn and (2) ritual. The ritual portion admits of three sub-division, *viz*, injunctibe, persuasive and re-inculcative.

तत्र-

विधिः विधायकः।। 65।।

यद् वाक्यं विधायकम्=चादकं स विधिः, विधिस्तु नियोगोऽनुज्ञा वा यथा-'अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः'' इत्यादि।।65।।

विधिः vidhiḥ, injunction; विधायकः vidhāyakaḥ, that which prescribes something positive.

126. An injunction is that which exhorts us to adopt a certain course of action [as the means of attaining good.]—65.

The following is an injunction :—"Let him who desires paradise perform the fire-sacrifice." This is direct command.

स्तुतिर्निन्दा परकृतिः पुराकल्प इति अर्थवादः।। 66।।

विधेः फलवादलक्षण या प्रशंसा सा स्तुतिः संप्रत्ययार्था-सतुयमानं श्रद्दधीतेति, प्रवर्तिका च-फलश्रवणात् प्रवर्तते-''सर्वजितो वै देवाः सर्वमजयन् सर्वस्याऽऽस्यै सर्वस्य जित्यै सर्वमेव तेनाप्नोति सर्वं जयति'' इत्येवमादि। अनिष्टफलवादो निन्दा वर्जनार्था-निन्दितं न समाचरेदिति ''स एष वा व प्रथमो यज्ञो यज्ञानां यज्ज्योतिष्टोमो य एतेनाऽनिष्ट्वाऽन्येन यजते गर्ते पतति=अयमेवैतद् जीर्यते वा प्रमीयते वा'' इत्यवमादि।

अन्यकर्तृकस्य व्याहतस्य विधेर्वादः परकृतिः-''हुत्वा वामेवाग्रेऽभिघारयन्ति अथ पृषदाज्यं तदुह चरकाध्वर्यवः पृषदाज्यमेवाग्रेऽभिघारयन्ति 'अग्नेः प्राणाः पृषदाज्यं स्तोमम्' इत्येवमभिदधति'' इत्येवमादि। ऐतिह्यसमाचरितो विधिः पुराकल्प इति-''तस्माद्वा एतेन ब्राह्मणा बहिष्पवमानं सामस्तोममऽस्तौषन्-योने यज्ञं प्रतनवामहे'' इत्येवमादि। कथं परकृतिपुराकल्पौ अर्थवादाविति?, स्तुतिनिन्दावाक्येनाभिसंबन्धाद् विध्याश्रयस्य कस्याचिदर्थस्य द्योतनादर्थवाद इति।।66।।

स्तुतिः stutiḥ, praise; निन्दा nindā, blame; परकृतिः para kṛtiḥ, doing of others, failures of others; पुराकल्प purā-kalpaḥ, tradition, customs of old; इति iti, such; अर्थवादः artha-vādaḥ, persuasion.

127. **Persuasion** is effected through **praise**, **blame**, **warning**, and **prescription**.—66.

Praise is speech which persuades us to a certain course of action by extolling its consequences, *e.g.*, "By the Sarvajit sacrifice gods conquered all, there is nothing like Sarvajit sacrifice, it enables us to obtain everything and to vanquish every one, etc." Here there is no direct command, but the Sarvajit sacrifice is extolled in such a way that we are persuaded to perform it.

Blame is speech which persuades us to adopt a certain course of action by acquainting us with the undersirable consequences of neglecting it, *e.g.*, "One who performs any other sacrifice, neglecting the Jyotiṣṭoma, falls into pit and decays there." Here one is persuaded to perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, the neglect of which brings about evil consequences.

Warning is the mentioning of a course of action, the obstruction of which by some particular person led to bad consequences, *e.g.*, one presenting oblation one is to take the fat first and the sprinkled butter

afterwards, but alas! the Charaka priests first took the sprinkled butter which was, as it were, the life of fire, etc. Here the foolish course of action adopted by the Charaka priests should serve as a warning to other priests who ought to avoid the course.

Prescription implies the mention of something as commendable on account of its antiquity, *e.g.*, "By this the Brāhmaṇas recited the Sāma hymn, etc."

विधिविहितस्यानुवचनम् अनुवादः॥ 67॥

विध्यनुवचनं चानुवादो विहितानुवचनं च, पूर्वः शब्दानुवादोऽपरोऽर्थानुवादः, यथा पुनरुक्तं द्विविधम् एवमनुवादोपि। किमर्थं पुनर्विहितमनूद्यते?, अधिकारार्थम्= विहितमधिकृत्य स्तुतिर्बोध्यते निन्दा वा विधिशेषो वाऽभिधियते, विहितानन्तरार्थोऽपि चानुवादो भवति, एवमन्यदप्युत्प्रेक्षणीयम्।

लोकेपि च विधिरर्थवादोऽनुवाद इति च त्रिविधं वाक्यम्–'ओदनं पचेत्' इति विधिवाक्यम्, अर्थवादवाक्यम्–'आयुर्वर्चो बलं सुखं प्रतिभामनं चान्ने प्रतिष्ठितम्', अनुवादः–'पचतु पचतु भवान्' इत्यभ्यासः, 'क्षिप्रं पच्यताम्' इति वा 'अङ्ग पच्यताम्' इति (वा) अध्येषाणर्थम्, 'पच्यतामेव' इति चावधारणार्थम्। यथा लौकिके वाक्ये विभागेनार्थग्रहणात् प्रमाणत्वम् एवं वेदवाक्यानामपि विभागेनार्थग्रहणात् प्रमाणत्वं भवितुमर्हतीति॥67॥

विधिविहितस्य vidhi-vihitasya, of what is prescribed by injunction; अनुवचनम् anu-vachanam, repetition; अनुवादः anuvādaḥ, reinculcation.

128. **Re-inculcation** is the repetition of that which has been enjoined by an injunction.—67.

Re-inculcation may consist of (1) the repetition of an *injunction*, or (2) the repetition of that which has been *enjoined*. The first is called verbal re-inculcation and the second objective re-inculcation. In the Veda there is re-inculcation, as in ordinary use there is repetition. "Non-eternal not eternal"—this is verbal repetition. "Non-enternal, possessing the character of extinction"—this is objective repetition.

नानुवादपुनरुक्तयोर्विशेषः शब्दाभ्यासोपपत्तेः॥ 68॥

'पुनरुक्ततसाधु साधुरनुवादः' इत्ययं विशेषो नोपपद्यते। कस्मात्? उभयत्र हि प्रतीतार्थः शब्दोऽभ्यस्यते, चरितार्थस्य शब्दस्याऽभ्यासादुभयमसाध्विति॥68॥

न na, not; अनुवादपुनरुक्तयोः anuvāda-punaruktayoḥ, of reinculcation and repetition; विशेषः viśeṣaḥ, difference; शब्दाभ्यासोपपत्तेः śabda-abhyāsa-upapatteḥ, because of the existence of the repetition of words.

129. There is, some say, no difference between re-inculcation and tautology, as there is in either case a repetition of some expression already used.—68.

Re-inculcaiton is supposed by some to be a fault, inasmuch as is does not, according to them, differ from tautology.

शीघ्रतरगमनोपदेशवदभ्यासान्नाविशेषः॥ 69॥

नानुवादपुनरुक्तयोरविशेषः। कस्मात्?, अर्थवतोऽभ्यासस्याऽनुवादभावात्, समानेऽभ्यासे पुनरुक्तम् अनर्थकम् अर्थवानभ्यासोऽनुवादः–शीघ्रतरगमनोपदेशवत् 'शीघ्रं शीघ्रं गम्यताम्' इति क्रियातिशयोऽभ्यासेनेवोच्यते उदाहरणार्थं चेदम्, एवमन्योप्यभ्यासः–'पचति पचति' इति क्रियानुपरमः, 'ग्रामो ग्रामो रमणीयः' इति व्याप्तिः, 'परि परि त्रिगर्तेभ्यो वृष्टो देवः' इति परिवर्जनम्, 'अध्यऽधिकुण्डं निषण्णम्, इति सामीप्यम्, 'तिक्तं तिक्तम्' इति प्रकारः, एवमनुवादस्य स्तुतिनिन्दाशेषविधिषु अधिकार्थता विहितानन्तरार्थता चेति॥69॥

शीघ्रतरगमनोपदेशवत् śīghratara-gamana-upadeśa-vat, like the direction of going faster and faster which indicates intensity of action; अभ्यासत् abhyāsāt, from repetition; न na not; अवशेषः a-viśeṣaḥ, non-difference.

130. There is a difference, because re-inculcation serves some useful purpose, as, *e.g.*, a command to go faster.—69.

Tautology consists of a useless repetition, but the repetition in the case of re-inculcation is useful, *e.g.*, "go on, go on"—signifies "go faster."

किं पुनः प्रतिषेधहेतूद्धारादेव शब्दस्य प्रमाणत्वं सिध्यति? न, अतश्च–

मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात्॥ 70॥

किं पुनरायुर्वेदस्य प्रमाण्यम्?, यत्तदायुर्वेदेनोपदिश्यते–'इदं कृत्वेष्टमधिगच्छति इदं वर्जयित्वाऽनिष्टं जहाति' (इति) तस्यानुष्ठीयमानस्य तथाभावः=सत्यार्थता=अविपर्ययः, मन्त्रपदानां च विषभूताशनिप्रतिषेधार्थानां प्रयोगेऽर्थस्य तथाभावः, एतत् प्रामाण्यम्। किंकृतमेतत्?, आप्तप्रामाण्यकृतम्। किंपुनराप्तानां प्रामाण्यम्?, साक्षात्कृतधर्मता भूतदया यथाभूतार्थचिख्यापयिषेति=आप्ताः खलु साक्षात्कृतधर्माणः 'इदं हातव्यम् इदमस्य हानिहेतुः, इदमस्याधिगतव्यम् इदमस्याधिगमहेतुः' इति भूतान्यनुकम्पन्ते, तेषां खलु वे प्राणभृतां स्वयमनवबुद्ध्यमानानां नान्यदुपदेशाद् अवबोधकारणमस्ति, न चाऽनवबोधे समीहा वर्जनं वा, न चाऽकृत्वा स्वस्तिभावः, नाप्यऽस्यान्य उपकारकोप्यस्ति, हन्त वयमेभ्यो यथादर्शनं यथाभूतमुपदिशामः ते इमे श्रुत्वा प्रतिपद्यमाना हेयं हास्यनित अधिगन्तव्यमेवाऽधिगमिष्यन्तीति एवमाप्तोपदेशः एतेन त्रिविधेनाप्तप्रामाण्येन परिगृहीतोऽनुष्ठीयमानोऽर्थस्य साधको भवति, एवमाप्तोपदेशः प्रमाणम्, एवमाप्ताः प्रमाणम्।

दृष्टार्थेनाप्तोपदेशेनाऽऽयुर्वेदेनाऽदृष्टार्थो वेदभागोऽनुमातव्यः-प्रमाणमिति-आप्तप्रामाण्यस्य हेतोः समानत्वादिति। अस्यापि चैकदेशः-"ग्रामकामो यजेत" इत्येवमादिर्दृष्टर्थस्तेनानुमातव्यमिति।

लोके च भूयानुपदेशाश्रयो व्यवहारः, लौकिकस्याप्युपदेष्टुरुपदेष्टव्यार्थज्ञानेन परानुजिघृक्षया यथाभूतार्थचिख्यापयिषया च प्रामाण्यम् तत्परिग्रहादाप्तोपदेशः प्रमाणमिति। द्रष्टृप्रवक्तृसामान्याच्चानुमानम्-ये एवाऽऽप्ता वेदार्थानां द्रष्टारः प्रवक्तारश्च ते एवायुर्वेदप्रभृतीनाम् इत्यायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवद् वेदप्रामाण्यमनुमातव्यमिति।

नित्यत्वाद्वेदावाक्यानां प्रमाणत्वे "तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात्" इत्ययुक्तम्। शब्दस्य वाचकत्वादर्थप्रतिपत्तौ प्रमाणत्वं न नित्यत्वात्, नित्यत्वे हि सर्वस्य सर्वेण वचनात् शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः। नाऽनित्यत्वे वाचकत्वमितिचेत्? न-लौकिकेष्वर्थदर्शनात् तेपि नित्या इति चेत्? न-अनाप्तोपदेशादर्थविसंवादोऽनुपपन्नः-नित्यत्वाद्धि शब्दः प्रमाणमिति। अनित्यः स इति चेत्? अविशेषवचनम्=अनाप्तोपदेशो लौकिको न नित्य इति कारणं वाच्यमिति।

यथानियोगं चार्थस्य प्रत्यायनाद् नामधेयशब्दानां लोके प्रामाण्यम्, नित्यत्वात् प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तिः=यत्रार्थे नामधेयशब्दो नियुज्यते लोके तस्य नियोगसामर्थ्यात् प्रत्यायको भवति न नित्यत्वात्। मन्वन्तरयुगान्तरेषु चाऽतीतानागतेषु संप्रदायाभ्यासप्रयोगाऽविच्छेद इति वेदानां नित्यत्वम्, आप्तप्रामाण्याच्च प्रामाण्यम्, लौकिकेषु शब्देषु चैतत् समानमिति॥70॥

॥ इति वात्स्यायनीये न्यायभाष्ये द्वितीयाऽध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम्॥

मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवत् mantra āyurveda-prāmāṇya-vat, like the validity mantra or chant and of medical science; च cha, and; तत्प्रामाण्यम् tat prāmāṇyam, its validity; आप्तप्रामाण्यात् āpta-prāmāṇyāt, from the authority the reliable speaker.

131. The Veda is reliable like thé spell and the medical science because of the reliability of their authors.—70.

The spell counteracts poison, etc., and the medical science prescribes correct remedies. The authority which belongs to them is derived from their authors, the sages, who were reliable persons. The sages themselves were reliable, because (1) they had an intuitive perception of truths, (2) they had great kindness for living beings and (3) they had the desire of communicating their knowledge of the truths. The authors, (*lit.*, the seers and speakers) of the Veda were also the authors of the spell and medical science. Hence, like the spell and medical science, the Veda must be accepted as authoritative. The view that the Veda is authoritative because eternal, is untenable.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 9 : Of the Veda : Sūtras : 60-70.

Some condemn the Veda on the ground of futility, contradication and repetition. But where the Vedic injunctions fail of their purpose the fault does not lie with the Veda but with the performer and the performance (in the same way as scientific experiments fail in the hands of novices). The so-called contradictory injunctions have reference to different points of time. The so-called repetition is re-inculcation with a purpose. The statements in the Veda admit of interpretation in the manner of secular statements. They are either : (1) injunction or (2) exhortations or (3) re-inculcations. *E.g.* (1) He who desires heaven let him perform the Agnihotra sacrifice, or let him cook cook; (2) this is the first among the sacrifices, this Jyotiṣṭoma, etc.; or life, strength, pleasure, etc. are all in the food;(3) he offers Agnihorta, he offers with curd; or cook, cook. The authoritative character of the Veda rests on its being the declaration of Āptas as in the case of Mantras and Medical Science. Mantras to counter act poisons, ghosts and lightning and medicines to cure diseases are vindicated by results. Some of the Vedic injunctions are similarly vindicated by results. The infallibility of others is inferred from the infallibility of the Āptas who have declared them. The Āptas are persons who have directly known the truth, who are kind to living beings and who are willing to communicate the truth as known by them. In the secular affairs of men also reliance on statements of āptas is seen. Moreover, the same Ṛṣis who are the seers and speakers of the veda are also the seer and speakers of Mantras and medicines.

The Vedic words are authoritative because they are significant of truth and not because they are eternal. They are not eternal as in that case all words would be related to all object at the same time. Non-eternality does not entail loss of significance, for ordinary secular words which are not eternal are yet significant. Secular words cannot be eternal, for in that case the statements of those who are not āptas would not be untrue.It cannot be said that the words of non-āptas are non-eternal, for there is no reason to distinguish them form the words of the āptas. In the case of secular words also their validity depends on convention and not on their eternality. In both case the authority of the āptas confers authority on their words. The eternality of Vedic words arises from their interrupted succession in tradition, study and application in all ages and world-cycles (manvataras), past and future.

॥ इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने द्वितीयस्याऽध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम्॥1॥

BOOK II, CHAPTER II

अयथार्थः प्रमाणोद्देश इति मत्वाऽऽह–

न चतुष्ट्वमैतिह्यार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावप्रामाण्यात्॥ 1॥

न चत्वार्येव प्रमाणानि। किं तर्हि? ऐतिह्यमर्थापत्तिः संभवोऽभाव इत्येतान्यपि प्रमाणानि तानि कस्मान्नोक्तानि? 'इति होचुः' इत्यऽनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकं प्रवादपारम्पर्यम् ऐतिह्यम्। अर्थादा पत्तिः अर्थापत्तिः, आपत्तिः=प्राप्तिः=प्रसङ्गः, यत्राऽभिधीयमानेऽर्थे योऽन्योऽर्थः प्रसज्जते सोऽर्थाषत्तिः यथा–'मेघेष्वऽसत्सु वृष्टिर्न भवति' इति, किमत्र प्रसज्यते? 'तस्तु भवति' इति। संभवो नाम अविनाभाविनोऽर्थस्य सत्ताग्रणादन्यस्य सत्ताग्रहणं यथा–द्रोणस्य सत्ताग्रहणादाढकस्य सत्ताग्रहणम्, आढकस्य ग्रहणात् प्रस्थस्येति। अभावः– विरोधी अभूतं भूतस्य, अविद्यमानं वर्षकर्म विद्यमानस्य वाय्वभ्रसंयोगस्य प्रतिपादकम्– विधारके हि वाय्वभ्रसंयोगे गुरुत्वादपां पतनकर्म न भवतीति॥1॥

न na, not; चतुष्ट्वम् chatuṣṭvam, to be four; ऐतिह्यार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावप्रामाण्यात् aitihya-arthāpatti-sambhava-abhāva-prāmāṇyāt, because tradition, presumption, probability and non-existence are also means of right knowledge.

132. Some say that the means of right knowledge are more than four, because rumour, presumption, probability and non-existence are also valid.—1.

In Book I, chapter I, aphorism 3, the means of right knowledge have been stated to be four, *viz.*, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Some say that there are other means fo right knowledge, such as rumour, presumption, probability and non-existence.

Rumour is an assertion which has come from one to another without any indication of the source from which it first originated, *e.g.*, in this fig tree there live goblins.

Presumption is the deduction of one thing form the declaration of another thing : *e.g.*, from the declaration that 'unless there is could,

there is no rain,' we deduce that 'there is rain, if there is could.' A more familiar instance of presumption is this : the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day time. Here the presumption is that he eats in the night for it is impossible for a person to be fat if he does not eat at all.

Probability consists in cognising the existence of a thing from that of another thing in which it is included, *e.g.*, cognising the measure of an *āḍhaka* from that of a *droṇa* of which it is a fourth part, and cognising the measure of a *prastha* from that of an *āḍhaka* of which it is a quarter.

Of two opposite things, the *non-existence* of one establishes the existence of the other, *e.g.*, the non-existence of rain establishes the combination of wind and cloud. When there is combination of wind and cloud, drops of water cannot fall, in spite of their weight.

सत्यम् एतानि प्रमाणानि न तु प्रमाणान्तराणि, प्रमाणान्तरं च मन्यमानेन प्रतिषेध उच्यते सोऽयम्–

शब्द ऐतिह्यानर्थान्तरभावादनुमानेऽर्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावानर्थान्तर-भावाच्चाप्रतिषेधः॥ 2॥

अनुपपन्नः प्रतिषेधः। कथम्? 'आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः' इति, न च शब्दलक्षणम् ऐतिह्यात् व्यावर्तते, सोयं भेदः सामान्यात् संगृह्यते इति। प्रत्यक्षेणाऽप्रत्यक्षस्य संबद्धस्य प्रतिपत्तिरनुमानं तथा चाऽर्थापत्तिसंभवाऽभावाः, वाक्यार्थसंप्रत्ययेनाऽनभिहितस्यार्थस्य प्रत्यकनीकभावाद् ग्रहणम् अर्थापत्तिरनुमानमेव, अविनाभाववृत्त्या च संबद्धयोः समुदाय-संमुदायिनोः समुदायेनेतरस्य ग्रहणं संभवः तदप्यनुमानमेव, 'अस्मिन् सतीदं नोपपद्यते' इति विराधित्वे प्रसिद्धे कार्यानुत्पत्त्या कारणस्य प्रतिबन्धकमनुमीयते। सोयं यथार्थ एव प्रमाणोद्देश इति 'सत्यमेतानि प्रमाणनि न तु प्रमाणान्तराणि' इत्युक्तम्॥2॥

शब्दे śabde, in word; ऐतिह्यानर्थान्तरभावात् aitihya-an-artha-antara-bhāvāt, from existence of tradition as a non-different object; अनुमाने anumāne, in inference; अर्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावानर्थान्तरभावात् arthāpatti-sambhava-abhāva-anartha-antara-bhāvāt, from existence of presumption, probability and non-existence as non-different objects; च cha, and; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

133. This, we reply, is no contradiction, since rumour is included in verbal testimony, and presumption, probability and non-existence are included in inference.—2.

Those who maintain that rumcur, presumption, probability and

non-existence are valid, do not really oppose our division of the means of right knowledge into four, *viz.*, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

Rumour partakes of the general characteristics of verbal testimony and is a special kind of it.

Presumption is explained as the knowledge of a thing derived through the consideration of it from the opposite standpoint. For instance, the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day time : here the presumption is that he eats in the night. The fact of his eating in the night has not been expressly stated, but is ascertained from this consideration that a person who does not eat during the day cannot be strong unless he eats in the night. It is evident that presumption, like inference passes from a perceived thing to an unperceived one, because they are in some way connected.

Probability is inference, because it is the cognizance of a part from knowledge of a whole with which it is inseparably connected.

Non-existence is inference, inasmuch as it really infers the obstruction of a cause from the non-existence of its effect through a certain connection, *viz.*, if the obstruction occurs, the effect cannot occur.

Hence rumour, etc., are not independent means of right knowledge but are included in the four, enumerated in Book I, Chapter I, aphorism 3.

अत्रार्थापत्तेः प्रमाणभावाभ्यनुज्ञा नोपपद्यते तथा हीयम्–

अर्थापत्तिरप्रमाणमनैकान्तिकत्वात्॥ 3॥

असस्तु मेघेषु वृष्टिर्न भवतीति सस्सु भवति इत्येतदर्थादापद्यते. सत्स्वपि चैकदा न भवति, सेयमर्थापत्तिरप्रमाणमिति॥3॥

अर्थापत्ति arthāpattiḥ, presumption; अप्रमाणं apramāṇam, not a means of right knowledge; अनैकान्तिकत्वात् anaikānikatvāt, because it is not one pointed.

134. Presumption, some say, is not valid, because it leads uncertainty.—3.

"If there is no cloud, there will be no rain"—from this we are said to presume that if there is a cloud there will be rain. But it often happens that a cloud is not followed by rain. So presumption does not always lead to certainly.

नाऽनैकान्तिकत्वमर्थापत्तेः–

अनर्थापत्तावर्थापत्त्यभिमानात्॥ 4॥

'असति कारण कार्यं नोत्पद्यते' इतिवाक्यात् प्रत्यनीकभूतोऽर्थः–'सति कारणे कार्यमुत्पद्यते' इत्यर्थादापद्यते, अभावस्य हि भावः प्रत्यनीक इति, सोयं कार्योत्पादः सति कारणेऽर्थादापद्यमानो न कारणस्य सत्तां व्यभिचरति–न खल्वऽसति कारणे कार्यमुत्पद्यते तस्माद् नाऽनैकान्तिकी। यत्तु 'सति कारणे निमित्तप्रतिबन्धात् कार्यं नोत्पद्यते' इति? कारणधर्मोऽसौ न त्वर्थापत्तेः प्रमेयम्। किं तर्ह्यस्याः प्रमेयम्?, सति कारणे कार्यमुपद्यते इति=योऽसौ कार्योत्पादः कारणसत्तां न व्यभिचरति तदस्याः प्रमेयम्। एवं तु सति अनर्थापत्तौ अर्थापत्त्यभिमानं कृत्या प्रतिषेध उच्यते इति, दृष्टश्च कारणधर्मो न शक्यः प्रत्याख्यातुमिति॥4॥

अनर्थापत्तौ anarthāpattau, in respect of what is not a presumption; अर्थापत्त्यभिमानात् arthāpatti-abhimānāt, from attribution of being presumption.

135. We reply : if there is any uncertainty, it is due to your supposing that to be a presumption which is not really so.—4.

"If there is no cloud, there will be no rain"—from this we are entitled to presume that if there is rain there must have been a cloud. But if you pretend to presume that "if there is a cloud, there will be rain," your so-called presumption will be an invalid one.

प्रतिषेधाप्रामाण्यञ्चानैकान्तिकत्वात्॥ 5॥

'अर्थापत्तिर्न प्रमाणम्–अनैकान्तिकत्वात्' इति वाक्यं प्रतिषेधः तेनाऽनेन अर्थापपत्तेः प्रमाणत्वं प्रतिषिध्यते न सद्भावः, एवमनैकान्तिको भवति, अनैकान्तिकत्वादप्रमाणेनाऽनेन न कश्चिदर्थः प्रतिषिध्यते इति॥5॥

प्रतिषेधाप्रमाण्यं pratiṣedha-aprāmāṇyam, invalidity of the contradiction; च cha, and; अनैकान्तिकत्वात् anaikānitikatvā, form being non-one-pointed.

136. The objection itself, we say, is invalid, because it leads to uncertainty.—5.

"Presumption is not valid, because it leads to uncertainty."—this is your objection. In it there are two points for consideration, *viz.*, (1) the validity of presumption and (2) the existence of presumption. Your

objection refers to one of the points, *viz.*, the validity of presumption. So you do not deny the existence of presumption. In some instances, however, your objection may refer to more points than one. In fact, the nature of your objection is not definite in itself, or, in other words, it leads to uncertainty. Hence your objection is in valid.

अथ मन्यसे नियतविषयेष्वर्थेषु स्वविषये व्यभिचारो भवति, न च प्रतिषेधस्य सद्भावो विषयः?, एवं तर्हि–

तत्प्रामाण्ये वा नार्थापत्त्यप्रामाण्यम्॥ 6॥

अर्थापत्तेरपि कार्योत्पादने कारणसत्ताया अव्यभिचारो विषयः न च कारणधर्मो निमित्तप्रतिबन्धात् कार्यानुत्पादकत्वमिति॥6॥

तत्प्रामाण्ये tat prāmāṇye, if the contradiction be valid; वा vā, or, न na, not; अर्थापत्त्यप्रामाण्यं arthāpatti-aprāmāṇyam, invalidity of presumption.

137. Or, if that be valid, then our presumption is not invalid.—6.

Perhaps you will say that your objection is valid, because you can ascertain in each case whether one or more points are referred to by the objection. Similarly, we shall say that our presumption is not invalid, because we can ascertian in each case whether the presumption is capable of leading to more conclusions than one. Hence, if you say that your objection is valid, we shall say that our presumption is also valid.

अभावस्य तर्हि प्रमाणभावाभ्यनुज्ञा नोपपद्यते, कथमिति?–

नाभावप्रामाण्यं प्रमेयासिद्धेः॥ 7॥

अभावस्य भूयसि प्रमेये लोकसिद्धे वैयात्यादुच्यते–"नाभावप्रामाण्यम्-प्रमेयासिद्धेः" इति॥7॥

न na, not; अभावप्रामाण्यं abhāva-prāmāṇyam, non-existence to be a means of right knowledge; प्रमेयासिद्धेः prameya-asiddheḥ, because of the non-existence of what is to be the object of right knowledge.

138. Some saythat **non-existence** is not a means of right knowledge, because there is no object which is known by it.—7.

अथायमर्थबहुत्वार्थैकदेश उदाहियते–

लक्षितेष्वलक्षणलक्षितत्वादलक्षितानां तत्प्रमेयसिद्धेः॥ 8॥

तस्याऽभावस्य सिध्यति प्रमेयम्। कथम्? लक्षितेषु वासस्तु अनुपादेयेषु उपादेयानाम्-

लक्षितानाम् अलक्षणलक्षितत्वात्=लक्षणाभावेन लक्षितत्वादिति, उभयसंनिधौ 'अलक्षितानि वासांस्यानय' इति प्रयुक्तो येषु वासस्सु लक्षणानि न भवन्ति तानि लक्षणाभवेन प्रतिपद्यते प्रतिपद्य चानयति प्रतिपत्तिहेतुश्च प्रमाणमिति॥8॥

लक्षितेषु lakṣiteṣu, in marked objects; अलक्षण लक्षितत्वात् alakṣaṇa-lakṣitatvāt, from being marked by what is not a mark; अलक्षितानां alakṣitāvām, of unmarked objects; तत्प्रमेयसिद्धेः tat-prameya-siddheḥ, from their affirmation as objects of knowledge.

139. Non-existence, we reply, serves to mark our an objects unmarked by the mark which characterises other objects.—8.

Suppose a person wants to bring a pot which is not blus. The absence of blueness is a mark which will enable him to mark out the particular pot he wants to bring, and to exclude the other pots which are blue. Thus an object may be known through the non-existence (absence) of its mark.

असत्यर्थे नाभाव इति चेन्नान्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः॥ 9॥

यत्र भूत्वा किंचिन्न भवति तत्र तस्याभाव उपपद्यते, न चालक्षितेषु वासस्सु लक्षणानि भूत्वा न भवन्ति, तस्मात्तेषु लक्षणाभावोऽनुपपन्न इति, न-अन्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः= यथाऽयमन्येषु वासस्सु लक्षणानामुपपत्तिं पश्यति नैवमलक्षितेषु सोयं लक्षणाभवं पश्यन् अभावेनार्थं प्रतिपद्यते इति॥9॥

असति asati, non-existent; अर्थे arthe, in the case of an object; न na, not; अभावः abhāvaḥ, non-existence or absence of mark; इतिचेत् iti chet, if so; न na, no; अन्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः anya-lakṣaṇa-upapatteḥ, from affirmation of other marks.

140. If you say that the non-existence (absence) of a marks is impossible where there was no mark at all, it is, we reply, not so, because the non-existence (absence) is possible in reference to a mark elsewhere.—9.

We can, say an objector, talk of a mark being non-existent (absent if itwas previously existent (present). A pot is said to be not blue only in reference to its being blue previously. In reply, we say that it is not so. "Not-blue" is nodoubt possible obly in reference to "blue," but that blueness may exist elsewhere. For instance, we can talk of this pot being not-blue, in contrast to that pot which is blue.

तत्सिद्धेरलक्षितेष्वहेतुः॥ 10॥

तेषु वासस्सु लक्षितेषु सिद्धिः=विद्यमानता येषां भवति न तेषामभावो लक्षणानाम्=यनानि च लक्षितेषु विद्यन्ते लक्षणानि तेषामलक्षितेष्वभाव इत्यऽहेतुः-यानि खलु भवन्ति तेषामभावो व्याहत इति॥10॥

तत्सिद्धेः: tat siddheḥ, from presence therein, *i.e.* in marked objects; अलक्षितेषु alakṣiteṣu, in respect of unmarked objects; अहेतुः ahetuh, no mark.

141. Though a mark may distinguish the object which is marked, the non-existence (absence) of the mark cannot, some say, distinguish the object which is not marked.—10.

A blue pot is distinguished by the blueness which is its mark. But How can we, says the objector, distinguish an unmarked object by the non-existence (absence) of the mark which it does not possess?

न लक्षणावास्थितापेक्षासिद्धेः॥ 11॥

न ब्रूमो यानि लक्षणानि भवन्ति तेषामभाव इति किं तु केषु चिल्लक्षणान्यवस्थितानि अनवस्थितानि केषुचित्। अपेक्षमाणो येषु लक्षणानां भावं न पश्यति तानि लक्षणाभावेन प्रतिपद्यते इति॥11॥

न na, no; लक्षणावस्थितापेक्षासिद्धेः: lakṣaṇa-avasthita-apekṣā-siddheḥ, from establishment by reference to objects in which marks are present.

142. This is not so, because the non-existence (absence) of a mark serves as a mark, in relation to the presence of the mark.—11.

We can speak of a pot being not blue, in relation to one which is blue. Hence, though not-blueness is not a positive mark, it serves as a (negative) mark, in relation to blueness.

प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावोपपत्तेश्च॥ 12॥

अभावद्वैतं खलु भवति-प्राक् चोत्पत्तेरविद्यमानता, उत्पन्नस्य चात्मनो हानादविद्यमानता, तत्राऽलक्षितेषु वास्सु प्रागुत्पत्तेरविद्यमानतालक्षणो लक्षणानामभावो नेतर इति॥12॥

प्राक् prāk, prior; उत्पत्ते utpatteḥ, to production; अभावोपपत्तेः abhāvopapatteḥ, from affirmation of non-existence; च cha, and.

143. Moreover, we perceive non-existence as a mark antecedent to the production of a thing.—12.

There are two kinds of non-existence, *viz.*, antecedent non-existence and subsequent non-existence. when we say that there will be a jar, we perceive the mark of non-existence of the jar in the halves which are destined to compose it. This is antecedent non-existence. Similarly, when we say that a jar has broken, we perceive the mark of non existence the jar in the parts which composed it. This is subsequent non-existence.

"आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः 1-1-7" इति प्रमाणभावे विशेषणं ब्रुवता 'नानाप्रकारः शब्दः' इति ज्ञात्यते, तस्मिन् सामान्येन विचारः-किं नित्योऽथानित्यः? इति,

विमर्शहेत्वनुयोगे च विप्रतिपत्तेः संशयः॥ 13॥

'आकाशगुणंः शब्दो विभुर्नित्योऽभिव्यक्तिधर्मकः' इत्येके, गन्धादिसहवृत्तिर्द्रव्येषु संनिविष्टो गन्धादिबदवस्थितोऽभिव्यक्तिधर्मकः' इत्यपरे, 'आकाशगुणः शब्द उत्पत्तिनिरोधधर्मको बुद्धिवत्' इत्यपरे, 'महाभूतसंक्षोभजः शब्दोऽनाश्रित उत्पत्तिधर्मको निरोधधर्मकः' इत्यन्ये, अतः संशयः-किमत्र तत्त्वम्? इति, 'अनित्यः शब्दः' इत्युत्तरम्।

144. There is doubt about the nature of sound, because there are conflicting opinions supported by conflicting reasons.—13.

Some say that sound is quality of ether, and that it is all-pervading, eternal, and capable of being manifested. Others say that sound, like smell, etc., is a quality of the substance in which it abides, and is capable of being manifested. Sound is said by other to be quality of ether and to be subject to production and destruction, like knowledge. Otherwise again say that sound arises from the concussion of elements, requires no abode, and is subject to production and destruction. Hence, there arises doubt about the true nature of sound.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 1 : The Pramāṇas are not more than four : Sūtras : 1-13.

We admit that Tradition (Aithiya), Implication (Arthāpatti), Composition (Sambhava) and Non-existence of Negation (Abhāva) are also means of knowledge; but we do not admit that they are different from the four means enumereated by us, *viz.*, Perception, Inference, Comparison and word. Tradition consists of opinions, coming down from generation to generation in uninterrupted succession, the origin of which is lost in oblivion. Implication is cognition following from the

sense of what is stated; *e.g.*, when it is said that without clouds there can be no rain, it follows that with clouds there can be rain. Composition consists in the apprehension of the presence of one object from the apprehension of the presence of another object which never exists without the former; *e.g.* the apprehension of the presence of the ounce from the apprehension of the presene of the pound. Non-existence is the negative, the contradictory, as the non-existent of the existent; *e.g.*, absence of rain in the presence of clouds leads to the cognition of the conjunction of the clouds with high winds.

Tradition is not different from Word or Testimony, as its authority is derived from the same source, *viz.*, its emanating from an Āpta. Implication Composition and Non-existenee are not different from Inference which is congition of the imperceptible by means of the perceptible. Implication and non-existence or Negation proceed on the basis of contradiction; Composition, cognition of the component from the composite, proceeds basis of universal concomitance.

Some question the validity of Implication on the ground that even when clouds exist rain does not sometimes fall. In putting forward this objection they mistake for Implication. From the statement that there can be no effect without a cause, it follows that where the cause exists the effect is produced. This is Implication according to the law of contradiction. The failure of the cause to produce the effect on account of the operation of counter-agents is an attribute of the cause, and not the object of cognition by Implication. The objcet of cognition by Implication is that the production of the effect depends upon the existence of the cause.

Non-existence or Negation is held by some to be not an instrument of cognition on the ground that the object of such cognition does not exist. This is a rash argument. There are innumerable objects of cognition which are apprehended by means of Negation in the form of cognition of non-existence. To take one example : Where from a heap of cloths some of which are marked and the others are not marked, the unmarked ones are taken out, the action of taking them out depends on their cognition and their cognition is produced by the non-existence of any mark. The negation of mark is thus a means of cognition and therefore a pramāṇa; for a pramāṇa is nothing but a means of congition. For the purpose of negation it is not necessary that an object should first be produced and then destroyed; *e.g.*, for cloths to be unmarkded, it is not necessary first to put marks on them and then to efface the marks. For

the negation of marks in some cloths can be perceived by seeing the presence of marks in other cloths. Negation is correlated to affirmation whether in the same or in a different substratum. Moreover, negation or non-existence is or two kinds, antecedent and consequent. Non-existence prior to production is antecedent non-existence; non-existenee after destruction is consequent non-existence. The absence of marks in cloths which have never been marked is antecedent non-existencec of marks in the cloths.

कथम्?-

आदिमत्त्वादैन्द्रियकत्वात् कृतकवदुपचाराच्च॥ 14॥

आदिः=योनिः=कारणम्-आदीयतेऽस्मादिति, कारणवद् अनित्यं दृष्टम्, संयोगविभागजश्च शब्दः कारणवत्त्वादनित्य इति। का पुनरियमऽर्थदेशना-'कारणतत्त्वात्' इति?, उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्त्वादनित्यः शब्द इति=भूत्वा न भवति=विनाशधर्मक इति। सांशयिकेतत्-किमुत्पत्तिकारणं संयोगविभागौ शब्दस्य? आहोस्विदभिव्यक्तिकारणम्? इत्यत आह-ऐन्द्रियकत्वात् (इति) इन्द्रियत्यासत्तिग्राह्य ऐन्द्रियकः।

किमयं व्यञ्जकेन समानदेशोऽभिव्यज्यते रूपादिवत्? अथ संयोगजाच्छब्दाच्छब्दसंताने सति श्रोत्रप्रत्यासन्नो गृह्यते? इति-

संयोगनिवृत्तौ शब्दग्रहणान्न व्यञ्जकेन समानदेशस्य ग्रहणम्।

दारुव्रश्चने दारुपरशुसंयोगनिवृतौ दूरस्थेन शब्दो गृह्यते, न च व्यञ्जकाभावे व्यङ्ग्यग्रहणं भवति तस्मान्न व्यञ्जकः संयोगः, उत्पादके तु संयोगे संयोगजाच्छब्दाच्छब्दसन्ताने सति श्रोत्रप्रत्यासन्नस्य ग्रहणमिति युक्तं संयोगनिवृतौ शब्दस्य ग्रहणमिति। इतश्च शब्द उत्पद्यते नाभिव्यज्यते-कृतकवदुपचारात्='तीव्रं मन्दम्' इति कृतकमुपचर्यते-'तीव्रं सुखं मन्दं सुखम्। तीव्रं दुःखं मन्दं दुःखम्' इति, उपचर्यते च-'तीव्रः शब्दो मन्दः शब्दः' इति।

व्यञ्जकस्य तथाभावाद् ग्रणस्य तीव्रमन्दता रूपवदिति चेत्? न अभिभवोपपत्तेः।

संयोगस्य व्यञ्जकस्य तीव्रमन्दतया शब्दग्रहणस्य तीव्रमन्दता भवति न तु शब्दो भिद्यते यथा प्रकाशस्य तीव्रमन्दतया रूपग्रहणस्येति, तच्च नैवम्-अभिभवोपपत्तेः=तीव्रो भेरीशब्दो मन्दं तन्त्रीशब्दम् अभिभवति न मन्दः, न च शब्दग्रहणमभिभावकं शब्दश्च न भिद्यते (इति), शब्दे तु भिद्यमाने युक्तोऽभिभवः तस्मादुत्पद्यते शब्दो नाभिव्यज्यते इति।

अभिभवानुपपत्तिश्च-व्यञ्जकसमानेदशस्याभिव्यक्तौ प्राप्त्यभावात्।

'व्यञ्जकेन समानदेशोऽभिव्यज्यते शब्दः' इत्येतस्मिन् पक्षे नोपपद्यतेऽभिभवः- न हि भेरीशब्देन तन्त्रीस्वनः प्राप्त इति।

अप्राप्तेऽभिभव इतिचेत्? शब्दमात्राभिभवप्रसङ्गः।

अथ मन्येत 'असत्यां प्राप्तावभिभवो भवति' इति, एवं सति यथा भेरीशब्दः कंचित् तन्त्रीस्वनमभिभवति एवमन्तिकस्थोपादानानिव दवीयस्स्थोपादानानपि तन्त्री-स्वनानभिभवेत्-अप्राप्तेरविशेषात्, तत्र क्वचिदेव भेर्यां प्रणादितायां सर्वलोकेषु समान-कालास्तन्त्रीस्वना न श्रूयेरन् इति। नानाभूतेषु शब्दसन्तानेषु सत्सु श्रोत्रप्रत्यासत्तिभावेन कस्यचिच्छब्दस्य=तीव्रेण मन्दस्याभिभवो युक्त इति। कः पुनरयमभिभवो नाम?, ग्राह्यसमान-जातीयग्रहणकृतमग्रहणम् अभिभवः यथोल्काप्रकाशस्य ग्रहणार्हस्याऽऽदित्यप्रकाशेनेति॥14॥

आदिमत्त्वात् ādi-mat-tvāt, because it has a beginning; ऐन्द्रियकत्वात् aindriyaka-tvāt, because it is sensuous; कृतकवदुपचारात् kṛtaka vat-upachārāt, because it is treated as any other product; च cha, and.

145. Sound is not eternal, because it has a beginning and is cognised by our sense and it spoken as artificial.—14.

Sound is non-eternal, because it begins or arises from the concussion of two hard substances, *e.g.*, an axe and a tree, etc. Another ground for the non-eternality of sound is that it is cognised by our sense. Moreoer, we attribute to sound the properties of an artificial object, *e.g.*, we speak of a sound being grave, acute, etc. This would be impossible, if it had been eternal.

Some say that the so called beginning of a sound is merely a manifestation of it, that is, sound does not really begin, but is merely manifested by the concussion of two hard substances. In reply, we say that the concussion does not manifest, but produces a sound. You cannot suppose the concussion to be the manifester and sound the manifested, unless you can prove that the concussion and sound are simultaneous. But the proof is impossible, as a sound is heard at a great distance even after the concussion of the substances has ceased. So sound is not manifested by the concussion. It is, however, legitimate to suppose that sound produced by the concussion, and that one sound produces another sound and so on, until the last sound is heard at a great distance.

न घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वान्नित्येष्वप्यनित्यवदुपचाराच्च॥ 15॥

न खल्वादिमत्त्वादनित्यः शब्दः। कस्मात्?, व्यभिचारात्=आदिमतः खलु घटाभावस्य दृष्टं नित्यत्वम्। कथमादिमान्? कारणविभागेभ्यो हि घटो न भवति। कथमस्य नित्यत्वम्? योऽसौ कारणविभागेभ्यो न भवति न तस्याऽभावो भावेन कदाचिद् निर्वर्त्यते इति। यदपि ऐन्द्रियकत्वात्, (इति) तदपि व्यभिचरति=ऐन्द्रियकं च सामान्यं नित्यं चेति। यदपि

कृतकवदुपचारादिति, एतदपि व्यभिचरति=नित्येष्वनित्यवदुपचारो दृष्टो यथा हि भवति-'वृक्षस्य प्रदेशः कम्बलस्य प्रदेशः' एवम्-'आकाशस्य प्रदेश आत्मनः प्रदेशः' इति भवतीति॥15॥

न na, no; घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वात् ghaṭa-abhāva-sāmānya-nitya-tvāt, because the non-existence of a pot after destruction and the genus which is cognisable through contact with the sense are eternal; नित्येषु nityeṣu, in the case of eternal objects; अनित्यवत् anitya-vat, as non-eternal; उपचारात् upachārāt, from treatment; च cha, and.

146. Some will not accept this argument, because the non-existence of a jar and the genus of it are eternal, and eternal things are also spoken of a if they were artificial.—15.

Some say that it is not true that whatever has a beginning is non-eternal. Look ! the non-existence (destruction) of a jar which began when the jar was broken is eternal (indestructible). Whatever is cognised by our sense is non-eternal: this is also said to be an unsound argument. When, for instance, we perceive a jar, we perceive also its genus (*i.e.*, jarness), which is eternal. It is further said that we often attribute eternal things the properties of an artificial object. *e.g.*, we speak of the extension of ether as we speak of the extension of a blanket.

तत्त्वभाक्तयोर्नानात्वाविभागादव्यभिचारः॥ 16॥

नित्यमित्यत्र किं तावात् तत्त्वम्? अर्थान्तरस्याऽनुत्पत्तिधर्मकस्याऽऽत्महानानुप-पत्तिर्नित्यत्वं तच्चाऽभावे नोपपद्यते, भाक्तं तु भवति-यत्तत्रात्मानमहासीत्=यद् भूत्वा न भवति न जातु तत् पुनर्भवति। तत्र नित्य इव नित्यो घटाभाव इत्ययं पदार्थ इति। तत्र यथाजातीयकः शब्दो न तथाजातीयकं कार्यं किंचिद् नित्यं दृश्यते इत्यऽव्यभिचारः॥16॥

तत्त्वभाक्तयो: tattva-blāktayoḥ, of true and false eternals; नानात्वविभागात् nānā-tva-vibhāgāt, from division as many; अव्यभिचार: a-vybhichāraḥ, absence of uncertainty.

147. There is, we reply, no opposition because there is distnction between what is really eternal and what is partially eternal.—16.

That which is really eternal belongs to the three times. But the non-exstence (destruction) of a jar does not belong to three times, as it was impossible before the jar was broken. Hence, the non-existence (destruction) of a jar which has a beginning is not really eternal.

यदपि 'समान्यनित्यत्वात्' इति इन्द्रियप्रत्यासत्तिग्राह्यम् ऐन्द्रियकम् इति–

सन्तानानुमानविशेषणात्॥ 17॥

'नित्येष्वव्यभिचार:' इति प्रकृतम्, नेन्द्रियग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् शब्दस्यानित्यत्वम्। किं तर्हि?, इन्द्रियप्रत्यासत्तिग्राह्यत्वात् संतानानुमानं तेनानित्यत्वमिति॥17॥

सन्तानानुमानविशेषणात् santāna-anumāna-viśeṣaṇāt, from the inference of continuity which is the distinguishing characteristic (of sound).

148. It is only the things cognised by our sense as belonging to a certian genus that must, we say, be inferred to be non-eternal.—17.

The objectors have said that things cognised by our sense area not necessarily non-eternal, *e.g.*, as we perceive a jar we also perceive its genus jar-ness, which is eternal. In reply, we say that not all things cognised by our sense are non-eternal, but only those that belong to a certain genus. A jar, for instance, is non-eternal, because we perceive it as belonging to the genus jar-ness. But jar-ness which is cognised by our sense is not non-eternal, becasue it does not belong to a further genus, named jar-ness-ness. Similarly, sound is non-eteranl, becuase it is cognised by our sense as belonging to the genus called sound-ness.

The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows :—Sound is non-eternal, because it is inferred to advance in a series.

We do not say that whatever is cognised by our sense is non-eternal : our intention is to say that things cognised by our sense as advancing in a series are non-eternal. Sound is cognised in that manner (*i.e.*, sound advances like a wave), and hence sound is non-eternal.

यदपि–'नित्येष्वप्यनित्यवदुपचारात्' इति, न–

कारणद्रव्यस्य प्रदेशशब्देनाभिधानात् नित्येष्वप्यव्यभिचार इति॥ 18॥

'एवमाकाशप्रदेश: आत्मप्रदेश:' इति, नाऽत्राऽऽकाशात्मनो: कारणद्रव्यमभिधीयते यथा कृतकस्य। कथं ह्यविद्यमानमभिधीयते, अभिद्यमानता च प्रमाणतोऽनुपलब्धे:। किं तर्हि तत्राभिधीयते?, संयोगस्याऽव्याप्यवृत्तित्वम्=परिच्छिन्नेन द्रव्येणाकाशस्य संयोगो नाऽऽकाशं व्याप्नोति=अव्याप्य वर्तते इति, तदस्य कृतकेन द्रव्येण सामान्यम्, न ह्यामलकयो: संयोग आश्रयं व्याप्नोति, सामान्यकृता च भक्ति:-'आकाशस्य प्रदेश:' इति, अनेनात्मप्रदेश व्याख्यात:। संयोगवच्च शब्दबुद्ध्यादीनामव्याप्यवृत्तित्वमिति। परीक्षिता च तीव्रमन्दता शब्दतत्त्वं न भक्तिकृतेति। कस्मात् पुन: सूत्रकारस्याऽस्मिन्नर्थे सूत्रं न श्रूयते इति? शीलमिदं भगवत: सूत्रकारस्य बहुष्वधिकरणेषु द्वौ पक्षौ न व्यवस्थापयति, तत्र शास्त्रसिद्धान्तात् तत्त्वावधारणं प्रतिपत्तुमर्हतीति मन्यतेत्र, शास्त्रसिद्धान्तस्तु न्यायसमाख्यातमनुमतं बहुशाख-मनुमानमिति॥18॥

कारणद्रव्यस्य kāraṇa-dravyasya, of the causal substance; प्रदेशशब्देन pradeśa-śabdena, in terms of extension; अभिधानात् abhidhānāt, from declaration or designation; नित्येषु nityeṣu, in the case of eternal object; अपि api, also; अव्यभिचार: a vyabhichāraḥ, absence of uncertainty.

149. We further say that only artificial things are designated by the term extension.—18.

When we speak of the extension of ether, we really mean that the extension belongs to an artificial things, which has for its substratum the ether. Hence, we do not in reality attribute to eternal things the properties of artificial objects.

अथापि खलु 'इदमस्ति इदं नास्ति' इति कुत एतत् प्रतिपत्तव्यमिति?, प्रमाणत उपलब्धेरनुपलब्धेश्चेति, अविद्यमानस्तर्हि शब्द:–

प्रागुच्चारणादनुपलब्धेरावरणाद्यनुपलब्धेश्च॥ 19॥

प्रगुच्चारणन्नास्ति शब्द: कस्मात्? अनुपलब्धे:, सतोऽनुपलब्धिरावरणादिभ्य एवन्नोप-पद्यते। कस्मात्? आवरणादीनामनुपलब्धिकारणानामग्रहणात्=अनेनावृत: शब्दो नोपलभ्यते असंनिकृष्टश्चेन्द्रियव्यवधानाद् इत्येवमादि अनुपलब्धिकारणं न गृह्यते इति, सोयमनुच्चारितो नास्तीति।

उच्चारणमस्य व्यञ्जकं तदभावात् प्रागुच्चारणादनुपलब्धिरिति। किमिदमुच्चारणं नामेति? विवक्षाजनितेन प्रयत्नेन कोष्ठ्यस्य वायो: प्रेरितंस्य कण्ठताल्वादिप्रतिघाताद् वर्णभिव्यक्तिरिति। संयोगविशेषो वै प्रतिघात: प्रतिषिद्धं च संयोगस्य व्यञ्जकत्वं तस्मान्न व्यञ्जकाभावादग्रहणम् अपि त्वभावादेवेति, सोयमुच्चर्यमाण: श्रूयते श्रूयमाणश्चाऽभूत्वा भवति इत्यनुमीयते, ऊर्ध्वं चोच्चारणान्न श्रूयते स भूत्वा न भवति=अभावान्न श्रूयते इति। कथम्? "आवरणाद्यनुपलब्धे:" इत्युक्तं तस्मादुत्पत्तितिरोभावधर्मक: शब्द इति॥19॥

प्राक् prāk, prior; उच्चारणात् uchhāraṇāt, to pronunciation; अनुपलब्धे an-upalabdheḥ, from non-apprehension; आवरणाद्यनुपलब्धे: āvaraṇa-ādi-an-upalabdheḥ, from non-apprehension of the causes of non-apprehension; च cha, and.

150. Sound is non-eternal, because neither do we perceive it before pronunciation, nor do we notice any veil which covers it.—19.

If sound were eternal, it would be perceived before pronunciation. You cannot say that sound really existed before pronunciation but was covered by some veil, for we do not notice any such veil.

एवं च सति तत्त्वं पांशुभिरिवाऽवाकिरन्निदमाह–

तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादावरणोपपत्तिः॥ 20॥

यद्यनुपलम्भादावरणं नास्ति? आवारणानुपलब्धिरपि तर्ह्यनुपलम्भान्नास्तीति, तस्या अभावादप्रतिषिद्धमावरणमिति। कथं पुनर्जानीते भवान् नावरणानुपलब्धिरुपलभ्यते? इति। किमत्र ज्ञेयं प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयत्वात्। समानम्=अयं खल्वावरणमनुपलभमानः प्रत्यात्ममेव संवेदयते–'नावरणमुपलभे' इति, यथा कुड्येनावृतस्याऽऽवरणमुपलभमानः प्रत्यात्ममेव संवेदयते, सेयमावरणोपलब्धिवद् आवरणानुपलब्धिरपि संवेद्यैवेति, एवं च सत्यऽपहृतविषयमुत्तरवाक्यमस्तीति॥20॥

तदनुपलब्धेः tat-an-upalabdheḥ, of its non-apprehension; अनुपलम्भात् an-unpalambhāt, from non-apprehension; आवरणोपपत्तिः āvaraṇa-upapattiḥ, establishment of causes of non-apprehension.

151. The veil, some say, really exists, because we do not perceive the non-perception thereof.—20.

The objectors say :—If you deny the veil because it is not perceived, we deny the non-perception of the veil because it is also not perceived. The denial of non-perception is the same as the acknowledgment of perception, or, in other words, the veil is acknowledged to be existent.

अभ्यनुज्ञावादेन तूच्यते जातिवादिना–

अनुपलम्भादप्यनुपलब्धिसद्भाववन्नावरणानुपपत्तिरनुपलम्भात्॥ 21॥

यथाऽनुपलभ्यमानाप्यावरणानुपलब्धिरस्ति एवमनुपलभ्यमानमप्यावरणमस्तीति। यद्यभ्यनुजानाति भवान्–'नानुपलभ्यमानाऽऽवरणानुपलब्धिरस्ति' इति, अभ्यनुज्ञाय च वदति–'नास्त्यावरणमनुपलम्भयात्' इत्येतत्, एतस्मिन्नभ्यनुज्ञावादे प्रतिपत्तिनियमो नोपपद्यते इति॥21॥

अनुपलम्भात् an upalambhāt, from non-apprehension; अपि api, even; अनुलब्धिसद्भाववत् an-upalabdhi-sadbhāvavat, like existence of non-apprehension; न na not; आवरणानुपपत्तिः āvaraṇa-an-upapattiḥ, non-establishment of the causes of non-apprehension; अनुपलम्भात् an-upalambhā, from non-apprehension.

152. If you assert non-perception of veil, though the non-perception is not perceived, we, continue the objectors, assert the existence of the veil, though it is not perceived.—21.

You admit non-perception of the veil, though you do not perceive

it (non-perception). Similarly, we, the objectors, admit the existence of the veil, though we do not perceive it.

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनुपलब्धेरहेतुः॥ 22॥

यदुपलभ्यते तदस्ति, यन्नोपलभ्यमे अनुपलम्भात्मकम् असदिति व्यस्थितम्, उपलब्ध्यभावाश्चाऽनुपलब्धिरिति सेयमभावत्वान्नोपलभ्यते सच्च खल्वारणं तस्योपलब्ध्या भवितव्यं न चोपलभ्यते तस्मान्नास्तीति। तत्र यदुक्तम्–"नावरणानुपपत्तिरनुपलम्भात्" इति अयुक्तमिति॥22॥

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वात् an-upalambha-ātmaka-tvāt, from the nature of its being non-apprehension; अनुपलब्धेः an-upalabdheḥ, of non-apprehension; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a mark.

153. This, we reply, is no reason, because non-perception consists of absence of perception.—22.

A veil is a thing fit to be perceived. Our non-perception of it indicates its absence. On the other hand, the non-perception of a veil is not a thing fit to be perceived. Hence, non-perception of the non-perception leads us to nothing real.

अथ शब्दस्य नित्यत्वं प्रतिजानानः कस्माद् हेतोः प्रतिजानीते?–

अस्पर्शत्वात्॥ 23॥

अस्पर्शमाकाशं नित्यं दृष्टमिति तथा च शब्द इति॥23॥

अस्पर्शत्वात् a-sparśa-tvāt, being intangible.

154. Some say that sound is eternal, because it is intangible.—23.

Ether which is intangible is eternal. Sound must, similarly, accroding to some, be eternal, because it is intangible.

सोऽयमुभयतः सव्यभिचारः–स्पर्शवांश्चाणुर्नित्यः, अस्पर्शं च कर्माऽनित्यं दृष्टम्। "अस्पर्शत्वात्" इत्येतस्य साध्यसाधर्म्येणोदाहरणम्–

न कर्मानित्यत्वात्॥ 24॥

न na, no; कर्मानित्यत्वात् karma-anitya-tvāt, because action is non-eternal.

155. This we deny, because action is non-eternal.—24.

Action is non-eternal, though it is intangible. Hence, intangibiliy does not establish eternality.

साध्यवैधर्म्येणोदाहरणम्–

नाणुनित्यत्वात्।। 25।।

उभस्मिन्नुदाहरणे व्यभिचारान्न हेतुः।।25।।

न na, no; अणुनित्यत्वात् aṇu-nitya-tvāt, becuase atom is eternal.

156. An atom, on the other hand, is eternal though not intangible.—25.

Tangibility is not incompatible with eternality, *e.g.*, atoms are tangible, yet eternal.

अयं तर्हि हेतुः–

सम्प्रदानात्।। 26।।

संप्रदीयमानमवस्थितं दृष्टं संप्रदीयते च शबद आचार्येणान्तेवासिने तस्मादवस्थित इति।।26।।

सम्प्रदानात् sampradānāt, from delivery.

157. Sound, some say, is eternal, because of the traditionary teaching.—26.

A precepter could not have imparted knowledge to his puplis by means of sounds, if these were perishable (non-eternal). In fact, the traditionary teaching would, according to the objectors, be impossible, the sounds were non-eternal.

तदन्तरालानुपलब्धेरहेतुः।। 27।।

येन संप्रदीयते यस्मै च तयोरन्तरालेऽवस्थानमस्य केन लिङ्गेनोपलभ्यते? संप्रदीयः मानो ह्यवस्थितः संप्रदातुरपैति संप्रदानं च प्राप्नोति इत्यवर्जनीयमेतत्।।27।।

तदन्तरालानुपलब्धे: tat-antarāla-an-upalabdheḥ, from non-apprehension in interval between them; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a mark.

158. This is, we reply, no reason, because sound is not perceived in the interval—27.

Suppose a preceptor delivers certain sounds (in the form of a lecture) which are received by his pupil. The sounds are not audible in interval between the preceptor giving them and the pupil receiving them. They would never be inaudible, if they were eternal.

अध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः।। 28।।

अध्यापनं लिङ्गम्–असति संप्रदानेऽध्यापनं न स्यादिति।।28।।

अध्यापनात् adhyāpanāt, from teaching; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, absence of contradiction.

159. This, say the objectors, is not argument, because there is the teaching.—28.

The objectors say :—If the sounds, as soon as they came out of the preceptor, were destroyed and did not reach the pupil, there could not be any teaching carried on. But there is the teaching, hence sound does not perish, or, in other, words, it is eternal.

उभयोः पक्षयोरन्यतरस्याध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः।। 29।।

समानमध्यापनमुभयोः पक्षयोः–संशयानिवृत्तेः–किमाचार्यस्थः शब्दोऽन्तेवासिनमापद्यते तदध्यापनम्? आहो स्वित् नृत्योपदेशवद् गृहीतस्यानुकरणम् अध्यापनम्? इति, एवमध्यापनमलिङ्गं संप्रदानस्येति।।29।।

उभयोः ubhayoḥ, in both; पक्षयोः pakṣyoḥ, views; अन्यतरस्य anyatarasya, of the one or the other; अध्यापनात् adhyāpanāt, from teaching; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-opposition.

160. In whichever of the two senses it is accepted, the teaching does not offer any opposition.—29.

The word "teaching" may be interpreted either as (1) the pupil's receiving the sounds given by his preceptor, or as (2) the pupil's imintating the sounds of his preceptor, as one imitates dancing. Neither of these interpretations would support the eternality of sound. In consonance with the first interpretation we shall say that the sound coming out of the preceptor produces another sound, and so on, until the last sound reaches the pupil. This would make sound non-eternal. It is obvious that the second interpretation similarly proves the non-eternality of sound.

अयं तर्हि हेतुः–

अभ्यासात्।। 30।।

अभ्यस्यमानमवस्थितं दृष्टम्–'पञ्चकृत्वः पश्यति' इति रूपमवस्थितं पुनः पुनर्दृश्यते, भवति च शब्देऽभ्यासः–'दशकृत्वोधीतोऽनुवाकः विंशतिकृत्वोऽधीतः' इति, तस्मादवस्थितस्य पुनः पुनरुच्चारणम् अभ्यास इति।।30।।

अभ्यासात् abhyāsāt, from repetition.

161. Sound, continue the objectors, is eternal, becasue it is capable of repetition.—30.

That which is capable of repetition s persistent or not perishable, *e.g.*, one and the same colour can be repeatedly looked at, because it is persistent. One and the same sound can similarly be repeatedly uttered, hance, it is persistent or not perishable.

नान्यत्वेऽप्यभ्यासस्योपचारात्॥ 31॥

अनवस्थानेऽभ्यासस्याऽभिधानं भवति-'द्विर्नृत्यतु भवान् त्रिर्नृत्यतु भवान्' इति 'द्विरनृत्यत् त्रिरनृत्यत्', 'द्विरग्निहोत्रं जुहोति', 'द्विर्भुङ्क्ते' (इति)॥31॥

न na no; अन्यत्वे anya-tve, were it otherwise; अपि api, even; अभ्यासस्य abhyāsasya, of repetition; उपचारात् upachārāt, from treatment or use.

162. It is, we reply, not so, because even if sounds were "other" (different), repetition could take place.—31.

Repetition does not prevent perishableness, because repetition is possible even if the things repeated are "other" or different, *e.g.*, he sacrifices twice, he dances thrice, etc. Here the two sacrifices are different, and yet we use the repetitive word 'twice'; similarly the three dancings are different, and yet we use the repetitive word 'thrice.'

एवं व्यभिचारात् प्रतिषिद्धहेतौ अन्यशब्दस्य प्रयोगः प्रतिषिध्यते-

अन्यदन्यस्मादनन्यत्वादनन्यदित्यन्यताऽभावः॥ 32॥

यदिदम् 'अन्यत्' इति मन्यसे तत् स्वात्मनोऽनन्यत्वादन्यन्न भवति एवमन्यताया अभावः, तत्र यदुक्तम्-'अन्यत्वेप्यभ्यासोपचारात्' इति एतदयुक्तमिति॥32॥

अन्यत् anyat, other; अन्यस्मात् anyasmāt, from other; अनन्यत्वात् an-anya-tvāt, from not being other; अनन्यत् an-anyat, not other; इति iti, thus; अन्यताऽभावः anya-tā-abhāvaḥ, non-existence of otherness.

163. Some say that there is no such thing as otherness, because what is called "other," in reference to some other, is not other in reference to itself.—32.

We maintain that repetition is possible even if the things repeated are "other" or different. Our position is said to be untenable : the term "other" is described as unmeaning, as nothing is other than itself.

शब्दप्रयोगं प्रतिषेधतः शब्दान्तरप्रयोगः प्रतिषिध्यते-

तदभावे नास्त्यनन्यता तयोरितरेतरापेक्षसिद्धेः॥ 33॥

अन्यस्मादऽन्यतामुपपदयति भवान् उपपाद्य च अन्यत् प्रत्याचष्टे, 'अनन्यत्' इति च शब्दमनुजानाति, प्रयुङ्क्ते च 'अनन्यत्' इति एतत् समासपदम्, अन्यशब्दोयं प्रतिषेधेन सह समस्यते, यदि चात्रोत्तरं पदं नास्ति कस्यायं प्रतिषेधेन सह समासः?, तस्मात् तयोरन्याऽनन्यशब्दयोरितरोऽनन्यशब्द इतरमन्यशब्दमपेक्षमाणः सिध्यतीति तत्र यदुक्त्-'अन्यताया अभावः' इति एतदयुक्तमिति॥33॥

तदभावे tat-abhāve, in the absence of otherness; न na, not; अस्ति asti, is; अनन्यता an-anya-tā, the being notother; तयोः tayoḥ, of these; इतरेतरापेक्ष सिद्धेः itara-itara-apekṣa-siddheḥ, because existence depends of one upon that of the other.

164. In the absence of otherness there would, we reply, be no sameness, because the two exist in reference to each other.—33.

If there was no otherness, there would be no sameness. This would lead us to absurdity, as it would disprove both persistency and perishableness. Hence, we must admit otherness, and if there is "other," there will be no flaw in our expression, *viz.*, repetition is possible even if things were "other" or different.

अस्तु तच्चदानीं शब्दस्य नित्यत्वम्-

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्च॥ 34॥

यदनित्यं तस्य विनाशः कारणाद् भवति यथा लोष्टस्य कारणद्रव्यविभागात्, शब्दश्चेदनित्यस्तस्य विनाशो यस्मात्कारणाद् भवति तदुपलभ्येत न चोपलभ्यते तस्मान्नित्य इति॥34॥

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः vināśa-kāraṇa-an-upalabdheḥ, because of non-apprehension of cause of destruction; च cha, and.

165. Sound, some say, is eternal, because we perceive no cause why it should perish.—34.

Whatever is non-eternal is destroyed by some cause. Sound is said to have no cause of destruction, hence sound is held by some to be not non-eternal, (*i.e.*, is regarded as eternal).

अश्रवणकारणानुपलब्धेस्सततश्रवणप्रसङ्गः॥ 35॥

यथा विनाशकारणनुपलब्धेरविनाशप्रसङ्गः एवमश्रवणकारणानुपलब्धेः सततं श्रवणप्रसङ्गः। व्यञ्जकाभावादश्रवणमितिचेत्? प्रतिषिद्धं व्यञ्जकम्। अथ विद्यमानस्य निर्निमित्तमऽश्रवणमिति? विद्यमानस्य निर्निमित्तो विनाश इति। समानश्च दृष्टविरोधो निमित्तमन्तरेण विनाशे चाश्रवणे चेति॥35॥

अश्रवणकारणानुपलब्धेः a-śravaṇa-kāraṇa-an-upalabdheḥ, from non-apprehension of cause of non-hearing; सततश्रवणप्रसङ्गः satata-śravaṇa-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of perpetual hearing.

166. But by the same argument, we are afraid, non-perception of the casue of inaudition would mean constant audition.—35.

It non-perception is to establish non-existence, we should cease to hear, because we do not perceive any cause of our not hearing. But such a conclusion is absurd.

उपलभ्यमाने चानुपलब्धेरसत्त्वादनपदेशः॥ 36॥

अनुमानाच्चोपलभ्यमाने शब्दस्य विनाशकरणे 'विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः=असत्त्वात्' इत्यनपदेशः यथा 'यस्माद्विषाणी तस्मादश्वः' इति किनुमानमितिचेत्? संतानोपपत्तिः, उपपादितः शब्दसंतानः–संयोगविभागजात् शब्दच्छब्दान्तरं ततोप्यन्यत् ततोप्यन्यदिति, तत्र कार्यः शब्दः कारणशब्दं विरुणद्धि, प्रतिघातिद्रव्यसंयोगस्तु अन्त्यस्य शब्दस्य निरोधकः, दृष्टं हि तिरःप्रतिकुड्यमऽनितकस्थेनाप्यश्रवणं शब्दस्य श्रवणं दूरस्थेनाप्यसति व्यवधाने इति। घण्टायामभिहन्यमानायां तारस्तारतरो मन्दो मन्दतर इति। श्रुतिभेदाद् नानाशब्द-संतानोऽविच्छेदेन श्रूयते, तंत्र नित्ये शब्दे घण्टास्थमन्यगतं वाऽवस्थितं संतानवृत्ति वा अभिव्यक्तिकारणं वाच्यं येन श्रुतिसंतानो भवतीति, शब्दभेदे चाऽसति श्रुतिभेद उपपादयितव्य इति। अनित्ये तु शब्दे घण्टास्थं संतानवृत्ति संयोगसहकारि निमित्तान्तरं संस्कारभूतं पटुमनदमनुवर्तते तस्यानुवृत्त्या शबदसंतानानुवृत्तिः पटुमन्दभावाच्च तीव्रमन्दता शब्दस्य, तत्कृतश्च श्रुतिभेद इति॥36॥

उपलभ्यमाने upalabhyamāne, in the case of being apprehended; च cha, and; अनुपलब्धेः anupalabdheḥ, of non-apprehension; असत्त्वात् a-sat-tvāt, from being non-existent; अनपदेशः an-apadeśaḥ, not a mark.

167. Your position, we further say, is untenable, because there is no non-perception; on the contrary, there is perception of the cause of inaudition.—36.

Suppose that a sound is produced by an axe striking against a tree. This sound will perish after producing another sound, which will again perish, giving rise to another, and so on, until the last sound is destroyed by some obstacle. In fact every sound that is produced is destined to perish. Hence, there is no non-perception of the cause of inaudition; on the contrary, there is perception of such a cause. Consequently, sound is not eternal.

न वै निर्निमित्तान्तरं संस्कार उपलभ्यते अनुपलब्धेर्नास्तीति–

पाणिनिमित्तप्रश्लेषाच्छब्दाभावे नानुपलब्धिः॥ 37॥

पाणिकर्मणा पाणिघण्टाप्रश्लेषो भवति तस्मिंश्च सति शब्दसंतानो नापलभ्यते अतः श्रवणानुपपत्तिः, तत्र प्रतिघातिद्रव्यसंयोगः शब्दस्य निमित्तान्तरं संस्कारभूतं निरुणद्धीत्यनुमीयते, तस्य च निरोधात् शब्दसंतानो नोत्पद्यते अनुत्पन्ने च श्रुतिविच्छेदः, यथा प्रतिघाति-द्रव्यसंयोगादिषोः क्रियाहेतौ संकारे निरुद्धे गमनाभाव इति। कम्पसंतानस्य स्पर्शनेन्द्रियग्राह्यस्य चोपरमः कांस्यपात्रादिषु पाणिसंश्लेषो लिङ्गं संस्कारसंतानस्येति, तस्मान्निमित्तान्तरस्य संस्कारभूतस्य नानुपलब्धिरिति॥37॥

पाणिनिमित्त प्रश्लेषात् pāṇi-nimitta-praśleṣāt, from contact with the gong due to action of the hand; शब्दाभावे śabda-abhāva, in the absence of sound; न na, not; अनुपलब्धिः an-upalabdhiḥ, non-apprehension.

168. There is, we again say, no non-perception, because the sound [if a gong] ceases on the contact of our hand [with the gong].—37.

You cannot say that there is non-perception of the cause of cessation of sound, because we actually perceive that by the contact of our hand we can stop the sound of a gong.

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्चावस्थाने तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः॥ 38॥

यदि यस्य विनाशकारणं नोपलभ्यते तदवतिष्ठते अवस्थानाच्च तस्य नित्यत्वं प्रसज्यते? एवं यानि खल्विमानि शब्दश्रवणानि शब्दाभिव्यक्तय इति मतं न तेषां विनाशकारणं भवतोपपाद्यते अनुपपादनादवस्थानम् अवस्थानात् तेषां नित्यत्वं प्रसज्यते इति, अथ नैवम्? न तर्हि विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः शब्दस्यावस्थानान्नित्यत्वमिति॥38॥

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः vināśa-kāraṇa-an-upalabdheḥ, from non-apprehension of the cause of destruction; च cha, and; अवस्थाने avasthāne, in persistence; तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः tat-nitya-tva-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of its eternality.

169. We call a thing eternal (persistent) if it continues to exist, and if we cannot perceive any cause why it should cease.—38.

Sound does not continue to exist, and the cause of its cessation is also perceived. Hence, sound is not eternal.

कम्पसमानाश्रयस्य चाऽनुनादस्य पाणिप्रश्लेषात् कारणोपरमादभावः, वैयधिकरण्ये हि प्रतिघातिद्रव्याऽप्रश्लेषात् समानाधिकरणस्यैवोपरमः स्यादिति।

अस्पर्शत्वादप्रतिषेधः॥ 39॥

यदिदम् 'नाकाशगुणः शब्दः' इति प्रतिषिध्यते, अयमनुपपन्नः प्रतिषेधः–अस्पर्शत्वात्

शब्दाश्रयस्य, रूपादिसमानदेशस्याग्रहणे शब्दसंतानोपपत्तेरस्पर्शव्यापिद्रव्याश्रयः शब्दः इति ज्ञायते न च कम्पसमानाश्रय इति।।39।।

अस्पर्शत्वात् a-sparśa-tvāt, from being intangible; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

170. That the substratum of sound is intangble is no counter argument.—39.

Sound has not for its substratum any of the tangible substances *viz.*, earth, water, fire and air, for, it is found to be produced even where these do not exist. For instance, sound is produced in a vacuum which is devoid of smell, taste, colour and touch, which are the qualities of tangible substances. The reason why the sound produced in a vacuum does not reach our ears is that there is no air to carry it. Hence, the substratum of sound is an intangible substance, *viz.*, ether.

It is a peculiarity of sound that it cannot co-abide with colour, etc. A tangible substance (*e.g.*, earth) which is the abode of smell may also be the abode of colour, taste or touch. But the substance, in which sound abides cannot be the abode of any other qualities. This distinguishes the substratum of sound from the substrata of other qualities. This peculiar substratum is called ether.

The fact of having an intangible substratum is no bar to the non-eternality of sound. Sound, though its substratum is the intangible ether, is produced by the contact of two hard substances. One sound produces another sound (or a certain vibration), which again causes another sound (or vibration) and so on, until the last sound (or vibration) ceases owing to some obstacle. Sound is therefore non-eternal.

प्रतिद्रव्यं रूपादिभिः सह संनिविष्टः शब्द समानदेशो व्यज्यते इति नोपपद्यते। कथम्?-

विभक्त्यन्तरोपपतेश्च समासे।। 40।।

संतानोपपत्तेश्चेति चार्थः, तद् व्याख्यातम्। यदि रूपादयः शब्दश्च प्रतिद्रव्यं समस्ताः=समुदितास्तस्मिन् समाससमुदाये यो यथाजातीयकः संनिष्टिस्तस्य तथाजातीयस्यैव ग्रहणेन भवितव्यं शब्दस्य रूपादिवत्, तत्र योऽयं विभागः एक द्रव्ये नानारूपा भिन्नश्रुतयो विधर्माणः शब्दा अभिव्यज्यमानाः श्रूयन्ते, यच्च विभागान्तरं सरूपाः समानश्रुतयः सधर्माणः शब्दाः तीव्रमन्दधर्मतया भिन्नाः श्रूयते, तदुभयं नोपपद्यते-नानाभूतानामुत्पद्यमानानामयं धर्मो नैकस्य व्यज्यमानस्येति। अस्ति चायं विभागो विभागान्तरं च तेन विभागोपपत्तेर्मन्यामहे-न प्रतिद्रव्यं रूपादिभिः सह शब्द संनिविष्टो व्यज्यते इति।।40।।

विभक्त्यन्तरोपपत्तेः vibhakti-antara-upapatteḥ, from affirmation of different divisions or inflections; च cha, and; समासे samāse, in the case of co-inherence, or of a compound.

171. Sound cannot be supposed to co-abide with other qualities, for there are also varieties of it.—40.

In each tangible substance there is only one kind of smell, taste, touch or colour. If we suppose that sound abides with one or more of these qualities in a tangible substance, we must admit that sound is of one kind only. But sound is of various kinds, such as grave, acute, etc.; and even the same sound may vary in degrees, according to the nature of the obstruction it meets. This proves that sound does not abide with other qualities in a tangible substance. It further proves that sound is not unalterable or eternal.

Also signifies that this aphorism is to be considered along with aphorism 2-2-38, in which a reason for the non-eternality of sound is given.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 2 : Sound is not eternal : Sūtras : 14-40.

Diverse opinions are held to the duration of Sound. The Mimāṁsakas assert that Sound is an attribute of Ether, is all-pervading, eternal, and is not produced bt manifasted. The Sāṅkhyas hold that Sound co-exists with smell, etc., inheres in substances, is existent like smell, etc., and is not produced but mainfested. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that like cognition. The Bauddhas think that Sound is produced from the agitation of the great Elements, is without any support and is liable to production and destruction. These opinions give rise to doubt as to what the truth of the matter may be. The truth is that Sound is non-eternal, because (1) it originates from a cause, (2) is sensible, and (3) is treated as a product. Whatever is caused is non-eternal, *i.e,* is also destroyed. Conjunction and disjunction of subsances are the causes of Sound. They are the causes of its production and not of its manifestation. It is not an object of manifestation because it is apprehended by Hearing. The sense of Hearing is imponderable and therefore, cannot go out and reach the place where Sound appears. Sound reaches the sense of Hearing in a series of sounds in the way of waves of water, after the cessation of the Conjunction (*e.g.* of the axe and the tree in cutting) which produces it. An object which is manifested is apprehended where it is manifested. This is not the case with Sound. The differene in th intensity of Sounds

also show that they are not different from other products such as pleasure and pain. It cannot be said that Sound is one and of a uniform character and is mainfested by Conjunction the strength of which accounts for the pitch of the Sound as preceived. For this cannot explain the phenomenon of the overpowering of one sound by another, *e.g.* of the sound of the flute by the sound of the drum. Heterogeneous objects do not overpower one another; *e.g.* colour does not overpower touch. An object does not overpower itself. Objects of the same class overpower one another; *e.g.*, brighter colours overpower less bright colours. Similarly, when it is seen that the sound of the flute is drowned by the sound of the drum it must be admitted that the two sounds are two separate object and that they vary in intensity. Intensity is their attribute and is not due to the strength of their causes. Therefore, sounds are produced and not that one uniform eternal sound is only manifested. Moreover, manifestation must take place where the causes of manifestation operate. That being so, as the flute and the drum are operated in different places Sound mainfested in the flute cannot be subdued by Sound manifested in the drum. If it is said that difference of place does not matter then the beating of a durm anywhere would drown Sound manifested in all flutes all over the world at the same time. The theory thus is untenable. The phenomena of sound can be explained only on the theory that sounds are produced and that they become perceptible only when they reach the sense of Hearing in waves.

The opponent attacks the three reasons given in support of the non-eternality of sound; (1) the destruction of a pot originates from the disjunction of its causes; the non-existence of the pot after destruction is eternal. (2) genus which is perceptible is eternal, (3) as we speak of the parts of a tree of a blanket which are non-eternal so we speak of the parts of Either and the Soul which are eternal. To this we reply; (1) There is a difference between the eternal and the pseudo-eternal. That object is eternal which has come into existence without production (by conjunction or disjunction of parts) and which never loses its self-existence. Non-existence after distruction of an object is not eternal in this sense. Moreover, in the case of sound there is no cause to originate its distruction in the manner of the pot. Therefore, the analogy of the pot does not hold good. (2) Sound is non-eternal, not because it is perceptible but because of the manner in which it comes into contact with the sense of Hearing and becomes perceptible. (3) when we speak of the parts of a tree or a blanket we mean their constituents. but Ether and the Soul have no constituent parts. The use of the word parts in

regard to them is metaphorical and conveys the sense that thir contact with finite object does not pervade the whole of them. The conjunction of two fruits does not pervade the whole of them but is confined to parts only. Similarly when we say that an object is in contact with Ether or the Soul we mean that it is not in contact with every part of Ether or the Soul and to convey this meaning we say that it is in the contact with a part of Ether or the Soul. As conjunction does not pervade the whole of its substrata, so sound does not pervade the whole of Ether, and cognition, etc., do not pervade the whole of the Soul.

You may ask, Why has not Gotama embodied in an aphorism the tenet that Ether and other eternal substances have no parts? Our reply is that in many topics he has not brought out all the sides; that is his characteristic. He thinks that in such cases one can ascertain the truth from the tenet of his Śāstra. The tenet of his Śāstra is, as is well known. Nyāya, that is, many branched Inferance not inconsistent with perception and Revelation.

Again, how are we to know that an object exists or that an objcet does not exist? By cognition or non-cognition according to pramāṇa. By this test sound is non-existent before utterance because it is then not cognised and because any obstruction to its cognition is also not cognised.

The reasons given in support of the theory that Sound is eternal are : (1) that it is intangible like Ether, (2) that it is capable of being imparted by the teacher to the pupil, (3) that it admits of repetition, and (4) that the cause of its destruction is not perceived. The first reason is fallacious, because the atom which is tangible is eternal, while action which is intanagible is non-eternal. As regards the second it is seen that an object of gift is perceptible on its way from the donor to the donee. But sound is not perceptible and therefore does not exist in the interval between the teacher and the pupil. Nevertheless, it may be said, instruction received by the pupil and from the fact of instruction the existence of Sound in the interval is to be inferred, whereby the gift of Sound from the teacher to the pupil becomes possible. To the we reply that the opponent has yet to establish what constitutes instruction. Is it that Sound residing in the teacher actually moves from him and teaches the pupil, or is it imitation of what is done by the teacher as in the case of a dancing lesson? Such being the case instruction does not remove the doubt as to the validity of instruction as a mark of the possibility of the gift of Sound by the teacher to the pupil. In regard to the third reason, it is argued that as the persistence of colour makes it possible to

see it again and again so the persistence of Sound renders possible its utterance times without number. But repetition is possible also in the case of objects which are not persistent, that is, are diffeent at every time they appear. Thus, we say, he danced twice, he eats twice, etc. As regards the fourth reason it is said that the cause of the destruction of non-eternal the cause of its destruction would also be perceived; but that such a cause is not perceived; and that therefore Sound is not non-eternal. We reply that if the non-apprehension of the cause of the destruction of Sound implies its non-destruction, the non-apprehension of the cause of its non-hearing also implies its constant hearing. Non-hearing cannot be due to absence of manifesting agents, for we have already shown the impossiblity of Sound being an object of manifestation. If then the opponent's theory is reduced to this that the hearing of Sound is without any cause then why should he not admit that the destruction of Sound also is without any cause? We do not say, however, that there can be no cognition of the cause of the distructon of sound. The existene of such cause can be inferred from the fact which we have already established that sounds are produced in a series. The first sound is produced by conjunction and disjunction gives rise to the second sound which, in its turn, to the third and so on and on till the series is stopped and the last sound destroys by some obstruction such as a wall. Each succeeding sound destroyed its immediate predecessor. Then, when a bell is rung various sound series of different tones, high and higher, low and lower, are heard. Such diverse differences in tone and timbre cannot co-exist in one eternal permanent Sound. And without them differences in aural cognitions cannot be explained. The cause of the defferences in the intensity of sound is the degree of force with which the bell is rung and which is communicated to the sound series produced by it. The existence of such force in the bell cannot be denied. For the ringing of the bell does not produce sound when the hand is placed upon it. This shows that the force is stopped in its action by the conjunction of the hand. It is also perceived by touch that the vibrations set up in the bell by the force of ringing gradually die away. On the other hand, if the non-apprehension of the cause of the destruction of Sound proves its eternality then the manifestaton of Sound after its appearance would continue for ever as no cause of its destruction is apprehended.

Sound cannot be an attribute of Ether, says the opponent; because in that case the stoping of the vibration in the bell by the hand could not cause its destruction. According to him, sound and the vibrations which cause it must reside in the same substratum. We reply that the objection does not apply, because Ether is intangile. The non-cognition of sound

in the same substance with colour, taste, smell and touch and the phenomena of sound series show that sound is the atribute of an intangible all-pervading substance, *i.e.* Ether. Sound exhibits a twofold difference: a bell, *e.g.*, produces different varieties of sound and in each variety there is a difference of pitch. These differences could not be possible if sound were an attribute of the same substance with colour, etc.; as in that case like colour,. etc., it would be of one unalterable character.

द्विविधश्चायं शब्दः-वर्णात्मको ध्वनिमात्रश्च तत्र वर्णात्मनि तावत्–

विकारादेशोपदेशात् संशयः।। 41।।

'दध्यत्र' इति केचिद् इकारः इत्वं हित्वा यत्वमापद्यते इति विकारं मन्यन्ते, केचिद् इकारस्य प्रयोगे विषयकृते यद् इकारः स्थानं जहाति तत्र यकारस्य प्रयोगं ब्रुवते, संहितायां विषये इकारो न प्रयुज्यते तस्य स्थाने यकारः प्रयुज्यते स आदेश इति, उभयामिदमुपदिश्यते तत्र न ज्ञायते किं तत्त्वमिति।।

आदेशोपदेशस्तत्त्वम्–

विकारोपदेशे ह्यन्वयस्याग्रहणाद् विकाराननुमानमिति।

सत्यऽन्वये किंचित् निवर्तते किंचिदुपजायते इति शक्येत विकारोऽनुमातुं न चाऽन्वयो गृह्यते तस्माद् विकारो नास्तीति।।

भिन्नकरणयोश्च वर्णयोरप्रयोगे प्रयोगोपपत्तिः।

विवृतकरण इकारः ईषत्स्पृष्टकरणो यकारः ताविमौ पृथक् कारणाख्येन प्रयत्नेनोच्चारणीयौ तयोरेकस्याऽप्रयोगेऽन्यस्य प्रयोग उपपन्न इति।।

अविकारे चाविशेषः।

यत्रेमौ इकारयकारौ न विकारभूतौ–'यतते, यच्छति, प्रायँस्त' इति, 'इकारः इदम्' इति च, यत्र च विकारभूतौ–'इष्ट्या' 'दध्याहर' इति उभयत्र प्रयोक्तुरविशेषो यत्नः श्रोतुश्च श्रुतिरित्यादेशोपपत्तिः।।

प्रयुज्यमानाऽग्रणाच्च।

न खलु इकारः प्रयुज्यमानो यकारतामापद्यमानो गृह्यते, किं तर्हि? इकारस्य प्रयोगे यकारः प्रयुज्यते, तस्मादविकार इति।।

अविकारे च न शब्दान्वाख्यानलोपः।

न विक्रियन्ते वणा इति। न चैतस्मिन् पक्षे शब्दान्वाख्यानस्याऽसंभवो येन वर्णविकारं प्रतिपद्येमहीति। न खलु वर्णस्य वर्णान्तरं कार्यम्–न हि इकाराद् यकार उत्पद्यते यकाराद्वा इकारः, पृथक्स्थानप्रयत्नोत्पाद्या हीमे वर्णास्तेषामन्योऽन्यस्य स्थाने प्रयुज्यते इति युक्तम्। एतात्नच्चैतत् परिणामो विकारः स्यात् कार्यकारणीभावो वा, उभयं च नास्ति तस्मान्न सन्ति वर्णविकाराः।।

वर्णसमुदायविकारानुपपत्तिवच्च वर्णविकारानुपपत्तिः।

''अस्तेर्भूः'', ''ब्रुवो वचिः'' इति यथा वर्णसमुदायस्य धातुलक्षणस्य क्वचिद्विषये वर्णान्तरसमुदायो न परिणामो न कार्यं शब्दान्तरस्य स्थाने शब्दान्तरं प्रयुज्यते तथा वर्णस्य वर्णान्तरमिति।।41।।

विकारादेशोपदेशात् vikāra-ādeśa-upadeśāt, from the rule of modification and substitution; संशयः saṃśayaḥ, doubt.

172. From the injunction about modification and subtitute there arises doubt.—41.

The word 'dadhi,' conjoined with the word 'atra,' becomes 'dadhyatra,' by the rule of Sanskrit grammar. Looking at 'dadhi-atra' and 'dadhyatra,' we notice that there is *i* in the former and *y* in the latter. Here some say the *i* undergoes modification as *y*, while others say that *y* comes as a substitute for *i*. Consequently we are thrown into doubt whether letters really undergo modifications or take up substitutes.

इतश्च न सन्ति विकाराः—

प्रकृतिविवृद्धौ विकारविवृद्धेः।। 42।।

प्रकृत्यनुविधानं विकारेषु दृष्टं यकारे ह्रस्वदीर्घानुविधानं नास्ति येन विकारत्वमनुमीयत इति।।42।।

प्रकृतिविवृद्धौ prakṛti-vivṛddhau, 'on the augmentation of the root; विकारविवृद्धेः vikāra-vivṛddheḥ, because there is augmentation of the modificaiton.

173. If letters underwent modification, an increase of bulk in the original material would be attended by an increase of bulk in the modification—42.

If we accept the theory of modification, the letter *y* which originated from the short *i* must be supposed to be less in bulk than the *y* which originated from the long *ī*. But in reality the *y* in both the cases is of the same bulk. Hence, it is concluded that letters do not undergo modification, but take up other letters as substitutes.

न्यूनसमाधिकोपलब्धेर्विकाराणामहेतुः।। 43।।

द्रव्यविकारा न्यूनाः समा अधिकाश्च गृह्यन्ते, तद्वदयं विकारो न्यूनः स्यादिति। द्विविधस्यापि हेतोरभावादऽसाधनं दृष्टान्तः–अत्र नोदाहरणसाधर्म्याद् हेतुरस्ति न वैधर्म्यात्, अनुपसंहृतश्च हेतुना दृष्टान्तो न साधक इति।।

प्रतिदृष्टान्ते चानियमः प्रसज्येत।

यथाऽनडुहः स्थानेऽश्वो वोढुं वियुक्तो न तद्विकारो भवति, एवमिवर्णस्य स्थाने यकारः प्रयुक्तो न विकार इति। न चात्र नियमहेतुरस्ति–दृष्टान्तः साधको न प्रतिदृष्टान्त इति।।43।।

न्यूनसमाधिकोपलब्धेः nyūna-sama-adhika-upalabdheḥ, from apprehension of less, same, and more; विकाराणाम् vikārāṇām, of modifications; अहेतुः ahetuḥ, not a mark.

174. The foregoing argument, some say, is futile, because we find modifications less than, equal to, and greater than, the original material.—43.

The bulk of the modification does not, in all cases, correspond to the bulk of the original material, *e.g.*, thread is of less bulk than cotton which is its original material, a bracelet is equal in bulk to the gold of which it is made, and a banyan tree is greater in bulk than the seed from which it springs. Hence, the argument against the theory of modification is, according to the objectors, baseless.

द्विविधस्यापि हेतोरभावादसाधनं दृष्टान्तः।। 44।।

द्विविधस्य dvi-vidha-sya, of twofold; अपि api, even; हेतोः hetoḥ, reasons, अभावात् abhāvāt, owing to absence; असाधनं a-sādhanam, दृष्टान्तः dṛṣṭāntaḥ, example.

175. On account of the absence of both the positive and negative marks of inference, we say, the example does not establish the point.—44.

The examples cited by the opponent are irrelevant. They are neither similar nor dissimilar to the case under consideration : they belong altogether to a different category. An example which can establish point must contain the reason which is found present in the thing to be established. Not only are the examples not a means of proof here, but they are also not the examples required.

द्रव्यविकारोदाहरणं च—

नातुल्यप्रकृतीनां विकारविकल्पात्।। 45।।

अतुल्यानां दव्याणां प्रकृतिभावो विकल्पते विकश्च प्रकृतीरनुविधीयते, न त्विवर्णमनुविधीयते यकारः तस्मादनुदाहरणम्–'द्रव्यविकारः' इति।। 45।।

न na, no; अतुल्यप्रकृतीनां a-tulya-prakṛtīnām, of different roots; विकार विकल्पात् vikāra-vikalpāt, from difference of modifications.

176. It is not so, because we spoke of those modification which originated from different materials.—45.

A modification may not correspond in bulk to its original material. But if the original materials are different, their modications are expected to be different. Here *i* being different from *ī*, their modification are expected to be different. But *y* issues form *i* as well *ī*. Hence *y* is not a modification of *i* or *ī*.

द्रव्यविकारे वैषम्यवद्वर्णविकारविकल्पः॥ 46॥

यथा द्रव्यभावेन तुल्यायाः प्रकृते र्विकारवैषम्यम् एवं वर्णभावेन तुल्यायाः प्रकृते-र्विकारविकल्प इति॥46॥

द्रव्यविकारे dravya-vikāre; in the case of the modification of substance in general; वैषम्यवत् vaiṣamya-vat, as there is dissimilarity; वर्णविकार विकल्पः varṇa-vikāralpaḥ, difference of the modification of letter in general.

177. There is, says an objector, difference, between a letter and its modification, as there is between a substance and its modification.—46.

According to the objector, there is difference between the letter *i* (or *ī*) and it modification *y*, as there is difference between the substance cotton and its modification thread.

न विकारधर्मानुपपत्तेः॥ 47॥

अयं विकारधर्मः-द्रव्यसमान्ये यदात्मकं द्रव्यं मृद्वा सुवर्णं वा तस्यात्मनोऽन्वये पूर्वो व्यूहो निवर्तते व्यूहान्तरं चोपजायते तं विकारमाचक्षते, न वर्णसामान्ये कश्चित् शब्दात्माऽन्वयी य इत्वं जहाति यत्वं चापद्यते, तत्र यथा सति द्रव्यभावे विकारवैषम्ये नाऽनुडुहोऽश्वो विकारः-विकारधर्मानुपपत्तेः, एवमिवर्णस्य न यकारो विकारः-विकार-धर्मानुपपत्तेरिति॥47॥

न na, no; विकारधर्मानुपपत्तेः vikāra-dharma-an-upapatteḥ, because of non-establishment of the charactor of a modification.

178. In reply, we say that it is not so, because the character of a modification does not exist here.—47.

A modification must be of the same nature as its original material, though the former may not correspond in bulk to the latter. A bracelet is no doubt a modification of gold or silver, but a horse is not a modification of a bull. Similarly, *y*, which is a semi-vowel, is not a modification of *i* (or *ī*) which is a full vowel.

इतश्च न सन्ति वर्णविकाराः:–

विकारप्राप्तानामपुनरापत्तेः॥ 48॥

अनुपपन्ना पुनरापत्तिः। कथम्? पुनरापत्तेरननुमानादिति। इकारो यकारत्वमापन्नः पुनर्विकारो भवति। न पुनरिकारस्य स्थाने यकारस्य प्रयोग इत्यत्रानुमानं नास्ति?॥46॥

विकारप्राप्तानाम् vikāra-prāptānām, of those which have undergone modification; अपुनरापत्तेः a-punaḥ-āpatteḥ, from non-return to original form.

179. A thing which has undergone modification does not again return to its original form.—48.

Milk modified into curd does not again attain the state of milk. But *i* having reached the condition of *y* may again revert to its original form. Hence, *y* is not a modification of *i*.

सुवर्णादीनां पुनरापत्तेरहेतुः॥ 49॥

अननुमानादिति न–इदं ह्यनुमानम्–सुवर्णं कुण्डलत्वं हित्वा रुचकत्वामापद्यते रुचकत्वं हित्वा पुनः कुण्डलत्वमापद्यते, एवमिकारो यणि यकारत्वमापन्नः पुनरिकारो भवतीति॥49॥

सुवर्णदीनाम् suvrṇa-ādīnām, of gold and the like; पुनरापत्तेः punaḥā-patteḥ, from return to original; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a mark.

180. Some say that this is unternable, because golden ornaments may again be coverted into their original forms.—49.

A golden bracelet is converted into a mass of gross gold which again may be modified into a bracelet. The objector, relying on the analogy of golden ornaments, says that in the case of letters the theory of modification does not suffer by *i* reaching the condition of *y* and again returning to its original form.

व्यभिचारादननुमानम्–यथा पयो दधिभावमापन्नं पयो न भवति–किमेवं वर्णानां न पुनरापत्तिः? अथ सुवर्णवत् पुनरापत्तिरिति?

सुवर्णोदाहरणोपपत्तिश्च–

न तद्विकाराणां सुवर्णभावाव्यतिरेकात्।। 50।।

अवस्थितं सुवर्णं हीयमानेनोपजायमानेन च धर्मेण धर्मि भवति नैवं कश्चित् शब्दात्मा हीयमानेन इत्वेन उपजायमानेन यत्वेन च धर्मी गृह्यते तस्मात् सुवर्णोदाहरणं नोपपद्यते इति।।50।।

न na, not; तद्विकाराणां tat-vikārāṇām, of its modifications; सुवर्ण-भावाव्यतिरेकात् suvarṇa-bhāva-a-vyatirekāt, from not giving up the natute of gold.

180. The analogy, we say, is inapt, because the modifications of gold (called ornaments) do not relinquish the nature of gold.—50.

A mass of gold when made into ornaments does not relinquish in its own nature. But *i* when coverted into *y* loses its own nature. Hence, the analogy is unsuitable.

वर्णत्वाव्यतिरेकाद्वर्णविकाराणमप्रतिषेधः।। 51।।

वर्णविकारा अपि वर्णत्वं न व्यभिचरन्ति यथा सुवर्णविकारः सुवर्णत्वमिति।।51।।

182. There is, according to the objector, no inaptness in the analogy, as the modificaiton of a letter does not relinquish the general notion of letters.—51.

Just as gold is modified into bracelet without relinquishing the general notion of gold, so the letter *i* undergoes modification as *y* without relinquishing the general notion of letters.

सामान्यवतो धर्मयोगो न सामान्यस्य।। 52।।

कुण्डलरुचकौ सुवर्णस्य धर्मौ न सुवर्णत्वस्य, एवमिकारयकारौ कस्य वर्णात्मनो धर्मौ? वर्णत्वं सामान्यं न तस्येमौ धर्मौ भवितुमर्हतः, न च निवर्तमानो धर्म उपजायमानस्य प्रकृतिः= तत्र निवर्तमान इकारो न यकारस्योपजायमानस्य प्रकृतिरिति।।52।।

183. A quality belongs, we reply, to a thing prossessing a general notion, but not to the general notion itself.

A bracelet is a modification of a ring, inasmuch as both of them are gold which possesses the general notion of goldness. The letter *y* cannot be a modification of the letter *i*, because they have not as their common basis another letter which possesses the general notion of letterness.

इतश्च वर्णविकारानुपपत्तिः–

नित्यत्वे अविकारदनित्यत्वे चानवस्थानात्।। 53।।

'नित्या वर्णाः' इत्येतस्मिन् पक्षे इकारयकारौ वर्णौ इत्युभयोर्नित्यत्वाद् विकरानुपपत्तिः, नित्यत्वेऽविनाशित्वात् कः कस्य विकार इति?। अथ 'अनित्या वर्णाः' इतिपक्षः? एवमप्यनवस्थानं वर्णानाम्। किमिदमनवस्थानं वर्णानाम्?, उत्पद्य निरोधः, उत्पद्य निरुद्धे इकारे यकार उत्पद्यते, यकारे चोत्पद्य निरुद्धे इकार उत्पद्यते, कः कस्य विकारः? तदेतद् अवगृह्य संधाने, संधाय चाऽवग्रहे वेदितव्यमिति।।53।।

नित्यत्वे nitya-tve, were letters eternal; अविकारात् a-vikārāt, from non-modification; अनित्यत्वे a-nitya-tva, were they non-eternal; च cha, and; अनवस्थानात् an-avasthānāt, from non-persistence.

184. It the letter were eternal it could not be modified, and if it were impermanent it could not abide long enough to furnish the material for modification.—53.

On the supposition of the letters being eternal, *i* cannot be modified into *y*; and on the supposition of their being impermanent, *i* must perish before it can be modified into *y*.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 3 : Of the modification of Sound : Sūtras 41-53.

Sound is either Varṇa, articulate, letter, of Dhvani, inarticulate, noise. In regard to sound as letter, when *Dadhi* and *Atra,* for instance become *Dadhyatra,* what does happen? Modification or substitution? Is *i* modified as *y* or is replaced by *y?* We say that *i* is replaced by *y.* Our reasons are as follows :

(1) When one object, *e.g.,* a piece of gold, modifies into another object, *e.g.,* a ring, some attributes disappear, other attributes appear : while the same material subsists in the modification; but this is not the case where *i* gives place to *y.*

(2) The effort required in the utterance of *i* is different from the effort required in the utterance of *y.*

(3) Where *y* comes in the place of *i* and where *y* stands by itself as in *yatate,* and where *i* gives place to *y* and where *i* stands by itself as in *idam,* the effort, required in the utteranece of the *y* in the two cases does differ, and the effort required in the utterance of the *i* in the two cases also does not differ.

(4) The modification of *i* in to *y* is not cognised as the modification of milk into curd is perceived.

(5) The theory of modification of letter is not necessary for the purpose of the rules of grammar.

(6) One letter is not the product of another. They are all independently produced.

(7) Modification can be either transformation, *i.e.*, change of formor production. But neither is possible in the case of letters.

(8) Where *bhu* takes the place of as, *vach* of *bru,* you do not say modification takes place. Similarly not modification but substitution takes place in the case of single letters.

(9) In the case of modificiation the bulk of the modification varies according to the bulk of the original; but whether *i* is long or short makes no difference in *y.* The opponent rejoins that modifications are sometimes greater than the original as in the case of a tree from an acorn and sometimes equal to the original as in the case of ring from a piece of gold and sometimes less than the original as in the case of yarns from cotton. To this we reply first that mere example unsupported by any reason, homogeneous or heterogenous, cannot establish a proposition; otherwise a horse would be a modification of a bullock, both being beasts of burden. In the second place, when we refer to the bulk of the original and the modification we intend to say that a modifiction follows its original in essentials so that if the originals differ the modifications also must differ. But in the case in question *y* does not follow its original, *i.e.*, it does not become long or short according as it takes the plae of *i* long or short. It is therefore not a modification of *i.* It cannot be said that the base *i* is not affected by its atributes of longness and shortness and that *y* follow the base. For what happens in the modification of a base, *e.g.*, gold or clay, is that its original form is destroyed and a new form is produced. but in the case in question there is no evidence that *i* is destroyed and *y* is produced from the disintegrated *i*.

(10) When *Dadhyatra* is disjoined *i* returns to its orignal form, but curd never returns to milk; therefore *y* is not a modification of *i*. It is true that a ring can be reduced to a piece of gold again. But the analogy does not hold good here. Fore gold remains constant; it becomes a ring by giving up and taking up some attributes. A similar change does not take place in the case of *i* and *y.* It cannot be said that letterness remains constant in *i* and *y*; for *i* and *y* cannot be attributes of the general attribute letterness.

(11) Again, the letters are either eternal or non-eternal. If they are eternal, they cannot undergo modification. If they are non-eternal, then one is destroyed before another takes its place. To this it may be replied by the opponent that there are eternal things which very in their attributes; *e.g.*, the atoms are imperceptible while the letters are perceptible; therefore while the atoms do not undergo modification letters may. The argument is invalid. The reason advanced, namely difference of attributes, is a contradictory reason, it contradicts the supposed eternal character of letters. Modification and eternality are contradictory terms. On the other hand, it cannot be said that as the hearing of the letters is possible though they are destroyed at the third moment after their production, so their modification also may be possible. For a mere example cannot establish a proposition. The reason must be stated. If the hearing of the letters be the reason, then we say that the universal concomitance of the hearing of the letters and of the modification of the letters is yet to be established. The fallacy of the opponent's argument is sādharmaya-sama (V. i. 2).

(12) A further reason why *y* cannot be modification of *i* is that sometimes we find *i* in the place of *y* as in *Vyadh* becoming *vidhyati.*

The expression "modification of letter" used by grammarians does not mean that one letter is transformed into, or produced by, another letter. It means the substitution of one letter in place of another. It appears in six different forms : (*a*) change of attribute, as when the grave takes the place of the acute accent; (*b*) suppression, as when *bhu* takes the place of as; (*c*) decrease, as when the long is replaced by the short; (*d*) increase, as when the short is replaced by long or the prolated; (*e*) curtailment, as when *stah* comes in the place of *as*; and (*f*) coalescence, as when the base or the affix is augmented. These are all instances of substitution.

The result of the above examination is to show that sound is non-eternal. Sound does not remain constant under change of forms nor survives in its product. It is produced at one moment, exists at the second moment and is destroyed at the third moment by the sound to which it gives rise or by the obstruction which it meets.

नित्यपक्षे तु तावत्समाधिः–

नित्यानामतीन्द्रियत्वात्तद्धर्म्मविकल्पाच्च वर्णविकाराणाम-प्रतिषेधः॥ 54॥

'नित्या वर्णा न विक्रियन्ते' इति विप्रतिषेधः, यथा नित्यत्वे सति किंचिदतीन्द्रियं किंचिदिन्द्रियग्राह्यम् इन्द्रियग्राह्याश्च वर्णाः, एवं नित्यत्वे सति किंचिन्न विक्रियते वर्णास्तु विक्रियन्ते इति। विरोधादहेतुः-तद्धर्मविकल्पः, नित्यं नोपजायते नाऽपैति=अनुपजनापाय-धर्मकं नित्यम्, अनित्यं पुनरुपजनापायुक्तम्, न चान्तरेणोपजनापायौ विकारः संभवति, तद् यदि वर्ण विक्रियन्ते? नित्यत्वमेषां निवर्तते, अथ नित्याः? विकारधर्मत्वमेषां निवर्तते, सोयं विरुद्धो हेत्वाभासो धर्मविकल्प इति॥54॥

नित्यानां nityānām, of eternals; अतींद्रयत्वात् ati-indirya-tvāt, from being super-sensuous; तद्धर्म्मविकल्पात् tat-dharma-vikalpāt, from difference of attributes; वर्णविकाराणां varṇa-vikārāṇām, of the modifications of letters; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

185. Though the letters be eternal, their modification, says an objector, cannot be denied, as some of the eternal things are beyond the grasp of the senses, while others possess a different character.—54.

Just as some eternal things (as ether) are supersensuous while others (such as cowhood) are cognisable by the sense, so some eternal things as ether may be unmodifiable while others such as letters may be susceptible to modification.

अनित्यपक्षे समाधिः–

अनवस्थायित्वे च वर्णोपलब्धिवत्तद्विकारोपपत्तिः॥ 55॥

यथाऽनवस्थायिनां वर्णानां श्रवणं भवत्येवमेषां विकारो भवतीति। असंबन्धादसमर्था। अर्थप्रतिपादिका वर्णोपलब्धिर्न विकारेण संबन्धादसमर्था या गृह्यमाणा वर्णविकार-मनुमापयेदिति, तत्र यादृगिदम्-यथा गन्धगुणा पृथिवी एवं शब्दसुखादिगुणापीति, तादृगेत् भवतीति। न च वर्णोपलब्धिर्वर्णनिवृत्तौ वर्णान्तरप्रयोगस्य निर्वर्तिका, योऽयमिवर्णनिवृत्तौ यकारस्य प्रयोगः यद्ययमिवर्णोपलब्ध्या निर्वर्तते तदा तत्रोपलभ्यमान इवर्णो यत्वमापद्यते इति गृह्येत?, तस्माद्वर्णोपलब्धिरहेतुर्वर्णविकारस्येति॥55॥

अनवस्थायित्वे an-avasthāyi-tve, in case of non persisting; च cha, and; वर्णोपलब्धिवत् varṇa-upalabdhi-vat, like apprehension of letters; तद्विकारोपपत्ति tat-vikāra-upapattiḥ, establishment of their modifications.

186. Even if the letters are impermanent, their modification, like their perception, is, according to the objector, possible.—55.

Even if you say that letters are impermanent, you admit that they abide long enough to be capable of being perceived. Why then cannot they abide long enough to be capable of being modified?

विकारधर्म्मित्वे नित्यत्वाभावात्कालान्तरे विकारोपपत्तेश्चा-प्रतिषेधः॥ 56॥

"तद्धर्मविकल्पात्" इति न युक्तः प्रतिषेधः-न खलु विकारधर्मकं किंचिद् नित्यमुपलभ्यते इति॥ "वर्णोपलब्धिवत्" इति (च) न युक्तः प्रतिषेधः-अवग्रहे हि 'दधि अत्र' इति प्रयुज्य चिरं स्थित्वा ततः संहितायां प्रयुङ्क्ते-'दध्यत्र' इति, चिरनिवृत्ते चायमिवर्णे यकारः प्रयुज्यमानः कस्य विकार इति प्रतीयते कारणाभावात् कार्याभाव इत्यनुयोगः प्रसज्यते इति॥56॥

विकारधर्मित्वे vikāra-dharmi-tve, where there is the character of undergoing modification; नित्यत्वाभावात् nitya-tva-abhāvāt, from absence of eternality; कालान्तरे kāla-antare, at another time; विकारोपपत्तेः vikāra-upapatteḥ, from establishment of modification; च cha, and; अप्रितिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

187. In reply, we say that our position is unassailable, because there is no eternalness where there is the character of modification and because your so-called modification; presents itself at a time subsequent to the destruction of the original meterial.—56.

The letters cannot be modified if you say that they are eternal, because modification is the reverse of eternalness. When a thing is modified it assumes another nature, abandoning its own. Again, the letters cannot be modified if you say that they are impermanent, because there is no time for *i* (of dadhi) to be modified into *y* when *a* (of atra) follows. The sound 'dadhi' is produced (pronounced) at the first moment, exists (continuously) during the second moment, and pershes at the third moment. The sound "atra" is produced (pronounced) at the second moment, exists (continues) during the third moment, and perishes at

the fourth moment. Now, *i* (of dadhi) cannot be modified into *y* until *a* (of atra) has come into existence. But *a* comes into existence at the third moment, when *i* has already perished. So, on the supposition of impermanency of letters, modification is impossible.

इतश्च वर्णविकारानुपपत्तिः–

प्रकृत्यनियमाद्वर्णविकाराणाम्॥ 57॥

इकारस्थाने यकारः श्रूयते, यकारस्थाने खल्विकारो विधीयते-विध्यति (इति), तद् यदि स्यात् प्रकृतिविकारभावो वर्णानाम्? तस्य प्रकृतिनियमः स्यात्-दृष्टो विकारधर्मित्वे प्रकृतिनियम इति॥57॥

प्रकृत्यनियमात् prakṛti-a-niyamāt, from non-restriction to the root; वर्णविकाराणां varṇa-vikārāṇām, of the modifications of letters.

188. Letters are not modified, because there is no fixity as to the original material of their modification.—57.

In the case of real modification there is a fixity as regards their original materials, *e.g.*, milk is the original material of curd, but no *vice versa*. In the case of letters, however, there is no fixed rule, *e.g.*, *i* is the original material of *y* in dadhyatra (dadhi+atra), but *y* is the origianl material of *i* in vidhyati (vyadh+ya+ti). Hence, the operation of modification is not really applicable to letters.

अनियमे नियमान्नानियमः॥ 58॥

योयं प्रकृतेरनियम उक्तः स नियतः=यथाविषयं व्यवस्थितः-नियतत्वान्नियम इति भवति, एवं सत्यनियमो नास्ति, तत्र यदुक्तम्-"प्रकृत्यनियमात्" इति एतदयुक्तमिति॥58॥

अनियमे a-niyame, in the case of non-restriction; नियमात् niyamāt, because of restriction, *i.e.* rule or uniformity; न na, not; अनियमः a-niyamaḥ, non-restriction.

189. Some say that there is no lack of fixity because the absence of fixity itself is fixed.—58.

I is sometimes modified into *y*, and *y*, sometimes into *i*. So in respect of letters there is no fixity as to the original materials of their modification. This much, however, is fixed that there is no fixity, or in other words, the absence of fixity is fixed. Hence, the objector, who is a quibbler, contends that there is fixity at least as to the negative aspect of modification.

नियमानियमविरोधादनियमे नियमाच्चाप्रतिषेधः॥ 59॥

नियम इत्यत्राऽर्थाभ्यनुज्ञा, अनियम इति तस्य प्रतिषेधः, अनुज्ञातनिषिद्धयोश्च व्याधातादनर्थान्तरत्वं न भवति, अनियमश्च नियतत्वाद् नियमो न भवतीति। नाऽत्रार्थस्य तथा भावः प्रतिषिध्यते, किं तर्हि? तथाभूतस्यार्थस्य नियमशब्देनाभिधीयमानस्य नियतत्वाद् नियमशब्द एवोपपद्यते, सोयं नियमादनियमे प्रतिषेधो न भवतीति॥59॥

नियमानियम विरोधात् niyama-aniyama-virodhāt, owing to contradiction of restriction and non-restriciton; अनियमे aniyame, in respect of non-restriction; नियमात् niyamāt, there being restriction; च cha, and; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

190. By saying that the absence of fixity is fixed, you cannot set aside our reason, because the fixity and its absence are contradiction terms.—59.

Our reason is that in respect of letters there is no fixity as to their modification. You contend that, though there is no fixity, the absence of fixity is fixed. Our reply is that, though the absence of fixity is fixed, it does not establish fixity as a positive fact, because fixity is incomptiable with the absence of fixity.

न चेयं वर्णविकारोपपत्तिः परिणामात् कार्यकारणभावाद्वा, किं तर्हि?–

गुणान्तरापत्त्युपमर्दह्रासवृद्धिलेशश्लेषेभ्यस्तु विकारोपपत्तेर्वर्ण-विकारः॥ 60॥

स्थान्यादेशभावादप्रयोगे प्रयोगो विकारशब्दार्थः स भिद्यते-गुणान्तरापत्तिः=उदात्तस्यानुदत्त इत्येवमादिः, उपमर्दो नाम एकरूपनिवृत्तौ रूपान्तरोपजनः, ह्रासः-दीर्घस्य ह्रस्वः, वृद्धिः=ह्रस्वस्य दीर्घः तयोर्वाप्लुतः, लेशः=लाघवम् 'स्तः' इत्यस्तेर्विकारः, श्लेषः=आगमः प्रकृतेः प्रत्ययस्य वा, एते एव विशेषाः विकारा इति एते एवादेशाः, एते चेद्विकारा उपपद्यन्ते तर्हि वर्णविकारा इति॥60॥

गुणान्तरापत्त्युपमर्दह्रासवृद्धिलेशश्लेषेभ्यः guṇa-antara-āpatti-upamarda-hrāsa-vṛddhi-leśa-śleṣbhyaḥ, from the ensuing of different quality, overcoming shortening, lengthening, dropping the incoming; तु tu, but; विकारोपपत्तेः vikāra-upapatteḥ, from establishment of modification; वर्णविकारः varṇa-vikāraḥ, modification of letters.

191. There is an apparent modification of letters in the case of their attaining a different quality, taking up substitutes, becoming short or long and undergoing diminution or augmentation.—60.

A letters is said to attain a different quality when, for instance, the grave accentuation is given to what was acuately accented. As an instance of a letter accepting a subsitute, we may mention *gam* as becoming *gachchh.* A long vowel is sometimes shortened, *e.g.*, nadī. (in the vocative case) becomes nadi. A short vowel is lengthened, *e.g.*, 'muni' (in the vocative case) becomes 'mune'. Diminution occurs in such cases as 'as+tas' becoming 'stas.' In 'devānām' (deva+ām) *na* is an augment.

ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदम्॥ 61॥

यथादर्शनं विकृता वर्णा विभक्त्यन्ताः पदसंज्ञा भवन्ति। विभक्तिर्द्वयी–नामिकी आख्यातिकी च 'ब्राह्मणः' 'पचति' इत्युदाहरणम्। उपसर्गनिपातास्तर्हि न पदसंज्ञाः लक्षणान्तरं वाच्यमिति, शिष्यते च खलु नामिक्या विभक्तेरव्ययाल्लोपस्तयोः पदेसंज्ञार्थमिति। पदेनार्थसंप्रत्यय इति प्रयोजनम्॥61॥

ते te, they, letters; विभक्त्यन्ता vibhakti-antāḥ, with inflection; पदम् padam, word.

192. The letters ended with an affix form a **word**.—61.

Words are of two kinds : *nouns* and *verbs.* A noun ends in a *sup* affix, *e.g.*, Rāmas (Rāma+su), while a verb ends in a *tiṅ* affix, *e.g.*, bhavati (bhū+ti).

नामपदं चाधिकृत्य परीक्षा–गौरिति (नाम) पदं खलु, इदमुदाहरणम्–

तदर्थे व्यक्त्याकृतिजातिसन्निधावुपचारात् संशयः॥ 62॥

अविनाभाववृत्तिः संनिधिः, अविनाभवेन वर्तमानासु व्यक्त्याकृतिजातिषु गौरिति प्रयुज्यते तत्र न ज्ञायते–किमन्यतमः पदार्थः? उत सर्वः? इति॥62॥

तदर्थे tat-arthe, as to the object or meaning of the word; व्यक्त्याकृति-जाति सन्निधौ vyakti-ākṛti-jāti-sannidhau, invariable association with an individual, form and class;उपचारात् upachārāt, from use; संशयः saṃśayaḥ, doubt.

193. There is doubt what word (noun) really means, as it invariably presents to us an **individual, form and genus**.—62.

The word 'cow' reminds us of an individual (a four-footed animal), its form (limbs) and its genus (cowhood). Now, it is asked, what is the real significaiton of a word (noun)—an individual, form or genus?

शब्दस्य प्रयोगसामर्थ्यात् पदार्थावधारणं तस्मात्–

याशब्दसमूहत्यागपरिग्रहसंख्यावृद्ध्युपचयवर्णसमासानुबन्धानां व्यक्तावुपचाराद्व्यक्तिः॥ 63॥

व्यक्तिः पदार्थः, कस्मात्? याशब्दप्रभृतीनां व्यक्तावुपचारात्। उपचारः=प्रयोगः, 'या गौस्तिष्ठति या गौर्निषण्णा' इति, नेदं वाक्यं जातेरभिधायकम्–अभेदात्, भेदात्तु द्रव्याभिधायकम्, 'गवा समूहः' इति भेदाद् द्रव्याभिधानं, न जातेः–अभेदात्, 'चैद्राय गां ददाति' इति द्रव्यस्य त्यागो, न जातेः–अमूर्तत्वात् प्रतिक्रमानुक्रमानुपपत्तेश्च, परिग्रहः= स्वत्वेनाभिसंबन्धः 'कौण्डिन्यस्य गौः', 'ब्राह्मणस्य गौः' इति द्रव्याभिधाने द्रव्यभेदात् संबन्धभेद इत्युपपन्नम्, अभिन्ना तु जातिरिति, संख्या–'दश गावो विंशतिर्गावः– इति भिन्नं द्रव्यं संख्यायते, न जातिः–अभेदादिति, वृद्धिः=कारणवतो द्रव्यस्याऽवयवोपचयः–'अवर्धत गौः' इति, निरवयवा तु जातिरिति, एतेनाऽपचयो व्याख्यातः, वर्णः–'शुक्ला गौः कपिला गौः' इति, द्रव्यस्य गुणयोगो न सामान्यस्य, समासः–'गोहितं गोसुखम्' इति द्रव्यस्य सुखादियोगो न जातेरिति, अनुबन्धः–सरूपप्रजननसन्तानः–'गौर्गां जनयति' इति तद् उत्पत्तिर्धर्मत्वाद् द्रव्ये युक्तं, न जातौ–विषर्ययादिति। द्रव्यं व्यक्तिरिति हि नार्थान्तरम्॥61॥

या शब्दसमूहत्यागपरिग्रहसंख्यावृद्ध्युपचयवर्णसमासानुबन्धानाम् yā-śabda-samūha-tyāga-parigraha-saṅkhyā-vṛddhi-upachaya-varṇa-samāsa-anubandhānām, of the word, that, *i.e.* any noun, collection, avoiding, accepting, number, growth, colour, connection, and propagation; व्यक्तौ vyaktau, in the case of the individual; उपचारात upachārāt, from use; व्यक्तिः vyaktiḥ, individual.

194. Some say that the word (noun) denotes individual, because it is only in respect of individuals that we can use "that," "taking," "number," "waxing," "waning," "colour," "componand" and "propagation."—63.

"That cow is going"—here the term "that" can be used only in reference to an individual cow. Similarly, it is only in respect individuals that we can use the expressions "collection of cows," "he giving the cow," "he takes the cow," "ten cows," "cow waxes," "cow wanes," "red cow," "cow-legs" and "cow gives birth to cow."

अस्य प्रतिषेधः—

न तदनवस्थानात्॥ 64॥

न व्यक्तिः पदार्थः, कस्मात्? अनवस्थानात्, याशब्दप्रभृतिभिर्यो विशेष्यते स गोशब्दार्थः-'या गौर्निषण्णा' इति न द्रव्यमात्रमविशिष्टं जात्या विनाऽभिधीयते। किं तर्हि? जातिविशिष्टं, तस्मान्न व्यक्तिः पदार्थः। एवं समूहादिषु द्रष्टव्यम्॥64॥

न na, no; तदनवस्थानात् tat-an-vasthānāt, from its non-persistence.

195. A word (noun) does not denote an individual, because there is no fixation of the latter.—64.

Unless we take genus into consideration, the word cow will denote any individual of any kind. Individuals are infinite. They cannot be distinguished from one another, unless we refer some of them to a certain genus and others to another genus, and so on. In order to distinguish cow-individual from a horse-individual, we must admit a genus called cow distinguished from a genus called horse.

यदि न व्यक्तिः पदार्थः कथं तर्हि व्यक्तावुपचार इति? निमित्तादऽतद्भावेपि तदुपचारो दृश्यते खलु—

सहचरणस्थानतादर्थ्यवृत्तमानधारणसामीप्ययोगसाधनाधिपत्येभ्यो ब्राह्मणमञ्चकटराजशक्तुचन्दनगङ्गाशटकान्न पुरुषेष्वतद्भावेऽपि तदुपचारः ॥ 65॥

अतद्भावेपि तदुपचार इति=अतच्छबदस्य तेन शब्देनाभिधानमिति, सहचरणात्-'यष्टिकां भोजय' इति यष्टिकासहचरितो ब्राह्मणोऽभिधीयते इति, स्थानात्-'मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति' इति मञ्चस्थाः पुरुषा अभिधायन्ते, तादर्थ्यात्-कटार्थेषु वीरणेषु व्यूह्यमानेषु 'कटं करोति' इति भवति, वृत्तात्-'यमो राजा', 'कुबेरो राजा' इति तद्वद्वर्तते इति, मानात्-आढकेन मिताः सक्तवः 'आढकं सत्क्वः' इति, धारणात्-तुलया धृतं चन्दनम् 'तुला चन्दनम्' इति, सामीप्यात्-'गङ्गायां गावश्चरन्ति' इति देशोऽभिधीयते संनिकृष्टः, योगात्-कृष्णेन रागेण युक्तः शाकटः 'कृष्णः' इत्यभिधीयते, साधनात्-'अन्नं प्राणाः' इति, आधिपत्यात्-'अयं पुरुषः कुलम्', 'अयं गोत्रम्' इति। तत्रायं सहचरणाद् योगाद् वा जातिशब्दो व्यक्तौ प्रयुज्यते इति॥65॥

सहचरण स्थानतादर्थ्यवृत्तमानधारण सामीप्य योग साधनाधिपत्येभ्यः sahacharaṇa-sthāna-tādarthya-vṛtta-māna-dhāraṇa-sāmīpya-yoga-sādhana-ādhipatye-bhyaḥ, from association, place, purpose, function, measure, containing vicinity, conjunciton, sustenance and supremacy; ब्राह्मणमञ्चकटराज शक्तुचन्दन गङ्गा शटकान्न पुरुषेषु brāhmaṇa-mañcha-kaṭa-rāja-saktu chandana gaṅgā-śakata-anna-puruṣeṣu, in respect of a brāhmaṇa, scaffold, mat, king, flour, sandal wood, Gaṅgā, cart bullock, food and person; अतद्भावे a-tat-bhāve, in the absence of object or inherent meaning; अपि api, even; तदुपचारः tat-upachā-āḥ, its use.

196. Though a word does not literally bear a certain meaning it is used figuratively to covery the same, as in the case of Brahmana, scaffold, mat, king, flour sandalwood, Ganges, cart, food and man, in consideration of association, place, design, function measure, containing, vicinity, conjunction, sustenance and supremacy.—65.

If the word does not denote an individual, how is it that we refer to an individual cow by the expression "that cow is feeding"? The answer is that, though the word cow may not literally mean an individual, we may refer to the same figuratively. There are such instances as :—'Feed the staff' means 'feed the Brāhmaṇa holding a staff,' 'the scaffolds shout' means 'men on the scaffolds shout,' 'he makes a mat' means 'he aims at making a mat,' 'Yama' (chastiser) means 'a king,' 'a bushel of flour' means flour measured by a bushel, 'a vessel of sandal-wood' means 'sandal-wood placed in vessel,' 'cows are grazing on the Ganges means 'cows are grazing in the vicinity of the Ganges,' 'a black cart' means a cart marked with blackness, 'food' means 'life' and 'this person (Bharadvāja) is a clan' 'this person is the head of a clan.'

यदि 'गौः' इत्यस्य पदस्य न व्यक्तिरर्थः? अस्तु तर्हि—

आकृतिस्तदपेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वव्यवस्थानसिद्धेः॥ 66॥

आकृतिः पदार्थः, कस्मात? तदपेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वव्यवस्थानासिद्धेः=सत्त्वावयवानां तदवयवानां च नियतो व्यूह आकृतिः तस्यां गृह्यमाणायां सत्त्वव्यवस्थानां सिध्यति-'अयं गौः', 'अयमश्चः' इति, नाऽगृह्यमाणायाम्, यस्य ग्रहणात् सत्त्वव्यवस्थानं सिध्यति तं शब्दोऽभिधातुमर्हति=सोऽस्यार्थ इति। नैतदुपपद्यते-यस्य जात्या योगस्तदत्र जातिविशिष्टम-भिधीयते-'गौः' इति। न चावयवव्यूहस्य जात्या योगः। कस्य तर्हि? नियतावयवव्यूहस्य द्रव्यस्य, तस्माद् नाऽऽकृतिः पदार्थः॥66॥

आकृति ākṛtiḥ, form; तदपेक्षत्वात् tat-apekṣe-tvāt, as being dependent upon it; सत्त्वव्यवस्थानसिद्धेः sattva-vyavasthāna-siddheḥ, from the establishment of the identity or position of an entity.

197. Some say that the word (noun) denotes form by which an entity is recognised.—66.

We use such expressions as 'this is a cow' and 'this is a horse' only with reference to the forms of the cow and the horse. Hence, it is alleged by some that the word denotes form.

अस्तु तर्हि जातिः पदार्थः–

व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्तेऽप्यप्रसङ्गात्प्रोक्षणादीनां मृद्गवके जातिः॥ 67॥

जातिः पदार्थः, कस्मात्? व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्तेपि मृद्गवके प्रोक्षणादीनामप्रसङ्गदीति='गां प्रोक्षय', 'गामानय', 'गां देहि' इति नैतानि मृद्गवके प्रयुज्यन्ते, कस्मात्? जातेरभावात्, अस्ति हि वत्र व्यक्तिरस्ति आकृतिः, यदभावादत् तत्राऽसंप्रत्ययः स पदार्थ इति॥67॥

व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्ते vyakti-ākṛti-yukte, possesing individuality and form; अपि api, also; अप्रसङ्गात् a-prasaṅgāt, from non-applicaiton; प्रोक्षणादीनाम् prokṣaṇa-ādīnām, of immolation, etc.; मृद्गवके mṛt-gavake, in respect of an earthenware cow; जातिः jātiḥ, class or genus.

198. Others say that the word (noun) must denote genus, otherwise why in an earthenware cow, possessed of individuality and form, do we not find immolation, etc.?—67.

We can immolate a real cow, but not an earthenware cow, though the latter possesses individuality and form. The distinction between a real cow and an earthenware one is that the former comes under the genus cow, but the latter does not. Hence, it is urged by some that a word (noun) denotes genus.

नाकृतिव्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वाज्जात्यभिव्यक्तेः॥ 68॥

जातेरभिव्यक्तिः आकृतिव्यक्ती अपेक्षते=नाऽगृह्यमाणायामाकृतौ व्यक्तौ (च) जातिमात्रं शुद्धं गृह्यते तस्मान्न जातिः पदार्थ इति॥68॥

न na, no; अकृति व्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वात् ākṛti-vyakti-apekṣa-tvat, from being dependent upon form and individuality; जात्यभिव्यक्तेः jāti-abhivyakteḥ, of the manifestation of the genus.

199. In reply, we say that it is not genus alone that is meant by a word (noun), because the manifestation of genus depends on the form and individuality.—68.

The genus abides in the individual, and the individual cannot be recognised except by its form. Hence, genus has reference both to the form and individual, or, in other words, the genus alone is not the signification of a word.

न वै पदार्थेन भवितुं शक्यम्। कः खल्विदानीं पदार्थ इति?–

व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थः॥ 69॥

तुशब्दो विशेषाणार्थः, किं विशिष्यते? प्रधानाङ्गभावस्याऽनियमेन पदार्थत्वमिति, यदा हि भेदविवक्षा विशेषगतिश्च तदा जातिः प्रधानमङ्गं तु जात्याकृती, यदा तु भेदोऽविक्षितः सामान्यगतिश्च तदा जातिः प्रधानमङ्गं तु व्यक्त्याकृती, तदेतद् बहुलं प्रयोगेषु। आकृतेस्तु प्रधानभाव उत्प्रेक्षितव्यः॥69॥

व्यक्त्याकृतिजातय vyakti ākṛti-jātayaḥ, individual, form and genus; तु tu, but; पदार्थः padārthaḥ the object denoted by the word.

200. The meaning of a word (noun) is, according to us, the genus, form and individual.—69.

The word (noun) signifies all the three, though prominence is given to one of them. For the purpose of distinction, the individual is prominent. In order to convey a general notion, per-eminence is given to the genus. In practical concerns, much importance is attached to the form. As a fact, the word 'noun' ordinarily present to us the form, denotes the individual and connotes the genus.

कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते नाना व्यक्त्याकृतिजायत इति?. लक्षणभेदात्, तत्र तावत्–

व्यक्तिर्गुणविशेषाश्रयो मूर्तिः॥ 70॥

व्यज्यते इति व्यक्तिः=इन्द्रिय ग्राह्येति, न सर्वं द्रव्यं व्यक्तिः, यो गुणविशेषाणां स्पर्शान्तानां गुरुत्वद्रवत्वसंस्काराणाम् अव्यापिनः परिमाणस्याश्रयो यथासंभवं तद्द्रव्यं मूर्तिः–मूर्छितावयक्त्वादिति॥70॥

व्यक्ति vyaktiḥ, individual; गुणविशेषाश्रयः guṇa-viśeṣa-āśrayaḥ, the abode of particular attributes; मूर्तिः mūrtiḥ, body, substance.

201. An **individual** is that which has a definite form and is the abode of particular qualities.—70.

An **individual** is any substance which is cognised by the senses, as a limited abode of colour, taste, smell, touch, weight, solidity, tremulousness, velocity or elasticity.

आकृतिर्ज्जातिलिङ्गाख्या॥ 71॥

यया जातिर्जातिलिङ्गानि च प्रख्यायन्ते तामाकृतिं विद्यात्. सा च नाऽन्या सत्त्वावयवानां तदवयवानां च नियताद् व्यूहादिति। नियतावयवव्यूहाः खलु सत्त्वावयवा जातिलिङ्गम्–शिरसा

पादेन गामनुमिन्वनित=नियते च सत्त्वावयवानां व्यूहे सति गोत्वं प्रख्यायते इति। अनाकृतिव्यङ्ग्धायां जातौ 'मृत्', 'सुवर्णम्', 'जरतम्' इत्येवमादिष्वाकृतिर्निवर्तते=अहाति पदार्थव्वमिति।।71।।

आकृति ākṛtiḥ, form; जातिलिङ्गाख्या jāti-liṅga-ākhyā, that by which the genus and the marks of the genus are manifested.

202. The **form** is that which is called the token of the genus.—71.

The genus cowhood, for instance, is recognised by a certain collocation of the dewlap which is a form. We cannot recognise the genus of a formless substance.

समानप्रसवात्मिका जातिः।। 72।।

या समानां बृद्धिं प्रसूते भिन्नेष्वधिकरणेषु, यया बहूनि इतरेतरतो न व्यावर्तन्ते, योऽर्थोऽनेकत्र प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिनिमित्तं तत् सामान्यम्, यच्च केषां चिदभेदं केषांचिद् भेदं करोति तत् सामान्यविशेषो जातिरिति।।72।।

।। इति वात्स्यायनीये न्यायभाष्ये द्वितीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकं समाप्तम्।।

।। द्वितीयाध्यायश्चसमाप्तः।।

समानप्रसवात्मिका samāna-prasava-ātmikā, that the nature of which is to produce the same idea or cognition; जातिः jātiḥ, genus, class.

203. **Genus** is that whose nature is to produce the same conception.—72.

Cowhood is a genus which underlies all cows. Seeing a cow somewhere, we acquire a general notion of cows (*i.e.*, derive knowledge of cowhood). This general notion enables us on all subsequent occasions to recognise individual cows.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 4 : Of the Force of Words : Sūtras : 54-71.

Gotama now proceeds to determine the force of words on which depend the validity of Word as pramāṇa. A word consists of letters ending in an affix. Affixes are nominal or verbal. prefixes and indeclinables have their nominal affixes elided (Paṇini, II.iv.28). Words lead to the cognition of objects. It is therefore, necessary to determine the nature or force of words. Let us take the word, cow, for example. The Word is used to denote an individual, a form and a genus. The doubt

therefore arises as to whether it denotes any one or all of these objects. One party says that the word denotes the individual, because individuals which differ from one another and possess attributes, and not the genus which is unproduced, undifferentiated and devoid of form, parts and attributes, admit of (*a*) specification, this cow, that cow, etc.; (*b*) collection, a herd of cows; (*c*) gift, he gives cows, to the learned; (*d*) possession, the Brāhmaṇa's cow; (*d*) enumeration, ten cows; (*e*) growth, the cow grows; (*f*) emaciation, the cow grows lean; (*g*) colour, white cow; (*h*) association, the good of the cow; and (*i*) propagation, the cow produces a calf. To this we reply that the above uses of the word cow are rendered possible only because the objects indicated are endowed with genus cow-ness. The use of the word cow in respect of the individual is metaphorical, as in such cases as when we say, he is a Shakespeare, he dwells on the lake, he is weaving a mat (when the mat is yet non-existent), etc.

Some think that the form is the denotation of the work; because form consists in the configuration of parts which endures, and because without the cognition of the forms we cannot distinguish a cow form a horse. This is not correct, because mere form has no connection with the genus. It is the substance cow which is connected with the genus. When we say, wash the cow, bring the cow, we mean the substance in which the genus cow-ness is present, and not a wooden cow though it possess the appearance (individual) and form of a cow. Neither can the genus alone be the denotation of the word; for there can be no cognition of the genus without the cognition of the individual and form.

The truth is that the individual, form and genus are all the denotation of the word. There is no fixed rule of the relation as principal and secondary among them. The of the word is the same in regard to each of them. When specification is intended, the individiual becomes principal, genus and form become secondary; when specification is not intended, the genus becomes principal, the individual and form become secondary.

The individual is that which is manifested. It is perceptible by the senses. Every substance is not manifested to the senses. The individual is that substance which is produced by the conjunction of parts and which is the substratum, as far may be of specific attributes such as smell, taste, colour, touch, gravity, density, fluidity, impetus, and finite magnitude.

The form is that by which the genus and the marks of the genus are made known. It consists the in the enduring or fixed configuration of the parts of the entities, cow, etc., and of the parts of those parts.

The genus is that which produces similar cognition in respect of different substrata. By reason of it individual objects are not differentiated from one another. It is the cause of the assimilation of objects. It is a minor Sāmānya or genus when it estabishes non-difference of some objects among themselves and their difference from some other objects.

॥ इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने द्वितीयस्याऽध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ॥2॥

Book III, Chapter I

अन्येनायमन्यस्य व्यपदेशः, कस्मात्?–

दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणात्॥ 1॥

दर्शनेन यावदर्थो गृहीतः स्पर्शनेनापि सोऽर्थो गृह्यते–'यमहमद्राक्षं चक्षुषा तं स्पर्शनेनापि स्पृशामि, इति, 'यं चाऽस्पार्क्षं स्पर्शनेन तं चक्षुषा पश्यामि' इति, एकविषयौ चेमौ प्रत्यौ एककर्तृकौ प्रतिसंधीयेते, न च संघातकर्तृकौ, न (वा) इन्द्रियेणैककर्तृकौ, तद् योऽसौ चक्षुषा त्वागिन्द्रियेण चैकार्थस्य ग्रहीता भिन्ननिमित्तौ अनन्यकर्तृकौ प्रत्ययौ समानविषयौ प्रतिसंदधाति सोऽर्थान्तरभूत आत्मा। कथं पुनर्नेन्द्रियेणैककर्तृकौ? इन्द्रियं खलु स्वं स्वं विषयग्रहणमऽनन्यकर्तृकं प्रतिसंधातुमर्हति नेन्द्रियान्तरस्य विषयान्तरग्रहणमिति। कथं न संघातकर्तृकौ? एकः खल्वयं भिन्ननिमित्तौ स्वात्मकर्तृकौ प्रत्ययौ प्रतिसंहितौ वेदयते न संघातः, कस्मात्? अनिवृत्तं हि संघाते प्रत्येकं विषयान्तरग्रहणस्याऽप्रतिसंघानम् इन्द्रियान्तरेणेवेति॥1॥

दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्याम् darśana-sparśanābhyām, by means of sight and touch; एकार्थग्रहणात् eka-artha grahaṇāt, because of the apprehension of the some object.

204. A sense is not soul because we can apprehend an object through both sight and touch.—1.

"Previously I saw the jar and now I touch it :" such expression will be meaningless if "I" is not different from eye which cannot touch and from skin which cannot see. In other words, the "I or soul in distinct from the senses."

न विषयव्यवस्थानात्॥ 2॥

न देहादिसंघातादन्यश्चेतनः, कस्मात्? विषयव्यस्थानात्=व्यवस्थितविषयाणीन्द्रियानि-चक्षुष्यऽसति रूपं न गृह्यते, यच्च यस्मिन्नऽसति न भवति सति (च) भवति तस्य तदिति विज्ञायते, तस्माद् रूपग्रहणं चक्षुषः चक्षू रूपं पश्यति, एवं घ्राणादिष्वपीति।

तानीन्द्रियाणीमानि स्वस्वविषयग्रहणात् चेतनानि-इन्द्रियाणां भावाभावयोर्विषयग्रहणस्य तथाभावात्, एवं सति किमन्येन चेतनेन॥

संदिग्धत्वादहेतुः।

योऽयमिन्द्रियाणां भावाभावायोर्विषयग्रहणस्य तथाभावः स किं चेतनत्वात्? आहोस्वित् चेतनोपकरणानां ग्रहणनिमित्तत्वात्? इति संदिह्यते, चेतनोपकरणत्वेऽजीन्द्रियाणां ग्रहणनिमित्तत्वाद भवितुमर्हति॥2॥

न na, no; विषयव्यवस्थानात् visyay-vyavasthānāt, owing to the particular relation or allocation of the senses to the objects.

205. This is, some say, not so because there is a fixed relation between the senses and their objects.—2.

Colour, for instance, is an exclusive object of the eye, sound the ear, smell of the nose, and so on. It is the eye that, according the objectors, apprehends colour, and there is no necessity for assuming a soul distinct from the eye for the purpose of explaining the apprehension of colour.

यच्चोक्तम् ''विषयव्यवस्थानात्'' इति–

तद्व्यवस्थानादेवात्मसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः॥ 3॥

यदि खल्वेकमिन्द्रियमऽव्यवस्थितविषयं सर्वज्ञम्=सर्वविषयग्राहि चेतनं स्यात् कस्ततोऽन्यं चेतनमनुमातुं शक्नुयात्, यस्मात्तु व्यवस्थितविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि तस्मात् तेभ्योऽन्यश्चतनः सर्वज्ञः=सर्वविषयग्राही विषयव्यवस्थितिमतीतोऽनुमीयते, तत्रेदं प्रत्यभिज्ञान-मऽप्रत्याख्येयं चेतनवृत्तमद्यह्रियते-रूपदर्शी खल्वयं रसं गन्धं वा पूर्वगृहीतमनुमिनोति, गन्धप्रतिवेदी च रूपरसावऽनुमिनोति, एवं विषयशेषेपि वाच्यम्। रूपं दृष्ट्वा गन्धं जिघ्रति, घ्रात्वा च गन्धं रूपं पश्यति, तदेवमनियतपर्यायं सर्वविषयग्रहणम् एकचेतनाधिकरण-मऽनन्यकर्तृकं प्रतिसंधत्ते, प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमसंशयान् प्रत्ययांश्च नानाविषयान् स्वात्मकर्तृकान् प्रतिसंदधाति प्रतिसंधायवेदयते, सर्वार्थविषयं च शास्त्रं प्रतिपद्यते, अर्थमविषयभूतं श्रोत्रस्य, क्रमभाविनो वर्णान् श्रुत्वा पदवाक्यभावं प्रतिसंधाय शब्दार्थव्यवस्थां च बुध्यमानोऽनेक-विषयमर्थजातमग्रहणीयमेकैके-नेन्द्रियेण गृह्णाति, सेयं सर्वज्ञस्य ज्ञेयाऽव्यवस्थाऽनुपदं न शक्या परिक्रमितुम्। आकृतिमात्रं तूदाहृतम्, तत्र यदुक्तम्–'इन्द्रियचैतन्ये सति किमन्येन चेतनेन' (इति) तदयुक्तं भवति॥3॥

तद्व्यवस्थानात् tat-vyavasthānāt, from that allocation; एव eva, itself आत्मसद्भावात् ātma-sadbhāvāt, because of the existence of the soul; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-opposition.

206. This is, we reply, no opposition because the existence of soul is inferred from that very fixed relation.—3.

There is a fixed relation between the senses and their objects, *e.g.*, and not the ear that can apprehend colour, and it is the ear and not the eye that can apprehend sound. It a sense were the soul it could apprehend only one object, but "I" can apprehend many objects, that is, "I" can see colour, hear sound, and so on. Hence, the "I" or soul which confers unity on the various kinds of apprehension is different from the senses each of which can apprehend only one object.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 1 : The Senses are not the Soul : Sūtras : 1-3.

There are two kinds of predication : (1) a part is predicated of a whole of which it is a part, *e.g.* the tree stands by the roots; (2) one thing is predicated of a different thing, *e.g.* he cuts with the axe. What is the nature of the predication in such cases as "A man sees with eye, knows with the mind, discriminates with the intellet, feels pleasure and pain with the body"? Are the eye, the mind, the intellect and the body predicated as parts of a whole of which they are parts, or of something different from them? Thus, arises the doubt as to whether the soul is indentical with the organism of the body, the senses, the mind, the intellect and the feeling or distinct from it? The truth is that it is distinct from the organism of the body, etc. because the same object is apprehended by the different senses. That agents which apprehends the same objects by means of the different senses and assimilates of integrates the mutually independent intuitions of the different senses, is a different objects. It is the soul. The senses cannot effect the assimilation, because one senses cannot perform the function of another sense. Nor can the organism, because, being an aggregate, it lacks the unity of apperception (anuvyavasāya, I see *and* touch). It is true that objects are allotted to the senses; so that in the absence of a senses its objects cannot be apprehended. *E.g.* the blind cannot see, the deaf cannot hear. But this does not show that each sense is a conscious entity and that the supposition of another conscious entity is superfluous. For the apprehension or non-apprehension of objects according to the efficiency or inefficiency of the senses will be the same whether the senses are themselves regarded as the conscious agents or as the instruments of a conscious agent. On the contrary, the very fact that the senses are limited in their respective functions proves the existence of the soul, as conscious, all-knowing, the receiver of the contents of all the senses, unaffected by the distribution of objects among the senses. The following instances of the operations of the conscious agent will show that its recognition as a distinct entity cannot be avoided. (i) he who sees colour, infers (recalls)

taste and smell previously perceived. He who preceives smell infers colour and taste. And so in the case of the other senses also. Again, after seeing colour one smells the flavour, and after smelling flavour one sees colour. This assimilated apprehension of the objcets of all the senses without any fixed order of succession must take place in the same site and cannot have any other agent but the soul. (ii) It also assimilates the various intuitions of perception, inference, testimony and doubt, embracing manifold objects and having it as their cause, and assimiliating knows, as illustrated in is comprehending the contents of a book, treating of all sensible objects. This hearing letters uttered one after another, it integrates them as words and sentences and assimilates them with meaning which is not to be grasped by the ear; then, cognising the fixed relation of words and meanings, it apprehends quite a number of objects belonging to more than one sense, which cannot be apprehended by the senses severally. This absence of limitation of the objects to be known in the case of the all-knower, which meets us at every step, cannot be circumvented, by attributing consciousness to the senses.

इतश्च देहादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा न देहादिसंघातामात्रम्–

शरीरदाहे पातकाभावात्॥ 4॥

शरीरग्रहणेन शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिवेदनासंघातः प्राणिभूतो गृह्यते, प्राणिभूतं शरीरं दहतः प्राणिहिंसाकृतपापं पातकमित्युच्यते, तस्याभावः–तत्फलेन कर्तुरसंबन्धात् अकर्तुश्च संबन्धात्= शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिवेदनाप्रबन्धे खल्वन्यः संघात उत्पद्यतेऽन्यो निरुध्यते, उत्पाद निरोधसंततिभूतः प्रबन्धो नाऽन्यत्वंबाधते–देहादिसंघातस्याऽनयत्वाऽधिष्ठानत्वात्, अन्यत्वाधिष्टानो ह्यसौ प्रख्यायते इति, एवं सति यो देहादिसंघातः प्राणिभूतो हिंसां करोति नासौ हिंसाफलेन संबध्यते, यश्च संबध्यते न तेन हिंसा कृता, तदेवं सत्त्वभेदे कृतहानमकृताभ्यागमः प्रसज्यते, सति च सत्त्वोत्पादे, सत्त्वनिरोधे चाऽकर्मनिमित्तः सत्त्वसर्गः प्राप्नोति तत्र मुक्त्यर्थो ब्रह्मचर्यवासो न स्यात्। तद् यदि देहादिसंघातमात्रं सत्त्वं स्यात् शरीरदाहे पातकं न भवेत्, अनिष्टं चैतत्, तस्माद् देहादिसंघातव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा नित्य इति॥4॥

शरीरदाहे śarīra-dāhe, in burning the body, पातकाभावात् pātaka-abhāvāt, as there would be absence of sin.

207. If the **body** were soul there should be release from sins as soon as the body was burnt.—4.

If a person has no soul beyond his body he should be freed from sins when the body is destroyed. But in reality sins pursue him in his subsequent lives. Hence, the body is not soul.

The aphorism admits of another interpretation :—

If the **body** were soul there could arise no sin from killing living beings.

Our body varies in dimension and character with every moment. The body which exists at the present moment is not responsible for the sin which was committed at a previous moment inasmuch as the body which committed the sin is now non-existent. In other words, no sin would attach to the person who killed living beings if the soul were identical with our transient body.

तदभावः सात्मकप्रदाहेऽपि तन्नित्यत्वात्॥ 5॥

यस्यापि नित्येनात्मना सात्मकं शरीरं दह्यते तस्यापि शरीरदाहे पातकं न भवेद् दग्धुः, कस्मात्? नित्यत्वादात्मनः, न जातु कश्चित् नित्यं हिंसितुमर्हति, अथ हिंस्यते? नित्यत्वमस्य न भवति, सेयमेकस्मिन् पक्षे हिंसा निष्फला, अन्यस्मिस्त्वऽनुपपन्नेति॥5॥

तदभावः tat-abhāvaḥ, absence of sin; सात्मकप्रदाहे sa-ātmaka pradāhe, in burning the body endowed with a soul; अपि api, even; तन्नित्यत्वात् tat-nityatvāt, as the soul is eternal.

208. There would, says an objector, be no sin even if the body endowed with a soul were burnt, for the soul is eternal,—5.

In the previous aphorism it was shown that the commission of sins would be impossible if we supposed the body to be the soul. In the present aphorism it is argued by an objector that we should be incapable of committing sins even on the supposition of the soul being distinct from our body, for the such a soul is eternal and cannot be killed.

न कार्य्याश्रयकर्तृबधात्॥ 6॥

न ब्रूमः–नित्यस्य सत्त्वस्य वधो हिंसा अपि त्वनुच्छितिधर्मकस्य सत्त्वस्य कार्याश्रयस्य शरीरस्य स्वविषयोपलब्धेश्च कर्तृणामिन्द्रियाणामुपघातः=पीडा वैकल्यलक्षणः प्रबन्धोच्छेदो वा बधो हिंसेति, कार्यं तु सुखदुःखसंवेदनं तस्याऽऽयतनम्=अधिष्ठानम्=आश्रयः शारीरम्, कार्याश्रयस्य शरीरस्य स्वविषयोपलब्धेश्च कर्तृणामिन्द्रियाणं वधो हिंसा न नित्यस्यात्मनः, तत्र यदुक्तम्–"तदभावः सात्मकप्रदाहेपि तन्नित्यत्वात् 5" इति एतदयुक्तम्। यस्य सत्त्वोच्छेदो हिंसा तस्य कृतहानमकृताभ्यागमश्चेति दोषः। एतावच्चैतत् स्यात्–सत्त्वोच्छेदो वा हिंसा अनुच्छित्तिधर्मकस्य सत्त्वस्य कार्याश्रयकर्तृवधो वा, न कल्पान्तरमस्ति, सत्त्वोच्छेदश्च प्रतिषिद्धः, तत्र किमन्यच्छेषम्? यथाभूतामिति॥

अथ वा "कार्याश्रयकर्तृबधात्" इति कार्याश्रयः=देहेन्द्रियबुद्धिसंघातो नित्यस्यात्मनः

तत्र सुखदु:खप्रतिसंवेदनं तस्याऽधिष्ठानम्=आश्रय:=तदायतनं तद् भवति न ततोऽन्यदिति स एव कर्ता–तन्निमित्ता हि सुखदु:खसंवेदनस्य निर्वृत्तिर्न तमन्तेणेति, तस्य वध:=उपघात: पीडा प्रमापणं वा हिंसा न नित्यत्वेनात्मोच्छेद:, तत्र यदुक्तम्–''तदभाव: सात्मकप्रदाहेपि तन्नित्यत्वात्'' (इति) एतन्नेति।।6।।

न na, no; कार्य्याश्रयकर्तृबधात् kārya-āśraya kartṛ badhāt, because there is killing of the body which is at once the cause and the field of experience, or killing of the field of experience, *i.e.* the body and of its cause, *i.e.* the senses, of kitting of the embodied life of the soul.

209. In reply we say that it is not so because we are capable of killing the body which is the site of operation of the soul.—6.

Though the soul is indestructible we can kill the body which is the eat of its sensations. Hence, we are not incapable of committing sins by killing or murder. Moreover, if we do not admit a permanent soul beyond our frail body we shall be confronted by many absurdities such as "loss of merited action" (kṛta-hāni) and "gain of unmerited action" (akṛtābhyāgama). A man who has committed a certain sin may not suffer its consequences in this life and unless there is a soul continuing to his next life he will not suffer them at all. This is a "loss of merited action". Again, we often find a man suffering the consequences of action which he never did in this life. This would be a "gam of unmerited action," unless we believed that his soul did the action in his previous life.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 2 : The Body is not the Soul : Sūtras : 4-6.

In the Sūtra III. i. 4 the word "Body" stands for the living being in the shape of the organism of the body, the senses, cognitions and feelings. Now, the scriptures declare that killing is a sin and that sin accrues to the agent. (Even those Bauddhas who deny the existence of a soul adimts the existence of virtue and vice). But if there were no soul other than the organism of the body, senses, cognition and feelings, then the declaration of the scriptures would be meaningless and virtue and vice would be impossible. For, the organism undergoes changes at every moment and is nothing but a series of chanes one taking the place of another at every moment. It would follow that the organism to which the sin of killing would accrue would be different form the oragnism which would kill. Again, if re-birth be possible of such and organism it would not be due to past acts, so that there would be no law of 'karma' and study and practices for the sake of release would be

futile. It may be argued that in the case of the killing of an organism endowed with a soul there would also be no sin, for the reason that the soul is eternal and cannot be killed. But the argument does not hold good, because we do not say that killing is the destruction of an eternal entity. By killing we mean the destruction, or the causing the anaesthesia, disease, inefficiency, disturbance of the interconnections or the disorganisation of the body which is the field of the experience of pleasure and pain, and also of the senses which are the instruments of the apprehension of their respective objects. Or the Sūtra (III. i. 6) may mean that killing is the disturbance or disorganisation of the association of the soul with the organism of the body, senses and cognitions by virtue of which association only the soul is the agent in the experience of pleasure and pain, and without which it can have no experience. It does not mean the distruction of the soul as an eternal entity.

सव्यदृष्टस्येतरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्।। 7।।

पूर्वपरयोर्विज्ञानयोरेकविषये प्रतिसंधिज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्–'तमेवैतर्हि पश्यामि यमज्ञासिषम्', 'स एवायमर्थ:' इति, सव्येन चक्षुषा दृष्टस्येतरेणापि चक्षुक्षा प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्–'यमद्राक्षं तमेवैतर्हि पश्यामि' इति। इन्द्रियचैतन्ये तु नान्यदृष्टमन्य: प्रत्यभिजानातीति प्रत्यभिज्ञानानुपपत्ति: अस्ति त्विदं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं तस्मादिन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तश्चतन:।।7।।

सव्यदृष्टस्य savya-dṛṣṭasya, of that which is seen by the left eye; इतरेण itareṇa, by the other; प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् pratyabhijñānāt because there is recognition.

210. [There is a soul beyond the **sense**] becasue what is seen by the left eye is recognised by the right.—7.

A thing perceived previously by the left eye is recognised now by the right eye. This would have been impossible if the soul were identical with the left eye or the right eye on the principle that the seat of recognition must be the same as the seat of perception. Consequently we must admit that there is a soul which is distinct from the left and right eyes and which is the common seat of perception and recognition.

नैकस्मिन्नासास्थिव्यवहिते द्वित्वाभिमानात्।। 8।।

एकमिदं चक्षु: मध्ये नासास्थिव्यवहितं तस्यान्तौ गृह्यमाणौ द्वित्वाभिमानं प्रयोजयत: मध्यव्यवहितस्य दीर्घस्येव।।8।।

न na, no; एकस्मिन् ekasmin, in one and the same; नासास्थिव्यवहिते nā-ā-asthi-vyavahite, separated by the nasal bone; द्वित्वाभिमानात् dvitva-abhunānāt, because there arises the conceit of duality of the eye.

211. Some say that the eyes are not **two** : the conceit of duality arises from the single organ of vision being divided by the bone of the nose.—8.

The objectors argue as follows :—

If the eyes were really two, *viz.*, right and left, we would have been bound to admit a soul distinct from the senses as the common seat of perception and recognition. But there is only one eye which is divided by the bridge of the nose and which performs the two functions of perception and recognition. Hence there is according to the objectors, no soul beyond the eye.

एकविनाशे द्वितोयाविनाशान्नैकत्वम्।। 9।।

एकस्मिन्नुपहते चोद्धृते वा चक्षुषि द्वितीयमवतिष्ठते चक्षुर्विषयग्रहणलिङ्गं तस्मादेकस्य व्यवधानानुपपत्तिः।।9।।

एकविनाशे eka-vināśe, on the destruction of the one; द्वितीयाविनाशात् dvitīya-a-vināśāt, as there is non-destruction of the other. न na, not; एकत्वम् eka-tvam, unity.

212. The eyes we reply, are really two because the destruction of one does not cause the destruction of the other.—9.

If the organ of vision was only one, then on the destruction of that one (*i.e.*, one eye) there would be total blindness.

अवयवनाशेप्यवयव्युपलब्धेरहेतुः।। 10।।

"एकविनाशे द्वितीयाविनाशात्" इत्यहेतुः कस्मात्? वृक्षस्य हि कासु चिच्छाखासु च्छिन्नासूपलभ्यते एव वृक्षः।।10।।

अवयवनाशे avayava nāśe, on the destruction of a part; अपि api, even; अवयव्युपलब्धेः avayavi upalabdheḥ, as the whole is cognised; अहेतुः a hetuḥ, no reason.

213. This is, some say, no argument, for the destruction of a part does not cause the destruction of the whole.—10.

The objectors say :—Just as a tree does not perish though a branch of it has been destroyed, so there may not be total blindness though one eye (a part of the organ of vision) has been destroyed.

दृष्टान्तविरोधादप्रतिषेधः।। 11।।

न कारणद्रव्यविभागे कार्यद्रव्यमवतिष्ठते-नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्, बहुष्ववयवित्रिषु यस्य कारणानि विभक्तानि तस्य विनाशः येषां कारणान्यऽविभक्तानि तान्यऽवतिष्ठन्ते।

अथ वा दृश्यामानार्थविरोधो दृष्टान्तविरोधः-मृतस्य हि शिरःकपाले द्वावऽवटौ नासास्थिव्यवहितौ चक्षुषः स्थाने भेदेन गृह्येते न चैतद् एकस्मिन् नासास्थिव्यवहिते संभवति, अथ चैकविनाशस्याऽनियमाद् द्वाविमावऽर्थौ, तौ च पृथगावरणोपघातौ अनुमीयेते-विभिन्नाविति। अवपीडनाच्चैकस्य चक्षुषो रश्मिविषयसंनिकर्षस्य भेदाद् दृश्यभेद इव गृह्यते तच्चैकत्वे विरुध्यते, अवपीडननिवृत्तौ चाभिन्नप्रतिसंधानमिति, तस्मादेकस्य व्यवधानानुपपत्तिः।।11।।

दृष्टान्तविरोधात dṛṣṭānta-virodhāt, owing to conflict with the familiar instance; अप्रतिषेधः a pratiṣedhaḥ, non-opposition.

214. This is, we reply, no opposition to our argument inasmuch as your illustration is inapt.—11.

The illustration of a tree and its branch is not quite apt, for a tree does not exist in its entirely but assumes a mutilated condition when a branch of it is cut off. The right eye, on the other hand, remains in a perfect condition and performs the full function of an eye even when the left eye is destroyed.

अनुमीयते चायं देहादिसंघातव्यतिरिक्तश्चेतन इति–

इन्द्रियान्तरविकारात्।। 12।।

कस्य चिदम्लफलस्य गृहीततद्रससाहचर्ये रूपे गन्धे वा केन चिदिन्द्रियेण गृह्यमाणे रसनस्येन्द्रियान्तरस्य विकारो रसानुस्मृतौ रसगर्धिप्रवर्तितरे दन्तोदकसंप्लवभूतो गृह्यते तस्येन्द्रियचैतन्येऽनुपपत्तिः-नान्यदृष्टमन्यः स्मरति।।12।।

इन्द्रियान्तरविकारात् indriya-antara-vikārāt, as there takes place modificaiton of another sense.

215. The soul is distinct from the senses, because there is an excitement of one sense through the operation of another sense.—12.

When we see an acid substance, water overflows our tongue. In other words, in virtue of the operation of our visual sense there is an excitement in the sense of taste. This would be impossible unless there was a soul distinct from the senses. The soul seeing the acid substance

remembers its properties; and the remembrance of the acid properties excites the sense of taste.

न स्मृतेः स्मर्त्तव्यविषयत्वात्॥ 13॥

स्मृतिर्नाम धर्मो निमित्तादुत्पद्यते, तस्याः स्मर्तव्यो विषयः तत्कृत इन्द्रियान्तरविकारो नात्मकृत इति॥13॥

न na no; स्मृतेः smṛteḥ, of memory, recollection; स्मर्त्तव्यविषयत्वात् smartavya-viṣaya-tvāt, because it has the thing recollected as its object.

216. It is, some say, not so because **remembrance** is lodged in the object remembered.—13.

Remembrance, according to the objectors, is lodged in the thing remembered and does not necessarily presuppose a soul.

तदात्मगुणसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः॥ 14॥

तस्या आत्मगुणत्वे सति सद्भावादप्रतिषेध आत्मनः=यदि स्मृतिरात्मगुणः एवं सति स्मृतिरुपपद्यते-नान्यदृष्टमन्यः स्वरतीति। इनिद्रयचैतन्ये तु नानाकर्तृकाणां विषयग्रहणानाम-ऽप्रतिसंधानम्। प्रतिसंधाने वा विषयव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः। एकस्तु चतनोऽनेकार्यदर्शी भिन्ननिमित्तः पूर्वदृष्टमर्थं स्मरतीति। एकस्याऽनेकार्थदर्शिनो दर्शनप्रतिसंधानात् स्मृतेरात्मगुणत्वे सति सद्भावः, विपर्यये चानुपपत्तिः, स्मृत्याश्रयाः प्राणभृतां सर्वे व्यवहाराः। आत्मलिङ्गमुदाहरणमात्र-मिन्द्रियान्तरविकार इति॥14॥

तदात्मगुणसद्भावात् tat-ātma-guṇa sadbhāvāt, because of its exitence of a quality of the soul; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-opposition.

217. This is, we reply, no opposition because remembrance really a quality of the soul.—14.

Remembrance is based on perception, that is, one can remember only that thing which one has perceived. It often happens that seeing the colour of a thing we remember its smell. This would be impossible if remembrance was a quality of a sense, *e.g.*, the eye which has never smelt the thing. Hence remembrance must be admitted to be a quality of a distinct substance called soul which is the common seat of perception of colour and of smell.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 3 : The sense of sight is not one : Sūtras : 7-14.

What is seen with the right eye is recognised as having been seen with the left eye. Such recognition also is a mark of the existence of the soul. But the opponent urges that here at any rate a soul is not needed to

account for the phenomena, because the sense of sight is really one and appears as dual owing to its operating on either side of the nasal bone. The objection is futile. When one eye is destroyed the other does not suffer destriction along with it. Of course, a tree remains a tree even after a branch is cut off. But the analogy does not apply here. For a tree is an aggregate of parts each of which is an aggregate by itself. So that the destriction of a part does not entail the destruction of the other parts. But the eye is supposed to be a unity. Or, "Dṛṣṭānta-virodha" in the Sūtra (III.i. 11) may mean that the supposition is contrary to experience. For, in the skull there are two sockets for the eyes. Again, when one eyeball is pressed the apprehension of the object by the two eyes becomes different, and on the removal of the pressure the apprehension by the two eyes becomes similar.

Association of Ideas

The mouth waters on seeing or smelling an orange; this is due to the recollection of the taste. And this shows that consciousness is not in the sense, for what is seen by one is not recollected by another. To this the opponent replies by alleging that recollection is caused by the receipt (the object recollected) and that this, and not the soul, causes the action in the mouth at the sight or smell of an orange. But recollection must be an attribute of the soul, and as such prove the existence of the soul. On the supposition of the senses being conscious there would be either no recollection or there would be no order of recollection. For the senses are diverse agents and on the supposition there is nothing to assimilate or co-ordinate their experiences; hence, there would be no recollection. Or every senses would recollect the experience of every other sense; which is contrary to experience : one does not remember what is seen by another. It follows that there must be a different agent capable of apprehending diverse objects; and that is the soul. The affairs of living beings depend on memory. The watering of the mouth as the mark of the existence of the soul is a mere instance.

Then our opponent argues that memory does not infer the soul, because the cause of recollection is impression and is content the object recollected and not the soul in either case. But he has not exactly determined the content of memory. Let us see what it really is. The statement which indicates the content of memory takes one or another of the following form: (a) I knew that object; (b) I have known that object; (c) that object has been known by me ; and (d) I had knowledge in respect of this object. In each of these statements not merely the object, but the object previously known associated with the knower and the knowledge forms the content of memory; in other words, every act of recollection comprehends the agent, the act and the object of cognition.

This is in regard to an object which is not before the senses. In regard to an object which is before the senses, *i.e.* in the case of recognition, three cognitions are assimilated, proceeding form the one and the same agent and not from diverse agents nor from no agent. Thus, in the statement, I see now what I have seen before, the previous seeing and the consciousness of seeing are two cognitions, while the present seeing is the third cognition. These cognition combine to connect a single object with a single object with a single agent. Thus this content of memory, the soul, which the opponent leaves undetermined, but which is present in memory and is clearly known, is sought to be negated by the reason that the object remembered is the content of memory.

Memory is not mere memory nor is the object remembered its only content. The assimilation of experiences which takes place in an act of memory cannot be possible without something to which all objects are equally accessible, as in the case of assimilation in an act of cognition. A single knower within whose purview are all objects assimilates its own cognitions as I shall know that object, I know that object, I knew that object, and, desiring to know, and not knowing for a long time, feels cerain at last that knew the object. Similarly it assimilates memory drawing its contents from the time future, present and past, operating with the desire to remember. Were the entity merely a series of impressions (or ideas), as impressions (and ideas) disappear as they arise at every moment, not a single impression (or idea) would be left which could be aware of any cognition and act of memory in association with all the three times. And without such awareness there can be no assimilation of cognition and memory in the form of "I (know or remember)", "(This cognition or recollection is) Mine", as it is not possible in the case of cognition and memory in different bodies. It follows, therefore, that there does exist a single entity penetrating all objects which unites and maintains the unity of the series of cognitions and the series of memories with that of another on account of the absence of its operation in the latter's body.

अपरिसङ्ख्यानाच्च स्मृतिविषयस्य॥ 15॥

अपरिसंख्याय च स्मृतिविषयमिदमुच्यते–"न स्मृते: स्मर्तव्यविषयत्वात् 13" इति, येयं स्मृतिरगृह्यमाणेऽर्थे–'अज्ञासिषमहममुमर्थम् 1' इति एतस्या ज्ञातृज्ञानविशिष्ट: पूर्वज्ञातोर्थो विषयो नार्थमात्रम्। 'ज्ञातवानहममुमर्थम् 2', 'असावर्थो मया ज्ञात: 3', 'अस्मिन्नर्थे मम ज्ञानमभूत् 4' इति। चतुर्धिमेतद्वाक्यं स्मृतिविषज्ञापकं समानार्थम्= सर्वत्र खलु ज्ञाता ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं च गृह्यते।

अथ प्रत्यक्षेऽर्थे या स्मृतिस्तया त्रीणि ज्ञानानि एकस्मिन्नर्थे प्रतिसंधीयन्ते समान–कर्तृकाणि न नानाकर्तृकाणि नाऽकर्तृकाणि, किं तर्हि? एककर्तृकाणि। 'अद्राक्षममुमर्थं

यमेवैतर्हि पश्यामि' अद्राक्षमिति दर्शनं दर्शनसंविश्च–न खल्वसंविदिते स्वे दर्शने स्यादेतत्– अद्राक्षमिति। ते खल्वेते द्वे ज्ञाने। 'यमेवैतर्हि पश्यामि' इति तृतीयं ज्ञानम्। एवमेकोर्थस्त्रिभिर्ज्ञानैर्युज्यमानो नाऽकर्तृको न नानाकर्तृक:, किं तर्हि? एककर्तृक इति, सोऽयं स्मृतिविषयोऽपरिसंख्यायमानो विद्यमान: प्रज्ञातोऽर्थ: प्रतिषिध्यते–'नास्त्यात्मा– स्मृते: स्मर्तव्यविषयत्वात्' इति। न चेदं स्मृतिमात्रं स्मर्तव्यामात्रविषयं वा, इदं खलु ज्ञानप्रतिसंधानवत् स्मृतिप्रतिसंधानम्। एकस्य सर्वविषयत्वात्= एकोऽयं ज्ञाता सर्वविषय; स्वानि ज्ञानानि प्रतिसंधत्ते–'अमुमर्थं ज्ञास्यामि' अमुमर्थं विजानामि', 'अमुमर्थमज्ञासिषम्' अमुमर्थं जिज्ञासमानश्चिरमऽज्ञात्वाऽध्यवस्यति–'अज्ञासिषम्' इति, एवं स्मृतिमपि त्रिकालविशिष्टां सुस्मूर्षाविशिष्टां च प्रतिसंधत्ते।

संस्कारसंततिमात्रे तु सत्त्वे उत्पद्योत्पद्य संस्कारास्तिरोभवन्ति, स नास्त्येकोपि संस्कारो यस्त्रिकालविशिष्टं ज्ञानं स्मृतिं चानुभवेत्। न चानुभवमन्तरेण ज्ञानस्य स्मृतेश्च प्रतिसंधानम् अहं मम इति चोत्पद्यते देहान्तरवत्, अतोऽनुमीयते– अस्त्येक: सर्वविषय: (य:) प्रतिदेहं स्वज्ञानप्रबन्धं स्मृतिप्रबन्धं च प्रतिसंधत्ते इति। यस्य देहान्तरेषु वृत्तेरभावान्न प्रतिसंधानं भवतीति॥15॥

218. Also because the things remembered are innumerable.—15.

If memory were lodged in things, we cound remember innumerable things at a time. But none can remember more things than one at a time. Hence, memory must be supposed to be a quality of a separate substance called soul (endowed with a mind).

नात्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां मनसि सम्भवात्॥ 16॥

न देहादिसंघातव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा, कस्मात्? आत्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां मनसि संभवात्= "दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणात्" इत्येवमादीनामाऽऽत्मप्रतिपादकानां हेतूनां संभव:–यतो मनो हि सर्वविषयमिति, तस्मान्न शरीरेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिसंघातव्यतिरिक्त आत्मेति॥16॥

न na, no; आत्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां ātma-pratipatti-hetūnām, of the reasons proofs of the existence of a separate soul; मनसि manasi, to the mind; सम्भवात् sambhavāt, because of applicability.

219. There is, some say, no soul other than the mind because the arguments which are adduced to establish the "soul" are applicable to the mind.—16.

The substance of the objection is this :—

We can apprehend an object by both the eye and the skin. It is true that the acts of seeing the touching the object by one agent cannot be explained unless we suppose the agent to be distinct from both the

eye and the skin (*i.e.*, from the senses), let however, the agent be identified with the mind.

ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानसाधनोपपत्तेः संज्ञाभेदमात्रम्॥ 17॥

ज्ञातुः खलु ज्ञानसाधनान्युपपद्यन्ते-'चक्षुषा पश्यति' 'घ्राणेन जिघ्रति, 'स्पर्शनेन स्पृशति' एवं मन्तुः सर्वविषयस्य मतिसाधनमऽन्तःकरणभूतं सर्वविषयं विद्यते येनायं मन्यते इति एवं सति ज्ञातर्याऽऽत्मसंज्ञा न मृष्यते मनस्संज्ञाऽभ्यनुज्ञायते, मनसि च मनस्संज्ञा न मृष्यते मतिसाधनसंज्ञा मृष्यते, तदिदं संज्ञाभेदमात्रं नाऽर्थे विवाद इति। प्रत्याख्याने वा सर्वेन्द्रियविलोपप्रसङ्गः=अथ मन्तुः सर्वविषयस मतिसाधनं सर्वविषयं प्रत्याख्यायते-नास्तीति? एवं रूपादग्रिहणसाधनान्यपि न सन्तीति सर्वेन्द्रियविलोपः प्रसज्यते इति॥17॥

ज्ञातु jñātuḥ, of the knower; ज्ञानसाधनोपपत्तेः jñāna-sādhana-upapatteḥ, as there must be instruments of knowing; संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् saṁjñā-bheda-mātram, mere difference of name.

220. Since there is a knower endowed with an instrument of knowledge it is, we reply, mere verbal trick to apply the name "mind" to that which is really the "soul."—17.

To explain the acts of seeing, touching, etc. you admit an agent distinct from the senses which are called its instruments. The sense or instrument by which the at of thinking is performed is called the "mind." The agent sees by the eye, hears by the ear, smells by the nose, tastes by the tongue, touches by the skin and thinks by the "mind." Hence, we must admit the agent (soul) over and above the mind. It you call the agent as "mind," you will have to invent another name to designate the instrument. This verbal trick will not, after all affect our position. Moreover, the mind cannot be the agent as it is atomic in nature. An atomic agent cannot perform the acts of seeing, hearing, knowing, feeling etc.

नियमश्च निरनुमानः॥ 18॥

योऽयं नियम इष्यते-रूपादिग्रहणसाधनान्यऽस्य सन्ति मतिसाधनं सर्वविषयं नास्तीति, अयं नियमो निरनुमानः-नात्रानुमानमस्ति ये नियमं प्रतिपद्यामहे इति। रूपादिभ्यश्च विषयान्तरं सुखादयस्तदुपलब्धौ करणान्तरसद्भावः, यथा चक्षुवा गन्धो न गृह्यते इति करणान्तरं घ्राणम् एवं चक्षुर्घ्राणाभ्यां रसो न गृह्यते इति करणान्तरं रसनम् एवं शेषेध्वपि, तथा चक्षुरादिभिः सुखादयो न गृह्यन्ते इति करणान्तरेण भवितव्यं तच्च ज्ञानाऽयौगपद्यलिङ्गम्, यच्च सुखाद्युपलब्धौ करणं तच्च ज्ञानायौगपद्यलिङ्गम्=तस्येन्द्रियमिन्द्रियं प्रति संनिधेरसंनिधेर्न युगपत् ज्ञानान्युत्पद्यन्ते इति, तत्र यदुक्तम्-"आत्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां मनसि संभवात् 16" इति तदयुक्तम्॥18॥

नियमः niyamaḥ, rule; च cha, and; निरनुमानः nir-anumānaī, devoid of inference.

221. Your conclusion is moreover opposed to inference. —18.

We admit a mind apart from the soul. If you deny any one of them or identify one with the other, an absurd conclusion will follow. Unless you admit the mind you will not be able to explain the internal perception. By the eye you can see, by the ear you can hear, by the nose you can smell, by the tongue you can taste and by the skin you can touch. By what sense do you carry on internal perception *viz.*, thinking imagining, etc.? Unless you admit the mind for that purpose your conclusion will be opposed to inference.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 4: The mindis not the soul : Sūtras : 15-18.

But, urges the opponent, the function attributed to the sol may all be possible for the mind. We reply that opponent is quarrelling about names and not about the reality. The instruments of knowledge such as the eye, nose, touch, must belong to a knower. So also does the thinker penetrating all objects posess an instrument of thinking in the form of the internal organ competent to reach all objects. That being so, the opponent errs in calling the knower the mind and not the soul, and not allowing the mind to be called the mind, though admitting that it is the instrunent of thought. On the other hand, if he denies that the thinker possesses an instrument of thought which can reach all object, then the knower can very well do without the instruments of knowledge, and the opposition will thereby entail the disappearance of all the senses as well. The distinction between sense-experience and thought-experience is not unfounded. Each sense is limited to its special object and cannot go beyond that limit. None of the senses can reach that other class of objects which include pleasure, etc. For the cognition of pleasure, etc. a different instrument is needed. It is known by its mark of non-simultaneity of cognitions, due to its coming into contact with the external senses one at a time.

किं पुनरयं देहादिसंघातादन्यो नित्यः? उपाऽनित्यः? कुतः संशयः?, उभयथा दृष्टात्वात् संशयः-विद्यमानमुभयथा भवति नित्यमनित्यं च, प्रतितिपादिते चात्मसद्भावे संशयाऽनिवृत्तेरिति। आत्मसद्भवहेतुभिरेवास्य प्राग्देहभेदादवस्थानां सिद्धम् ऊर्ध्वमपि देहभेदादवतिष्ठते। कुतः?-

पूर्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धाज्जातस्य हर्षभयशोकसंप्रतिपत्तेः॥ 19॥

जातः खल्वयं कुमारोऽस्मिन् जन्मन्यऽगृहीतेषु हर्षभयशोकहेतुषु हर्षभयशोकान्

प्रतिपद्यते लिङ्गानुमेयान्, ते च स्मृत्यनुबन्धादुत्पद्यन्ते नान्यथा, स्मृत्यनुबन्धश्च पूर्वाभ्यासमन्तरेण न भवति, पूर्वाभ्यासश्च पूर्वजन्मनि सति नान्यथा इति सिध्यत्येतत्-अवतिष्ठतेऽयमूर्ध्वम् (प्राक् च) शरीरभेदादिति॥19॥

पूर्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धात् pūrva-abhyasta-smṛti-anubandhāt, from association with, or sequence from, memory previously experienced; जातस्य jātasya, of the new-born, the child; हर्षभयशोकसंप्रतिपत्तेः harṣa-bhaya-śoka-sampratipatteḥ, on account of the occurrence of pleasure, fear and grief.

222. (The soul is to be admitted) on account of joy, fear and grief arising in a child from the memory of things previously experienced.—19.

A new-born child manifests makes of joy, fear and grief. This is inexplicable unless we suppose that the child perceiving certain things in this life remembers the corresponding things of the past life. The things which used to excite joy, fear and grief in the past life continue to do so in this life. The memory of the past proves the previous birth as well as the existence of the soul.

पद्मादिषु प्रबोधसंमीलनविकारवत्तद्विकारः॥ 20॥

यथा पद्मादिष्वऽनित्येषु प्रबोधः संमीलनं (च) विकारो भवति, एवंमनित्यस्यात्मनो हर्षभयशोकसंप्रतिपत्तिर्विकारः स्यात्॥

हेत्वभावादयुक्तम्=अनेन हेतुना पद्मादिषु प्रबोधसंमीलनविकारवद् अनित्यस्यात्मनो हर्षादिसंप्रतिपत्तिरिति नात्रोदाहरणसाधर्म्यात् साप्रयसाधनं हेतुर्न वैधर्म्यादस्ति, हेत्वभावात्-असंबद्धार्थकमपार्थकमुच्यते इति। दृष्टान्ताच्च हर्षदिनिमित्तस्याऽनिवृत्तिः=या चेयमासेवितेषु विषयेषु हर्षदिसंप्रतिपत्तिः स्मृत्यनुबन्धकृता प्रत्यात्मं गृह्यते सेयं पद्मादिसंमीलनदृष्टान्तेन न निवर्तते, यथा चेयं न निवर्तते तथा जातमात्रस्यापीति। क्रियाजातश्च पर्णविभागसंयोगः प्रबोधसंमीलने, क्रियाहेतुश्च क्रियानुमेयः, एवं च सति किं दृष्टान्तेन प्रतिषिध्यते?॥20॥

पद्मादिषु padma-ādiṣu, in the case of the lotus, etc.; प्रबोधसंमीलनविकार-वत् prabodha-sammīlana vikāra-vat, like the modification of opening and closing; तद्विकारः tat-vikāraḥ, its modification.

223. It is objected that the changes of countenance in a child are life those of expanding and closing up in a lotus.—20.

The objection stands thus :—

Just as a lotus which is devoid of memory expands and closes up

by itself, so a child expresses joy, fear and grief even without the recollection of the things with which these were associated in the previous life.

अथ निर्निमित्तः पद्मादिषु प्रबोधसंमीलनविकार इति मतम् एवमात्मनेपि हर्षादिसंप्रतिपत्तिरिति? तच्च–

नोष्णाशीतवर्षकालनिमित्तत्वात् पञ्चात्मकविकाराणाम्॥ 21॥

उष्णादिषु सत्सु भावाद् असत्स्वऽभावाद् तन्निमित्ताः पञ्चभूतानुग्रहेण निर्वृत्तानां पद्मादीनां प्रबोधसंमीलनविकारा इति न निर्निमित्ताः, एवं हर्षादयोपि विकारा निमित्ताद् भवितुमर्हन्ति न निमित्तमन्तरेण, न चान्यत् पूर्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धाद् निमित्तमस्तीति। न चोत्पत्तिनिरोधकारणानुमानमाऽऽत्मनः–अदृष्टान्तात्। न हर्षादीनां निमित्तन्तरेणोत्पत्तिः। नोष्णादिवद् निमित्तान्तरोपादानं हर्षादीनाम्, तस्मादयुक्तमेतत्॥21॥

न na, no; उष्णाशीतवर्षकालनिमित्तत्वात् uṣṇa śīta-va-ṣa-kāla-nimitta tvāt, because of their being caused by heat, cold, rain and season; पञ्चात्मकविकाराणाम् pañcha-ātmaka-vikārāṇām, of the modifications or changes in things constituted by the five (elements).

224. This is, we reply, not so because the changes in inanimate things are caused by heat, cold, rain an season.—21.

The changes of expansion and contraction in a lotus are caused by heat and cold. Similarly, the changes of countenance in a child must be caused by something. What is that things? It is the recollection of pleasure and pain associated with the things which are perceived.

इतश्च नित्य आत्मा–

प्रेत्याहाराभ्यासकृतात् स्तन्याभिलाषात्॥ 22॥

जातामात्रस्य वत्सस्य प्रवृत्तिलिङ्गः स्तन्याभिलाषो गृह्यते स च नान्तरेणाऽऽहाराभ्यासम्। कया युक्त्या?, दृश्यते हि शरीरिणां क्षुधा पीड्यमानानामाहाराभ्यांसकृतान् स्मरणानुबन्धादा-हाराभिलाषः, न च पूर्वशारीराभ्यासमन्तरेणासौ जातमात्रस्योपपद्यते, तेनानुमीयते-भूतपूर्वं शरीरम् यत्राऽनेनाहारोऽभ्यस्त इति, स खल्वयमात्मा पूर्वशरीरात् प्रेत्य शरीरान्तरमापन्नः क्षुत्पीडितः पूर्वाभ्यस्तमाहारमनुस्मरन् स्तन्यमभिलधति, तस्मान्न देहभेदादात्मा भिद्यते=भवत्येवोर्ध्वं देहभादादिति॥22॥

प्रेत्य pretya, transmigrating; अहाराभ्यासकृतात् āhāra-abhyāsa-kṛtāt, produced by the habit of eating (in the previous life); स्तन्याभिलाषात् stanya abhilāṣāt, from the desire for the mother's milk.

225. A child's desire for milk in this life is caused by the practice of his having drunk it in the previous life.—22.

A child just born drinks the breast of his mother through the remembrance that he did so in the previous life as a means of satisfying hunger. The child's desire for milk in this life is caused by the rememberance of his experience in the previous life. This proves that the child's soul, though it has abandoned a previous body and has accepted a new one, remembers the experiences of the previous body.

अयसोऽयस्कान्ताभिगमनवत्तदुपसर्पणम्॥ 23॥

यथा खल्वयऽयोऽभ्यासमन्तरेणाऽयस्कान्तमुपसर्पति एवमाहराभ्यासमन्तरेण बाल: स्तन्यमभिलषति।।23।।

अयस: ayasaḥ, of the iron; अयस्कान्ताभिगमनवत् ayaskānta-abhigamanavat, like the approach to the loadstone; तदुपसर्पणम् tat-upasarpaṇam, the approach of the infant.

226. Some deny the above by saying that a new-born child approaches the breast of his mother just as an iron approaches a loadstone (without any cause).—23.

The objection runs thus :—

Just as an iron approaches a loadstone by itself, so does a child approach the breast of his mother without any cause.

किमिदमयसोऽयस्कान्ताभिगमनं निर्निमित्तम्? अथ निमित्तात्? इति, निर्निमित्तं तावत्–

नान्यत्र प्रवृत्त्यभावात्॥ 24॥

यदि निर्निमित्तम्? लोष्टादयोप्ययस्कान्तमुपसर्पयेयु:– न जातु नियमे कारणमस्तीति। अथ निमित्तात्? तत् केनोपलभ्यते? इति, क्रियालिङ्ग: क्रियाहेतु: क्रियानियमङ्गिश्च क्रियानियमहेतु: तेनान्यत्र प्रवृत्त्यभाव:। बालस्यापि नियतमुपसर्पणं क्रियोपलभ्यते, न च स्तन्याभिलाषलिङ्गम् अन्यदाहाराभ्यासकृतात् स्मरणानुबन्धात्, निमित्तं दृष्टान्तोनोपपाद्यते, न चाऽसति निमित्ते कस्य चिदुत्पत्ति:, न च दृष्टान्तो दृष्टामभिलाषेतुं बाधते, तस्मादयसो–ऽस्कान्ताभिगमनमऽदृष्टान्त इति।

अयस: खल्वपि नान्यत्र प्रवृत्तिर्भवति=न जात्वऽयो लोष्टमुपसर्पति। किंकृतोस्य नियम:? इति, यदि कारणनियमात् सच क्रियानियमलिङ्ग:, एवं बालस्यापि नियतविषयोऽभिलाष: कारणनियमाद् भवितुमर्हति, तच्चकारणमभ्यस्तस्मरणम् अन्येद्वेति दृष्टेन विशिष्यते= दृष्टो कि शरीरिणामभ्यस्तस्मरणादाहराभिलाष इति।।24।।

न na, no; अन्यत्र anyatra, elsewhere; प्रवृत्त्यभावात् pravṛtti-abhāvāt, on account of absence of activity.

227. This is, we reply, not so because there is no approach towards any other things.—24.

You say that there is no cause which makes an iron approach a loadstone, or a child the breast of his mother. How do you then explain that an iron approaches only a loadstone but not a clod of earth and a child approaches only the breast of his mother and not any other thing? Evidently there is some cause to regulate these fixed relations.

इतश्च नित्य आत्मा, कस्मात्?–

वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात्॥ 25॥

सरागो जायते इत्यर्थादापद्यते, अयं जायमानो रागानुविद्धो जायते, रागस्य पूर्वानुभूतविषयानुचिन्तनं योनि:, पूर्वानुभवश्च विषयाणां पूर्वस्मिन् जन्मनि शरीरमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते, सोयमात्मा पूर्वशरीरानुभात् विषयान् अनुस्मरन् तेषु तेषु रज्यते, तथा चायं द्वयोर्जन्मनो: प्रतिसन्धि:, एवं पूर्वशरास्य पूर्वतरेण पूर्वतरशरीरस्य पूर्वतमेन इत्यादिनाऽनादिश्चतनस्य शरीरयोग: अनादिश्च रागानुबन्ध इति सिद्धं नित्यत्वमिति।।25।।

वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात् vīta rāga-janma-a-darśanāt, because the rebirth of one who is free from desire is not observed.

228. We find that none is born without desire.—25.

Every creature is born with some disires which are associated with the things enjoyed by him in the past life. In other words, the desire proves the existence of the creature or rather of his soul in the previous lives. Hence, the soul is eternal.

कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते–पूर्वविषयानुचिन्तनजनितो जातस्य राग: न पुन:–

सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत्तदुत्पत्ति:॥ 26॥

यथोत्पत्तिधर्मकस्य द्रव्यस्य गुणा: कारणत उत्पद्यन्ते तथोत्पत्तिधर्मकस्यात्मनो राग: कुतश्चिदुत्पद्यते। अत्रयमुदितानुवादो निदर्शनार्थ।।26।।

सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत् sa-guṇa-dravya-utpatti-vat, like the production of substances endowed with qualities; तदुत्पत्ति: tat-utpattiḥ, its production.

229. Some say that the soul is not eternal because it may be produced along with desire as other things are produced along with their qualities.—26.

The objection stands thus :—

Just as a jar, when it is produced, is distinguished by its colour, etc. so the soul when it is produced is marked by its desire, etc. Hence,

the desires do not pre-suppose the soul in the previous lives or, in other words, the soul is not eternal.

न संकल्पनिमित्तत्वाद्रागादीनाम्।। 27।।

न खलु सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवद् उत्पत्तिरात्मनो रागस्य च। कस्मात्? संकल्पनिभित्तत्वाद्रागादीनाम्=अयं खलु प्राणिनां विषयानाऽऽसेवमानानां संकल्पजनितो रागो गृह्यते, संकल्पश्च पूर्वानुभूतविषयानुचिन्तनयोनिः तेनानुमीयते-जातस्यापि पूर्वानुभूतार्थचिन्तनकृतो राग इति। आत्मोत्पादाधिकरणात्तु रागोत्पत्तिर्भवन्ती संकल्पादन्यस्मिन् रागकारणे सति वाच्या कार्यद्रव्यगुणवत्, न चात्मोत्पादः सिद्धः नापि संकल्पादन्यद् रागकारणमस्ति, तस्मादयुक्तम्-'सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत्तयोरुत्पत्तिः' इति। अथापि संकल्पादन्यद् रागकारणं धर्माधर्मलक्षणमदृष्टामुपादीयते तथापि पूर्वशरीरयोगोऽत्याख्येयः-तत्र हि तस्य निर्वृत्तिर्नाऽस्मिन् जन्मनि।।

तन्मयत्वाद्राग इति।

विषयाभ्यासः खल्वयं भावनाहेतुस्तन्मयत्वमुच्यते इति।।

जातिविशेषच्च रागविशेष इति।

कर्म खल्विदं जातिविशेषनिर्वर्तकं तादात्म्यात् ताच्छब्द्यं विज्ञायते, तस्मादनुपपन्नम्-संकल्पादन्यद् रागाकारणमिति।।27।।

न na, no; संकल्पनिमित्तत्वात् saṃkalpa-nimitta-tvāt, because of the being caused by saṃkalpa, *i.e.* volition (springing from the recollection of past experience); रागादीनाम् rāga ādīnām, of desire, etc.

230. This is, we reply, not so because the desire in a new-born child is caused by the ideas left in his soul by the things he enjoyed in his previous lives.—27.

The desire implies that the soul existed in the previous lives or, in other words, the soul is eternal.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 5 : The Soul is eternal : Sūtras : 19-27.

Some entities are eternal, some are non-eternal. Is the soul which is established as distinct from the organism of the body, senses, mind and cognitions eternal or non-eternal? The answer is that the very reasons which prove the existence of the soul throughout the stages of infancy, childhood, youth and old age, also prove its existence after its separation from the body, etc. For, an infant to whom the things to the world are yet unknown feels joy, fear and grief. This is rendered possible by memory, and not otherwise, and memory depends upon past experience,

and this epends upon past life and nothing else. The somatic resonance of the infant in the presence of the cause of joy, fear and grief cannot be explained on the analogy the opening and closing of a lotus; for in the case of a full grown man it is found that his changes of countenance due to joy, fear and grief are not automatic like the opening and closing of a lotus. There is therefore no reason why these should be so in the case of an infant. Moreover, the changes in a lotus are known to be due to a definite cause, namely the action of heat, cold, rain and season, and are not quite automatic. Similary the changes of joy, etc. must be due to a definite cause, and that cause cannot be anything but the continuity of memory. Again, the new-born baby's instinctive desire for the mother's milk shows the habit of taking food and this habit necessarily implies a previous body in which the soul has experienced hunger and its satisfaction with food. This instinctive desire for food bears no analogy to the attraction of the iron towards a magnet. But the cause is not apparent to the eye and has to be inferred both as regards its nature and its limitation. The inference must be make from the action itself. Thus iron approaches only a magnet, and only at a certain distance. Similarly only an infant moves for food only and when in the mother's arms. Is the cause of such movement past habit or something else? it is seen that memory of past experience causes adults to approach food for the satisfaction of hunger. The same must be the cause also in the of the infant.

Then a man is born possessing Attraction, and the source of Attraction is the after-thought of the contents of previous experience which can be possible only in a previous body. The soul, remembering the objects experienced in a previous body, becomes attracted to those objects. Attraction thus links together two successive births and it is not possible to point to a beginning of its connection with the body.

But how do you know that the recollection of past experience gives rise to Attraction in a new-born baby, and that it is not produced in the same way as are the properties of a substance (*e.g.*, jar) along with the substance itself from the same cause? The soul and its attraction are not produced simultaneously like a pot and its properties, because Attraction, etc. are due to saṅkalpa, imagination, thought. It is seen that Attraction is produced by the thought of living beings enjoying objects, the thought springs from the memory of past experiences. Hence, it is inferred that the Attraction which the baby feels is also caused by the memory of past experiences. Attraction could be produced like the property of a pot were the soul a product and were the cause of Attraction something other than the memory of past experiences. But neither of these is the case. Should it be supposed that adṛṣṭa, *i.e.*, merit and

demerit, is the cause of Attraction, even then connection with a previous body cannot be denied; for the production of adṛṣṭa a must have taken place in the previous life and not in this.

The truth is that Attraction for an object arises from the entire occupation of the mind with that object, and this is nothing but habitual experience of the object which determines modes of thinking in future. Attraction differs according to the sphere of brith which is determined by karma or adṛṣṭa, and the new-born entity deries its name from the sphere of its birth.

अनादिश्चेतनस्य शरीरयोग इत्युक्तम्, स्वकृतकर्मनिमित्तं चास्य शरीरं सुखदुःखाधिष्ठान् तत् परीक्ष्यते–किं घ्राणादिवदेकप्रकृतिकम्? उत नानाप्रकृतिकम्? इति। कुतः संशयः?, विप्रतिपत्तः संशयः–पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि संख्याविकल्पेन शरीरप्रकृतिरिति प्रतिजानते इति। किं तत्र तत्त्वम्?–

पार्थिवं गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः॥ 28॥

तत्र मानुषं शरीरं पार्थिवम्, कस्मात्? गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः=गन्धवती पृथिवी गन्धवच्च शरीरम्, अबादीनामऽगन्धत्वात् तत्प्रकृति अगन्धं स्यात्। न त्विदमवादिभिरसंपृक्तया पृथिव्याऽऽरब्धं चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयभावेन कल्पते इत्यतः पञ्चानां भूतानां संयोगे सति शरीरं भवति; भूतसंयोगो हि मिथः पञ्चानां न निषिद्ध इति। आप्यतैजसवायव्यानि लोकान्तरे शरीराणि तेष्वपि भूतसंयोगः पुरुषार्थतन्त्र इति। स्थाल्यादिद्रव्यनिष्पत्तावपि निस्संशयः–नाऽवादिसंयोगमन्तरेण निष्पत्तिरिति।

'पार्थिवाप्यतैजसम्–तद्गुणोपलब्धेः', 'निःश्वासोच्छ्वासोपलब्धेश्चातुर्भौतिकम्', 'गन्धक्लेदपाकव्यूहावकाशदानेभ्यः पाञ्चभौतिकम्' ते इमे संदिग्धा हेतव इत्युपेक्षितवान् सूत्रकारः। कथं संदिग्धाः?, सति न प्रकृतिभावे भूतानां धर्मोपलब्धिः असति च संयोगा–प्रतिषेधात् संनिहितानामिति, यथा स्थाल्यामुदकतेजोवाय्वाकाशानामिति। तदिदमनेकभूतप्रकृति (सत्) शरीरम् अगन्धमऽरसमऽरूपमऽस्पर्शं च प्रकृत्यनुविधानात् स्यात्, न त्विदमित्थम्भूतं तस्मात् पार्थिवं गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः॥28॥

पार्थिवं pārthivam, earthy; गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः guṇa-antara-upalabdheḥ, becuase of the perception of the quality of the earth.

231. Our body is earthy because it possesses the special qualities of earth.—28.

In other worlds there are beings whose bodies are watery, fiery, airy or ethereal. Though our body is composed of all the five elements we call it earthy owing to the preponderance of earth in it.

पार्थिवाप्यतैजसं तद्गुणोपलब्धेः॥ 29॥

पार्थिवाप्यतैजसं pārthiva-āpya-taijasam, composed of elements of earth, water, and fire; तद्गुणोपलब्धेः tat-guṇa-upalabdheḥ, because of the perception of their attributes.

232. The body is composed of the elements of earth, water and fire, as the attributes of these elements are perceived in it.—29.

अथेदानीमिन्द्रियाणि प्रमेयक्रमेण विचार्यन्ते–किमाऽऽव्यक्तिकानि? आहोस्विद् भौतिकानि? इति। कुतः संशयः?–

निःश्वासोच्छ्वासोपलब्धेश्चातुर्भौतिकम्॥ 30॥

निःश्वासोच्छ्वासोपलब्ध niḥśvāsa-uchchhvāsa-upalabdheḥ, because of the perception of in breathing and out-breathing; चातुर्भौतिकं chātur-bhautikam, composed of four elements.

233. The body is composed of four elements, because it performs the operations of in-breathing and out breathing.—30.

अभौतिकानीत्याह, कस्मात्?–

गन्धक्लेदपाकव्यूहावकारशदानेभ्यः पाञ्चभौतिकम्॥ 31॥

गन्धक्लेदपाकव्यूहावकाशदानेभ्यः gandha-kleda-pāka-vyūha-avakāśva-dānebhyaḥ, by reason of smell, wetness, digestion, circulation of blood, and room for movement; पाञ्चभौतिकं pāñcha bhautikam, composed of five elements.

234. The body is composed of five elements, as it possesses smell, wetness, digestion, circulation of blood and room for movement.—31.

In the body there are smell and moisture which are attributes of earth and water respectively. Digestion and circulation of blood are done respectively by fire and air. There is also in the body room for the movement of the other elements in it, and therefore ether is also present in it.

Gotama has not taken the trouble to refute these doubtful reasoning in the above three aphorisms. They are generally refuted by the authority of the Veda in the next aphorism.

श्रुतिप्रमाण्याच्च॥ 32॥

"सूर्यं ते चक्षुर्गच्छताम्" इत्यत्र मन्त्रे "पृथिवीं ते शरीरम्" इति श्रूयते तदिदं

प्रकृतौ विकारस्य प्रलयाभिधानमिति।। "सूर्यं ते चक्षुः स्पृणोमि" इत्यत्र मन्त्रान्तरे "पृथिवीं ते शरीरं स्पृणोमि" इति श्रूयते सेयं कारणाद् विकारस्य स्पृत्तिभिधीयते इति स्थाल्यादिषु च तुल्यजातीयानामेककार्यारम्भदर्शनाद् भिन्नजातीयानामेककार्यारम्भानुपपत्तिः।।32।।

श्रुतिप्रमाण्यात् śruti-prāmāṇyāt, from the authority of the Veda; च cha, and.

235. In virtue of the authority of scripture too.—32.

That our body is earthy is proved by our scripture. In the section on "Dissolution into the primordial matter," there are such texts as : May the eye be absorbed into the sun, may the body be absorbed into the earth, etc. The sun is evidently the source of the eye and the earth of the body.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 6 : The Body is of the Earth, earthy : Sūtras : 28-32.

It has been demonstrated that the soul's connection with the body is without beginning and that the body in which it experiences pleasure and pain the due to its own karma. It is to be investigated whether the body possesses a single character like the senses of smell, etc., or a diverse character. Doubt arises in this respect owing to the differences of opinion on the subject. The truth is that the human body is constituted by the element of Earth alone, because the distinctive attribute of Earth, namely smell is observed in it. At the same time it is not denied that the other elements conjoin with Earth as condition in the production of the human body. Similarly all the elements conjoin to produce aqueous, igneous, aerial and etherial bodies in different worlds to serve the particular purposes of the souls. There is also scriptural authority for the view that the human body is constituted by Earth alone, *e.g.*, "Let thy eye go to the sun…let thy body go to the Earth" (Ṛgveda, X. xvi. 3) "I make the sun thy eye. I made the Earth tht body" (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, XVII. viii. 4-6.) In the one the product resolves into its quiescent original; in the other the product is derived from the original.

कृष्णसारे सत्युपलम्भाद्व्यतिरिच्य चोपलम्भात्संशयः।। 33।।

कृष्णसारं भौतिकं तस्मिन्नऽनुपहते रूपोपलब्धिः उपहते चानुपलब्धिरिति, व्यतिरिच्य कृष्णसारमवस्थितस्य विषयस्योपलम्भो न कृष्णसारप्राप्तस्य, न चाऽप्राप्यकारित्वमिन्द्रियाणाम्, तदिदमभौतिकत्वे विभुत्वात् संभवति, एवमुभयधर्मोपलब्धेः संशयः।।33।।

कृष्णसारे kṛṣṇasāre, the eyeball; सति sati, there being; उपलम्भात् upalambhāt, because there is perception (of colour); व्यतिरिच्य vyatirichya, screening, removing; च cha, and ; उपलम्भात् upalambhāt, because there is perception; संशयः saṃśayaḥ, doubt.

236. It is doubtful as to whether a sense is material or all-pervading because there is perception when there is (contact with) the eye-ball and there is perception even when the eye-ball is far off.—33.

The eye-ball is said by some to be a material (elemental) substance inasmuch as its function is limited by its contact. A thing is seen when it has contact with the eye-ball, but it is not seen when the eye-ball is not connected. In other words, the eye-ball, like any other material substance, exercises its function only in virtue of its contact with things. Others hold that the eye-ball is a non-material all-pervading substance inasmuch as it can perceive things with which it has not come in contact. The eye-ball does not touch the things which it sees from a distance. Hence, the question arises as to whether the eye-ball is a material or an all-pervading substance.

अभौतिकानीत्याह, कस्मात्?–

महदणुग्रहणात्।। 34।।

महदिति–महत्तरं महत्तमं चोपलभ्यते यथा न्याग्रोधपर्वतादि; अण्विति–अणुतरमणुतमं च गृह्यते यथा न्यग्रोधधानादि, तदुभयमुपलभ्यमानं चक्षुषो भौतिकत्वं बाधते–भौतिकं कि यावत् तावदेव व्याप्नोति अभौतिकं तु विभुत्वात् सर्वव्यापकमिति।।34।।

महदणुग्रहणात् mahat aṇu-grahaṇāt, because it apprehends both the large and the small.

237. It is contended that the eye-ball is not material substance because it can apprehend the great and the small.—34.

It the eye-ball had been a material substance it could have apprehended only those things which coincided with itself in bulk. But we find it can apprehend things of greater and smaller bulk. So it is contended that the eye-ball is not a material substance.

न महदणुग्रहणमात्रादभौतिकत्वं विभुत्वं चेन्द्रियाणां शक्यं प्रतिपत्तम्, इदं खलु–

रश्म्यर्थसन्निकर्षविशेषात्तद्ग्रहणम्।। 35।।

तयोर्महदण्वोर्ग्रहणं चक्षूरश्मेरर्थस्य च संनिकर्षविशेषाद् भवति यथा प्रदीपरश्मेरर्थस्य

चेति, रश्म्यर्थसंनिकर्षश्च आवरणलिङ्गः–चक्षुषो हि रश्मिः कुड्यादिभिरावृतमर्थं न प्रकाशयति यथा प्रदीपरश्मिरिमिति।।35।।

रश्म्यर्थसन्निकर्षविशेषात् raśmi-artha-sannikarṣa-viśeṣāt, from a special contact of the ocular ray with the object; तद्ग्रहणम् tat-grahaṇam, the apprehension of the large and the small.

238. (The Naiyayika's reply to the above is that) it is by the contact of the ray that the things great and small are apprehended.—35.

The Naiyāyikas say that even on the supposition of the eye-ball being a material substance the apprehension by it of the great and the small will not be impossible. Their explanation is that though the eye-ball itself does not coincide with things which are greater or smaller in bulk, yet the rays issuing from the eye-ball reach the things in their entire extent. Hence in spite of the eye-ball being a material substance there is no impossibility for it to apprehend the great and the small.

आवरणानुमेयत्वे सतीदमाह–

तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः।। 36।।

रूपस्पर्शवृद्धि तेजः महत्त्वादनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वाद् रूपवत्त्वाच्चोपलब्धिरिति प्रदीपवत् प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्येत चाक्षुषो रश्मिर्यदि स्यादिति।।36।।

तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः tat-an-upalabdheḥ, because of its non-perception; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a cause.

239. Contact is not the cause because we do not perceive the ray.—36.

The contact of a ray with a thing is not the cause of apprehension of the thing because we perceive no ray issuing from the eye ball.

नानुमीयमानस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिरभावहेतुः।। 37।।

संनिकर्षप्रतिषेधार्थेनाऽऽवरणेन लिङ्गेनानुमीयमानस्य रश्मेर्या प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिर्नाऽसावऽभावं प्रतिपादयति यथा चन्द्रमसः परभागस्य पृथिव्याश्चाधोभागस्य।।37।।

न na, not; अनुमीयमानस्य anumīyamānasya, of that which can be inferred; प्रत्यक्षातः pratyakṣataḥ, by perception; अनुपलब्धिः an-upalabdhiḥ, non-apprehension; अभावहेतुः abhāva-hetuḥ, a mark of non-existence.

240. That we do not apprehend a thing through perception is no proof of non-existence of the thing because we may yet apprehend it though inference.—37.

The ray issuing from the eye is not perceived as it is supersensuous. But it is established by inference like the lower half of the earth or the of her side of the moon.

द्रव्यगुणधर्मभेदाच्चोपलब्धिनियमः।। 38।।

भिन्नः खल्वयं द्रव्यधर्मो गुणधर्मश्च, महदनेकद्रव्यवच्च विभक्तावयवमाप्यं द्रव्यं प्रत्यक्षतो नोपलभ्यते स्पर्शस्तु शीतो गृह्यते, तस्य द्रव्यस्यानुबन्धात् हेमन्तशिशिरौ कल्पेते, तथाविधमेव च तैजसं द्रव्यमनुद्भूतरूपं सह रूपेण नोपलभ्यते स्पर्शत्वऽस्योष्ण उपलभ्यते तस्य द्रव्यस्यानुबन्धाद् ग्रीष्मवसन्तौ कल्पेते।।38।।

द्रव्यगुणधर्मभेदात् dravya-guṇa dharma-bhedāt, according to differences of the nature of the substance and the attribute; च cha, and; उपलब्धिनियमः upalabdhi-niyamaḥ, rule of perception.

241. And perception dependes upon the special character of the substance and its qualities.—38.

A substance unless it possesses magnitude, or a quality unless it possesses obviousness, is not perceived. From the absence of magnitude and obvious colour the ray of the eye-ball is not perceived.

यत्र त्वेषा भवति–

अनेकद्रव्यसमवायात् रूपविशेषाच्च रूपोपलब्धिः।। 39।।

यत्र रूपं च द्रव्यं च तदाश्रयः प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्यते, रूपविशेषस्तु यद्भावात् क्वचिद्रूपोपलब्धिः यदभावाच्च द्रव्यस्य क्वचिदनुपलब्धिः स रूपधर्मोयमुद्भवसमाख्यात इति, अनुद्भूतरूपश्चायं नायनो रश्मिः तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षतो नोपलभ्यते इति। दृष्टश्च तेजसो धर्मभेदः–उद्भूतरूपस्पर्शं प्रत्यक्षं तेजो यथाऽऽदित्यरश्मयः, उद्भूतरूपमनुद्भूतस्पर्शं च प्रत्यक्षम् (तेजः) यथा प्रदीपरश्मयः उद्भूतस्पर्शमनुद्भूतरूपमप्रत्यक्षं यथाऽवादिसंयुक्तं तेजः, अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शोऽप्रत्यक्षश्चक्षुषो रश्मिरिति।।39।।

अनेकद्रव्यसमवायात् an-eka-dravya-samavāyāt, from combination in more than one substance; रूपविशेषात् rūpaviśeṣāt, from peculiarity, *i.e.* perceptible intensity, of colour; च cha, and; रूपोपलब्धिः rūpa-upalabdhiḥ, perception of colour.

242. A colour is perceived only when it abides in many things intimately and possesses obviousness.—39.

The sun's ray is perceived as it possesses an obviousness in respect of colour and touch. But the ray of the eye-ball is not perceived as it is obvious neither in respect of colour nor in respect of touch.

कर्मकारितश्चेन्द्रियाणां व्यूहः पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः।। 40।।

यथा चेतनस्यार्थो विषयोपलब्धिभूतः सुखदुःखेपलब्धिभूतश्च कल्पते तथेन्द्रियाणि व्यूढानि, विषयप्राप्त्यर्थश्च रश्मेश्चाक्षुषस्य व्यूहः, रूपस्पर्शानभिव्यक्तिश्च व्यवहारप्रक्लृप्त्यर्था, द्रव्यविशेषे च प्रतीघातादावरणोपपत्तिर्व्यवहारार्था, सर्वद्रव्याणां विश्वरूपो व्यूह इन्द्रियवत् कर्मकारितः पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः। कर्म तु धर्माधर्मभूतं चेतनस्योपभोगार्थमिति।।40।।

कर्मकारित karma-kāritaḥ, determined or organised by karma or deserts; च cha, and; इन्द्रियाणानाम् indriyāṇām, of the senses; व्यूहः vyūhaḥ order or assemblage; पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः puruṣa artha-tantraḥ, subservient to the purposes of the puruṣa or man.

242. And the senses subservient to the purposes of man have been set in order by his deserts.—40.

The order referred to is as follows :—

The eye emits ray which does not possess the quality of obviousness and cannot consequently burn the things it touches. Moreover, had there been obviousness in the ray it would have obstructed our vision by standing as a screen between the eye and the things. This sort of arrangement of the senses was made to enable man to attain his purposes according his merits and demerits.

अव्यभिचाराच्च प्रतीघातो भौतिकधर्म्मः।। 41।।

यश्चावरणोपलम्भादिन्द्रियस्य द्रव्यविशेषे प्रतिघातः स भौतिकधर्मः–न भूतानि व्यभिचरति। नाऽभौतिकं प्रतिघातधर्मकं दृष्टमिति। अप्रतिघातस्तु व्यभिचारी– भौतिकाभौतिकयोः समानत्वादिति। यदपि मन्यते–प्रतिघाताद् भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणि अप्रतिघातादऽभौतिकानीति प्राप्तम्। दृष्टश्चाऽप्रतिघातः काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धेः, तन्न युक्तम्, कस्मात्? यस्माद् भौतिकमपि न प्रतिहन्यते–काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितप्रकाशात् प्रदीपरश्मीनाम्, स्थाल्यादिषु पाचकस्य तेजसोऽप्रतिघातः।।41।।

243. The senses are material substances inasmuch as they invariably receive obstruction.—41.

Nothing can offer obstruction to a non-material all-pervading substance. The senses receive obstruction from wall, etc. and are therefore material substances.

उपपद्यते चानुपलब्धिः कारणभेदात्–

मध्यन्दिनोल्काप्रकाशानुपलब्धिवत्तदनुपलब्धिः।। 42।।

यथाऽनेकद्रव्येण समवायाद्रूपविशेषाच्चोपलब्धिरिति सत्युपलब्धिकारणे मध्यन्दिनाल्काप्रकाशो नोपलभ्यते आदित्यप्रकाशेनाऽभिभूतः, एवं महदनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वाद् रूपविशेषाच्चोपलब्धिरिति सत्युपलब्धिकारणे चाक्षुषो रश्मिर्नोपलभ्यते निमित्तान्तरतः, तच्च

व्याख्यातम्–अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शस्य द्रव्यस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिरिति, अत्यन्तानुपलब्धिश्चाभावकारणम्।।42।।

मध्यन्दिनोल्काप्रकाशानुपलब्धिवत् madhyandina-ulkā prakāśa-an-upalabdhivat, like the non-perception of the light of a meteor at midday; तदनुपलब्धिः tat-an-upalabdhiḥ, its non-perception.

245. Some say that the ray of the eye (possesses obviousness of colour but it) is not perceived just as the light of a meteor at midday is not perceived.—42.

The light of a meteor though possessing obviousness of colour is not perceived at midday because it is then overpowered by the light of the sun. Similarly, some say, the ray of the eye possesses obviousness of colour but it is not perceived during the day time on account of its being overpowered by the light of the sun.

यो हि ब्रवीति–लोष्टप्रकाशो मध्यन्दिने आदित्यप्रकाशाभिभवान्नोपलभ्यते इति, तस्यैतत्स्यात्–

न रात्रावप्यनुपलब्धेः।। 43।।

अपि=अनुमानतोऽनुपलब्धेरिति, एवमत्यन्तानुपलब्धेर्लोष्टप्रकाशो नास्ति, न त्वेवं चाक्षुषो रश्मिरिति।।43।।

न na, no; रात्रौ rātrau, at night; अपि api, even; अनुपलब्धेः anupalabdheḥ, from its non-perception.

246. It is, we reply, not so because even in the night the ray of the eye is not perceived.—43.

Had the ray of the eye possessed obviousness of colour it would have been perceived during the night when it cannot be overpowered by the light of the sun. As the ray of the eye is not perceived even during the night we must conclude that it does not possess obviousness of colour.

उपपन्नरूपा चेयम्–

बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहाद्विषयोपलब्धेरनभिव्यक्तितोऽनुपलब्धिः।। 44।।

बाह्येन प्रकाशेनाऽनुगृहीतं चक्षुर्विषयग्राहकम्, तदभावेनुपलब्धिः, सति च प्रकाशानुग्रहे रूपस्पर्शोपलब्धौ च सत्यां तदाश्रयस्य द्रव्यस्य चक्षुषा ग्रहणम्, रूपस्याऽनुद्भूतत्वात् सेयं रूपानभिव्यक्तितो रूपाश्रयस्य द्रव्यस्यानुपलब्धिर्दृष्टा, तत्र यदुक्तम्–"तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः 36" इति, एतदयुक्तम्।।44।।

बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहात् bāhya-prakāśa-anugrahāt, though conjunction with,

or co-operation of, external light; विषयोपलब्धेः viṣaya-upalabdheḥ, because perception of objects (takes place); अनभिव्यक्तितः an-abhivyakti-taḥ, from non-manifestation; अनुपलब्धिः an-upalabdhiḥ, non-perception.

247. The ray of the eye is not perceived in consequence of its unobviousness but not on account of its total absence because it reaches objects through the aid of external light.—44.

In the eye there is ray which does not however possess an obvious colour. Had the eye possessed no ray it could not have perceived any object. Since the eye perceives objects, it possesses ray in it, and since it requires the aid of external light (such as the light of the sun) to perceive them it follows that the ray does not possess the quality of obviousness. This aphorism answers the objection raised in 3-1-36.

कस्मात् पुनरभिभावोऽनुपलब्धिकारणं चाक्षुषस्य रश्मेर्नोच्यते? इति

अभिव्यक्तौ चाभिभवात्॥ 45॥

बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहनिरपेक्षतायां चेति चार्थः, यद् रूपमाभिव्यक्तम्= उद्भूतं बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहं च नापेक्षते तद्विषयोऽभिभवः—'विपर्ययेऽभिभवाभावात्=अनुद्भूतरूपत्वाच्च-ऽनुपलभ्यमानं बाह्यकाशानुग्रहच्चोपलभ्यमानं नाऽभिभूयते इति, एवमुपपन्नम्-अस्ति चाक्षुषो रश्मिरिति॥45॥

अभिव्यक्तौ abhivyaktau, in case of man festation; च cha, and (where co-operation of external light is not required); अभिभवात् abhibhavāt, because it is overpowered.

248. And the invisibility of the ray of the eye cannot be due to its being overpowered (by an external light such as the light of the sun) because the overpowering is possible only of a thing which possessed obviousness.—45.

It is only a thing which possesses obviousness or manifastation that can be overpowered or obscured. But how can we throw a thing into obscurity which never possessed manifestation? We cannot therefore say that the ray of the eye is not perceived on account of its having been overpowered by an external light.

नक्तञ्चरनयनरश्मिदर्शनाच्च॥ 46॥

दृश्यते हि नक्तं नयनरश्मयो नक्तञ्चराणां वृषदंशप्रभृतीनां तेन शेषस्यानुमानमिति।

जातिभेदवदिन्द्रियभेद इति चेत्? धर्मभेदमात्रं चानुपपन्नम्-आवरणस्य प्राप्तिप्रतिषेधार्थस्य दर्शनादिति॥46॥

नक्तञ्चरनयनरश्मिदर्शनात् naktañchara nayana-raśmi-darśanāt, because the ray of the eye is seen in the case of powlers by night, च cha, and.

249. There must be ray in the eye of man as we see it in the eye of animals that move about in the night.—46.

We see that animals wandering by night, such as cats, possess ray in their eyes. By this we can conjecture that there is ray in the eye of man.

इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षस्य ज्ञानकारणत्वानुपपत्तिः, कस्मात्?—

अप्राप्य ग्रहणं काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धेः॥ 47॥

तृणादि सर्पद् द्रव्यं काचेऽभ्रपटले वा प्रतिहतं दृष्टम्, अव्यवहितेन संनिकृष्यते, व्याहन्यते वै प्राप्तिर्व्यवधानेनेति, यदि च रश्मर्थसंनिकर्षो ग्रहणहेतुः स्यात्? न व्यवहितस्य संनिकर्ष इत्यऽग्रहणं स्यात्, अस्ति चेयं काचाऽभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरिपोलब्धिः सा ज्ञापयति-अप्राप्यकारीणीन्द्रियाणि (इति), अत एवाऽभौतिकानि-प्राप्यकारित्वं हि भौतिकधर्म इति॥47॥

अप्राप्य aprāpya, without reaching; ग्रहणं grahaṇam, apprehension; काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धेः kācha-abhra-paṭala-sphaṭika-antarita-upalabdheḥ, because of perception of things screened by glass, mica, and crystal.

250. Some say that the eye can perceive a thing even without coming in contact with it by means of its rays just as things screened from us by glass, mica, membrane or crystal are seen.—47.

The objection raised in this aphorism controverts the Nyāya theory of contact (in pratyakṣa) and seeks to prove that the senses are not material substances.

न—

कुड्यान्तरितानुपलबधेरप्रतिषेधः॥ 48॥

अप्राप्यकारित्वे सतीन्द्रियाणां कुड्यान्तरितस्यानुपलब्धिर्न स्यात्॥48॥

कुड्यान्तरितानुपलब्धे kuḍya antarita-an-upalabdheḥ, because of non-perception of what is screened from view by a wall; अप्रतिषेधः a-prati-ṣedheḥ, non-contradiction.

251. (The foregoing objection is not valid) because we cannot perceive what is screened from us by walls.—48.

The eye cannot really perceive a things without coming in contact with it by means of its rays. For instance, a thing which is screened from us by a wall is not perceived by our eyes.

प्राप्यकारित्वेऽपि तु काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धिर्न स्यात्?–

अप्रतिघातात् सन्निकर्षोपपत्तिः॥ 49॥

न च काचोऽभ्रपटलं वा नायनरश्मिं विष्टभ्नाति सोऽप्रतिहन्यमानः संनिकृष्यते इति॥49॥

अप्रतिघातात् a-pratighārāt, from non-obstruction; सन्निकर्षोपपत्तिः sannikarṣa-upapattiḥ, establishment of contact.

252. There is a real contact because there is no actual obstruction (caused by glass, mica, membrane or crystal).—49.

The ray issuing from the eye can reach an external object through glass, mica, etc., which are transparent substances. There being no obstruction caused by these substances, the eye comes really in contact with the external object.

अथ मन्यते–न भौतिकस्याऽप्रतिघात इति, तत्र–

आदित्यरश्मेः स्फटिकान्तरेऽपि दाह्येऽविघातात्॥ 50॥

‘आदित्यरश्मेरविघातात्’ ‘स्फटिकान्तरितेप्यविघातात्’ ‘दाह्येऽविघातात्’ अविघातादिति च पदाभिसंबन्धाद् वाक्यभेद इति, यथावाक्यं चार्थभेद इति, आदित्यरश्मिः कुम्भादिषु न प्रतिहन्यते अविघातात् कुम्भस्थमुदकं तपति, प्राप्तौ हि द्रव्यान्तरगुणस्य उष्णस्य स्पर्शस्य ग्रहणं तेन च शीतस्पर्शाभिभव इति 1। स्फटिकान्तरितेपि प्रकाशनीये प्रदीपरश्मीनामप्रतिघातः अप्रतिघातात् ग्रहणमिति 2। भर्जनकपालादिस्थं च द्रव्यमाग्नेयेन तेजसा दह्यते तत्राऽविघातात् प्राप्तिः, प्राप्तौ तु दाहः–नाऽप्राप्यकारि तेज इति 3। "अविघातात्" इति च केवलं पदमुपादीयते, कोयमविघातो नाम?, अव्यूह्यमानावयेवन व्यवधाकेन द्रव्येण सर्वतो द्रव्यस्याऽविष्टम्भः=क्रियाहेतोरप्रतिबन्धः=प्राप्तेरप्रतिषेध इति, दृष्टं हि कलशनिषक्तानामपां बहिः शीतस्पर्शग्रहणम्, न चेन्द्रियेणासंनिकृष्टस्य द्रव्यस्य स्पर्शोपलब्धिः, दृष्टौ च प्रस्पन्दपरिस्रवौ, तत्र काचाभ्रपटलादिभिर्नायनरश्मेरप्रतिघाताद् विभिद्याऽर्थेन सह संनिकर्षादुपपन्नं ग्रहणमिति॥50॥

आदित्यरश्मेः āditya-raśmeḥ, of the sun's ray; स्फटिकान्तरे sphaṭika-antare, being screened by a crystal; अपि api, even; दाह्ये dāhye, towards a combustible substance; अविघातात् a-vighātāt, from non-obstruction.

253. A ray of the sun is not prevented from reaching a combustible substance though the latter is screened by a crystal.—50.

This is an example which supports the theory of contact, *viz.*, a ray issuing form the eye passes actually through a crystal to an object lying beyond it.

नेतरेतरधर्म्मप्रसङ्गात्॥ 51॥

काचाभ्रपटलदिवद्वा कुड्यादिभिरप्रतिघातः, कुड्यादिवद्वा काचाभ्रपटलादिभिः प्रतीघात इति प्रसज्यते, नियमे कारणं वाच्यमिति॥51॥

न na, no; इतरेतरधर्म्मप्रसङ्गात् itara-itara-dharma-prasaṅgāt, on account of implication of mutual properties.

254. It is, some say, not so because the character of one presents itself in the other.—51.

The objection stands thus :—

If a ray issuing from the eye can reach an object screened by a crystal, why can it not reach another object which is screened by a wall? According to the objector the property of the crystal presents itself in the wall.

आदर्शोदकयोः प्रसादस्वाभाव्याद्रूपोपलब्धितत्तदुपलब्धिः॥ 52॥

आदर्शोदकथोः प्रसादः=रूपविशेषः स्वो धर्मः–नियमदर्शनात्, प्रसादस्य वा स्वो धर्मो रूपोपलम्भनम्, यथाऽऽदर्शप्रतिहस्य परावृत्तस्य नयनरश्मेः स्वेन मुखेन संनिकर्षे सति स्वमुखोपलम्भनं प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणाख्यम् आदर्शरूपानुग्रहात् तन्निमित्तं भवति–आदर्श–रूपोपघाते तदभावात्, कुड्यादिषु च प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणं न भवति, एवं काचाभ्रपटलदिभिर–विघातश्चक्षूरश्मेः कुड्यादिभिश्च तिघातः–द्रव्यस्वभावनियमादिति॥52॥

आदर्शोदकयोः ādarśa-udakayoḥ, in a mirror and in water; प्रसादस्वाभाव्यात् prasāda svābhāvyāt, from natural clearness or transparency; रूपोपलब्धित् rūpa-upalabdhi-vat, like the perception of colour or form; तदुपलब्धिः tat-upalabdhiḥ, its perception.

255. In reply we say that the perception of a thing screened by a crystal takes place in the same manner as that

of a form in a mirror or water owing to the possession of the character of transparency.—52.

The form of a face is reflected on a mirror because the latter possesses transparency. Similarly, a thing is reflected on a crystal inasmuch as the latter is transparent. A wall which does not possess transparency can reflect nothing. It is therefore entirely due to the nature of the screens that we can or cannot perceive things through them.

दृष्टानुमितानां नियोगप्रतिषेधानुपत्तिः।। 53।।

प्रमाणस्य तत्त्वविषयत्वात्, न खलु भोः परीक्षमाणेन दृष्टानुमिता अर्थाः शक्या नियोक्तुम्-'एवं भवत' इति, नापि प्रतिषेद्धम्-'एवं न भवत' इति, न हीदमुपपद्यते-'रूपवद् गन्धेपि चाक्षुषो भवतु' इति, 'गन्धवद्वा रूपं चाक्षुषं मा भूत्' इति,'अग्निप्रतिपत्तिवद् धूमेनोदकप्रतिपत्तिरपि भवतु' इति, 'उदकाऽप्रतिपत्तिद्वा धूमेनाग्निप्रतिपत्तिरपि मा भूत्' इति। किं कारणम्?, यथा खल्वर्था भवन्ति=य एषां स्वो भावः=स्वो धर्म इति तथाभूताः प्रमाणेन प्रतिपद्यन्ते इति-तथाभूतविषयकं हि प्रमाणमिति। इमौ खलु नियोगप्रतिषेधौ भवता देशितौ-काचाभ्रपटलादिवद्वा कुड्यादिभिरप्रतिघातो भवतु, कुड्यादिवद्वा काचाभ्रपटलादिभिरप्रतिघातो मा भूत्, इति, न-दृष्टानुमिताः खल्विमे द्रव्यधर्माः=प्रतिघाता-प्रतिघातयोर्हि उपलब्ध्यऽनुपलब्धी व्यवस्थापिके-व्यवहितानुपलब्ध्याऽनुमीयते-कुड्यादिभिः प्रतिघातः, व्यवहितोपलब्ध्याऽनुमीयते-काचाभ्रपटलादिभिरप्रतिघात इति।।53।।

दृष्टानुमितानां dṛṣṭa-anumitānām, of things seen and inferred; नियोगप्रतिषेधानुपत्तिः niyoga-pratiṣedha-an-upapattiḥ, inapplicability of injunctions and prohibitions, assertions and denials.

256. It is not possbile to impose injunction and prohibition on facts which are perceived or inferred to be of some fixed character.—53.

A crystal and a wall and found respectively to be transparent and non transparent. It is not poseible to alter their character by syaing "let the crystal be non-transparent" and "let the wall be transparent." Likewise, a ray of the eye in passing to a things is obstructed by a wall but nt by a crystal. This is a perceived fact which cannot be altered by our words. Hence the theory of contact remains intact.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 3 : The Senses are constituted by the Elements : Sūtras : 33-53.

To take the case of the eye (sight) : Colour is perceived when the pupil of the eye is unimpaired, and is not perceived when it is impaired.

The pupil is a material body. On the other hand, the pupil itself does not come into contact with the object when its colour is perceived. At the same time there must be some contact as otherwise perception of colour cannot be possible. The eye therefore must be immaterial in the sense of not being constituted by the manifested or visible elements, and must be all-pervading. In this state of uncertainty one arges that the senses must be immaterial and all-pervading because they apprehend objects of widely divergent dimensioms from the acorn to the Himalaya mountain. To this the reply is that the preception of objects of diferent dimensions by the eye is due to different contacts of ocular rays with the objects. Such contact is essential in ocular perception as is proved by the fact there is no perception where there is an obstruction. It is no argument against the existence of ocular rays that they are not perceived. For perception is not the sole test of existence. Inference by the mark of obstruction preventing contact proves their existence, as it does in the case of the other side of the moon and the lower portion of the earth. The rule of perception varies in its application according to the nature of substances and attributes. *E.g.*, water vapour hanging in the air is not perceived but its cool touch is felt; heat rays are not perceived, but their worth is experienced. Similarly Fire exists in various conditions. In the solar rays both colour and touch are developed and so they are perceived. In the rays of light from a lamp colour is developed and touch is un developed; these too are perceptible. Fire in hot water possesses developed touch and undeveloped colour; hence, it is imperceptible. In the ocular fire both colour and touch are undeveloped; hence, it is imperceptible. The development or accession of intensity of colour is one of the conditions of the perception of colour.

This peculiarity of the ocular rays arises from the nature of the senses. Like the multi-form aggregations of all substances the organisation of the senses is brought about by merit and demerit to subserve the purpose of the soul which consists in the cognition of objects and the experience of pleasure and pain.

Some thinkers argue as follows : The resilience of the sense of sight on meeting an obstruction is an attribute of a material substance. For this is the case with all material substances in all circumstances. On the other hand, the penetration of glass, mica, etc., by the ocular rays shows that they are non-material. So, the point remains doubtful. We say that this is not so, for the reason given is erratic. For such

penetration is also seen in the case of the light of a lamp which illumines objects beyond glass, etc., and of heat which cooks grains in a vessel.

Non-perception again may be due to overpowering, as in the case of a meteor which is not seen when the sun shines. In the case of ocular rays there is such a special cause of their non-perception, namely as already stated, want of development or intensity. That the ocular rays lack in intensity also appears from the fact that the eye cannot apprehend objects without the aid of external light. The ocular rays are not overpowered, for overpowering can take place only when the thing overpowered has been developed. The ocular rays are not perceived even at night in all cases. That such rays exist appears from the observation of these rays in the eyes of prowlers by night, *e.g.*, cat, tiger, etc. There is no generic difference between the eyes of these animals and of men, because the sight in both cases is impeded by obstructions.

The perception of objects behind a plate of glass or mica or a thin stratum of cloud offers no argument against the proposition that the contact of the senses with the objects is the cause of cognition. For in these cases there is really no obstruction, but actual contact is established through the glass, etc. The sun's rays also cause burning through a crystal. In all such cases the interspaces among the components of the intervening substances provide a passage whereby direct contact is established between the rays and the objects on which they operate.

But why cannot a wall, *e.g.*, offer such a passage? Because a wall is not constituted in the same way as glass is. How do you know this? This is known from the nature of the things as revealed by their effects. The ocular rays reflected form the smooth surface of the mirror makes one's own face perceptible. This clarity of the mirror is its nature. Similarly a wall does not reflect light rays. This is its nature. Thus experience shows that lass, etc., offers no obstruction, while a wall, etc., do, to the passage of light rays. And no arbitrary limitations can be imposed upon facts established by perception and inference. For these pramāṇas reveal reality as it is. Objects as they really are, in their own nature, in their own character, are established by the pramāṇas. These must be accepted as such and must not be modified at random. Obstruction is inferred in the case of a wall by the fact of the non-perception of objects behind it. Non-obstruction is inferred in the case of glass, etc. by the fact of perception of objects behind them.

अथापि खल्वेंकामिन्द्रियम्? बहुनीन्द्रियाणि वा? कुत: संशय?–

स्थानान्यत्वे नानात्वादवयविनानात्वादवयविनानास्थानत्वाच्च संशय:॥ 54॥

बहुनि द्रव्याणि नानास्थानानि दृश्यन्ते, नानास्थानश्च सन्नेकोऽवयवी चेति, तेनेन्द्रियेषु भिन्नस्थानेषु संशय इति॥54॥

स्थानान्यत्वे sthāna-anya-tve, from occupying different places; नानात्वात् nānātvát, because of diversity; अवयविनानास्थानत्वात् avayavi-nānā-sthanatavāt, from a whole occupying different places; च cha, and; संशय: saṃśayaḥ, doubt.

257. Since many things occupy many places and since also one things possessing different parts occupies many places, there arises doubt as to whether the senses are more than one.—54.

There is doubt as to whether there are as many senses as there are sensuous functions or whether all the functions belong to one sense possessing different parts.

एकमिन्द्रियम्–

त्वगव्यतिरेकात्॥ 55॥

'त्वगेकमिन्द्रियम्' इत्याह। कस्मात्? अव्यतिरकात्=न त्वचा किंचिदिन्द्रियाधिष्ठानं न प्राप्तम्–न चाऽसत्यां त्वचि किंचिद्विषयग्रहणं भवति, यथा सेंन्द्रियस्थानानि व्याप्तानि यस्यां च सत्यां विषयग्रहणं भवति सा त्वगेकमिन्द्रियमिति॥55॥

त्वक् tvak, sikn, touch; अव्यतिरेकात् a-vyatirekāt, from its non-exclusion.

258. Some say that the senses are not many as none of them is independent of touch (skin).—55.

The eye, ear nose and tongue are said to be mere modifications of touch (skin) which pervades them, that is, there is only one sense, *viz.*, touch (skin), all others being merely its parts.

नेन्द्रियान्तरार्थानुपलब्धे:॥ 56॥

स्पर्शोपलब्धिलक्षणायां सत्यां त्वचि गृह्यमाणे (च) त्वगिन्द्रियेण स्पर्शे इन्द्रियान्तरार्था रूपादयो न गृह्यन्ते अन्धादिभि:, न स्पर्शग्राहकादिन्द्रियाद इन्द्रियानतरमस्तीति स्पर्शवद् अन्धादिभिर्गृह्येरन् रूपादय: न च गृह्यन्ते तस्मान्नैकमिन्द्रियं त्वगिति॥56॥

259. It is, we reply, not so because the objects of other senses are not perceived by touch (skin).—56.

If there had been only one sense, *viz.*, touch (skin), then it could have seen colour, heard sound and so on. But a blind man possessing the sense of touch cannot see colour. Hence, it is concluded that senses are many.

त्वगवयवविशेषेण धूमोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः॥ 57॥

यथा त्वोऽवयवविशेषः कश्चित् चक्षुपि संनिकृष्टो धूमस्पर्शं गृह्णाति नान्य एवं त्वचोऽवयवविशेषा रूपादिग्रहकास्तषामुपघातादन्धादिभिर्न गृह्यन्ते रूपादय इति॥57॥

260. Perception of various objects of sense is comparable to that of smoke by a special part of touch.—57.

Just no smoke is perceived by a special part of touch located in the eye, so sound, smell etc., are perceived by special parts of touch specially located.

व्याहतत्वादहेतुः॥ 58॥

'त्वगव्यतिरेकादेकमिन्द्रियम्' इत्युक्त्वा 'त्वगवयवविशेषेण धूमोपलब्धिवद् रूपाद्युपलब्धिः' इत्युच्यते, एवं च सति नानाभूतानि, विषयग्रहाकाणि-विषयव्यवस्थानात्= तद्भावो विषयग्रहणस्य भावात् तदुपघाते चाऽभावात्, तथा च पूर्वो वाद उत्तेण वादेन व्याहन्यते इति। पृथिव्यादिभिरपि भूतैरिन्द्रियाधिष्ठानानि व्याप्तानि, न च तेष्वस्सु विषयग्रहणं भवतीति, तस्मान्न त्वग् अन्यद्वा सर्वविषयमेकमिन्द्रियमिति॥58॥

261. This is, according to us, absurd as it involves contradiction.—58.

It has been said that touch is the obly sense by the special parts of which special functions are performed. Now, it is asked whether the special parts of touch do not partake of the nature of senses. If they do, then the senses are many. If on the other hand they do not partake of the nature of senses, then it is to be admitted that colour, sound, etc., are not cognisable by the senses.

न युगपदर्थानुपलब्धेः॥ 59॥

आत्मा मनसा संबध्यते मन इन्द्रियेण इन्द्रियं सर्वार्थैः संनिकृष्टमिति आत्मेन्द्रियमनो-ऽर्थसंनिकर्षेभ्यो युगपद् ग्रहणानि स्युः न च युगपद् रूपादयो गृह्यन्ते तस्मान्नैकमिन्द्रियं सर्वविषयमस्तीति=असाहचर्याच्च विषयग्रहणानां नैकमिन्द्रियं सर्वविषयकम्, साहचर्ये हि विषयग्रहणानामन्धाद्यनुपपत्तिरिति॥59॥

न na, no; युगपत् yugapat, simultaneously; अर्थानुपलब्धेः artha-an-upaladheḥ, from non-perception of objects.

262. Touch is not the only sense because objects are not perceived simultaneously.—59.

Had there been only one sense. *viz.*, touch, it would have in conjunction with the mind produced the functions of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, etc., simultaneously. But we cannot perform different functions at once. This proves that the senses are many : the mind which is an atomic substance being unable to come in contact with the different senses at a time cannot produce different functions simultaneously.

विप्रतिषेधाच्च नत्वगेका॥ 60॥

न खलु त्वमेकमिन्द्रियम्-व्याघातात्, त्वचा रूपाण्यऽप्राप्तानि गृह्यन्ते इति अप्राप्यकारित्वे स्पर्शदिष्वप्येवं प्रसङ्गः, स्पर्शदीनां च प्राप्तानां रूपादीनाम् (अपि) प्राप्तानां ग्रहणमिति प्राप्तम्। प्राप्याऽप्राप्यकारित्वमितिचेत्? आवरणानुपपत्तेर्विषयमात्रस्य ग्रहणम्=अथापि मन्येत-प्राप्ताः स्पर्शदयस्त्वचा गृह्यन्ते रूपाणि त्वऽप्राप्तानीति, एवं सति नास्त्यावरणम्, आवरणानुपपत्तेश्च रूपमात्रस्य ग्रहणं व्यवहितस्य चाव्यहितस्य चेति। दूरीन्तिकानुविधानं च रूपोपलबध्यनुपलब्ध्योर्न स्यात्=अप्राप्तं त्वचा गृह्यते रूपमिति दूरे रूपस्याऽग्रहणमन्तिके च ग्रहणमित्येतद् न स्यादिति॥60॥

विप्रतिषेधात् vipratiṣedhāt, because there is obstruction; च cha, and; न na, not; त्वक् tvak, touch; एका ekā, only one.

263. Touch cannot be the only sense prohibiting the function of other senses.—60.

Touch can perceive only those objects which are near (contiguous) but it cannot perceive objects which are far off. As a fact we can perceive colour and sound from a great distance. This is certainly not the function of touch but of some other sense which can reach distant objects.

एकत्वप्रतिषेधाच्च नानात्वसिद्धौ स्थापनाहेतुरप्युपादीयते—

इन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात्॥ 61॥

अर्थः=प्रयोजनं तत् पञ्चविधमिन्द्रियाणाम्=स्पर्शनेनेन्द्रियेण स्पर्शग्रहणे सति न तेनैव रूपं गृह्यते इति रूपग्रहणप्रयोजनं चक्षुरनुमीयते, स्पर्शरूपग्रहणे च ताभ्यामेव न गन्धो गृह्यते इति गन्धग्रहणप्रयोजनं घ्रणमनुमीयते, त्रयाणां ग्रहणे न तैरेव रसो गृह्यते इति रसग्रहणप्रयोजनं रसनमनुमीयते, न चतुर्णां ग्रहणे तैरेव शब्दः श्रयूते इति शब्दग्रहणप्रयोजनं श्रोत्रमनुमीयते, एवमिन्द्रियप्रयोजनस्याऽनितरेतरसाधनसाध्यत्वात् पञ्चैवेन्द्रियाणि॥61॥

इन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात् indriya-artha-pañcha-tvāt, because the objects of the senses are five.

264. Senses are five because there are five objects.—61.

There are five objects, *viz.*, colour, sound, smell (odour), taste (savour) and touch which are cognised respectively by the eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin. There are therefore five senses corresponding to the five objects.

न तदर्थबहुत्वात्॥ 62॥

न खलु 'इन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात् पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि' इति सिध्यति, कस्मात्? तेषामर्थानां बहुत्वात्=बहवः खल्विमे इन्द्रियार्थाः-स्पर्शास्तावत् शीतोष्णानुष्णाशीता इति, रूपाणि शुक्लहरितादीनि, गन्धा इष्टानिष्टोपेक्षणीयाः रसाः कटुकादयः, शब्दा वर्णात्मनो ध्वनिमात्राश्च-भिन्नाः, तद् यस्येन्दियार्थपञ्चत्वात् पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि तस्येन्द्रियार्थबहुत्वाद् बहूनीन्द्रियाणि प्रसज्यन्ते इति॥62॥

न na, no; तदर्थबहुत्वात् tat-artha-bahu-tvāt, because their objects are many.

265. Some say that the senses are not five because there are more than five objects.—62.

The objects of sense are said to be many such as good smell, bad smell, white colour, yellow colour, bitter taste, sweet taste, pungent taste, warm touch, cold touch, etc. According to the objector there must be senses corresponding to all these objects.

गन्धत्वाद्यव्यतिरेकाद्गन्धादीनामप्रतिषेधः॥ 63॥

गन्धत्वादिभिः स्वसामान्यैः कृतव्यवस्थानां गन्धादीनां यानि गन्धादिग्रहणानि तान्यऽसमानसाधनसाध्यत्वाद् ग्राहकान्तराणि न प्रयोजयन्ति, अर्थसमूहोऽनुमानमुक्तो नाऽर्थैकदेशः, अर्थैकदेशं चाश्रित्य विषयपञ्चत्वमात्रं भवान् प्रतिषेधति, तस्मादयुक्तोयं प्रतिषेध इति। कथं पुनर्गन्धत्वादिभिः स्वसामान्यैः कृतव्यवस्था गन्धादयः? इति, स्पर्शः खल्वयं त्रिविधः-शीत उष्णोऽनुष्णाशीतश्च स्पर्शत्वेन स्वसामान्येन संगृहीतः, गृह्यमाणे च शीतस्पर्शे नोष्णस्याऽनुष्णाशीतस्य वा स्पर्शस्य ग्रहणं ग्राहकान्तरं प्रयोजयति-स्पर्शभेदाना-मेकसाधनसाध्यत्वात्=येनैव शीतस्पर्शो गृह्यते तेनैवेतरावपीति। एवं गन्धत्वेत गन्धानाम्, रूपत्वेन रूपाणाम्, रसत्वेन रसानाम्, शब्दानामिति। गन्धादिग्रहणानि पुनरसमानसाधन-साध्यत्वान्न ग्राहकान्तराणां प्रयोजकानि, तस्मादुपपन्नमिन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात् पञ्चेन्द्रियाणीति॥63॥

गन्धत्वाद्यव्यतिरेकात् gandha-tva-ādi-a-vyatirekāt, because of the non-

exclusion of the character of smell, etc.; गन्धादीनां gandha-ādīnāṃ, of smell, etc; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-exclusion.

266. There is, we reply, no objection because odour (smell), etc., are never devoid of the nature of odour (smell), etc.—63.

Good odour, bad odour, etc. are not different objects of sense but they all come under the genus odour. It is the nose alone that cognises all sorts of odour—good or bad. similarly all colours—white, yellow, blue or green—are cognised by the eye. In fact there are only five objects which ae cognised by the five senses.

यदि सामान्यं संग्राहकम्? प्राप्तमिन्द्रियाणाम्—

विषयत्वाव्यतिरेकादेकत्वाम्॥ 64॥

विषयत्वेन हि सामान्येन गन्धादयः संगृहीता इति॥64॥

विषयत्वाव्यतिरेकात् viṣaya-tva-a-vyatirekāt, because of the non-exclusion of the character of their being objects of senses; एकत्वाम् eka-tvāṃ, unity.

267. Some say that there is only one sese as the so-called different objects of sense are not devoid of the character of an object.—64.

The objection raised in this aphorism is as follows :—

The so-called different objects, *viz.*, colour, sound, smell (odour), taste (savour) and touch agree with one another in each of them being an object of sense. As they all possess the common characteristic of being an object of sense it is much simpler to say that the object of sense is only one. If there is only one object of sense, the sense must also be one only.

न बुद्धिलक्षणाधिष्ठानगत्याकृतिजातिपञ्चत्वेभ्यः॥ 65॥

न खलु विषयत्वेन सामान्येन कृतव्यवस्था विषया ग्राहकान्तरनिरपेक्षाः=एकसाधनग्राह्या अनुमीयन्ते, अनुमीयन्ते च पञ्च गन्धादयो गन्धत्वादिभिः स्वसामान्यैः कृतव्यवस्था इन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्याः, तस्मादसंबद्धमेतत्, अयमेव चार्थोऽनूद्यते-'बुद्धिलक्षणपञ्चत्वात्' इति=बुद्धय एव लक्षणानि-विषयग्रहणलिङ्गत्वादिन्द्रियाणाम्, तदेतत् "इन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात् 61" इत्येतस्मिन् सूत्रे कृतभाष्यमिति, तस्माद् बुद्धिलक्षणपञ्चत्वात् पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि।

अधिष्ठानान्यपि खलु पञ्च इन्द्रियाणाम्-सर्वशरीराधिष्ठानं स्पर्शनं स्पर्शग्रणलिङ्गम्,

कृष्णताराधिष्ठानं चक्षुः बहिर्निस्सृतं रूपग्रहणलिङ्गम्, नासाधिष्ठानं घ्राणम्, जिह्वाधिष्ठानं रसनम्, कर्णच्छिद्राधिष्ठानं श्रोत्रम्, गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दग्रहणलिङ्गत्वादिति।

गतिभेदादपीन्द्रियभेदः-कृष्णसारोपनिबद्धं चक्षुर्बहिर्निस्सृत्य रूपाधिकरणानि द्रव्याणि प्राप्नोति, स्पर्शनादीनि त्विन्द्रियाणि विषया एवाऽऽश्रयोपसर्पणात् प्रत्यासीदन्ति, सन्तानवृत्त्या शब्दस्य श्रोत्रप्रत्त्यासत्तिरिति।

आकृतिः खलु परिमाणम्=इयत्ता सा पञ्चधा-स्वस्थानमात्राणि घ्राणरसनस्पर्शनानि विषयग्रहणेनानुमेयानि, चक्षु कृष्णसाराश्रयं बहिर्निस्सृतं विषयव्यापि, श्रोत्रं नान्यदाकाशात् तच्च विभु शब्दमात्रानुभवानुमेयं पुरुषसंस्कारोपग्रहाच्चाधिष्ठाननियमेन शब्दस्य व्यञ्जकमिति।

जातिरिति योनिं प्रचक्षते-पञ्च खल्विन्द्रिययोनयः पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि तस्मात् प्रकृतिपञ्चत्वादपि पञ्चेन्द्रियाणीति सिद्धम्।।65।।

न na, no; बुद्धिलक्षणाधिष्ठानगत्याकृतिजातिपञ्चत्वेभ्यः: buddhi-lakṣaṇa-adhiṣṭhānagati-ākṛti-jāti-pañcha-tvebhyaḥ, becuase of fivefoldness of the states of consciousness which the senses produce, their sites, their movements, their shapes and their origins.

268. It is, we reply, not so because the senses possess five-fold character corresponding to the characters of knowledge, sites, processes, forms and materials.—65.

The senses must be admitted to be five on the following grounds :—

(a) *The characters of knowledge*—There are five senses corresponding to the give characters of knowledge, *viz*., visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual.

(b) *The sites*—The senses are five on account of the various sites they occupy. The visual sense rests on the eyeball, the auditory sense on the ear-hole, the olfactory sense on the nose, the gustatory sense on the tongue, while the tactual sense occupies the whole body.

(c) *The processes*—There are five senses involving five different processes, *e.g.*, the visual sense apprehends a colour by approaching it through the (ocular) ray while the tactual sense apprehends an object which is in association with the body, and so on.

(d) *The forms*—The senses are of different forms, *e.g.*, the eye partakes of the nature of a blue ball, and the ear is not different from ether, etc.

(e) *The materials*—The senses are made up of different materials : the eye is fiery, the ear is ethereal, the nose is earthy, the tongue is watery, and the skin (touch) is airy.

कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते-भूतप्रकृतीनीन्द्रियाणि नाऽव्यक्तप्रकृतीनीति?-

भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धेस्तादात्म्यम्।। 66।।

दृष्टो हि वाय्वादीनां भूतानां गुणविशषाभिव्यक्तिनियमः=वायुः स्पर्शव्यञ्जकः आपो रसव्यञ्जिकाः, तेजो रूपव्यञ्जकम्, पार्थिव किंचिद् द्रव्यं कस्यचिद् द्रव्यस्य गन्धव्यञ्जकम्, अस्ति चायमिन्द्रियाणां भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धिनियमः तेन भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धेर्मन्यामहे-भूतप्रकृतीनीन्द्रियाणि नाऽव्यक्तप्रकृतीनिति।।66।।

(अथाऽर्थविवेचनम्)

भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धेः bhūta-guṇa-viśeṣa-upalabdheḥ, on account of the perception of the specific attributes of the elements; तादात्म्यम् tadātmyam, identity.

269. The senses are essentially identical with the elements in consequence of the possession of their special qualities.—66.

The five senses, *viz.*, the eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin (touch) are essentially identical with the five elements, *viz.*, fire, ether, earch, water and air, whose special qualities, *viz.*, colour, sound, smell (odour), savour (taste) and tangibility, are exhibited by them.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 8 : The Senses are manifold : Sūtras : 54-66.

Some say that, though the senses are located in different parts of the body, they are in reality only one, as the skin is present in every such location. It is true that even inspite of the presence of the skin a blind man does not see. But the skin is differentiated in its power in different parts of the body and that is the reason why the blind do not see, because blindness means loss of the particular power in the particular part of the skin. This argument of the opponent is self destructive. For it amounts to an admission of the difference of the senses. Moreover, no only the skin but the elements of Earth, etc., constitute the site of the senses. Touch cannot be the one and universal sense, as in that case colour, tuch, taste, etc. would all be perceived simultaneously, which is not the case. In the perception of colour Touch cannot establish contact between itself and an object screened from view, and perception without contact of sense and object is impossible. The objects of sense again are more than one, and the senses have to perform more than one function. The sense of touch cannot serve the purpose of the sense of sight and *vice-versa*. So also in the case of the other senses. Sensible objects being five, the senses also must be five in number. Moreover, they

produce five different kinds of cognition, are located in five different sites, have five different operations, possess five different shapes and have five different origins. Sight operates by going out of the eyes and reaching its objects. Sound reaches Hearing in waves. The other senses operate when the objects come into contact with them by the movement of the body. Smell, Taste and Touch are limited in shape to their sites. Sight residing in the pupils of the eyes goes out to pervade objects. Hearing is nothing else than Ether and is all-pervading. It is inferred by the perception of sound. It does not reveal all sounds because it is limited by its site according to the merit and demerit of the soul. The origins of the senses are the five elements respectively, as they severally make manifest and apprehend the specific attributes of the five elements. They are not modifications of the unmanifest matter (avyakta.)

गन्धादयः पृथिव्यादिगुणा इत्युद्दिष्टं उद्देशश्च पृथिव्यादीनामेकगुणत्वे चाऽनेकगुणत्वे समान इत्यत आह–

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दानां स्पर्शपर्य्यन्ताः पृथिव्याः॥ 67॥

अप्तेजोवायूनां पूर्व्वं पूर्व्वमपोह्याकाशस्योत्तरः॥ 68॥

स्पर्शपर्यन्तानामिति विभक्तिविपरिमाणः, आकाशस्योत्तरः=शब्दः स्पर्शपर्यन्तेभ्य इति। कथं तर्हि:? स्वतन्त्रविनियोगसामर्थ्यात् तेनोत्तरशब्दस्य परार्थाभिधानं विज्ञायते-उद्देशसूत्रे हि स्पर्शपयन्तेभ्यः परः शब्द इति, तन्त्रं वा-स्पर्शस्य विवक्षितत्वात्=स्पर्शपर्यन्तेषु नियुक्तेषु योऽन्यस्तदुत्तरः शब्द इति॥67-68॥

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दानां gandha-rasa-rūpa-sparśa-śabdānāṃ, of smell, taste, form, touch, and sound; स्पर्शपर्य्यन्ताः sparśa-paryantāḥ, those ending with touch; पृथिव्याः pṛthivyāḥ, of the earth.

अप्तेजोवायूनाम् ap-tejo-vāyūnāṃ, of water, fire and air; पूर्वम्पूर्वम् pūrvaṃ pūrvaṃ, each preceding one; अपोह्य apohya, discarding; आकाशस्य ākāśasya, of ether; उत्तरः uttaraḥ, the last.

270. Of odour (smell), savour (taste), colour, tangibility (touch) and sound those ending with tangibility belong to earth.—67.

271. Rejecting each preceding one in succession they belong respectively to water, fire and air; the last (sound) belongs to ether.—68.

The earth possesses four qualities, *viz.*, odour (smell), savour (taste), colour and tangibility. In water there are three qualities, viz., savour, colour and tangibility; colour and tangibility are known to be the qualities of fire while tangibility and sound belong respectively to air and ether.

न सर्व्वगुणानुपलब्धेः॥ 69।

नायं गुणनियोगः साधुः, कस्मात्? यस्य भूतस्य ये गुणा न ते तदात्मकेनेन्द्रियेण सर्वे उपलभ्यन्ते=पार्थिवेन हि घ्राणेन स्पर्शपर्यन्ता न गृह्यन्ते गन्ध एवैको गृह्यते, एवं शेषेष्वपीति॥69॥

न na, no; सर्वगुणानुपलब्धेः sarva-guṇa-an-upalabdheḥ, an account of the non-perception of all the attributes.

272. An objector says that it is not so beause an elements is not apparently found to possess more than one quality.—69.

The substance of the objection is that the earth does not possess four qualities but only one quality, *viz.*, odour (smell) which is apprehended by the nose. Water does not possess three qualities but possesses only one quality *viz.*, savour (taste) which is apprehended by the tongue. Similarly the other elements do, each of them, possess only one quality.

कथं तर्हीमे गुणा विनियोक्तव्याः? इति–

एकैकश्येनोत्तरोत्तरगुणसद्भावादुत्तराणां तदनुपलब्धिः॥ 70॥

गन्धादीनामेकैको यथाक्रमं पथिव्यादीनामेकैकस्य गुणः अतस्तदनुपलब्धिः=तेषां तयोः तस्य चानुपलब्धिः=घ्राणेन रसरूपस्पर्शानां, रसनेन रूपस्पर्शयोः, चक्षुषा स्पर्शस्येति॥70॥

एकैकश्येन eka-eka-śyena, one to one; उत्तरोत्तरगुणसद्भावात् uttara-uttara-guṇa-sadbhāvāt, because of the existence of the attributes in each succeding one; उत्तराणाम् uttarāṇām, in the succeeding ones; तदनुपलब्धि tat-anupa-labdhiḥ, non-perception thereof.

273. The objector further says that the qualities belong to the elements, one to one, in their respective order so that there is non-perception of other qualities in them.—70.

The substance of the objection is this :—

Odour (smell) is the only quality of the earth. Consequently the other three qualities, *viz.*, savour (taste), colour and tangibility, allegend to belong to the earth, are not found in it. Savour (taste) is the only quality of water, hence, the other two qualities, *viz.*, colour and tangibility alleged to belong to water, are not found in it. Colour is the only quality of fire, and hence the other quality, *viz.*, tangibility allegend to belong to fire, is not found in it. Tangibility is of course the quality of air and sound of ether.

कथं तर्ह्यऽनेकगुणानि भूतानि गृह्यन्त? इति,

संसर्गाच्चानेकगुणग्रहणम्।। 71।।

अबासिंसर्गाच्च पृथिव्यां रसादयो गृह्यन्ते एवं शेषेष्वपीति।।71।।

नियमस्तर्हि न प्राप्नोति– संसर्गस्यानियमात् 'चतुर्गुणा पृथिवी', 'त्रिगुणा आप:', 'द्विगुणं तेज:', 'एकगुणो वायु:' इति, नियमश्चोपपद्यते, कथम्?–

274. And it is through their commixture, continues the objector, that there is the apprehension of more than one quality.—71.

The objector further says as follows :—

The earth possesses only odour (smell), and if sometimes savour (taste) is also found there it is because the earth is then mixed with water. Similarly if there is odour (smell) in water it is because the earth is mixed with it.

विष्टं ह्यपरम्परेण।। 72।।

पृथिव्यादीनां पूर्वपूर्वमुत्तरेणोत्तरेण विष्टम् अतो न संसर्गानियम इति, तच्चैतद् भूतसृष्टौ वेदितव्यं नैतर्हीति।।72।।

विष्टं viṣṭam, covered, interpenetrated; हि hi, for; अपरं aparam, one; अपरेण apareṇa, by another.

275. Of the elements one is, according to the objector, often interpenetrated by others.—72.

The objection is explained as follows :

The earth is often interpenetrated by water, fire and air and is consequently found to possess savour (taste), colour and tangibility besides odour (smell). Similar is the case with water, etc.

न पार्थिवाप्ययो: प्रत्यक्षत्वात्।। 73।।

नेति त्रिसूत्रीं प्रत्याचष्टे, कस्मात्?, पार्थिवस्य द्रव्यस्याऽऽप्यस्य च प्रत्यक्षत्वात्। महत्त्वानेकद्रव्यत्वाद्रूपाच्चोपलब्धिरिति तैजसमेव द्रव्यं प्रत्यक्षं स्यात्, न पार्थिवमाप्यं वा–रूपाभावात्। तैजसवत्तु पार्थिवाप्ययो: प्रत्यक्षत्वाद् न संसर्गादनेकगुणग्रहणं भूतानामिति। भूतान्तररूपकृतं च पार्थिवाप्ययो: प्रत्यक्षत्वं ब्रुवत: प्रत्यक्षो वायु: प्रसज्यते, नियमे वा कारणमुच्यतामिति।

रसयोर्वा पार्थिवाप्ययो: प्रत्यक्षात्वात् पार्थिवो रस: षड्विध: आप्यो मधुर एव न चैतत् संसर्गाद् भवितुमर्हति। रूपयोर्वा पार्थिवाप्ययो: प्रत्यक्षत्वात्, तैजसरूपानुगृहीतयो: संसर्गे हि व्यञ्जकमेव यपं न व्यङ्ग्यमस्तीति। एकानेकविधत्वे च पार्थिवाप्ययो: प्रत्यक्षत्वाद्

रूपयो:=पार्थिवं हरितलोहितपीताद्यनेकविधं रूपम् आप्यं तु शुक्लमप्रकाशकं न चैतदेकगुणानां संसर्गे सत्युपलभ्यते इति। उदाहरणमात्रं चैतत्।

अत: परं प्रपञ्च:– स्पर्शयोर्वा पार्थिवतैजसयो: प्रत्यक्षत्वात्, पार्थिवोऽनुष्णाशीत: स्पर्श: उष्णस्तैजस: प्रत्यक्ष:, न चैतदेकगुणानामऽनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शेन वायुना संसर्गेणोपपद्यते इति। अथ वा पार्थिवाप्ययोर्द्रव्यायेर्व्यवस्थितगुणयो: प्रत्यक्षत्वात्=चतुर्गुणं पार्थिव द्रव्यं त्रिगुणमाप्यं प्रत्यक्षं तेन तत्कारणमुमीयते–तथाभूतमिति, तस्य कार्यं लिङ्गम्–कारणभावाद्धि कार्यभाव इति। एवं तैजसवायव्ययोर्द्रव्ययो: प्रत्यक्षत्वाद् गुणव्यवस्थायास्तत्कारणे द्रव्ये व्यवस्थानुमानमिति।

दृष्टश्च विवेक:– पार्थिवाप्ययो: प्रत्यक्षत्वात्=पार्थिवं द्रव्यमऽबादिभिर्वियुक्तं प्रत्यक्षतो गृह्यते आप्यं च पराभ्यां तैजसं च वायुना, न चैकैकगुणं गृह्यते इति। निरनुमानं तु "विष्टं ह्यपरं परेण 71" इत्येतदिति=नात्र लिङ्गमनुमापकं इति येनैतदेवं प्रतिपद्येमहि। यच्चोक्तम्– 'विष्टं ह्यपरं परेणेति भूतसृष्टौ वेदितव्यं न सांप्रतम्' इति नियमकारणाभावादयुक्तम्, दृष्टं च सांप्रतम्–'अपरं परेण विष्टम्' इति=वायुना च विष्टं तेज इति। विष्टत्वम्=संयोग: स च द्वयो: समान:, वायुना च विष्टत्वात् स्पर्शवत् तेज: न तु तेजसा विष्टत्वाद् रूपवान् वायुरिति नियमकारणं नास्तीति। दृष्टं च तैजसेन स्पर्शेन वायव्यस्य स्पर्शस्याऽभिभवादग्रहणमिति न च तेनैव तस्याऽभिभव इति।।73।।

न na, no; पार्थिवाप्ययो: pārthiva-āpyayoḥ, of the earthy and the watery, of the terrene and aqueous; प्रत्यक्षत्वात् pratyakṣa-tvāt, because of being perceptible.

276. It is, we reply, not so because there is visual perception of the earthy and the watery.—73.

The Naiyayikas meet the foregoing objections by saying that the earth really possesses four qualities, water three, fire two air one, and ether one. Had the earth possessed only odour (smell) and the water only savour (taste) then it would have been impossible for us to see the earthy and watery things. We are competent to see only those things which possess colour, and if the earth and water had not possessed colour how could we have seen them? Since we can see the earthy and the watery it follows that they possess colour. If you say that earth and water are visible because they are mixed with the fiery things which possess colour, why then the air and ether are also not visible? There is not rule that it is only the earth and water that can be mixed with fiery things but that the air and ether cannot be so mixed. Proceeding in this way we find that the earth, etc. do not each possess only one quality.

तदेवं न्यायाविरुद्धं प्रवादं प्रतिषिध्य "न सर्वगुणानुपलब्धे: 69" इति चोदितं समाधीयते–

पूर्व्वपूर्व्वगुणोत्कर्षात्तत्तत्प्रधानम्।। 74।।

तस्मात्र सर्वगुणोपलब्धिर्घ्राणादीनाम्, पूर्वं पूर्वं गन्धादेर्गुणस्योत्कर्षात् तत्तत्प्रधानम्। का प्रधानता?, विषयग्रहकत्वम्। को गुणोत्कर्ष:?, अभिव्यक्तौ समर्थत्वम्। यथा बाह्यानां पार्थिवाप्यतैजसानां द्रव्याणां चतुर्गुणत्रिगुणद्विगुणानां न सर्वगुणव्यञ्जकत्वं गन्धरसरूपोत्कर्षात्तु यथाक्रमं गन्धरसरूपव्यञ्जकत्वम् एवं घ्राणरसनचक्षुषां चतुर्गुणत्रिगुणद्विगुणानां न सर्वगुणग्राहकत्वं गन्धरसरूपोत्कर्षात्तु यथाक्रमं गन्धरसरूपग्राहकत्वं तस्माद् घ्राणदिभिर्न सर्वेषां गुणनामुपलब्धिरिति। यस्तु प्रतिजानीते-गन्धगुणत्वाद् घ्राणं गन्धस्य ग्राहकम् एवं रसनादिष्वपीति, तस्य यथागुणयोगं घ्राणादिभिर्गुणग्रहणं प्रसज्यते इति।।74।।

पूर्वपूर्वगुणोत्कर्षात् pūrva-pūrva-guṇa-utkarṣāt, owing to the predominance of each preceding attribute; तत्तत्प्रधानां tat-tat-pradhānam, each is predominant attribute of each corresponding element.

277. Owing to the predominance of one quality in an element, a sense is characterised by the quality which predominates in its corresponding element.—74.

The nose is characterised by odour (smell) which predominates in its corresponding element the earth; the tongue is characterised by savour (taste) which predominates in its corresponding element the water the eye is characterised by colour which predominates in its corresponding element the fire; the skin (touch) is characterised by tangibility which abides in its corresponding element the air while the ear is characterised by sound which is the special quality of its corresponding element the ether.

किंकृतं पुनर्व्यवस्थानं किंचित् पार्थिवमिन्द्रियं न सर्वाणि? कानिचित् आप्यतैजसवायव्यानि इन्द्रियाणि न सर्वाणि? इति–

तद्व्यवस्थानन्तु भूयस्त्वात्।। 75।।

अर्थनिर्वृत्तिसमर्थस्य प्रविभक्तस्य द्रव्यस्य संसर्ग: पुरुषसंस्कारकारितो भूयस्त्वम्, दृष्टो हि प्रकर्षे भूयस्त्वशब्द:–प्रकृष्टो यथा विषय: 'भूयान्' इत्युच्यते, यथा पृथगर्थक्रिया-समर्थानि पुरुषसंस्कारवशाद् विषौषधिमणिप्रभृतीनि द्रव्याणि निर्वर्त्यन्ते न सर्वं सर्वार्थम् एवं पृथग्विषयग्रहणसमर्थानि घ्राणादीनि निर्वर्त्यन्ते न सर्वविषयग्रहणसमर्थानीति।।75।।

तद्व्यवस्थानं tat-vyavasthānam, distribution thereof; तु tu, however; भूयस्त्वात् bhūyastvāt, according to their fitness.

278. A sense as distinguished from its corresponding element is determined by its fineness.—75.

A sense (*e.g.*, the nose) which is the fine part of an element (*e.g.*, the earth) is able to perceive a special object (*e.g.*, odour) owing to the act-corce (*saṃskāra, karma)* of the person possessing the sense. A sense cannot perceive more than one object because it possesses the predominant quality of an element, *e.g.*, the nose possesses only odour which is the predominant quality of the earth, the tongue the savour of water, the eye the colour of fire, and so on.

स्वगुणान् नोपलभन्ते इन्द्रियाणि, कस्मादितिचेत्?–

सगुणानामिन्द्रियभावात्।। 76।।

स्वान् गन्धादीन् नोपलभन्ते घ्राणादीनि। केन कारणेनेतिचतेत्?, स्वगुणै: सह घ्राणदीनामिन्द्रियभावात्=घ्राणं स्वेन गन्धेन समानार्थकारिणा सह बाह्यं गन्धं गृह्णाति तस्य स्वगन्धग्रहणं सहकारिवैकल्यान्न भवति, एवं शेषाणामपि।।76।।

सगुणानां saguṇānām, of those atended with attributes; इन्द्रियभावात् indriya-bhāvāt, being themselves the senses.

279. A sense is really called as such when it is attended by is quality.—76.

Some may say why a sense (the nose for instance) cannot perceive its own quality (odour). The reply is that a sense consists of an element that it can see an object. Now in perceiving an object the sense is attended by the quality but in perceiving its own quality it is not so attended. Consequently a sense cannot perceive its own quality.

यदि पुनर्गन्ध: सहकारी च स्याद् घ्राणस्य? ग्राह्यश्च (स्यादेव?) इत्यत आह–

तेनैव तस्याग्रहणाच्च।। 77।।

न गुणोपलब्धिरिन्द्रियाणाम्। यो ब्रूते–यथा बाह्यं द्रव्यं चक्षुषा गृह्यते तथा तेनैव चक्षुषा तदेव चक्षुर्गृह्यतामिति तादृगिदम्–तुल्यो ह्युभयत्र प्रतिपत्तिहेत्वभाव इति।।77।।

तेने tena, by that; एव eva, alone; तस्य tasya, its; अग्रहणात् a-grahaṇāt, on account of non-apprehension; च cha, and.

280. Moreover an object is never perceived by itself. —77.

An eye can see an external object but it cannot see itself. On the same principle a sense cannot perceive its own quality.

न शब्दगुणोपलब्धे।। 78।।

'स्वगुणान् नोपलभन्ते इन्द्रियाणि' इत्येतन्न भवति–उपलभ्यते हि स्वगुण: शब्द: श्रोत्रेणेति।।78।।

न na, no; शब्दगुणोपलब्धेः śabda-guṇa-upalabdheḥ, because of perception of the attribute of sound.

281. It is, some say, not so because the quality of sound is perceived by the ear.—78.

The objection stands thus :—

It is not ture that a sense cannot perceive its own quality. The ear, for instance, can perceive sound which is its own quality.

तदुपलब्धिरितरेतरद्रव्यगुणवैधर्म्यात्॥ 79॥

न शब्देन गुणेन सगुणमाकाशमिन्द्रियं भवति, न शब्दः शब्दस्य व्यञ्जकः। न च घ्राणादीनां स्वगुणग्रहणं प्रत्यक्षं नाप्यनुमीयते, अनुमीयते तु श्रोत्रेणाकाशेन शब्दस्य ग्रहणं शब्दगुणत्वं चाकाशस्येति, परिशेषश्चानुमानं वेदितव्यम्–आत्मा तावत् श्रोता न करणम्, मनसः श्रोत्रत्वे बधिरत्वाभावः, पृथिव्यादीनां घ्राणादिभावे सामर्थ्यं श्रोत्रभावे चाऽसामर्थ्यम्, अस्ति चेदं श्रोत्रम् आकाशं च शिष्यते परिशेषादाकाशं श्रोत्रमिति।।79।।

॥ इति वात्स्यायनविरचिते न्यायभाष्ये तृतीयाऽध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकं समाप्तम्॥

तदुपलब्धि tat-upalabdhiḥ, its perception; इतरेतरद्रव्यगुणवैधर्म्यात् itara-itara-dravya-guṇa-vaidharmyāt, from difference from the attribute of evey other substance.

282. The perception of sound furnishes a contrast to the of other qualities and their corresponding substrata.—79.

The nose, tongue, eye and skin can respectively smell earth, taste water, see colour and touch air only when they are attended by their own qualities, *viz.*, odour (smell), savour (taste), colour and tangibility. But an ear when it hears sound is not attended by any quality. In fact the ear is identical with the ether and hears sound by itself. By indirect inference we can prove that sound is the special quality of the ether : odour is the predominant quality of the earth, savour of water, colour of the eye, and tangibility of the skin (touch): sound must therefore be the quality of the remaining element, *viz.*, the ether.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 9 : The Objects of the Senses : Sūtras : 67-79.

Smell, Taste, Colour and Touch are the attributes of Earth; Taste, Colour and Touch, of Water; Colour and Touch, of Fire; Touch, of Air; and Sound, of Ether. The opposite view is that the elements possess only one attribute each and that other attribute are perceiveed in them owing to their interpenetration by other elements. The interpenetration, it is also said, is not mutual among all the elements but of the preceding by the succeeding in the order of their mention as Earth, Water, Fire,

Air and Ether. This view is not correct. For, as a matter of fact, bodies formed of Earth and Water are perceptible to the eye; they must therefore possess colour. Moreover, interpenetration must affect both the element interpenetrated and that interpenetrating. But colour is not perceived in Air though it is said to interpenetrate Fire. The theory of interpenetration therefore has to be rejected.

What is the explanation then of the fact that the senses constituted by the elements do not apprehend al the attributes of their respective elements? The explanations is that the senses become dominant in respect of that attributes which is prominent in their respective elements. This limitation of the scope of the senses is due to the saṃskāra, *i.e.*, tendency or potency which is the resultant of karma (appetency) of the soul which they serve, just as the things of te world, *e.g.*, poison, herbs, gems, etc., serve specific purposes of man according to his karma, and every single thing does not serve all is purposes.

The senses are also limited in their scope in this that they are themselves insensible in respect of their own attributes. Sight, for instance, cannot see its own colour. Smell cannot smell its own smell. This is because in perception the instrument must be endowed with the same attribue as the object, and when its own attribute is to be the object of its apprehension, the condition of perception is not present. In other words, an attribute cannot apprehend itself :—a sense does not apprehend its own attribute because of the absence of the auxiliary attribute.The perception of sound by Hearing is an exception which tests the rule. Hearing is composed of Ether. In the perception of sound it is independent of the possession of the attribute of sound as an auxiliary. That Hearing is composed of Ether is known as follows : The soul is the hearer. Mind cannot be the instrument of hearing; as in that case there would be no deafness as mind is not liable to destruction. Earth, Water, Fire and Air are not known to have the capacity to produce Hearing. Ether therefore is the constituent of Hearing.

॥ इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने तृतीयस्याऽध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम् ॥1॥

Book III, Chapter II

परीक्षितानीन्द्रियाणि अर्थाश्च, बुद्धेरिदानीं परीक्षाक्रमः–सा क्िमनित्या अनत्या वा? इति। कुतः संशयः?–

कर्म्माकाशसाधर्म्यात् संशयः॥ 1॥

अस्पर्शवत्त्वं ताभ्यां समानो धर्म उपलभ्यते बुद्धौ, विशेषाश्चेपजनाऽपायधर्मवत्त्वम्, विपर्ययश्च यथास्वमऽनित्यनित्ययोस्तस्यां बुद्धौ नोपलभ्यते तेन संशय इति॥ अनुपपन्नः खल्वयं संशयः–सर्वशरीरिणां हि प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयाऽनित्या बुद्धिः सुखादिवत् भवति च संवित्तिः–'ज्ञास्यामि', 'जानामि', 'अज्ञासिषम्' इति, नचोपजनापायावन्तरेण त्रैकाल्यव्यक्तिस्त- त्श्च त्रैकाल्यव्यक्तेः 'अनित्या बुद्धिः' इत्येतत् सिद्धम्, प्रमाणसिद्धं चेदं शास्त्रेप्युक्तम्- "इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नम् 1-1-4", "युगपत् ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् 1-1-16" इत्येवमादि, तस्मात्संशयप्रक्रियानुपपत्तिरिति। दृष्टिप्रवादोपालम्भार्थं तु प्रकरणम्। एवं हि पश्यन्तः प्रवदन्ति सांख्याः–'पुरुषस्यान्तःकरणभूता नित्या बुद्धिः' इति॥1॥

कर्माकाशसाधर्म्यात् karma-ākāśa-sādharmyāt, owing to its resemblance to action and ether; संशयः saṃśayaḥ, doubt.

283. Since the intellect resembles both action and ether there is doubt as to whether it is transitory or permanent.—1.

Inasmuch as the intellect bears likeness to both action and ether in respect of intangibility, there arises the question whether it is transitory like an action or permanent like the ether. We find in the intellect the function of origination and decay which marks transitory things as well as the function of recognition which marks permanent things. "I knew the tree," "I know it" and "I shall know it"—these are expression which involving the ideas of origination and decay indicate our knowledge to be transitory. "I who knew the tree yesterday am knowing it again today"—this is an expression which involving the idea of continuity indicates our knowledge to be permanent. Hence, there is doubt as to whether the intellect which exhibits both kinds of knowledge is really transitory or permanent.

साधनं च प्रचक्षते–

विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानात्॥ 2॥

किं पुनरिदं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्? 'पूर्वमज्ञासिषमर्थं तमिमं जानामि' इतिज्ञानयोः समानेऽर्थे प्रतिसन्धिज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् एतच्चऽवस्थिताया बुद्धेरुपपन्नम्, नानात्वे तु बुद्धिभेदेषूत्पन्नापवर्गिषु प्रत्यभिानानुपपत्तिः–नान्यज्ञातम्यः प्रत्यभिजानातीति॥2॥

विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् viṣaya-pratyabhijñānāt, because of recognition of objects.

284. Some say that the intellect is permanent because there is recognition of objects.—2.

The Sāṃkhyas maintain the permanency of the intellect on the ground of its capacity for the recognition of objects. A thing which was known before is known again now—this sort of knowledge is called recognition. It is possible only if knowledge which existed in the past continues also at the present, that is, if knowledge is persistence or permanent. Recognition would have been impossible if knowledge had been transitory. Hence, the Sāṃkhyas conclude that the intellect which recognises objects is permanent.

साध्यसमत्वादहेतुः॥ 3॥

यथा खलु नित्यवं बुद्धेः साध्यम् एवं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमपीति। किं कारणम्? चेतन धर्मस्य करणेऽनुपपत्तिः–पुरुषधर्मः खल्वयं ज्ञानं दर्शनमुपलब्धिर्बोधः प्रत्ययोऽध्यवसाय इति–चेतनो हि पूर्वज्ञातमर्थं प्रत्यभिजानाति तस्यैतस्माद् हेतोर्नित्यत्वं युक्तमिति। करणचैतन्याभ्युपगमे तु चेतनस्वरूपं च वचनीयम्–नाऽनिर्दिष्टस्वरूपमाऽऽत्मान्तरं शक्यमस्तीति प्रतिपत्तुम्! ज्ञानं चुद् बुद्धेरन्तःकरणस्याभ्युपगम्यते चतनस्येदानी किं स्वरूपं को धर्मः किं तत्त्वम्, ज्ञानेन च बुद्धौ वर्तमानेनायं चेतनः किं करोरीति॥

चेतयते इतिचेत्? न ज्ञानादर्थानतर वचनम्।

पुरुषश्चेतयते बुद्धिर्जानातीति, नेदं ज्ञानादर्थान्तमुच्यते–चेतयते जानीते पश्यति उपलभते इत्येकोयमर्थ इति। बुद्धिर्ज्ञापयतीति चेत्? अद्धा जानीते पुरुषो बुद्धिर्ज्ञापयतीति सत्यमेतत्, एवं चाभ्युपगमे 'ज्ञानं पुरुषस्य' इति सिद्धं भवति न बुद्धेरन्तःकरणस्येति॥

प्रतिपुरुषं च शब्दान्तर व्यवस्थाप्रतिज्ञाने? प्रतिषेधहेतुवचनम्।

यश्च प्रतिजानीते–कश्चित् पुरुषश्चेतयते कश्चिद् बुध्यते कश्चिदुपलभते कश्चित् पश्यति इति पुरुषान्तराणि खल्विमानि=चेतनो बोद्धा उपलब्धा द्रष्टेता नैकस्येते धर्मा इति, अत्र कः प्रतिषेधहेतुरिति॥

अर्थस्याऽभेद इति चेत्? समानम्।

अभिन्नार्था एते शब्दा इति तत्र व्यस्थानुपपत्तिरित्येवं चेत् मन्यसे? समानं भवति= पुरुषश्चेतयते बुद्धिर्जानीते इत्यत्राप्यर्थो न भिद्यते, तत्रोभयोश्चेतनत्वादन्यतरलोप इति। यदि पुनर्बुध्यतेऽनयेति बोधनं बुद्धिर्मन एवोच्यते तच्च नित्यम्? अस्त्वेदेवं न तु मनसो विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानाद् नित्यत्वम्, दृष्टं हि करणभेदे ज्ञातुरेकत्वात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्-सव्यदृष्टस्येतरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानादिति चक्षुर्वत् प्रदीपवच्च=प्रदीपान्तरदृष्टस्य प्रदीपान्तरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानमिति, तस्माद् ज्ञातुरयं नित्यत्वे हेतुरिति।।3।।

साध्यसमत्वात् sādhya-sama-tvāt, because the proof is the same as the things to be proved; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, no mark.

285. The foregoing reason is not, we say, valid inasmuchas it requires proof like the very subject in dispute.—3.

Whether the intellect is permanent or not—this is the subjects in dispute. The Sāṃkhyas affirm that it is permanent and the reason adduced by them is that it can recognise objects. The Naiyāyikas dispute not only the conclusion of the Sāṃkhyas but also their reason. They say that the intellect does not recognise objects but it is the soul that does so. Knowledge cannot be attributed to an unconscious instrument, the intellect, but it must be admitted to a quality of a conscious agent, the soul. If knowledge is not a quality of the soul, what else can be its quality? How is the soul to be defined? There is therefore no proof as to the validity of the reason, *viz.*, that the intellect recognises objects.

यच्च मन्यते-बुद्धेरऽवस्थिताया यथाविषयं वृत्तयः=ज्ञानानि निश्चरन्ति वृत्तिश्च वृत्तिमतो नाऽन्येति, तच्च-

न युगपदग्रहणात्।। 4।।

वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरनन्यत्वे वृत्तिमतोऽवस्थानाद् वृत्तीनामवस्थानमिति यानीमानि विषयग्रहणानि तान्यवतिष्ठन्ते इति युगपद् विषयाणां ग्रहणं प्रसज्यते इति।।4।।

न na, no; युगपत् yugapat, simultaneously; अग्रहणात् a-grahaṇāt, because of non-perception.

286. Knowledge is neither a mode of the permanent intellect nor identical with it because various sorts of knowledge do not occur simultaneously.—4.

The Sāṃkhyas affirm that knowledge is a mode of the permanent intellect from ; which it is not different. Knowledge, according to them,

is nothing but the permanent intellect modified in the shape of an object which is reflected on it through the senses. The Naiyāyikas oppose this view by saying that if knowledge as a mode of the permanent intellect is not different from it, then we must admit various sorts of knowledge to be permanent. But as a fact various sorts of knowledge are not permanent, that is, we cannot receive various sorts of knowledge simultaneously. Hence, knowledge is not identical with the permanent intellect.

अप्रत्यभिज्ञाने च विनाशप्रसङ्गः।। 5।।

अतीते च प्रत्यभिज्ञाने वृत्तिमानप्यतीत इत्यन्तःकरणस्य विनाशः प्रसज्यते, विपर्यये च नानात्वमिति।।5।।

अप्रत्यभिज्ञाने a-pratyabhijñāne, during non-recognition; च cha, and; विनाशप्रसङ्गः vināśa-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of destruction.

287. And in the cessation of recognition there arises the contingency of cessation of the intellect.—5.

If knowledge as a mode of the intellect is not different from it, then the cessation of recognition which is a kind of knowledge should be followed by the cessation of the intellect. This will upset the conclusion of the Sāṃkhyas that the intellect is permanent. Hence, knowledge is not identical with the intellect.

अविभु चैकं मनः पर्यायेणेन्द्रियैः संयुज्यते इति-

क्रमवृत्तित्वादयुगपद्ग्रहणम्।। 6।।

इन्द्रियार्थानाम्। वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोर्नानात्वमिति, एकत्वे च प्रादुर्भावतिरोभावयोरभाव इति।।6।।

क्रमवृत्तित्वात् krama-vṛtti-tvāt, owing to its operation being successive; अयुगपत् a-yugapat, non-simultaneous; ग्रहणम् grahaṇam, reception, apprehension.

288. The reception is different sorts of knowledge is non-simultaneous owing, according to us, to our mind coming in contact with different senses in succession.—6

The Naiyāyikas say that if knowledge as a mode of the permanent intellect has been identical with it, then there would have been neither a variety of knowledge nor origination and cessation of it. The different sorts of knowledge do not occur simultaneously because they are produced, according to the Naiyāyikas, by the mind which is atomic in dimension coming in contact with the senses in due succession.

अप्रत्यभिज्ञानञ्च विषयान्तरव्यासङ्गात्।। 7।।

अप्रत्यभिज्ञानम्=अनुपलब्धि:, अनुपलब्धिश्च, कस्य चिदर्थस्य विषयान्तरव्यासक्ते मनस्युपपद्यते-वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोर्नानात्वात्, एकत्वे हि अनर्थको व्यासङ्ग इति।।7।।

अप्रत्यभिज्ञानं a-pratyabhijñānam, non-recognition; च cha, and; विषायान्तरव्यासप्रसङ्ग viṣaya-antara-vyāsaṅgāt, due to occupation with another object.

289. The recognition (or knowledge) of an object cannot take place when the mind is drawn away by another object.—7.

We cannot hear a sound by our ear when the mind conjoined with the eye is drawn away by a colour. This shows that knowledge is different from the intellect, and that the mind which is atomic in dimension serves as an instrument for the production of knowledge.

विभुत्वे चान्तःकरणस्य पर्यायेणेन्द्रियै: संयोग:–

न गत्यभावात्।। 8।।

प्राप्तानीन्द्रियाण्यन्तःकरणेनेति प्राप्त्यर्थस्य गमनस्याभाव: तत्र क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावाद्-युगपद्ग्रहणानुपपत्तिरिति, गत्यभावाच्च प्रतिषिद्धं विभुनोऽन्तःकरणस्याऽयुगपद्ग्रहणं न लिङ्गान्तरेणानुमीयते इति, यथा चक्षुषो गति: प्रतिषिद्धा-संनिकृष्टविप्रकृष्टयोस्तुल्यकालग्रहणात्, पाणिचन्द्रमसोर्व्यवधानेन प्रतीघातेसाऽनुमीयते इति। सोऽयं नान्तःकरणे विवादो न (च) तस्य नित्यत्वे-सिद्धं हि मनोऽन्तःकरणं नित्यं चेति। क तर्हि विवाद्:?, तस्य विभुत्वे, तच्च प्रमाणतोऽनुपलब्धे: प्रतिषिद्धमिति। एकं चान्तःकरणं नाना चैता ज्ञानात्मिका वृत्तय:-चक्षुर्विज्ञानं घ्राणविज्ञानम्=रूपविज्ञानं, एतच्च वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरेकत्वेऽनुपपन्नमिति। पुरुषो जानीते नान्तःकरणमिति, एतेन विषयान्तरव्यासङ्ग: प्रत्युक्त:=विषयान्तरग्रहणलक्षणो विषयान्तरव्यासङ्ग पुरुषस्य नान्तःकरणस्येति। केन चिदिन्द्रियेण संनिधि: केन चिदऽसंनिधि-रित्ययं तु व्यासङ्गोऽनुज्ञायते मनस इति।।8।।

न na, no; गत्यभावात् gati-abhāvāt, because of absence of motion.

290. The intellect cannot be conjoined with the senses in succession because there is no motion in it.—8.

The mind which according to the Naiyāyikas, is atomic in dimension can move from one sense-organ to another in succession to produce different kinds of knowledge. This is impossible in the case of the intellect which, according to the Sāṃkhyas, is not only permanent but also all-perveding and as such cannot change its place, that is, does

not possess the tendency to be conjoined with the different sense-organs in other two so-called internal senses—intellect (Buddhi) and self-conceit (Ahaṅkāra)—being superfluous. It is not all-pervading, and knowledge is not is mode. Knowledge classified as visual, olfactory, etc. is of different kinds which belong ot the soul.

एकमन्तःकरणं नाना वृत्तय इति, सत्यऽभेदे वृत्तेरिदमुच्यते–

स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत्तदन्यत्वाभिमान:।। 9।।

तस्यां वृत्तौ नानात्वभिमानो यथा द्रव्यान्तरोपहिते स्फटिकेऽन्यत्वाभिमानो 'नील:' 'लोहित:' इति, एवं विषयान्तरोपधानादिति।।9।।

स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत् sphaṭika-anyatva-abhimāna-vat, like conceit that a crystal is other than what it is; तदन्यत्वाभिमान: tat-anya-tva-abhimānaḥ, the conceit of its being other than what it is.

291. A conceit of difference is said to arise in the intellect in the same way as the appearance of difference in a crystal.—9.

As a single crystal apprears to assume the different colours of different objects which are reflected on it, so the intellect though one appears, according to the Sāṃkhya, to be modified into different sorts of knowledge under the influence of different objects reflected on it through the senses.

न हेत्वभावात्।। 10।।

स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवदयं ज्ञानेषु नानात्वाभिमानो गौण: न पुनर्गन्धाद्यन्यत्वाभिमान-वदिति हेतुर्नास्ति हेत्वभावादनुपपन्न इति। समानो हेत्वभाव: इति चेत्? न-ज्ञानानां क्रमेणोपजनापायदर्शनात्=क्रमेण हीन्द्रियार्थेषु ज्ञानान्युपजायन्ते चाऽपयन्ति चेति दृश्यते तस्माद् गन्धाद्यन्यत्वाभिमानवदयं ज्ञानेषु नानात्वाभिमान इति।।10।।

292. It is, we reply, not so because there is no proof. —10.

The Sāṅkhya says that the variety of knowledge arises from the same intellect appearing to be modified by the various objects which are reflected on it through the senses. The various modes which the intellect undergoes, that is, the various kinds of knowlege are not real but only apparent. The Naiyāyikas dispose of this view by saying that there is no proof as to the unreality of the modes, that is, the various kinds of knowledge, inasmuch as they are found to originate and cease in due order in consequence of the contact of senses and their objects and *vice-versa*.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 1: Cognition is not eternal : Sūtras : 1-10.

It is a matter of common experience that cognitions appear and disappear. Their non-etenality is quite manifest, and is taken for granted in N.S., I. i. 16. The topic is concerned with the refutation of the speculation of the Sāṅkhyas that Buddhi is eternal. In support of the view they argue that unless Buddhi, cognition, were eternal, re-cognition would not be possible. To this the reply is that the reason given is not valid, because it has yet to be proved that re-cognition is done by Buddhi, and not by the soul, as we hold. We maintain that cognition, perception, aprehension, awareness, intuition, understanding is an attribute of the soul. If you hold that consciousness belong to the instrument you have to explain the nature of the conscious soul. If you admit that cognition is by the Buddhi, the inner instrument, you should explain what nature, what attribute, what reality is left to the conscious soul, what use it makes of cognition residing in Buddhi. If you say that the soul makes conscious and Buddhi knows, then where is the difference? To make conscious, to know, to perceive and to apprehend convey the same meaning. If, on the other hand, you admit that Buddhi makes known and the soul knows, we agree. Buddhi is then the instrument of cognition, the mind. The mind is eternal, but recognition of objects is not the reason for its eternality. For then the eyes too would be eternal, for one recognises with the left eye what is seen with the right eye. Recognition belongs to the knower and not to the instrument of knowledge.

The Sāṅkhyas also hold that Buddhi is eternal and that modifications in the form of cognitions emanate from it according to objects and that the modifications are in essence not different from the original. This view again is not correct. For in that case all objects would be perceived at the same time, which is not the case. Again, if Buddhi and its modifications were identical then the disappearance of the modification would entail the disappearance of Buddhi also. This shows that Buddhi and its modifications are not identical in essence. Further, they are different and modification arise in the mind one after another which account for the fact that the objects of all the senses are not apprehended all at once. Also when the mind is attached to one object there can be no cognition of another object. This shows that the mind is not all-pervading and moves from one object to another. Our view is that the inner instrument, the mind, is erernal but not all-pervading; that the mind is one while its cognitive modifications are mainfold; and that this could not be possible were the modification identical with the mind in essence. The soul therefore knows and not the mind. The mind's attachment to one object really means its contact with one sense. The

attachment or occupation is really of the soul. There is no force in the argument that the modification like the mind with which it is identical is really one but looks as many in the same way as does a crystal looks diverse in the proximity of different colours in succession, so that simultaneous cognitions of all objects need not necessarily be entailed. For the diversity in the case of the crystal is only apparent while the diversity of cognition is real, as it is a fact of experience that cognitions appear and disappear one after another.

"स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत्" इत्येतदमृष्यमाणः क्षणिकवाद्याह–

स्फटिकेऽप्यपरापरोत्पत्तेः क्षणिकत्वाद्व्यक्तीनामहेतुः॥ 11॥

'स्फटिकस्याऽभेदेनाऽवस्थितस्योपधानभेदान्नानात्वाभिमानः' इत्ययमविद्यमानहेतुकः पक्षः, कस्मात्? स्फटिकेप्यपरापरोत्पत्तेः=स्फटिकेप्यऽन्या व्यक्तय उत्पद्यन्ते अन्या निरुध्यन्ते इति, कथम्? क्षणिकत्वाद् व्यक्तीनाम्, क्षणश्चाल्पीयान् कालः क्षणस्थितिकाः क्षणिकाः। कथं पुनर्गम्यते क्षणिका व्यक्तयः इति, उपचयापचयप्रबन्धदर्शनात् शरीरादिषु=पक्ति-निर्वृत्तस्याऽऽहाररसस्य शरीरे रुधिरादिभावेनोपचयोऽपचश्च प्रबन्धेन प्रवर्तते उपचयाद् व्यक्तीनामुत्पादः अपचयाद् व्यक्तिनिरोधः एवं च सत्यऽवयवपरिणामभेदेन वृद्धिः शरीरस्य कालान्तरे गृह्यते इति सोयं व्यक्तिविशेषधर्मो व्यक्तिमात्रे वेदितत्य इति॥11॥

स्फटिके sphaṭike, in the case of a crystal; अपि api, even; अपरापरोत्पत्तेः apara-apara-utpatteḥ, of diverse manifestations one after another; क्षणिकत्वात् kṣaṇika-tvāt, being momentary; व्यक्तीनां vyaktīnām, of the individual manifestations; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, no mark.

293. It is said to be absurd even in the case of a crystal being replaced by newer and newer ones which grow up owing to all individuals being momentary.—11.

The Sāṅkhya says that as crystal seems to be modified by the colours which are reflected on it, so the intellect seems to be modified by the objects which are reflected on it through the senses. In reality there is, according to the Sāṃkhya, neither any modification of the crystal nor that of the intellect. This theory has in the preceding aphorism been controverted by the Naiyāyikas and is in the present aphorism opposed by the Buddhists. According to the latter al things, including even our body, are momentary. A thing which exists at the present moment grows up into another thing at the next moment so that there is no wonder that in the course of moments there should grow up crystals of different colours or intellects of different modes. Hence, the conclusion of the Sāṃkhyas that a crystal remains unaltered is, according to the Buddhists, untenable.

नियमहेत्वभावाद्यथादर्शनमभ्यनुज्ञा।। 12।।

सर्वासु व्यक्तिषु उपचयापचयप्रबन्धः शरीरवदिति नायं नियमः, कस्मात्?, हेत्वभावात्=नात्र प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वा प्रतिपादकमस्तीति, तस्माद् यथादर्शनमभ्यनुज्ञा=यत्र यत्रोपचयापचयप्रबन्धो दृश्यते तत्र तत्र व्यक्तीनाम् अपरापरोत्पत्तिरुपचयाऽपचयप्रबन्ध-दर्शनेनाभ्यनुज्ञायते यथा शरीरादिषु, यत्र यत्र न दृश्यते तत्र तत्र प्रत्याख्यायते यथा ग्रावप्रभृतिषु, स्फटिकेप्युपचयापचयप्रबन्धो न दृश्यते तस्मादऽयुक्तम्-'स्फटिकेप्यऽपरोत्पत्तिः' इति, यथा चाऽर्कस्य कटुकिम्ना सर्वद्रव्याणां कटुकिमानमापदयेत् तादृगेतदिति।।12।।

नियमहेत्वभावात् niyama-hetu-abhāvāt, owing to the absence of any reason for the rule (of growth and decay) ; यथादर्शनं yathā darśanam, exactly as seen; अभ्यनुज्ञा abhyanujñā, assent.

294. Owing to the absence of any absolute rule we shall give our assent according to the nature of each occurrence. —12.

It is not true that in every case there are at each moment newer growths. Our body no doubt undergoes increase and decrease but a piece of stone or a crystal does not, so that the doctrine of growth applies to the first case but not to the second. Hence, there is not general rule that a thing at the lapse of a moment should be replaced by another thing which grows up in its place.

यश्चाशेषनिरोधेनापूर्वोत्पादं निरन्वयं द्रव्यसंताने क्षणिकतां मन्यते तस्यैतत्–

नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः।। 13।।

उत्पत्तिकारणं तावदुपलभ्यते-अवयवोपचयो वल्मीकादीनाम्, विनाशकारणं चोपलभ्यते-घटादीनामवयवविभागः। यस्य त्वऽनपचितावयवं निरुध्यते अनुपचितावयवं चोत्पद्यते तस्याशेषनिरोधे निरन्वये वाऽपूर्वोत्पादे नकारणमुभयत्राप्युपलभ्यते इति।।13।।

न na, no; उत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः utpatti-vināśa-kāraṇa-upalabdheḥ, because of the perception of the cause of production and destruction.

295. There is no absence of link as we perceive the cause of growth and decay.—13.

The growth of a thing is the increase of its parts while the decay is the decrease of them. An ant-hill gradually increase in dimension before it attains its full growth while a pot decreases in dimension before it reaches its final decay. We never find an instance in which a thing decays without leaving any connecting link for another thing which grows in its place. There is in fact no linkless growth or linkless decay.

क्षीरविनाशे कारणानुपलब्धिवद्दध्युत्पत्तिवच्च तदुपपत्तिः।। 14।।

यथाऽनुपलभ्यमानं क्षीरविनाशकारणं दध्युत्पत्तिकारणं चाभ्यनुज्ञायते तथा स्फटिके पराऽपरासु व्यक्तिषु विनाशकारणमुत्पत्तिकरणं चाभ्यनेज्ञेयमिति।।14।।

क्षीरविनाशे kṣīra-vināśe, in the case of the destruction of milk; कारणानुपलब्धिवत् kāraṇa-anupalabdhi-vat, like the non-perception of the cause; दध्युत्पत्तिवत् dadhi-utpatti-vat, like production of curd; च cha, and; तदुत्पत्तिः tat-uptattiḥ, its production.

296. The growth of newer crystals in the place of an old one is comparable, according to some, to the growth of curd in the place of milk the cause of whose decay is not perceived.—14

The Buddhist says that there are things which grow and decay without the gradual increase and decrease of their parts. Of such things we do not find the cause of the first growth (origination) and the last decay (cessation), that is, ther is no link between the thing which ceases and another thing which grows in its palce. The milk, for instance, ceases without leaving any connecting link for the curd which grows in its place. Similarly new crystals grow to take the place of an old one which decays without leaving any mark. The crystal which exists at the present moment is not the same one that existed at the previous moment. There is no connection whatsoever between them.

लिङ्गतोग्रहणान्नानुपलब्धिः।। 15।।

क्षीरविनाशलिङ्गं क्षीरविनाशकारणं दध्युत्पत्तिलिङ्गं दध्युत्पत्तिकारणं च गृह्यते अतो नाऽनुपलब्धिः। विपर्ययस्तु स्फटिकादिषु द्रव्येषु अपरापरोत्पत्तीनां न लिङ्गमस्तीत्यनुवृत्ति-रेवेति।।15।।

लिङ्गतः liṅgataḥ, from the mark; ग्रहणात् grahaṇāt, from perception; न na, not; अनुपलब्धिः an-upalabdhiḥ, non-perception.

297. There is no non-perception of the cause of final decay as it is cognisable by its mark.—15.

The Naiyāyikas say that it is not ture that we do not perceive the final decay of the milk which is the cause of the first growth of the curd. The mark attending the final decay of milk (that is, the disappearance of sweet flavour) is the cause of the distruction of the milk, and that

attending the first growth of curd (that is, the appearance of acid flavour) is the cause of its production. So through the mark we really perceive the cause of decay of milk and growth of curd. But there is no such mark perceptible in the case of a crystal which at the lapse of a moment is said to be replaced by another crystal of a different character.

अत्र कश्चित् परिहारमाह–

न पयसः परिणामगुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावात्।। 16।।

'पयसः परिणामो न विनाशः' इत्येक आह परिणामश्चाऽवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिरिति। 'गुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावः' इत्यपर आह=सतो पूर्वगुणनिवृत्तौ गुणान्तरमुत्पद्यते इति, स खल्वेकपक्षीभाव इव।।16।।

न na, not; पयसः payasaḥ, of milk; परिणामगुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावात् pariṇāmaguṇa-antara-prādurbhāvāt, owing to the appearance or evolution of a different attribute or quality in virtue of transformation.

298. There is, it is alleged, no destruction of the milk but only a change of its quality.—16.

The Sāṃkhya says that the milk as a substance is not destroyed to produce another substance called curd. In reality a quality of the milk, *viz.*, sweet flavour, is changed into another quality, *viz.*, acid flavour.

अत्र तु प्रतिषेधः–

व्यूहान्तराद्द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनं पूर्व्वद्रव्यनिवृत्तेरनुमानम्।। 17।।

संमूर्छनलक्षणादवयवव्यूहाद् द्रव्यान्तरे दध्नि उत्पन्ने गृह्यमाणे पूर्वं पयोद्रव्यम् अवयवविभागेभ्यो निवृत्तमित्यनुमीयते, यथा मृदवयवानां व्यूहान्तराद् द्रव्यान्तरे स्थालयामुत्पन्नायां पूर्वं मृत्पिण्डद्रव्यं मृदवयवविभागेभ्यो निवर्तते इति, मृद्वच्चावयवान्यवः पयोदध्नोः नाऽशेषनिरोधे निरन्वयो द्रव्यान्तरोत्पादो घटते इति।।17।।

व्यूहान्तरात् vyūha-antarāt, from one set (of causes); द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनं dravya-antara-utpatti-darśanam, observation of the production of another substance; पूर्वद्रव्यनिवृत्ते pūrva-dravya-nivṛtteḥ, of the cessation of the previous substance; अनुमानम् anumānam, inference.

299. Seeing that a thing grows from another thing whose parts are disjoined, we infer that the latter things is destroyed.—17.

Seeing that a things grows after the component parts of another thing have been disjoined, we infer that the latter thing has really been destroyed. The curd, for instance, is not produced until the component

parts of the milk have been destroyed. This shows that the growth of curd follows the decay of milk.

अभ्यनुज्ञाय च निष्कारणं क्षीरविनाशं दध्युत्पादं च प्रतिषेध उच्यते इति–

क्वचिद्विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः क्वचिच्चोपलब्धेरनेकान्तः।। 18।।

क्षीरदधिवन्निष्कारणो विनाशोत्पदौ स्फटिकव्यक्तीनामिति नायमेकान्त इति। कस्मात्?, हेत्वभावात्=नात्र हेतुरस्ति-अकारणौ विनाशेत्पादौ स्फटिकादिव्यक्तीनां क्षीरदधिवत् न पुनर्यथा विनाशकारणभावात् कुम्भस्य विनाश उत्पत्तिकारणभावाच्चोत्पत्तिरेवं स्फटिका-दिव्यक्तीनां विनाशोत्पत्तिकारणभावाद्विनाशोत्पत्तिभाव इति।।

निरधिष्ठानं च दृष्टान्तवचनम्।

गृह्यमाणयोर्विनाशोत्पादयोः स्फटिकादिषु स्यादयमाश्रयवान् दृष्टान्तः-क्षीरविनाश-कारणानुपलब्धिवद् दध्युत्पत्तिकारणानुपलब्धिवच्चेति, तौ तु न गृह्येते तस्मान्निरधिष्ठानोयं दृष्टान्त इति।।

अभ्यनुज्ञाय च स्फटिकस्योत्पादविनाशौ योत्र साधकस्तस्याभ्यनुज्ञानाद-प्रतिषेधः।।

कुम्भवन्न निष्कारणौ विनाशोत्पादौ स्फटिकादीनाम् इत्यभ्यनुज्ञेयोऽयं दृष्टान्तः-प्रतिषेद्धुमशक्यत्वात्। क्षीरदधिवत्तु निष्कारणौ विनाशोत्पादाविति शक्योयं प्रतिषेद्धुम्–कारणतो विनाशोत्पत्तिदर्शनात्। क्षीरदध्नोर्विनाशोत्पत्ती पश्यता तत्कारणमनुमेयम्–कार्यलिङ्गं हि कारणम्, इत्युपपन्नम्–अनित्या बुद्धिरिति।।18।।

क्वचित् kvachit, in some cases; विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः vināśa-kāraṇa-an-upalabdheḥ, from the non-perception of the cause of destruction; क्वचित् kvachit, in some cases; च cha, and; उपलब्धे upalabdheḥ, from perception; अनेकान्तः an-eka-antaḥ, not-one-ended, uncertain.

300. There will be an uncertainty of conclusion on the assumption that the cause of destruction is perceived in some cases and not perceived in others.—18.

In the case of a jar being produced out of a piece of clay you say you perceive the cause of destruction of the clay and production of the jar, but in the case of the curd growing out of milk you say that you do not perceive the cause of destruciton of the milk and production of the curd. This sort of perception in certain cases and non-perception in others will lead to an uncertainty of conclusion. As a fact every case there is perception of the cause of destruction. Milk, for instance, is destroyed when there is the contact of an acid substance.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 2 : The transiencey of the things of the world : Sūtras : 10-18.

The Sāṅkhya who maintains that the crystal remaining constant undergoes modifications is opposed by the Nihilist who urges that nothing in the would is permanent, that everythig is in a flux, and that the crystal is a new crystal at every successive moment, as is found in the case of the human body which decays, throws off refuse and grows again by assimilating food. We have to point out that the proposition is too wide and is supported neither by inference, and that we can give our assent to it in accordance with our with our observation of nature. Growth and decay in recurrence are seen in the human body. These are not seen in stones and crystals. We also demur to the speculation of the thorough-going Nihilist that a new entity is produced at every moment out of the ashes of the old, for the reason that the causes of such wholesale production and destruction are not apprehende. The destruction of milk and the production of curd furnishes no analogy. For the distruction of milk is seen and its cause is inferred. The production of curd is seen and its cause is inferred. In the case of the crystal no such production or destruction is seen and there is no occasion for the infernce of any cause.

Some (Sāṅkhyas) say in reply to the Nihilist that milk is not destroyed but only transform into a different character, or merely develops different properties. To them we say that the constituents of milk disintegrate and redintegrate as curd, whereby the destruction o milk is inferred. What we deny is that there is a total destruction of milk and that curd is entirely a new product and that there is no cause for such destruction and production. Seeing that in some cases the cause of destruction is apprehended and that in some it is not apprehended it cannot be admitted that all is a flux.

इदं तु चिन्त्यते–कस्येयं बुद्धिः आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थानां गुण इति, प्रसिद्धोपि खल्वयमर्थः 'पीरक्षाशेषं प्रवर्तयामि' इति प्रक्रियते, सोयं बुद्धौ संनिकर्षोत्पत्तेः संशय–विशेषस्याऽग्रहणादिति। तत्रायं विशेषः–

नेन्द्रियार्थयोस्तद्विनाशेऽपि ज्ञानावस्थानात्॥ 19॥

नेन्द्रियाणामर्थानां वा गुणो ज्ञानम्–तेषां विनाशे (अपि) ज्ञानस्य भावात्, भवति खल्विदमिन्द्रियेऽर्थे च विनष्टे ज्ञानम् 'अद्राक्षम्' इति, न च ज्ञातरि विनष्टे ज्ञानं भवितुमर्हति, अन्यत् खलु वै तद् इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षजं ज्ञानं यद् इन्द्रियार्थविनाशे न भवति, इदमन्यदात्म–मनस्संनिकर्षजं तस्य युक्तो भाव इति=स्मृतिः खल्वियम् 'अद्राक्षम्' इति पूर्वदृष्टविषया न च विज्ञातरि नष्टे पूर्वोपलब्धेः स्मरणं युक्तम्–न चान्यदृष्टमन्यः स्मरति, न च मनसि ज्ञातर्यभ्युपगम्यमाने शक्यमिन्द्रियार्थयोज्ञातृत्वं प्रतिपादयितुम्।।19।।

न na, not; इन्द्रयार्थयोः indriya-arthayoḥ, of the sense and of the object; तद्विनाशे tat-vanāśe, on their destruction; अपि api, also; ज्ञानावस्थानात् jñāna-avasthānāt, from the continuance of cognition.

301. Knowledge belongs neither to the sense nor to the object because it continues even on the destruction thereof.—19.

If knowledge had been a quality of the sense, it could not continue after the sense had been destroyed. But knowledge in the form of memory is found actually to abide even after the sense has perished. Hence, the sense is not the abode of knowledge. Similarly it may be proved that knowledge does not abide in the object.

अस्तु तर्हि मनोगुणो ज्ञानम्,

युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेश्च न मनसः॥ 20॥

युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धिरन्तःकरणस्य लिङ्गं तत्र युगपद्ज्ञेयानुपलब्ध्या यदनुमीयतेऽन्तकरणं न तस्य गुणो ज्ञानम्। कस्य तर्हि?, ज्ञस्य–वशित्वात्=वशी ज्ञाता वश्यं करणम्, ज्ञानगुणत्वे वा करणभावनिवृत्तिः। घ्राणादिसाधनस्य च ज्ञातुर्गन्धादिज्ञानभावादनुमीयते–अन्तःकरण–साधनस्य सुखादिज्ञानं स्मृतिश्चेति, तत्र यत् ज्ञानगुणं मनः स आत्मा, यत्तु सुखाद्युप–लब्धिसाधनमन्तःकरणं मनस्तदिति संज्ञाभेदमात्रं नार्थभेदं इति।

युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेश्चाऽयोगिन इति चार्थः, योगी खलु ऋद्धौ प्रादुर्भूतायां विकरणधर्मा निर्माय सेन्द्रियाणि शरीरान्तराणि तेषु तेषु युगपज् ज्ञेयान्युपलभते तच्चैतद् विभौ ज्ञातर्युपपद्यते नाणौ मनसीति। विभुत्वे मनसो ज्ञानस्य नात्मगुणत्वप्रतिषेधः–विभु च मनस्तदन्तःकरणभूतमिति तस्य सर्वेन्द्रियैर्युगपत् युगपज् संयोगात् ज्ञानान्युत्पद्येरन्निति।।20।।

युगपत् yugapat, simultaneously; ज्ञेयानुपलबधेः jñeya-an-upalabdheḥ, from the non-perception of the knowables; च cha, and; न na, not; मनसः manasaḥ, of the mind.

302. It does not also belong to the mind the existence of which is inferred from the knowables not being perceived simultaneously.—20.

As two or more things cannot be known (perceived) simultaneously, it is to be concluded that the mind which is an instrument of our knowledge is atomic in dimension. If we supposed this mind to be the abode of knowledge we could not call it an instrument in the acquisition

of the same; and knowledge as a quality of an atom would in that case become imperceptible. An atomic mind as the abode of our knowledge would stand moreover in the way of a *yogi* perceiving many things simultaneously through many sensuous bodies formed by his magical power.

तदात्मगुणत्वेऽपि तुल्यम्॥ 21॥

विभुरात्मा सर्वेन्द्रियैः संयुक्त इति युगपज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग इति॥21॥

तत् tat, it objection; आत्मगुणत्वे ātma-guṇa-tve, were (cognition) an attribute of the soul; अपि api, also; तुल्यम् tulyaṁ, the same.

303. Even if knowledge were a quality of the soul it would, says some one, give rise to similar absurdities.—21.

The objection stands thus :—If the soul which is all-pervading were the abode of knowledge, there would be the simultaneous perception of many things in virtue of different sense-organs coming in contact with the soul simultaneously. But two or more things are never perceived simultaneously : the soul cannot therefore be the abode of knowledge that is, knowledge cannot be a quality of the soul.

इन्द्रियैर्मनसः सन्निकर्षाभावात् तदनुत्पत्तिः॥ 22॥

गन्धाद्युपलब्धेरिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षवद् इन्द्रियमनस्संनिकर्षोपि कारणं तस्य चायौगपद्यम्–अणुत्वान्मनसः अयौगपद्यादनुत्पत्तिर्युगपज्ज्ञानानामात्मगुणत्वेपीति॥22॥

इन्द्रियैः indriyaiḥ, with the senses; मनसः manasaḥ, of the mind सन्निकर्षाभावात् sannikarṣa-abhāvāt, owing to absence of contact or connection; तदनुत्पत्तिः tat-an-uptattiḥ, non-production of simultaneous cognitions.

304. There is, we reply, non-production of simultaneous ognition on account of the absence of contact of the mind with many sense-organs at a time.—22.

The Naiyāyikas say that the soul cannot perceive an object unless the latter comes in contact with a sense with is conjoined with the mind. Though many objects can come in proximity with their correspon-ding senses simultaneously, the mind which is atomic in dimension can come in conjunction with only one sense at a time. Hence two or more things are not perceived simultaneously although the soul which perceives them is all-pervading.

यदि पुनरात्मेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षमात्राद् गन्धादिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते?–

नोत्पत्तिकारणानुपदेशात्॥ 23॥

आत्मेन्द्रियसंनिकर्षमात्राद् गन्धादिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते इति नात्रोत्पत्तिकारणमपदिश्यते येनैतत् प्रतिपद्येमहीति॥23॥

न na, no;उत्पत्तिकारणानुपदेशात् utpatti-kārana-an-apadeśāt, owing to non-predication of cause of production.

305. This is held by some to be untenable as there is no ground for the production of knowledge.—23.

The objection stands thus :—It has been argued by the Naiyāyikas that there is absence of production of simultaneous cognition on account of the lack of contact of the senses with the mind. An opponent takes exception to the word "production" and syas that knowledge cannot be said to be produced if it is regarded as a quality of the soul which is eternal.

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्चावस्थाने तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः॥ 24॥

"तदात्मगुणत्वेपि तुल्यम् 21" इत्येतदनेन समुच्चीयते, द्विविधो हि गुणनाशहेतुः–गुणानामाश्रयाभावो विरोधी च गुणः, नित्यत्वादात्मनोऽनुपपन्नः पूर्वः, विरोधी च बुद्धेर्गुणो न गृह्यते, तस्मादात्मगुणत्वे सति बुद्धेर्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः॥24॥

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः vināśak-āraṇa-an-upalabdheḥ, owing to non-perception of the cause of destruciton; च cha, and; अवस्थाने avasthāne, in the case of the existence (of cognition in the soul); तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः tat-nitya-tva-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of its eternality.

306. If knowledge is supposed to abide in the soul there is the contingency of its being eternal as there is perceived no cause of its destruction.—24.

Knowledge can never be destroyed if it is supposed to be a quality of the soul. A quality may be destroyed in two ways—(1) either by the destruction of its abode, or (2) by the production of an opposite quality in its place. In the case of knowledge neither of these is possible as the soul which is its abode is eternal and as we find no opposite quality taking its place. Hence, it follows that if knowledge is a quality of the soul it is eternal. But as knowledge is not eternal it is not a quality of the soul.

अनित्यत्वग्रहाद्बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तराद्विनाशः शब्दवत्॥ 25॥

अनित्या बुद्धिरिति सर्वशरीरिणां प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयमेतत्, गृह्यते च बुद्धिसंतानस्तत्र बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तरं विरोधी गुण इत्यनुमीयते यथा शब्दसंताने शब्दः शब्दान्तरविरोधीति॥25॥

अनित्यत्वग्रहात् a-nitya-tva-grahāt, from the observation of non-eternality; बुद्धे buddheḥ, of cognition; बुद्ध्यन्तरात् buddhi-antarāt, from another cognition; विनाशः vināśaḥ, destruction; शब्दवत् śabda-vat, as in the case of sound.

307. Cognitions being found to be non-eternal there is, we reply, destruction of one cognition by another like that of a sound.—25.

We realize that cognition (knowledge) is not eternal when we observe that at one time there arises in us a certian kind of cognition (knowledge) and at the next time that cognition (knowledge) vanishes giving rise to another kind of cognition (knowledge). It has been asked how cognitions undergo destruction. Our reply is that one cognition vanishes as soon as it is replaced by another cognition which is opposed to it just as a sound-wave is destroyed by another sound-wave which takes its place.

असंख्येयेषु ज्ञानकारितेषु संस्कारेषु स्मृतिहेतुष्वात्मसमवेतेषु आत्ममनसोश्च संनिकर्षे समाने स्मृतिहेतौ सति न कारणस्याऽयौगपद्यमस्तीति युगपत्स्मृतयः प्रादुर्भवेयुर्यदि बुद्धिरात्मगुणः स्यादिति, तत्र कश्चित् संनिकर्षस्याऽयौगपद्यमुपपादयिष्यन्नाह—

ज्ञानसमवेतात्मप्रदेशसन्निकर्षान्मनसः स्मृत्युत्पत्तेर्न युगपदुत्पत्तिः॥ 26॥

ज्ञानसाधनः संस्कारो ज्ञानमित्युच्यते ज्ञानसंकृतैरात्मप्रदेशैः पर्यायेण मनः संनिकृष्यते, आत्ममनस्संनिकर्षात् स्मृतयोपि पर्यायेण भवन्तीति॥26॥

ज्ञानसमवेतात्मप्रदेशसन्निकर्षात् jñāna-samaveta-ātma-pradeśa-sannikarṣāt, from contact with a certain part of the soul in which cognition (in the form of impression) in heres; मनसः manasaḥ of the mind; स्मृत्युत्पत्तेः smṛti utpatteḥ, because of the production of recollection; न na, not; युगपत् yugapat, simultaneous; उत्पत्तिः utpattiḥ, production.

308. Since recollection (memory) is produced, according to some, by the conjunction of the mind with a certain part of the soul in which knowledge (impression) inheres, there is no simultaneous production of many recollections. —26.

If knowledge be a quality of the soul there is the possibility of many recollections being produced simultaneously inasmuch as the many impressions deposited in our soul by our past perceptions are liable at once to be revived and developed into recollection by the mind whose contact with the sould always remains constant. Some say that there is no such possibility of simultaneousness because recollections are produced, according to them, by the mind coming in contact with perticular parts of the soul in which particular impressions inhere. As the mind cannot come in contact with all parts of the soul simultaneously, the many impressions deposited in different parts of the soul are not revived and developed into recollections at once.

नान्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वान्मनसः॥ 27॥

सदेहस्यात्मनो मनसा संयोगो विपच्यमानकर्माशयसहितो जीवनमिष्यते तत्रास्य प्राक् प्रायणादन्तःशरीरे वर्तमानस्य मनसः शरीराद् बहिर्ज्ञानसंकृतैनरात्मप्रदेशैः संयोगो नोपपद्यते इति॥27॥

न na, not; अन्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वात् antaḥ-śarīra-vṛtti-tvāt, because it has its operation within the body, मनसः manasaḥ, of the mind.

309. This is, we reply, not so because it is within the body that the mind has its function.—27.

It has been said in the preceding aphorism that recollections are produced by the mind coming in due order in conjunction with particular parts of the soul in which impressions in here. This is, according to the Naiyāyikas, untenable because the mind cannot come in conjunction with the soul except in the body, and if the conjunction takes place in the body then there remains the possibility of simultaneous recollections.

साध्यत्वादहेतुः॥ 28॥

विपच्यमानकर्माशयमात्रं जीवनम् एवं च सति साध्यमन्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वं मनस इति॥28॥

साध्यत्वात् sādhya-tvāt, because it is the thing to be established; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a mark.

310. This is, some say, no reason because it requires to be proved.—28.

The Naiyāyikas say that the mind comes in conjunction with the

soul only within the limit of the body. Some oppose this by saying that until they receive sufficient proof they cannot admit that the conjunction takes place only in the body.

स्मरतः शरीरधारणोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः॥ 29॥

सुस्मूर्षया खल्वयं मनः प्रणिदधानः चिरादपि कं चिदर्थं स्मरति स्मरतश्च शरीरधारणं दृश्यते, आत्ममनस्संनिकर्षजश्च प्रयत्नो द्विविधः-धारकः प्रेरकश्च, निस्सृते च शरीराद्बहिर्मनसि धारकस्य प्रयत्नस्याऽभावाद् गुरुत्वात्पतनं स्यात् शरीरस्यात्मवत इति॥29॥

स्मरतः smarataḥ, of the person recollecting; शरीरधारणोपपत्ते śarīra-dhāraṇa-upapatteḥ, because of the fact of his sustaining the body; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiciton.

311. It is, we reply, not unreasonable because a person is found to sustain his body even while he performs an act of recollection.—29.

If we suppose that a recollection is produced by the mind coming in conjunction with a particular part of the soul outside the body, we cannot account for the body being sustained during the time when the recollection is performed. The body in order that it may be sustained requires an effort which is supplied by the mind coming in conjunction with the soul. Now, the effort which arises from the conjunction is of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) the effort for sustaining, and (2) that for impelling (setting in motion). The body will be devoid of the first kind of effort if we suppose the mind to wander away from it for conjunction with the soul.

न तदाशुगतित्वान्मनसः॥ 30॥

आशुगति मनस्तस्य बहिः शरीरादात्मप्रदेशेन ज्ञानसंस्कृतेन संनिकर्षः प्रत्यागतस्य च प्रयत्नोत्पादनम् उभयं युज्यते इति, उत्पाद्य वा धारकं शरीरान्निस्सरंण मनसोऽतस्तत्रोपपन्नं धारणमिति॥30॥

न na, no; तत् tat, this; आशुगतित्वात् āśu-gati-tvāt, owing to swiftness; मनसः manasaḥ, of the mind.

312. This is, some say, not so because the mind moves swiftly.—30.

Some meet the objection raised in the preceding aphorism by saying that the mind while producing a recollection by its conjunction with the soul outside the body can, on account of its swift motion, come back at once to the body to produce the effort required for the sustenance of the same.

न स्मरणकालानियमात्॥ 31॥

किंचित् क्षिपं स्मर्यते किंचिच्चिरेण, यदा चिरेण तदा सुस्मूर्षया मनसि धार्यमाणे चिन्ताप्रबन्धे सति कस्य चिदर्थस्य लिङ्गभूतस्य चिन्तनमाराधितं स्मृतिहेतुर्भवति तत्रैतत् चिरनिश्चरिते मनसि नोपपद्यते इति। शरीरसंयोगानपेक्षश्चाऽऽत्ममनस्संयोगो न स्मृतिहेतुः-शरीरस्योपभोगायतनत्वात्=उपभोगायतनं पुरुषस्य ज्ञातुः शरीरं न ततो निश्चरितस्य मनस आत्मसंयोगमात्रं ज्ञानसुखदीनामुत्पत्तौ कल्पते, कॢप्तौ वा शरीर वैयर्थ्यमिति॥30॥

न na, no; स्मरणकालानियमात् smaraṇa-kāla-aniyamāt, as there is no rule as to the time of recollection.

313. It is, we reply, not so because there is no fixed rule as to the duration of recollection.—31.

The Naiyāyikas oppose the view expressed in the foregoing aphorism on the ground that the mind, if it is to be conjoined with the soul outside the body, may take a pretty long time to produce a recollection there, so that it may not come back to the body with sufficient quickness to produce the effort required for the sustenance of it.

आत्मप्रेरणयदृच्छाज्ञताभिश्च न संयोगविशेषः॥ 32॥

आत्मप्रेरणेन वा मनसो बहिः शरीरात् संयोगविशेषः स्याद् यदृच्छया वा=आकस्मिकतया ज्ञतया वा मनसः, सर्वथा चानुपपत्तिः। कथम्? स्मर्तव्यत्वाद्, इच्छातः स्मरणज्ञानासंभवाच्च=यदि तावदात्मा-'अमुष्यार्थस्य स्मृतिहेतुः संस्कारोऽमुष्मिन्नात्मप्रदेशे समवेतस्तेन मनः संयुज्यताम्' इति मनः प्रेरयति तदा स्मृत एवाऽसावऽर्थो भवति न स्मर्तव्यः, न चात्मप्रत्यक्ष आत्मप्रदेशः संस्कारो वा तत्राऽनुपपन्नाऽऽत्मप्रत्यक्षेण संवित्तिरिति। सुस्मूर्षया चायं मनः प्रणिदधानश्चिरादपि कंचिदर्थं स्मरति नाऽकस्मात्। ज्ञत्वं च मनसो नास्तिज्ञानप्रतिषेधादिति॥32॥

आत्मप्रेरणयदृच्छाज्ञताभिः ātma-preraṇa-yat-ṛchchhā jña-tā-bhiḥ, in virtue of a direction of the soul, spontaneity or chance, and the characteristic of its being the knower च cha, and; न na no; संयोगविशेषः saṃyogaviśeṣaḥ, particular conjunction.

314. There is no peculiar conjunction of the soul with the mind either in virtue of the former sending the latter in search of what it wishes to recollect or through the latter

being congnizant of what is to be recollected or through arbitrariness.—32.

If we suppose the soul to send the mind to recollect a particular thing we encounter the absurdity of admitting that the soul already possesses the memory of what it is going to recollect. If on the other hand we suppose the mind to move out of its own accord for a particular recollection, we shall have to assume that the mind is the knower but in reality it is not so. We cannot even hold that the mind comes in conjunction with the soul arbitrariy for in that case there will remain no order then as to the occurrence of the objects of recollection.

एतच्च—

व्यासक्तमनसः पादव्यथनेन संयोगविशेषेण समानम्।। 33।।

यदा खल्वयं व्यासक्तमनाः क्वचिद् देशे शर्करया कण्टकेन वा पादव्यथनमाप्नोति तदाऽऽत्ममनस्संयोगविशेष एषितव्यः-दृष्टं हि दुःखं दुःखवेदनं चेति, तत्रायं समानः प्रतिषेधः, यदृच्छया तु न विशेषः-नाऽऽकस्मिकी क्रिया नाऽऽकस्मिकः संयोग इति।

कर्मादृष्टमुपभोगार्थं क्रियाहेतुरितिचेत्? समानम्।

कर्मादृष्टं पुरुषस्थं पुरुषोपभोगार्थं मनसि क्रियाहेतः एवं दुःखं दुःखसंवेदनं च सिध्यति चेत्येवं चेन्मन्यसे?, समानं स्मृतिहेतावपि=संयोगविशेषो भवितुमर्हति, तत्र यदुक्तम्—"आत्मप्रेरणयदृच्छाज्ञताभिश्च च संयोगविशेषः 32" इत्ययमप्रतिषेध इति, पूर्वस्तु प्रतिषेधः-"नान्तः-शरीरवृत्तित्वान्मनसः 27" इति।।33।।

व्यासक्तमनसः vyāsakta-manasaḥ, of a man whose mind is absorbed in something else; पादव्यथनेन pāda-vyathanena, by the hurting of his foot; संयोगविशेषेण somyoga-viśeṣeṇa, with the particular conjunction; समानम् samānam, similar.

315. This is, some say, parallel to the particular conjunction which occurs in a man who while rapt in mind hurts his foot.—33.

If a man while looking eargerly at dancing hurts his foot with a thorn, he feels pain because his mind comes instantly in conjunction referred to in the foregoing aphorism takes place, according to some, through the mind being cognizant of what is to be recollected.

कः खल्विदानीं कारणयौगपद्यसद्भावे युगपदस्मरणस्य हेतुरिति?,

प्रणिधानलिङ्गादिज्ञानानामयुगपद्भावादयुगपत्स्मरणम्।। 34।।

यथा खल्वात्ममनसोः संनिकर्षः संस्कारश्च स्मृतिहेतुरेवं प्रणिधानं लिङ्गादिज्ञानानि, तानि च न युगपद् भवन्ति तत्कृता स्मृतीनां युगपदनुत्पत्तिरिति।।34।।

प्रणिधानलिङ्गादिज्ञानानां praṇidhāna-linga-ādi-jñānānām, of concentration and cognition of the marks, etc.; अयुगपद्भावात् āyugapat-bhāvāt, owing to non-simultaneousness; अयुगपत् a-yugapat, non-simultaneous; स्मरणं smaraṇam, recollection.

316. Recollections are not simultaneous owing to the non-simultaneousness of the efforts of attention, operations of stimuli etc.—34.

A recollection is produced by the mind coming in conjunction with the soul in which impressions inhere. The production of recollection also presupposes efforts of attention, operations of stimuli, etc. As these do not occur simultaneously there is no simultaneousness of recollections.

प्रातिभवत्तु प्रणिधानाद्यनपेक्षे स्मार्त्ते यौगपद्यप्रसङ्गः।। 35।।

यत् खल्विदं प्रातिभमिव ज्ञानं प्रणिधानाद्यनपेक्षं स्मार्तमुत्पद्यते कदाचित् तस्य युगपदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः-हेत्वभावात्।। सतः स्मृतिहेतोरसंवेदनात् प्रातिभेन समानाभिमानः= बह्वर्थविषये वै चिन्ताप्रबन्धे कश्चिदेवार्थः कस्यचित् स्मृतिहेतुः-तस्यानुचिन्तनात् तस्य स्मृतिर्भवति। न चायं स्मर्ता सर्वं स्मृतिहेतुं संवेदयते='एवं मे स्मृतिरुत्पन्ना' इत्यसंवेदनात् प्रातिभमिव ज्ञानमिदं स्मार्तमित्यभिमन्यते, न त्वस्ति प्रणिधानाद्यनपेक्षं स्मार्तमिति।।

प्रातिभे कथमितिचेत्? पुरुषकर्मविशेषादुपभोगवन्नियमः।

प्रातिभमिदानीं ज्ञानं युगपपत् कस्मान्नोत्पद्यते? यथोपभोगार्थं कर्म युगपदुपभोगं न करोति एवं पुरुषकर्मविशेषः प्रतिभाहेतुर्न युगपदनेकं प्रातिभं ज्ञानमुत्पादयति।।

हेत्वभावादयुक्तमितिचेत्? न-करणस्य प्रत्ययपर्यायेसामर्थ्यात्।

'उपभोगवन्नियमः' इत्यस्ति दृष्टान्तो हेतुर्नास्तीति चेन्मन्यसे? न-करणस्य प्रत्ययपर्याये सामर्थ्याद् नैकस्मिन् ज्ञेये युगपदनेकं ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते न चाऽनेकस्मिन्, तदिदं दृष्टेन प्रत्ययपर्यायेणानुमेयं करणसामर्थ्यमित्थम्भूतमिति। न ज्ञातुः-विकरणधर्मणो देहनानात्वे प्रत्यययौगपद्यादिति।

अयं च द्वितीयः प्रतिषेधः-व्यवस्थितशरीरस्य चाऽनेकज्ञानसमवायादेकप्रदेशे युगपदनेकार्थस्मरणं स्यात्=क्वचिद् देशेऽवस्थितशरीरस्य ज्ञातुरिन्द्रियार्थप्रबन्धेन ज्ञानमेकस्मिन्नात्मप्रदेशे समवैति तेन यदा मनः संयुज्यते तदा ज्ञातपूर्वस्याऽनेकस्य युगपत् स्मरणं प्रसज्यते-प्रदेशसंयोगपर्यायाभावादिति। आत्मप्रदेशानामद्रव्यान्तरत्वादेकार्थसमवास्याऽविशेषे स्मृतियौगपद्यप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः। शब्दसंताने तु श्रोत्राधिष्ठानप्रत्यासत्त्या

शब्दश्रवणवत् संस्कारप्रत्यासत्त्या मनसः स्मृत्युत्पत्तेर्न युगपदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः। पूर्व एव तु प्रतिषेधः–नाऽनेकज्ञानमसमवायादेकप्रदेशे युगपत् स्मृतिप्रसङ्ग इति।।35।।

317. [It is not ture that] there is possibility of simultaneousness in the case of recollections which are independent of the efforts of attention, etc., just as in the case of cognitions derived from impressions of equal vividness not dependent on stimuli.—35.

Some say that recollections which are not dependent on the efforts of attention, etc., may be simultaneous like seversal cognitions or acts of knowledge that are produced from impressions of equal vividness without the aid of external stimuli. But this view is untenable because neither the recollections nor the several acts of knowledge are simultaneous. The acts of knowledge, though derived from impressions of equal vividness, will appear in succession according to the amount of attention paid to them and the recollectons though not dependent on the efforts of attention will appear one after another in proportion to the strength of stimuli that revive them.

यत् 'पुरुषधर्मो ज्ञानम्, अन्तकरणस्येच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदःखानि धर्माः' इति कस्यचिद् दर्शनं तत् प्रतिषिध्यते–

ज्ञस्येच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वादारम्भनिवृत्त्योः।। 36।।

अयं खलु जानीते तावत्–'इदं मे सुखसाधनम् इदं मे दुःखसाधनम्' इति, ज्ञातं स्वस्य सुखसाधनमाप्तुमिच्छति दुःखसाधनं हातुमिच्छति, प्राप्तुमिच्छज्ञयुक्तस्याऽस्य सुखसाधनाऽवाप्तये समीहाविशेष आरम्भः जिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य दुःखसाधनपरिवर्जनं निवृत्तिः एवं ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नद्वेषसुखदुःखानामेकेनाभिसंबन्धः=एककर्तृत्वं ज्ञानेच्छाप्रवृत्तीनां समानश्रयत्वं च, तस्मात् ज्ञस्येच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखानि धर्मा नाऽचेतनस्येति, आरम्भनिवृत्त्योश्च प्रत्यगात्मनि दृष्टत्वात् परत्रानुमानं वेदिव्यमिति।।36।।

ज्ञस्य jñasya, of the knower; इच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वात् ichchhā-dveṣa-nimitta-tvāt, because of their being caused by desire and aversion; आरम्भनिवृत्त्योः ārambha-nivṛttyoh, of action and inaction.

318. Desire and aversion belong to the soul inasmuch as they are the causes of its doing an act or forbearing from doing the same.—36.

The Sāṃkhyas say that knowledge is a quality of the soul (Purusa) while desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain are the qualities of the internal sense (the mind). This is, according to the Naiyāyikas,

unreasonable because a person does an act or for bear from doing it on account of a certain desire for or aversion against the same. The desire and aversion again are caused by the knowledge of pleasure and pain respectively. Hence, it is established that knowledge, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain have all of them a single abode, that is, they are the qualities of a single substance called the soul.

अत्र भूतचैतनिक आह–

तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः पार्थिवाद्येष्वप्रतिषेधः।। 37।।

आरम्भनिवृत्तिलिङ्गाविच्छाद्वेषाविति, यस्यारम्भनिवृत्ती तस्येच्छाद्वेषौ तस्य ज्ञानमिति प्राप्तम्–पार्थिवाप्यतैजसवायवीनां शरीराणामारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनादिच्छाद्वेषज्ञानैर्योग इति चैतन्यम्।।37।।

तल्लिङ्गत्वात् tat-liṅga-tvāt, because they are their marks; इच्छाद्वेषयोः ichchhā dveṣayoḥ, of desire and aversion; पार्थिवाद्येषु pārthiva-ādyeṣu, in respect of the terrene, etc.; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ non-obstruction.

319. It cannot, some say, be denied that desire and aversion belong to the body inasmuch as they are indicated by activity and forbearance from activity.—37.

The Chārvākas say that activity and forbearance from activity are the marks respectively of desire and aversion which again are the effects of knowledge. Now, the body which is made of earth, etc. is the abode (field) of activity and forbearance from activity. Hence, it is also the abode of knowledge, desire, aversion, etc.

परश्वादिष्वारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनात्।। 38।।

शरीरचैतन्यनिवृत्तिः। आरम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनादिच्छाद्वेषज्ञानैर्योग इति प्राप्तम् परश्वादेः करणस्यारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनाच्चैतन्यमिति। अथ शरीरस्येच्छादिभिर्योगः परश्वादेस्तु करण-स्याऽऽस्रम्भनिवृत्ती व्यभिचरतः?, न तर्ह्ययं हेतुः–'पार्थिवाप्यतैजसवायवीनां शरीराणामारम्भ-निवृत्तिदर्शनादिच्छाद्वेषज्ञानैर्योगः' इति।।38।।

परश्वादिषु paraśu-ādiṣu, in the axe, etc.; आरम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनात् ārambhani-vṛtti-darśanāt, from the observation of action and inaction.

320. This is, we reply, unreasonable because activity and forbearance from activity are found in the axes and the like.—38.

Just as an axe, which is found sometimes to split a tree and at other times not to split it, is not a receptacle of knowledge, desire and aversion, so the body which is made of earth, etc. is not an abode of

knowledge, etc., though we may find activity and forbearance from activity in it.

अयं तर्ह्यन्योऽर्थः-"तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः पार्थिवाद्येष्वप्रतिषेधः 36" पृथिव्यादीनां भूतानामारम्भस्तावत् त्रसविशरारुस्थावरशरीरेषु तदवयवव्यूहलिङ्गः प्रवृत्तिविशेषः लोष्टादिषु लिङ्गाभावात्, प्रवृत्तिविशेषाभावो निवृत्तिः, आरम्भनिवृत्तिलिङ्गाविच्छाद्वेषाविति पार्थिवाद्येष्वऽणुषु तद्दर्शनादिच्छाद्वेषयोस्तद्योगाद् ज्ञानयोग इति सिद्धं भूतचैतन्यमिति,

कुम्भादिष्वनुपलब्धेरहेतुः॥ 39॥

कुम्भादिमृदवयवानां व्यूहलिङ्गः प्रवृत्तिविशेष आरम्भः सिकतादिषु प्रवृत्तिविशेषाभावो निवृत्तिः न च मृत्सिकतानामारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनादिच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नज्ञानैर्योगः, तस्मात् "तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः 37" इत्यहेतुरिति॥39॥

321. It is unreasonable also on account of the non-perception of knowledge in pots and the like.—39.

In a pot there is activity indicated by the conglomeration of different earthy parts while in sand there is forbearance form activity indicated by the disruption of the parts from one another. Yet there is no knowledge, desire or aversion in a pot or sand. Hence, the body is not the seat of knowledge, desire or aversion.

नियमानियमौ तु तद्विशेषकौ॥ 40॥

तयोः=इच्छाद्वेषयोर्नियमानियमौ विशेषकौ=भेदकौ, ज्ञस्येच्छोद्वेषनिमित्ते प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती न स्वाश्रये, किं तर्हि? प्रयोज्याश्रये, तत्र प्रसुज्यमानेषु भूतेषु प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती स्तः न सर्वेष्वित्यऽनियमोपपत्तिः। यस्य तु ज्ञत्वाद् भूतानामिच्छाद्वेषनिमित्ते आरम्भनिवृत्ती स्वाश्रये तस्य नियमः स्यात्=यथा भूतानां गुणान्तरनिमित्ता प्रवृत्तिः गुणप्रतिबन्धाच्च निवृत्तिर्भूतमात्रे भवति नियमेन एव भूतमात्रे ज्ञानेच्छाद्वेषनिमिते प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती स्वाश्रये स्यातां न तु भवतः तस्मात् प्रयोजकाश्रिता ज्ञानेच्छाद्वेषप्रयन्ताः प्रयोज्याश्रये तु प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती इति सिद्धम्। एकशरीरे ज्ञातृबहुत्वं निरनुमानम्। भूतचैतनिकस्य एकशरीरे बहुनि भूतानि ज्ञानेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्न-गुणानीति ज्ञातृबहुत्वं प्राप्तम्, ओमिति ब्रुवतः प्रमाणं नास्ति, यथा नानाशरीरेषु नानाज्ञातारो प्रत्ययव्यवस्थानाद् एवमेकशरीरेपि प्रत्ययव्यवस्थानुमानं स्यात् ज्ञातृबहुत्वस्येति॥

दृष्टश्चान्यगुणनिमित्तः प्रवृत्तिविशेषो भूतानां सोनुमानमन्यत्रापि॥

दृष्टः करणलक्षणेषु भूतेषु परश्वादिषु उपादानलक्षणेषु च मृत्प्रभृतिषु अन्यगुणनिमित्तः प्रवृत्तिविशेषः सोनुमानमन्यत्रापि=स त्रसस्थावरशरीरेषु तदवयवव्यूहतलिङ्गः प्रवृत्तिविशेषो भूतानामऽन्यगुणनिमित्त इति, स च गुणः प्रयत्नसमानाश्रयः संस्कारो धर्माधर्मसमाख्यातः सर्वार्थः पुरुषार्थाराधनाय प्रयोजको भूतनां प्रयत्नवदिति। आत्मास्तित्वहेतुभिरात्मनित्यत्व-हेतुभिश्च भूतचैतन्यप्रतिषेधः कृतो वेदितव्यः। "नेन्द्रियार्थयोस्तद्विनाशेपि ज्ञानावस्थानात्

19" इति च समानः प्रतिषध इति। क्रियामात्रं क्रियोपरममात्रं चारम्भनिवृत्ती इत्यभि-प्रेत्योक्तम्-"तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः पार्थिवाद्येष्वप्रतिषेधः 37" (इति)। अन्यथात्विमे आरम्भनिवृत्ती आख्याते, न च तथाविधे पृथिव्यादिषु दृश्येते तस्मादयुक्तम्-"तल्लिङ्गत्वा-दिच्छाद्वेषयोः पार्थिवाद्येष्वप्रतिषेधः 37" इति॥40॥

नियमानियमौ niyama-aniyamau, regularity and irregularity; तु tu, but; तद्विशेषकौ tat-viśeṣakau, their distinguishing marks.

322. The regularity and irregularity of possession demarcate the soul and matter.—40.

A material thing is by nature but becomes endowed with activity when it is moved by a conscious agent. There is no such irregularity or uncertainty as to the possession of activity, etc. by the soul. Knowledge, desire, aversion, etc. abide in the soul through an intimate connection, while these belong to matter through a mediate connection. We cannot account for the function of recognition, etc. if we assume knowledge to abide in the material atoms a conglomeration of which forms the body. Those who suppose the body to be the seat of knowledge cannot admit the efficacy of deserts and can offer no consolation to sufferers.

भूतेन्द्रियमनसां समानः प्रतिषेधो मनस्तूदाहरणमात्रम्-

यथोक्तहेतुत्वात् पारतन्त्र्यादकृताभ्यागमाच्च न मनसः॥ 41॥

"इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गम् 1-1-10" इत्यतः प्रभृति यथोक्तं संगृह्यते तेन भूतेन्द्रियमनसां चैतन्यप्रतिषेधः, पारतन्त्र्यात्=परतन्त्राणि भूतेन्द्रियमनांसि-धारणप्रेरणव्यूहनक्रियासु प्रयत्नवशात् प्रवर्तन्ते, चैतन्ये पुनः स्वतन्त्राणि स्युरिति, अकृताभ्यागमाच्च="प्रवृत्तिः=वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भ इति 1-1-17" चैतन्ये भूतेन्द्रियमनसां परकृतं कर्म पुरुषेणोपभुज्यते इति स्यात्, अचैतन्ये तु तत्साधनस्य स्वकृतकर्मफलोपभोगः पुरुषस्येत्युपपद्यते इति॥41॥

यथोक्तहेतुत्वात् yathokta-hetu-tvāt, for the reasons already given; पारतन्त्र्यात् pāratantrayāt, from subserviency; अकृताभ्यागमात् a-kṛta-abhyāgamāt, from usurpation of the unearned; च cha, and न na, not; मनसः manasaḥ, of the mind.

323. The mind is not the seat of knowledge on account of reasons already given, on account of its being subject to an agent and owing to its incapacity to reap the fruits of another's deeds.—41.

The mind cannot be the seat of knowledge because it has already been shown in aphorism 1.1.10 that desire, aversion, volition, pleasure

and pain are the marks of the soul. Had the mind been the abode of knowledge it could have come in contact with the objects of sense independent of any agent. Since, it cannot do so it is to be admitted to be a material thing serving the purpose of an instrument in the acquisition of knowledge. If you say that the mind itself is the agent you will have to admit that it is not an atom but possessed of magnitude like the soul so that it can apprehend knowledge, etc. which are its qualities. In order to avoid the simultaneousness of many perceptions it will further be necessary to assume an internal sense of an atomic dimension like the mind as we understand it. These assumptions will lead you to accept in some shape the tenets of the Naiyāyikas. On the supposition of the mind (or body) being the seat of knowledge and consequently of merits and demerits, it will be possible for work done by a person not to produce its effects on him after death and it may even necessitate a person to suffer for work not done by him. Hence, the mind is not the seat of knowledge, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain.

अथायं सिद्धोपसंग्रहः—

परिशेषाद्यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेश्च॥ 42॥

'आत्मगुणो ज्ञानम्' इतिप्रकृतम्, परिशेषो नाम प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधे अन्यत्राप्रसङ्गाच्छिष्यमाणे संप्रत्ययः=भूतेन्द्रियमनसां प्रतिषेधे द्रव्यान्तरं न प्रसज्यते शिष्यते चात्मा तस्य गुणो ज्ञानमिति ज्ञायते, यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेश्चेति–"दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणात् 3-1-1" इत्येवमादीनामात्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनामप्रतिषेधामिति। परिशेषज्ञापनार्थं प्रकृतस्थापनादिज्ञानार्थं यथोक्तिहेतूपपत्तिवचनमिति।

अथ वा "उपपत्तेश्च" इति हेत्वन्तरमेवेदम्–नित्यः खल्वयमात्मा यस्मादेकस्मिन् शरीरे धर्मं चरित्वा कायभेदात् स्वर्गे देवेषूपपद्यते, अधर्मं देहभेदाद् नरकेषूपपद्यते इति, उपपत्तिः=शरीरान्तरप्राप्तिलक्षणा, सा सति सत्त्वे नित्ये चाश्रयवती। बुद्धिप्रबन्धमात्रे तु निरात्मके निराश्रमा नोपपद्यते इति। एकसत्त्वाधिष्ठानश्चनेकशरीरयोगः संसार उपपद्यते, शरीरप्रबन्धोच्छदेश्चापवर्गो मुक्तिरित्युपपद्यते, बुद्धिसंततिमात्रे त्वेकसत्त्वानुपपत्तेर्न कश्चिद् दीर्घमध्वानं संधावति, न कश्चित् शरीरप्रबन्धाद्विमुच्यते इति संसारापवर्गानुपपत्तिरिति। बुद्धिसंततिमात्रे च सत्त्वभेदात् सर्वमिदं प्राणिव्यवहारजातमऽप्रतिसंहितमऽव्यावृत्तमऽपरिनिष्ठितं च स्यात् ततः स्मरणाभावात्–नाऽन्यदृष्टमन्यः स्मरतीति, स्मरणं च खलु पूर्वज्ञातस्य समानेन ज्ञात्रा ग्रहणम्–'अज्ञासिषममुमर्थं ज्ञेयम्' इति, सोयमेको ज्ञाता पूर्वज्ञातमर्थं गृह्णाति तच्चास्य ग्रहणं स्मरणमिति, तद् बुद्धिप्रबन्धमात्रे निरात्मके नोपपद्यते॥42॥

परिशेषात् pariśeṣāt, by exhaustion; यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेः yathā-nkta-hetuupa-patteḥ, from the operation of the reasons already given; च cha, and.

324. Knowledge, etc. must be admitted to be qualities

of the soul by the principle of exclusion and on account of arguments already adduced.—42.

Knowledge is a quality which inheres in a substance. That substance is neither the body nor the sense nor the mind. It must therefore be the soul. The body cannot be the abode of knowledge because it is a material substance like a pot, cloth, etc. Knowledge cannot belong to the sense as the latter is an instrument like an axe. Had the sense been the abode of knowledge there could not be any recollection of things which were experienced by the sense before it was destroyed. If knowledge were a quality of the mind many perceptions could be simultaneous. But this is impossible. Hence, the abode of knowledge is not the mind but it is the soul which is permanent so that it can perceive a thing now as well as remember one perceived in the past.

स्मरणन्त्वात्मनो ज्ञस्वाभाव्यात्॥ 43॥

उपपद्यते इति, आत्मन एवं स्मरणं न बुद्धिसंततिमात्रस्येति, तुशब्दोऽवधारणे। कथम्? ज्ञस्वाभाव्यात्=ज्ञ इत्यस्य स्वभावः=स्वो धर्मः–अयं खलु 'ज्ञास्यति जानाति अज्ञासीत्' इति त्रिकालविषयेणाऽनेकेन ज्ञानेन संबध्यते, तच्चास्य त्रिकालविषयं ज्ञानं प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयम्–'ज्ञास्यामि जानामि अज्ञासिषम्' इति वर्तते, तद् यस्यायं स्वो धर्मस्तस्य स्मरणं न बुद्धिप्रबन्धमात्रस्य निरात्कस्येति॥43॥

स्मरणं smarṇam, recollection; तु tu, but; आत्मनः ātmanaḥ, of the soul; ज्ञस्वाभाव्यात् jña-svābhāvyāt, because its nature is to be the knower.

325. Memory belongs to the soul which possesses the character of a knower.—43.

The soul is competent to recollect a thing because it possesses the knowledge of the past, persent and future.

स्मृतिहेतूनामऽयौगपद्याद् युगपदस्मरणमित्युक्तम्, अथ केभ्यः स्मृतिरुत्पद्यते इति?, स्मृतिः खलु–

प्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यांसलिङ्गलक्षणसादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्रयाश्रितसम्बन्धानन्तर्य्य-वियोगैककार्य्यविरोधातिशयप्राप्तिव्यवधानसुखदुःखच्छाद्वेषभयाऽर्थित्वक्रियाराग-धर्म्माधर्म्मनिमित्तेभ्यः॥ 44॥

सुस्मूर्षया मनसो धारणं प्रणिधानम्–सुस्मूर्षितलिङ्गचिन्तनं चार्थस्मृतिकारणम् 1, निबन्ध खल्वेकग्रन्थोपयमोर्थानाम्–एकाग्रनथोपयताः खल्वर्था अन्योन्यस्मृतिहेतवः आनुपूर्व्येणेतरथा वा भवन्तीति, धारणाशास्त्रकृतो वा प्रज्ञातेषु वस्तुषु स्मर्तव्यानामुपनिक्षेपो निबन्ध इति 2, अभ्यासस्तु समाने विषये ज्ञानानामभ्यावृत्तिः अभ्यासजनितः संस्कार आत्मगुणोऽभ्यासशब्देनोच्यते स च स्मृतिहेतुः समान इति 3, लिङ्गं पुनः संयोगि

समवायि एकार्थसमवायि विरोधि चेति, संयोगि यथा धूमोऽग्नेः गोर्विषणं पाणिः पादस्य रूपं स्पर्शस्य अभूतं भूतस्येति 4, लक्षणं पश्ववयवस्थं गोत्रस्य सम्‌तिहेतुः-विदानामिदं गर्गाणामिदमिति।। 5, सादृश्यं चित्रगतं प्रतिरूपकं देवदत्तस्येत्येवमादि 6, परिग्रहात्-स्वेन वा स्वामी वा स्वं स्मर्यते 7, आश्रयात्-ग्रामण्या तदधीनं स्मरति 8, आश्रितात्-तदधीनेन ग्रामण्यमिति 9, संबन्धात्-अन्तेवासिना युक्तं गुरुं स्मरति ऋत्विजा याज्यमिति 10, आनन्तर्यात्-इतिकरणीयेष्वर्थेषु 11, वियोगात्-येन विप्रयुज्यते तद्वियोगप्रतिसंवेदी भृशं स्मरति 12, एककार्यात्-कर्त्रन्तरदर्शनात् कर्त्रन्तरे स्मृतिः 13, विरोधात्-विजिगीषमाणयो-रन्यतरदर्शनादन्यतरः स्मर्यते 14, अतिशयात्-येनातिशय उत्पादितः 15, प्राप्तेः-यतो येन किंचित् प्राप्तमाप्तव्यं वा भवति तमभीक्ष्णं स्मरति 16, व्यवधानात्-कोशादिभिरसिमृतीनि स्मर्यन्ते 17, सुखदुःखाभ्यां तद्धेतुः स्मर्यते 19, इच्छाद्वेषाभ्यां यमिच्छति यं च द्वेष्टि तं स्मरति 21, भयात्-यतो बिभेति 22, अर्थित्वात्-येनार्थी भोजनेनाऽऽच्छादनेन वा 23, क्रियया-रथेन रथकारं स्मरति 24, रागात्-यस्यां स्त्रियां रक्तो भवति तामभीक्ष्णं स्मरति 25, धर्मात् जात्यन्तरस्मरणम् इह चाधीतश्रुतावधारणमिति 26, अधर्मात् प्रागनुभूतदुःखसाधनं स्मरति 27, न चैतेषु निमित्तेषु युगपत्संवेदनानि भवन्तीति युगपदस्मरणमिति। निदर्शनं चेदं स्मृतिहेतूनां न परिसंख्यानमिति।।44।।

प्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यासलिङ्गलक्षणसादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्रयाश्रितसम्बन्धानन्तर्य्यवियोगैक-कार्य्यविरोधातिशयप्राप्तिव्यवधानसुखदुःखच्छाद्वेषभयाऽर्थित्वक्रियारागधर्म्माधर्म्मनिमित्तेभ्यः; praṇidhānanibandha-abhyāsa-liṅga-lakṣaṇa-sādṛśya-parigraha-āśraya-āśrita-sambandha-ānantarya-viyoga-eka-kārya-virodha-atiśaya-prāpti-vyavadhāna-sukhaduḥkha-ichchhā-dveṣa-bhaya-arthitva-kriyā-rāga-dharmma-adharmma-nimittebhyaḥ, from the causes of concentration, context, repetition, mark, characteristic, similarity, relationship, container, contained, connection, immediacy, separation, co-efficient, opposition, excess, acquisition, distance, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, fear, entreaty, action, passion, merit and demerit.

326. Memory is awakened by such causes as attention, context, exercise, signs, marks, likeness, possession, relation of refuge and refugee, immediate subsequency, separation, similar employment, opposition, excess, receipt, intervention, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, fear, entreaty, action, affection and merit and demerit.—44.

Attention—enables us to fix the mind on one object by checking it from wandering away to any other object.

Context—is the connection of subjects such as proof, that which is to be proved, etc.

Exercise—is the constant repetition which confirms as impression.

Sings—may be (1) connected, (2) inseparable (intimate), (3) correlated or (4) opposite, *e.g.*, smoke is a sign of fire with which it is connected; horn is a sign of a cow from which it is inseparable; and the non-existent is a sign of the existent by the relation of opposition.

Mark—a mark on the body of a horse awakens the memory of the stable in which it was kept.

Likeness—as the image of Devadatta drawn on aboard reminds us of the real person.

Possession—such as a property awakens the memory of the owner and *vice versa.*

Refuge and refugee—such as a king and his attendants.

Immediate subsequency—as sprinkling the rice and pounding it in a wooden mortar.

Separation—as of husband and wife.

Similar employment—as of fellow-disciples.

Opposition—as between a snake and ichneumon.

Excess—awakening the memory of that which exceeded.

Receipt—reminding us of one from whom something has been or will be received.

Intervention—such as a sheath reminding us of the sword.

Pleasure and pain—reminding us of that which caused them.

Desire and aversion—reminding us of one whom we liked or hated.

Fear—reminding us of that which caused it, *e.g.*, death.

Entreaty—reminding us of that which was wanted or prayed for.

Action—such as a chariot reminding us of the charioteer.

Affection—as recollecting a son or wife.

Merit and demerit—through which there is recollection of the causes of joy and sorrow experienced in a previous life.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 3 : Cognition is an attribute of the Soul : Sūtras : 19-44.

Cognition is either present when it called intuition, or past when it is called recollection. The intuition of the red colour of a rose, for instance, survives in memory even after the destruction of the eye and the rose. It therefore belongs not to the object nor to the sense but to the knower. The knower again, is not the mind, but the soul. For the mind is only an instrument under the control of the soul. It is the inner instrument which brings about the cognition of pleasure and pain and recollection. If cognition be its attributes then it would cease to be an

instrument. Its existence as an instrument is inferred by the non-simultaneity of cognitions. If you distinguish between the mind and the inner instrument, then what we call the soul out call the mind, and what we call the mind you call the inner instrument. Your difference with us is about names only or the Sūtra (III. ii. 20) may mean that where a simultaneous cognitions of diverse object by the mind is impossible, the Yogins by their power of Yoga bring abouts simultaneous cognition in several bodies with all the senses created by them for the purpose to exhaust their karma, and that this shows that cognitions do not belong to the mind but to the soul. It may be objected that cognitions cannot belong to the soul because as te soul is all-perading and eternal, (i) simulatneous cognitions of all objects and (ii) the eternality of cognitions will be thereby entailed. Our reply to the first is that the cause of the production of cognition is not merely the contact ot the senses with the objects but also the contact of the senses with the mind, and that as mind is atomic simultaneous cognitions of all objects is impossible. To the last we reply that every embodied soul knows within itself that cognition is non-eternal; and that like one sound by another a preceding cognition is destroyed by a succeeding one.

But then impression produced by cognitions are the causes of recollection, and these, according to you, says an objector, abide in the soul; the contact of the soul and the mind which is equally a cause of recollection, also exist; how is it that all the memories of the soul form the beginning of time are not revived at one and the same moment? Some meet the objection with the reply that the mind serially comes into contact with the different parts of the soul on which cognitions have left their impress and that for this reason all memories are not revived simultaneously. The reply is not correct. For the mind can never come into contact with the soul as transcending the body, (the soul being a universal and eternal substance, it pervades the body and also transcends it), because the function of the mind is confined within the body. The life of an embodied soul consists in its conjunction with the mind together with a vehicle of the experience (body) necessitated by past karma which is in fruition. That the mind without a body is incapable of subserving the purpose of soul appears from the fact that the contact of the mind and the soul generates the double effort of support and direction, and that if the mind operated outside the body the body would drop down by graviry for want of support.

The swift movement of the mind will not solve the difficulty, for there are memories which take a considerable length of time to revive them through a series of intermediate stages which for long keep the mind engaged. Moreover, conjunction of the soul and mind independently

of the body is not the cause of recollection. The body is the field of the soul's experience. If without it the mere conjunction of the mind with the soul could produce cognition, pleasure, etc., then the body would be perfectly useless.

Some of us point out that the contact of the mind and the soul outside the body cannot be established either by the direction of the soul, or by chance, or by the mind's being the knower. For the direction of the soul implies that the soul already knows the object of memory to which it directs the mind; and if the memory is already revived there is no need for any contact of the mind. All memories are not revived by chance, *i.e.* all of a sudden ; some take mental effort for a long time to revive them. Nor is the mind the knower. But this, we say, is only a partial view of the matter. For cognitions do take place and there must be particular conjunction of the soul and the mind, as when a thorn suddenly pricks the foot of a man and pain is felt by him when his mind was engaged elsewhere, *e.g.* a beautiful scenery. As this particular conjunction is due to adṛṣṭa, conjunction may be similarly produced by adṛṣṭa serially in the case of non-simultaneous revival of all memories. The true reply, however, to the explanation offered, namely that the mind serially comes into contact with parts of the soul, is as given, that is that the mind must operate within the body and not outside it.

The contact of the soul and the mind and the impressions are not the sole causes of recollections. These dipend also on attention and cognition of signs (*vide* Sūtra III. ii. 44.). Recollections do not occur simultaneously because their causes do not occur simultaneously. Even in cases of flashes of memory recollection is not independent of attention, etc. What happens in such cases is that the mind is occupied with several objects and one of them engages attention and revives a memory without our being aware of the cause of such revival. The mind is associated with the soul in the body for specific purpose determined by adṛṣṭa. Its dimension is atomic. It can come into contact with one impression at a time. Hence, there can be no simultaneity of recollections.

Some hold the view that while cognition is an attribute of the soul, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain are the attributes of the inner instrument, *i.e.* the mind. This view is not correct. For we find that these refer to one and the same agent and substratum as cognition. It is the knower which resolves to put forth effort for the acquisition of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Therefore, these must also be the attributes of the soul.

The Materialist twists the above argument to his advantage. Says he : You argue that acquistion and avoidance proceed from desire and

aversion and that desire and aversion are attributes of conciousness. But atoms are acted upon by attriction and repulsion. They must then possess desire and aversion and therefore be conscious. To this we reply that uniformity in the one and want of uniformity in the other distinguish the two cases. Gravity, *e.g.*, is a property of all material substances; it adheres to them in all circumstances. But while acitivity is found in atoms it is absent from such things as a pot. The activity which is found in material bodies such as an axe, or in the atoms, is caused by the will of the knower or by his darma under the will of the All-Knower. A second objection to the materialistic view is that as each atom would be endowed with consciousness, there would be a plurality of knowers in a single product, which is not warranted by any reason. Moreover, the reasons previously given for the existence of the soul and its eternality completely refute the theory that consciousness blongs to material substances.

To sum up : Consciousness does not belong to the mind or for the matter of that to the senses or the elements; for the reasons already adduced commencing with Sūtra I. i. 10, "Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain are the marks of the Soul", and also on account of their existing for the sake of another whose volition incites them to activity. Then, on the supposition that consciousness belongs to the elements, senses and the mind, all of which disintegrate at death, the consequences of their activity would befall the soul at or as rebirth, which is contrary to the moral law. Hence by proof by exhaustion consciousness must be the attribute of the soul. Moreover, the reasons already given in support of this have been vindicated by the refutation of the arguments against them. Or the word "Upapatti" in the Sūtra (III. ii. 44) means rebirth, and furnishes an additional reason in support of the view that consciousness belongs to the soul. A series of cognitions without a soul cannot account for rebirth. It can offer no explanation of saṃsāra and release. If the world were a congeries of series of conscious states there could be no harmony, no co-ordination, no organisation in society and the conduct of the affairs of the world would be impossible. Within the man also there would be the same chaos and confusion, and recollection would be an impossbility, because one state could not remember what was experienced by an antecedent state. Therefore, the soul which knows also recollects. Its nature is to know. Every one is aware of the unity of the cognitions "I shall know", "I knew."

अनित्यायां च बुद्धौ उत्पन्नापवर्गित्वात् कालान्तरावस्थानाच्चानित्यानां संशय:–किमुत्पन्नापवर्गिणी बुद्धि: शब्दवत्? आहो स्वित् कालान्तरावस्थायिनी कुम्भवत्? इति, उत्पन्नापवर्गिणीति पक्ष: परिगृह्यते, कस्मात्?

कर्म्मानवस्थायिग्रहणात्॥ 45॥

कर्मणोऽनवस्थायिनो ग्रहणादिति–क्षिप्तस्येषोरापतनात् क्रियासंतानो गृह्यते, प्रत्यर्थनियमाच्च बुदीनां क्रियासंतानवद् बुद्धिसंतानोपपत्तिरिति, अवस्थितग्रहणे च व्यवधीयमानस्य प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्ते:=अवस्थिते च कुम्भे गृह्यमाणे संतानेनैव बुद्धिर्वर्तते प्राग् व्यवधानात्, तेन व्यवहिते प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानं निवर्तते, कालान्तरावस्थाने तु बुद्धेर्दृश्यव्यवधानेपि प्रत्यक्षमवतिष्ठेतेति। स्मृतिश्चालिङ्गं बुद्ध्यवस्थाने–संस्कारस्य बुद्धिजस्य स्मृतिहेतुत्वात्। यश्च मन्येत–अवतिष्ठते बुद्धि:–दृष्टा हि बुद्धिविषये स्मृति: सा च बुद्धावनित्यायां कारणाभावान्न स्याहिति, तदिदमलिङ्गम्, कस्मात्? बुद्धिजो हि संस्कारो गुणान्तरं स्मृतिहेतुर्न बुद्धिरिति।

हेत्वभावादयुक्तमितिचेत्? बुद्ध्यवस्थानात् प्रत्यक्षत्वे स्मृत्यभाव:।

यावदवतिष्ठते बुद्धिस्तावदसौ बोद्धव्यार्थ: प्रत्यक्ष: प्रत्यक्षे च स्मृतिरनुपपन्नेति॥45॥

कर्म्मानवस्थायिग्रहणात् karma-anavasthāyi, because of the cognisance of momentary events by action.

327. Knowledge perishes instantly because all actions are found to be transitory.—45.

Does knowledge perish instantly like a sound or does it continue like a pot? Knowledge perishes as soon as it is produced in virtue of its being an aciton. In analysing an aciton, such as the falling of an arrow, we find that the arrow undergoes a series of movements in the course of its falling to the ground. Similarly in examining an act of knowledge we find that a series of steps are undergone by the act in the course of its production. These steps perish one after another in due succession. Hence, it is clear that knowledge is transitery. If knowledge were permanent we could say, "I am preceiving a pot," even after the pot has been removed from our sight. Since we cannot use such an expression we must admit that knowledge is not permanent but transitory.

अव्यक्तग्रहणमनवस्थायित्वात् विद्युत्सम्पाते रूपाव्यक्तग्रहणवत्॥ 46॥

यद्युत्पन्नावर्गिणी बुद्धि:? प्राप्तम् अव्यक्तं बोद्धव्यस्य ग्रहणं यथा विद्युत्संपाते वैद्युतस्य प्रकाशस्याऽनवस्थानादव्यक्तं रूपग्रहणमिति, व्यक्तं तु द्रव्यणां ग्रहणं तस्मादयुक्तमेतदिति॥46॥

अव्यक्तग्रहणं a-vyakta-grahaṇam, cognition of the indistinct; अनवस्थायित्वात् an-avasthāyi-tvāt, being uneuduring; विद्युत्संम्पाते vidyut-sampāte, on the flash of lightning; रूपाव्यक्तग्रहणवत् rūpa-avyakta-grahaṇa-vat, like the indistinct cognition of form.

328. An opponent fears that if knowledge were transitory

no object could be known distinctly just as there is no distinct apprehension of colour during a flash of lightning.—46.

The fear of the opponent arises thus :—If knowledge were transitory it could not at a moment apprehend an object in its entirety, that is, could not apprehend the infinite number of its properties at once. Hence, the object could only be known indistinctly. As a fact, however, we can know things distinctly. Hence, knowledge is not transitory.

हेतूपादानात् प्रतिषेद्धव्याभ्यनुज्ञा।। 47।।

'उत्पन्नापवर्गिणी बुद्धिः' इति प्रतिषेद्धव्यम्, तदेवाभ्यनुज्ञायते-''विद्युत्संपाते रूपाऽव्यक्तग्रहणवत्'' इति।।47।।

यत्राऽव्यक्तग्रहणं तत्रोत्पन्नापवर्गिणी बुद्धिरिति-

ग्रहणहेतुविकल्पाद् ग्रहणविकल्पो न बुद्धिविकल्पात्।

यदिदं क्वचिव्यक्तं क्वचित् व्यक्तं ग्रहणमऽयं विकल्पो ग्रहणहेतूविकल्पात्= यत्रानवस्थितो ग्रहणहेतुस्तत्राऽव्यक्तं ग्रहणम् यत्रावस्थितस्तत्र व्यक्तं न तु बुद्धेर-ऽवस्थानाऽनवस्थानाभ्यामिति। कस्मात्? अर्थग्रहणं हि बुद्धिः=यत् तदर्थग्रहणमऽव्यक्तं व्यक्तं वा बुद्धिः सेति, विशेषाग्रहणे च सामान्यग्रहणमऽव्यक्तग्रहणं तत्र विषयान्तरे बुद्ध्यन्तरानुपत्तिर्निमित्तभावात्, यत्र सामान्यधर्मयुक्तश्च धर्मी गृह्यते विशेषधर्मयुक्तश्च तद् व्यक्तं ग्रहणं, यत्र तु विशेषेऽगृह्यमाणे सामान्यग्रहणमात्रं तदव्यक्तं ग्रहणम्, सामान्यधर्मयोगाच्च विशिष्टधर्मयोगो विषयान्तरम्, तत्र यद् ग्रहणं न भवति तद् ग्रहणनिमित्ताभावाद् न तु बुद्धेरनवस्थानादिति।।47।।

हेतूपादानात् hetu upādānāt, from the reason advanced; प्रतिषेद्धव्याभ्यनुज्ञा pratiṣeddhavya-abhyanujñā, admission of what is sought to be disproved.

329. From the argument advanced you have, we reply, to admit that which you went to disprove.—47.

In the previous aphorism the opponent feared that if knowledge were transitory no object could be apprehended distinctly. The Naiyāyika removes the fear by saying that objects are apprehended indistinctly not owing to the transitoriness of knowledge but on account of our apprehending only their general qualities. The knowledge which takes cognizance of objects as possessed of both the general and special qualities is distinct but that which concerns itself only with the general qualities is indistinct.

The aphorism may be explained in another way :—The very illustration cited by you, *viz*. that there is distinct apprehension during a flash of lightning leads you to admit the transitoriness of knowledge which you went to disporve.

बुद्ध्यवस्थानात् प्रत्यक्षत्वे स्मृत्यभावः।। 48।।

यथाविषयं च ग्रहण व्यक्तमेव-प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वाच्च बुद्धीनाम्=सामान्यविषयं च ग्रहणं स्वविषयं प्रति व्यक्तं विशेषविषयं च ग्रहणं स्वविषयं प्रति व्यक्तम्-प्रत्यर्थनियता हि बुद्धयः, तदिदमव्यक्तग्रहणं देशितं क्व विषये बुद्ध्यनवस्थानकारितं स्यादिति।।

धर्मिणस्तु धर्मभेदे बुद्धिनानात्वस्य भावाभावाभ्यां तदुपपत्तिः।

धर्मिणः खल्वर्थस्य समानाश्च धर्मा विशिष्टाश्च तेषु प्रत्यर्थनियताः=नाना बुद्धयस्ता उभय्यो यदि धर्मिणि वर्तन्ते तदा व्यक्तं ग्रहणं धर्मिणमभिप्रेत्य, यदा तु सामान्यग्रहणमात्रं तदाऽव्यक्तं ग्रहणमिति, एवं धर्मिणमभिप्रेत्य व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोर्ग्रहणयोरुपपत्तिरिति, न चेदमव्यक्तं ग्रहणं बुद्धेर्बोद्धव्यस्य वाऽनवस्थायित्वादुपपद्यते इति।।48।।

330. If knowledge were permanent it would always be perceptible so that there would be no recollection.—48.

If there is knowledge it is perceptible and as long as there s perception there is no recollection. Hence, on the supposition of knowledge being permanent there would be a total absence of recollection.

इदं हि न–

[1]प्रदीपार्चिःसन्तत्यभिव्यक्तग्रहणवत्तद्ग्रहणम्।। 49।।

अनवस्थायित्वेपि बुद्धेः तेषां द्रव्याणां ग्रहणं व्यक्तं प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। कथम्? प्रदीपार्चिस्संतत्यभिव्यक्तग्रहणवत्=प्रदीपार्चिषां संतत्या वर्तमानानां ग्रहणानवस्थानं ग्राह्यानवस्थानं च, प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वाद्वा बुद्धीनां यावन्ति प्रदीपार्चीषि तावत्यो बुद्धय इति, दृश्यते चात्र व्यक्तं प्रदीपार्चिषां ग्रहणमिति।।49।।

प्रदीपार्चिःसन्तत्य भिव्यक्तग्रहणवत् pradīpa-archiḥ-santati-abhivyakta-grahaṇa-vat, like the apprehension of that which is illuminated by the stream of the rays of the lamp; तद्ग्रहणं tat-grahaṇam, distinct apprehension.

331. Although knowledge is transitory there is distinct apprehended through it as there is one through the series of momentary rays of a lamp.—49.

Though the series of rays emitted by a lamp are transitory the

1. Vāchaspati reads a न to show that the opponent's apprehension is unfounded.

apprehension through them is distinct. Similarly though our knowledge is transitory there is no obstacle to our appehension being distinct.

चेतना शरीरगुणः-सति शरीरे चाऽभावादिति।

द्रव्ये स्वगुणपरगुणोपलब्धेः संशयः॥ 50॥

सांशयिकः सति भावः-स्वगुणोऽप्सु द्रव्यत्मुपलभ्यते परगुणश्चोष्णता, तेनायं संशयः- किं शरीरगुणश्चेतना शरीरे गृह्यते? अथ द्रव्यान्तरगुणः? इति॥50॥

द्रव्ये dravye, in a substance; स्वगुणपरगुणोपलब्धेः sva-guṇa-paraguṇa upalabdheḥ, from the perception of its own as well as of other attributes; संशयः saṃśayaḥ, doubt.

332. From out perceiving in a substance the qualities of itself as well as of others there arises, says an opponent, a doubt as to whether the knowledge perceived in our body is a quality of its own.—50.

In water we perceive liquidity which is one of its natural qualities as well as warmth which is an adventitious one. One may therefore ask as to whether the knowledge perceived in our body is a natural quality of the latter or is a mere adventitious one.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 4 : Cognition is momentary : Sūtras : 45-50.

Cognition lasts but an insant, as it is action. Its continuity is only apparent as in the case of the motion of an arrow shot from a bow which is really a series of instantaneous motions. So long as the pot, *e.g.*, is present before the eyes there is cognition; as soon as it is removed the cognition ceases. The duration of cognition is made up of cognitions arising every moment. On the other hand, the persistence of cognition will mean perpetual perception, and recollection will be rendered unnecessary; for the cause of recollection is not cognition but the impression left by cognition. It is a misconception to hold that cognition which disappears as soon as it is produced can give us only the apprehension of the genus and not of the individual, as in the case of a flash of lightning. In the flash of lightning you can see that a thing is a man but cannot determine his individual characteristics. Similar would be the case were cognition instantaneous. The objection is groundless. For the character of the cognition depends upon the causes which give rise to it. Where the cause of the cognition is fleeting the apprehension is indeterminate, general ; where it is not fleeting the apprehension is determinate, detailed. For cognition is the apprehension of an object, whether indeterminate or determinate. The various characteristics of

an object, generic and specific, provide cognition with its manifold contents. In respect of each such content the cognition is self-complete and determinate. It is merely a convention to speak of the cognition of the generic aspects of an object as indeterminate and of the cognition of its specific aspects as deteminate. The instantaneity of cognition in no way affects perception even when the object is also momentary. *E.g.* in a lamp the flame consists of a series of radiant energies emitted by the lamp. Each such radiation is an object of cognition, and the series of such cognition gives us the perception of the flame of the lamp.

न शरीरगुणश्चेतना, कस्मात्?,

यावच्छरीरभावित्वाद्रूपादीनाम्॥ 51॥

न रूपादिहीनं शरीरं गृह्यते चेतनाहीनं तु गृह्यते यथोष्णताहीना आपः तस्मान्न शरीरगुणश्चेतनेति॥

संस्कारवदितिचेत्? न-कारणानुच्छेदात्॥

यथाविधे द्रव्ये संकारस्तथाविधे एवोपरमः? न-तत्र कारणोच्छेदादत्यन्तं संस्कारानुपपत्तिर्भवति, यथाविधे शरीरे चेतना गृह्यते तथाविधे एवात्यन्तोपरमश्चेतनाया गृह्यते, तस्मात् 'संस्कार वत्' इत्यसमः समाधिः॥

अथापि शरीरस्थं चेतनोत्पत्तिकारणं स्यात् द्रव्यान्तरस्थं वा उभयस्थं वा, तन्न-नियमहेत्वभावात्=शरीरस्थेन कदाचित् चेतनोत्पद्यते कदाचिन्नेति नियमे हेतुर्नास्तीति, द्रव्यान्तरस्थेन च शरीरे एव चेतनोत्पद्यते न लोष्टादिष्वित्यत्र नियमहेतुर्नास्तीति, उभयस्थस्य निमित्तत्वे शरीरसमानजातीयद्रव्ये चेतना नोत्पद्यते शरीरे एव चोत्पद्यते इतिनियमे हेतुर्नास्तीति॥51॥

यावच्छरीरभावित्वात् yāvat-śarīra-bhāvi-tvāt, because (form, etc.) endure as long as the body does; रूपादीनां rūpa-ādīnām, of form, etc.

333. Knowledge is not a natural quality of the body because it furnishes a contrast to] colour, etc. which as natural qualities of the body do exist as long as the latter continues.—51.

Knowledge, according to the Naiyāyika, is not a natural quality of the body because it may not continue quite as long as the body does. But such is not the case with colour, etc. which as natural qualities of the body do always exist with it. Hence, knowledge is merely an adventitious quality of the body.

यच्च मन्येत-सति श्यामादिगुण द्रव्ये श्यामाद्युपरमो दृष्ट एवं चेतनोपरम: स्यादिति,

न पाकजगुणान्तरोत्पत्तेः॥ 52॥

नात्यन्तरूपोपरमः=द्रव्यस्य श्यामे रूपे निवृते पाकजं गुणान्तरम्=रक्तं रूपमुत्पद्यते, शरीरे तु चेतनामात्रोपरमोऽत्यन्तमिति॥52॥

न na, no; पाकजगुणान्तरोत्पत्तेः pāka-ja-guṇa-antara-utpatteḥ, because of the production of other attributes caused by the action of heat.

334. It is, says an opponent, not so because other qualities produced by maturation do arise.—52.

It has been stated that a substance and its natural qualities co-exist which each other and that knowledge not being always co-existent with the body is not a natural quality of the latter. An opponent in order to maintain that a substance and its natual qualities are not necessarily co-existent cites the instance of a jar whose natural colour is blue but which assumes a red colour through maturation in fire.

अथापि–

प्रतिद्वन्द्विसिद्धेः पाकजानामप्रतिषेधः॥ 53॥

यावत्सु द्रव्येषु पूर्वगुणप्रतिद्वन्द्विसिद्धिस्तावत्सु पाकजोत्पत्तिर्दृश्यते-पूर्वगुणैः सह पाकजानामवस्थानस्याऽग्रहणात्, न च शरीरे चेतनाप्रतिद्वन्द्वि सहानवस्थायि गुणान्तरं गृह्यते येनाऽनुमीयेत तेन चेतनाया विरोधः, तस्मादप्रतिषिद्धा चेतना यावच्छरीरं वर्तेत न तु वर्तते तस्मान्न शरीरगुणश्चेतना इति॥53॥

प्रतिद्वन्द्विसिद्धेः pratidvandvi-siddheḥ, from the production of opposites; पाकजानाम् pākajānām, in the case of attributes caused by the action of heat; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

335. This is, we reply, no opposition becauses maturation occurs if there is production of opposite qualities.—53.

A jar which was blue may through maturation become red but it is never, totally deprived of colour which is its natural quality. But a body (dead) may be totally devoid of knowledge which is therefore not a natural quality of it. In the case of maturation moreover a quality is replaced by an opposite one with which it cannot co-abide, *e.g.*, the blueness of a jar may through maturation assume redness but cannot co-abide with the same. In the case of the body however knowledge is not replaced by an opposite quality. Hence, knowledge is not a natural quality of the body.

इतश्च न शरीरगुणश्चेतना–

शरीरव्यापित्वात्॥ 54॥

शरीरं शरीरावयवाश्च सर्वे चेतनोत्पत्त्या व्याप्ता इति न क्वचिदनुत्पत्तिश्चेतनायाः, शरीरवत् शरीरावयवाश्चेतना इति प्राप्तं चेतनबहुत्वम्, तत्र यथा प्रतिशरीरं चेतनबहुत्वे सुखःदुःखज्ञानानां व्यवस्था लिङ्गम् एवमेकशरीरेपि स्यात्, न तु भवति, तस्मान्न शरीरगुणश्चेतनेति॥54॥

शरीरव्यापित्वात् śarīra-vyāpi-tvāt, because it pervades the body.

336. [Knowledge, says an opponent, is a natural quality] because it pervades the whole body.—54.

The opponent tries to prove that knowledge is a natural quality of the body because it pervades, according to him, the whole body and the numerous parts of it. But this, according to the Naiyāyika, is unreasonable as it leads to the assumption of numerous seats of knowledge, that is, souls in the body destructive of all order the system as to the feeling of pleasure, pain; etc.

यदुक्तम्-न क्वचिच्छरीरावयवे चेतनाया अनुत्पत्तिरिति, सा न–

न केशनखादिष्वनुपलब्धेः॥ 55॥

केशेषु नखादिषु चानुत्पत्तिश्चेतनाया इत्यनुपपन्नं शरीरव्यापित्वमिति॥55॥

न na, no; केशनखादिषु keśa-nakha-āhiṣu, in the hair, nails etc; अनुपलब्धेः an-upalabdheḥ, because of non-perception.

337. [Knowledge does not pervade the whole body] as it is not found in the hair, nails, etc.—55.

Knowledge does not pervade the whole body, *e.g.*, it is not found in the hair, nails, etc. It cannot therefore be a natural quality of the body.

This aphorism may also be explained as follows :—

It is not true that a substance should be entirely pervaded by its natural qualities. Colour, for instance, is a natural quality of the body but it does not pervade the hair, nails, etc.

त्वक्पर्य्यन्तत्वाच्छरीरस्य केशनखादिष्वप्रसङ्गः॥ 56॥

इन्द्रियाश्रयत्वं शरीरलक्षणम्=त्वक्पर्यन्तं जीवमनस्सुखदुःखसंवित्यायतनभूतं शरीरं तस्मान्न केशादिषु चेतनोत्पद्यते, अर्थकारितस्तु शरीरोनिबन्धः केशादीनामिति॥56॥

त्वक्पर्य्यन्तत्वात् tvak-paryanta-tvāt, because of ending with the skin;

शरीरस्य śarīrasya, of the body; केशनखादिषु keśa nakha-ādiṣu, in the hair, nails, etc.; अप्रसङ्गः a-prasaṅgaḥ, non-following.

338. The body being bounded by touch (cuticle) there is, says an opponent, no possiblity of knowledge abiding in the hair, nails, etc.—56

The hair, nails, etc. are not according to the opponent, part of the body as they are not bounded by touch (cuticle). Knowledge cannot consequently abode in them.

The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows :—

The body being bounded by touch (cuticle) there is no possibility of colour abiding in the hair, nails, etc.

इतश्च न शरीरगुणश्चेतना–

शरीरगुणवैधर्म्यात्॥ 57॥

द्विविधः शरीरगुणः–अप्रत्यक्षं च गुरुत्वम् इन्द्रियाग्राह्यं च रूपादि, विधान्तरं तु चेतना=नाऽप्रत्यक्षा–संवेद्यत्वात्, नेन्द्रियग्राह्या–मनोविषयत्वात्, तस्माद् द्रव्यान्तरगुण इति॥57॥

शरीरगुणबैधर्म्यात् śarīra-vaidharmyāt, from dissimilarity to attributes of the body.

339. Knowledge, we reply, is not a quality of the body because of its difference from the well-known qualities of the same.—57.

The Naiyāyika says :—

The qualities of the body are of two kinds, *viz* : (1) those which are cognised by the external senses : *e.g.*, colour, and (2) those which are not cognised by them, *e.g.*, gravity. Knowledge does not come under either of the categories as it is uncognizable on account of our being aware of the same.

The aphorism may also be explained as follows :—

The qualities of the body are cognized by the external senses but knowledgeis not so cognized. Consequently knowledge cannot be a quality of the body.

न रूपादीनामितरेतरवैधर्म्यात्॥ 58॥

यथेतरेतरविधर्माणो रूपादयो न शरीरगुणत्वं जहति, एवं रूपादिवैधर्म्यात् चेतना शरीरगुणत्वं न हास्यतीति॥58॥

न na, no, रूपादीनां rūpa-ādīnām, of form etc; इतरेतरवैधर्म्यात् itara-itara-vaidharmyāt, from dissimilarity of one to another.

340. This is, says the opponent not so because of the natural difference in character of the colour, etc.—58.

The opponent argues :—

If you say that knowledge is not a quality of the body because it differ in character from other well-known qualities of the same. I should say that the well-known qualities themselves differ from each other, *e.g.*, the colour is cognized by the eye but the touch is not. You cannot on this ground say that colour is a quality of the body but touch is not.

ऐन्द्रियकत्वाद्रूपादीनामप्रतिषेधः॥ 59॥

अप्रत्यक्षत्वाच्चेति, यथेतरेतरविधर्माणो रूपादयो नै द्वैविध्यमतिवर्तन्ते तथा रूपादिवैध–र्म्यात् चेतना न द्वैविध्यमतिवर्तेत यदि शरीरगुणः स्यादिति, अतिवर्त्तते तु तस्मान्न शरीरगुण इति। भूतेन्द्रियमनसां ज्ञानप्रतिषेधात् सिद्धे सत्याऽऽरम्भो विशेषज्ञापनार्थः=बहुधा परीक्ष्यमाणं तत्त्वं सुनिश्चिततरं भवतीति॥59॥

ऐन्द्रियकत्वात् aindriyaka-tvāt, from being sensible; रूपादीनाम् rūpa-ādīnām, of form, etc.; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

341. There is, we reply, no objection to colour, etc. being qualities of the body because these are cognized by senses.—59.

The colour, etc. may differ from touch, etc. in respect of certian aspect of their character but they all agree in one respect, *viz.*, that they are all cognisable by one or another of the external senses. But knowledge is not so cognized and cannot therefore be a quality of the body.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 5 : Consciousness is not in the Body : Sūtras : 51-59.

The colour and other attributes of the body co-exist with the body. But a dead body does not possess consciousness. It cannot be compared to momentum, for momentum depends upon definite causes and no such causes of consciousness are found present or absent in the body. The cause of consciousness in the body can be neither in the body as in the case death would make no difference, not in another substance as in that case there would be no reason why it should not produce consciousness in stones and stocks, nor in both as in that case there would be no reason why consciousness should be produced in the body and not in

other things of the same class with it. The disappearance of consciousness from the body at death cannot also be compared to the destruction of the dark colour of earth by baking, for baking does not merely destroy black colour but also produces red colour, while no such new production in the body is found at death, but the total cessation of consciousness. Moreover, baking produces red colour in earth because the materials for such colour exist in the earth. But in the body are not found agencies destructive of consciousness. Further consciousness pervades every particle of the body and on the theory in question there would be innumerable conscious entities in a single body : so that pleasure, pain and cognition would be entirely localised in the part affected and would not effect any other part, which is contrary to experience. Our statement that consciousness pervades every part of the body of course excludes the hair, nails, etc. For they do not constitute the body which extends upto the skin only. The body is defined as the seat of the senses, the field of te activity of the soul and the mind, and of the experience of pleasure, pain, cognition. Moreover, the attributes of the body are either imperceptible as, *e.g.*, gravity, or perceptible as, *e.g.*, colour; but consciousness is neither impcereptible because one is aware of it nor sensible because it is apprehended by the mind. It follows that consciousness is not an attribute of the body. And this conclusion further confirms the previous conclusion that cognition does not belong to the mind, the senses and the body but to the soul.

परीक्षिता बुद्धिः, मनस इदानीं परीक्षाक्रमः तत् किं प्रतिशरीरमेकमनेकमिति विचारे–

ज्ञानायौगपद्यादेकं मनः॥ 60॥

अस्ति खलु वे ज्ञानायौगपद्यम्-एकैकस्येन्द्रियस्य यथाविषयं करणस्यैकप्रत्ययनिर्वृत्तौ सामर्थ्यात् न तदेकत्वे मनसो लिङ्गम्, यत्तु खल्विन्द्रियान्तराणां विषयान्तरेषु ज्ञानायौगपद्यमिति तल्लिङ्गम्। कस्मात्? संभवति खलु वै बहुषु मनस्सु इन्द्रियमनस्संयोगयौगपद्यमिति ज्ञानयौगपद्यं स्यात्, न तु भवति तस्माद् विषये प्रत्ययपर्यायादेकं मनो भवतीति॥60॥

ज्ञानायौगपद्यात् jñāna-ayaugapadyāt, from non-simultaneity of cognitions; एकं ekam, one; मनः manaḥ, mind.

342. The mind is one on account of the non-simultaneousness of cognitions.—60.

If there were more minds than one, they could come in contact with many senses at a times so that many cognitions could be produced

simultaneously. As many cognitions are never produced at once the mind must be admitted to be one.

न युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः॥ 61॥

अयं खल्वध्यापकोऽधीते व्रजति कमण्डलुं धारयति पन्थानं पश्यति शृणोत्यारण्यजान् शब्दान् बिभेति व्याललिङ्गानि बुभुत्सते स्मरति च गन्तव्यं स्थानीयमिति क्रमस्याऽग्रहणाद् युगपदेताः क्रिया इति प्राप्तं मनसो बहुत्वमिति॥61॥

न na, no; युगपत् yugapat, simultaneously; अनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः anekakriyā-upalabdheḥ, from the perception of more than one action or change.

343. It is, says an opponent, not so because we do cognize many acts simultaneously.—61.

The objection stands thus :—A certain teacher while walking on a road holds a waterpot in his hand. Hearing wild sounds he, out of fear, looks at the road, recites a sacred text and thinks of the nearest place of safety. The teacher is supposed in this instance to perform visual perception, auditory perception, recollection, etc., simultaneously. This would be impossible if there were only one mind.

अलातचक्रदर्शनवत्तदुपलब्धिराशुसञ्चारात्॥ 62॥

आशुसंचारादलातचक्रस्य भ्रमतो विद्यमानः क्रमो न गृह्यते, क्रमस्याऽग्रहणाद् अविच्छेदबुद्ध्या चक्रवद् बुद्धिर्भवति, तथा बुद्धीनां क्रियाणं चाशुवृत्तित्वाद् विद्यमानः क्रमो न गृह्यते, क्रमस्याऽग्रहणाद् युगपत् क्रिया भवन्तीति अभिमानो भवति।

किं पुनः क्रमस्याऽग्रहणाद् युगपत् क्रियाभिमानः? अथ युगपद्भावादेव युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धिरिति?, नात्र विशेषप्रतिपत्तेः। कारणमुच्यते। उक्तम्-इन्द्रियान्तराणां विषयान्तरेषु पर्यायेण बुद्धयो भवन्तीति, तच्चाऽप्रत्याख्येयम्-आत्मप्रत्यक्षत्वात्। अथापि दृष्टश्रुतानर्थांश्चिन्तयतः क्रमेण बुद्धयो वर्तनते न युगपद् अनेनानुमातव्यमिति। वर्णपदवाक्यबुद्धीनां तदर्थबुद्धीनां चाशुवृत्तित्वान् क्रमस्याग्रहणम्। कथम्?, वाक्यस्थेषु खलु वर्णेषूच्चरत्सु प्रतिवर्णं तावच्छ्रवणं भवति, श्रुतं वर्णमेकमनेकं वा पदभावेन प्रतिसंधत्ते, प्रतिसंधाय पदं व्यवस्यति, पदव्यवसायेन स्मृत्या पदार्थं प्रतिपद्यते, पदसमूहप्रतिसंधानाच्च वाक्यं व्यवस्यति, संबद्धांश्च पदार्थान गृहीत्वा वाक्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यते, न चासां क्रमेण वर्तमानानां बुद्धीनामाशुवृत्तित्वात् क्रमो गृह्यते, तदेतदनुमानमन्यत्र बुद्धिक्रियायौगपद्याभिमानस्येति। न चास्ति मुक्तसंशया युगपदुत्पत्तिर्बुद्धीनां यया मनसो बहुत्वमेकशरीरेऽनुमीयते इति॥62॥

अलातचक्रदर्शनवत् alāta-chakra-darśana-vat, like the observation of

a circle of fire caused buy a revolving firebrand; तदुपलब्धि: tat-upalabdhiḥ, their perception; आशुसञ्चारात् āśu-sañchārāt, from rapid movement.

344. The appearance of simultaneousness is, we reply, due to the mind coming in cantact with different senses in rapid succession like the appearance of circle of firebrand.—62.

Just as a firebrand while whirling quickly appears to form a continuous circle, so the mind moving from one sense to another in repid succession appears to come in contact with them simultaneously. Hence, the cognitions produced by the contact appear to the simultaneous though in reality they are successive.

यथोक्तहेतुत्वाच्चाणु:।। 63।।

अणु मन एकं चेति धर्मसमुच्चय:-ज्ञानायौगपद्यात्, महत्त्वे मनस: सर्वेन्द्रिसंयोगाद् युगपद् विषयग्रहणं स्यादिति।।63।।

यथोक्तहेतुत्वात् yathā-ukta-hetu-tvāt from the reasons already stated; च cha, and; अणु: aṇuḥ, atomic.

345. And on account of the aforsaid reasons the mind is an atom.—63.

If the mind were possessed of magnitude it could come in contact with many senses at a time of that many cognitions could take; place simultaneously. Since this has been found to be impossible the mind is an atom.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 5 : Of the Mind : Sūtras : 60-63.

In the organism of the mind, senses, cognition and the body there is only one mind. The unity of the mind is inferred from the non-simultaneity of cognition of several objects through the different senses. When we observe the different movements of and individual we seem to have several cognition at one and the same time. But this is due to the swiftness of the cognition and of the movements of the mind. Every one is aware within oneself that cognition arise in sequence according to the serial operation of the senses in respect of their objects. Recollections also appear in sequence. This shows that succession and not simultaneity is the truth. That swiftness of cognition and the movements of the mind obliterates, as it were, their succession is best illustrated when we at a glance grasp the meaning of a sentence which involves the hearing of

each letter as uttered, their formation into wards, the recollection of the meanings of the words, their syntactical connection, etc. And the same reason, namely non-simultaneity of cognitions, also establishes that the mind is atomic.

मनस: खलु भो: सेन्द्रियस्य शरीरे वृत्तिलाभो नान्यत्र शरीरात्, ज्ञातुश्च पुरुषस्य शरीरयुगपद् बुद्ध्यादयो विषयोपभोगो जिहासितहानम् ईप्सितावाप्तिश्च सर्वे च शरीराश्रया व्यवहारा: तत्र खलु विप्रतिपत्ते: संशय:-किमयं पुरुषकर्मनिमित्त: शरीरसर्ग:? अथ वा भूतमात्रादकर्मनिमित्त:? इति, श्रूयते खल्वत्र विप्रतिपत्तिरिति।

तत्रेदं तत्त्वम्—

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात्तदुत्पत्ति:।। 64।।

पूर्वशरीरे या प्रवृत्ति: वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भलक्षणा तत् पूर्वकृतं कर्मोक्तं तस्य फलम्=तज्जनितौ धर्माधर्मौ, तत्फलस्यानुबन्ध:=आत्मसमवेतस्यावस्थानम्, तेन प्रयुक्तेभ्यो भूतेभ्यस्तस्य शरीरस्योत्पत्तिर्न स्वतन्त्रेभ्य इति। यदधिष्ठानोयमात्मा 'अयमहम्' इतिमन्यमानो यत्राभियुक्तो यत्रोपभोगतृष्णया विषयानुपलभमानो धर्माधर्मौ संस्करोति तदस्य शरीरम्, तेन संस्कारेण धर्माधर्मलक्षणेन भूतसहितेन पतितेऽस्मिन् शरीरे शरीरान्तरं निष्पद्यते, निष्पन्नस्य च तस्य पूर्वशरीरवत् पुरुषार्थक्रिया पुरुषस्य च पूर्वशरीरवत् प्रवृत्तिरिति कर्मापेक्षेभ्यो भूतेभ्य: शरीरसर्गे सति एतदुपपद्यते इति, दृष्ट च पुरुषगुणेन प्रयत्नेन प्रयुक्तेभ्यो भूतेभ्य: पुरुषार्थक्रियासमर्थानं द्रव्याणां रथप्रभृतीनामुत्पत्तिस्तयाऽनुमातव्यम्— 'शरीरमपि पुरुषार्थक्रियासमर्थमुत्पद्यमानं पुरुषस्य गुणान्तरापेक्षेभ्यो भूतेभ्य उत्पद्यते' इति।।64।।

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात् pūrva-kṛta-phala-anubandhāt, following as the fruit of acts previously done; तदुत्पत्ति: tat-utpattiḥ, its production.

346. The body is produced as the fruit of our previous deeds (deserts).—64.

Our present body has been made up of elements endowed with the fruits of merit and demerit of our previous lives.

अत्र नास्तिक आह—

भूतेभ्यो मूर्त्त्युपादानवत् तदुपादानम्।। 65।।

यथा कर्मनिरपेक्षेभ्यो भूतेभ्यो निवृत्ता मूर्तय:=सिकताशर्करापाषाणगैरिकाऽञ्जनप्रभृतय: पुरुषार्थकारित्वादुपादीयन्ते तथा कर्मनिरपेक्षेभ्यो भूतेभ्य: शरीरमुत्पन्नं पुरुषार्थकारित्वादुपादीयते इति।।65।।

भूतेभ्य: bhūtebhyaḥ, from the element; मूर्त्त्युपादानवत् mūrti-upādānavat, like the formation of bodies. तदुपादानम् tat-upādānam, its production.

347. The formation of our body of elements, says an opponent, resembles that of a statue of stone, etc.—65.

The objection stands thus :—Just as a statue is formed of stone, clay, etc., which are devoid of deserts, our body has been made up of elements which are not endowed with the fruits of our previous merits and demerits.

न साध्यसमत्वात्॥ 66॥

यथा शरीरोत्पत्तिरकर्मनिमित्ता साध्या तथा सिकताशर्करापापाणगैरिकाञ्जनप्रभृतीना-मप्यऽकर्मनिमित्तः सर्गः साध्यः साध्यसमत्वादसाधनमिति="भूतेभ्यो मूर्त्युपादानवत्" इति चानेन साध्यम्॥66॥

न na, no; साध्यसमत्वात् sādhya-sama-tvāt, because this is the same as the thing to be established.

348. It is, we reply, not so because the statement requires proof.—66.

To prove the our body is formed of elements which are devoid of deserts, the opponent cites the instance of a statue made up of clay or stone, which is supposed to bear no connection whatsoever with deserts. The Naiyāyika replies that the very example cited requires to be verified for clay, etc. are made of atoms which have actually a reference to deserts as they comport themselves in such a way as to work out the designs of Retributive Justice.

नोत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वान्मातापित्रोः॥ 67॥

विषमश्चायमुपन्यासः, कस्मात्?, निर्बीजा इमा मूर्तय उत्पद्यते, बीजपूर्विका तु शरीरोत्पत्तिः। मातापितृशब्देन लोहितरेतसी बीजभूते गृह्येते, तत्र सत्त्वस्य गर्भवासानुभवनीयं कर्म पित्रोश्च पुत्रफलानुभवनीये कर्मणी मातुर्गर्भाश्रये शरीरोत्पत्तिं भूतेभ्यः प्रयोजयन्ति इत्युपपन्नं बीजानुविधानमिति॥67॥

न na, no; उत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वात् utaptti-nimitta-tvāt, because of their being the conditions of production; मातापित्रोः mātā-pitroḥ, of the blood and the seed.

349. Not so because father and mother are the cause of its production.—67.

The formation of our body cannot be compared to that a clay-statue because the body owes its origin to the sperm and blood of our father and mother while the statue is produced without any seed at all.

तथाहारस्य॥ 68॥

"उत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वात्" इतिप्रकृतम्, भुक्तं पीतम् आहारस्तस्य पक्तिनिर्वृत्तं रसद्रव्यं मातृशरीरे चोपचीयते, बीजे गर्भाशयस्थे बीजसमानापाकं मात्रया चोपचयः बीजे यावद् व्यूहसमर्थः संचत इति, संचितं चाऽर्बुदमांसपेशीकलककण्डरशिरःपाण्यादिना च व्यूहेन इन्द्रियाधिष्ठानभेदेन व्यूह्यते, व्यूहे च गर्भनाड्याऽवतारितं रसद्रव्यमुपचीयते यावत् प्रसवसमर्थ-मिति। न चायमन्नपानस्य स्थाल्यादिगतस्य कल्पते इति, एतस्मात् कारणात् कर्मनिमित्तत्वं शरीरस्य विज्ञायते इति॥68॥

तथा tathā, so; आहारस्य āhārasya, of the food.

350. So too eating is a cause.—68.

The food and drink taken by the mother turns into blood which develops the embryo (made up of the sperm of the father), through the various stages of formation of the *arbuda* (a long round mass), *māṃsa peśī* (a piece of flesh), *kalala* (a round lump), *kaṇḍara* (sinews), *śiraḥ,* (head), *pāṇi* (hands), *pāda* (legs), etc. Eating is therefore a cause of production of our body but not of a clay-statue.

प्राप्तौ चानियमात्॥ 69॥

न सर्वो दम्पत्योः संयोगो गर्भाधानहेतुर्दृश्यते, तत्राऽसति कर्मणि न भवति सति च भवतीत्युपपन्नो नियमाभाव इति। कर्मनिरपेक्षेषु भूतेषु शरीरोत्पत्तिहेतुषु नियमः स्यात्–न ह्यत्र कारणाभाव इति॥69॥

प्राप्तौ prāptau, in case of union; च cha, and; अनियमात् aniyamāt, because there is no uniformity.

351. And there is desert because of uncertainty even in the cause of union.—69.

All unions between husband and wife are not followed by the production of a child (body). Hence, we must acknowledge the desert of the child to be a co-operative cause of its birth.

अथापि–

शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत् संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्म्म॥ 70॥

यथा खल्विदं शरीरं धातुप्राणसंवाहिनीनां नाडीनां शुक्रान्तानां धातूनां च स्नायुत्वग-स्थिशिरापेशीकललकण्डराणां च शिरोबाहूदराणां सक्थ्नां च कोष्ठगानां वातपित्तकफानां च मुखकण्ठहृदयाऽऽमाशयपक्वाशयाऽधःस्रोतसां च परमदुःखसंपादनीयेन संनिवेशेन व्यूहितम् अशक्यं पृथिव्यादिभिः कर्मनिरपेक्षैरुत्पादयितुमिति कर्मनिमित्ता शरीरोत्पत्तिरिति विज्ञायते,

एवं च प्रत्यात्मनियतस्य निमित्तस्याऽभावाद् निरतिशयैरात्मभिः संबन्धात् सर्वात्मनां च समानैः पृथिव्यादिभिरुत्पादितं शरीरं पृथिव्यादिगतस्य च नियमहेतोरभावात् सर्वात्मनां सुखदुःखसंवित्तिसाधनं समानं प्राप्तम्, यत्तु प्रत्यात्मं व्यवतिष्ठते तत्र शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्म व्यवस्थाहेतुरिति विज्ञायते, परिपच्यमानो हि प्रत्यात्मनियतः कर्माशयो यस्मिन्नात्मनि वर्तते तस्यैवोपभोगायतनं शरीरमुत्पाद्य व्यवस्थापयति, तदेवं शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत् संयोगनिमित्तं कर्मेति विज्ञायते। प्रत्यात्मव्यवस्थानं तु शरीरस्यात्मना संयोगं प्रचक्ष्महे इति।।70।।

शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत् śarīra-utpatti-nitta-vat, as it is the condition of the production of the body; संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं saṃyoga-utpatti-nimittam, condition of the production of (generative) union; कर्म karma, desert.

352. Desert is the cause not only of the production of the body but also of its conjunction with a soul.—70.

Just as the earth, etc., independent of a person's desert, are unable to produce his body, so the body itself as a seat of particular pleasures and pains is unable ot be connected with a soul without the intervention of the desert of the latter.

एतेनानियमः प्रत्युक्तः।। 71।।

योऽयमकर्मनिमित्ते शरीरसर्गे सति नियम इत्युच्यते अयम्-"शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत् संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्म 70" इत्यनेन प्रत्युक्तः। कस्तावदयं नियमः? यथैकस्यात्मनः शरीरं तथा सर्वेषामिति नियमः, अन्यस्याऽन्यथा अन्यस्याऽन्यथा इत्यऽनियमः=भेदः= व्यावृत्तिविशेष इति, दृष्टा च जन्मव्यावृत्तिः-उच्चभिजनो निकृष्टाभिजन इति, प्रशस्तं निन्दितमिति, व्याधिबहुलम्, अरोगमिति, समग्रं विकलमिति, पीडाबहुलं सुखबहुलमिति, पुरुषातिशयलक्षणोपपन्नं विपरीतमिति, प्रशस्तलक्षणं निन्दितलक्षणमिति, पटुविन्द्रियं मृद्विन्द्रियमिति, सूक्ष्मश्च भेदोऽपरिमेयः सोयं जन्मभेदः प्रत्यात्मनियतात् कर्मभेदादुपपद्यते। असति कर्मभेदे प्रत्यात्मनियते निरतिशयत्वादात्मनां समानत्वाच्च पृथिव्यादीनां पृथिव्यादिगतस्य नियमहेतोरभावात् सर्वं सर्वात्मनां प्रसज्येत, न त्विदमित्थम्भूतं जन्म, तस्माद् नाऽकर्मनिमित्ता शरीरोत्पत्तिरिति।।71।।

एतेन् etena, by this; अनियमः a-niyamaḥ, absence of uniformity; प्रत्युक्तः prati-uktaḥ, answered.

353. By this the charge against inequality is answered. —71.

Some persons are found to possess a healthy body while ethers an unhealthy one; a certian body is beautiful while another ugly. This inequality in the formation of the body is due to the desert acquired by the persons in their previous lives.

The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows :—

It is due entirely to the interference of the desert that the union between husband and wife is not always followed by the production of a child (body).

उपपन्नश्च तद्वियोगः कर्म्मक्षयोपपत्तेः।। 72।।

कर्मनिमित्ते शरीरसर्गे तेन शरीरेणात्मनो वियोग उपपन्नः। कस्मात्? कर्मक्षयोपपत्तेः= उपपद्यते खलु कर्मक्षयः सम्यग्दर्शनात्, प्रक्षीणे मोहे वीतरागः पुनर्भवहेतुकर्म कायवाङ्मनोभिर्न करोति इत्युत्तरस्याऽनुपचयः पूर्वोपचितस्य विपाकप्रतिसंवेदनात् प्रक्षयः, एवं प्रसवहेतोरभावात् पतितेऽस्मिन् शरीरे पुनः शरीरान्तरानुत्पत्तेरप्रतिसंधिः। अकर्मनिमित्ते तु शरीरसर्गे भूतक्षयानुपपत्तेस्तद्वियोगानुपपत्तिरिति।।72।।

354. And the separation between the soul and the body si effected by the termination of the deserts.—72.

It is in virtue of its deserts that a soul is joined with a particular body and it is by the exhaustion of the deserts that the separation between the two takes place. The soul cannot be separated from the body until it attains perfect knowledge through the cessation of ignorance and lust

तददृष्टकारितमिति चेत् पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गे।। 73।।

अदर्शनं खलु अदृष्टमित्युच्यते, अदृष्टकारिता भूतेभ्यः शरीरोत्पत्तिः। न जात्वऽनुत्पन्ने शरीरे द्रष्टा निरायतनो दृश्यंपश्यंति, तच्चास्यदृश्यं द्विविधम्-विषयश्च नानात्वं चाऽव्यक्तात्मनोः तदर्थः शरीरसर्गः, तस्मिन्नऽवसिते चरितार्थानि भूतानि न शरीरमुत्पादयन्तीति उपपन्नः शरीरवियोग इति, एवं चेन्मन्यसे? पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गे=पुनः शरीरोत्पत्तिः प्रसज्यते इति=या चानुत्पन्ने शरीरे दर्शनानुत्पत्तिरदर्शनाभिमता या चापवर्गे शरीरनिवृत्तौ दर्शनानुत्पत्तिरदर्शनभूता नैतयोरदर्शनयोः क्वचिद् विशेष इत्यऽदर्शनस्याऽनिवृत्तेरपवर्गे पुनः शरीरोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग इति।।73।।

तत् tat, that; अद्दष्टकारितम् adṛṣṭa kāritam, caused by adṛṣṭa; इतिचेत् iti, chet, should by say; पुनः punaḥ, again; तत्प्रसङ्गः tat-prassaṅgaḥ its implication; अपवर्गे apavarge, in the case of release.

355. If the the body was attached to a soul only to remove the inexperience of the latter, then the same inexperience would recur after the soul had been emancipated (released).—73.

An opponent says that there is no necessity for admitting the desert and that the body which is made up of elements is connected with a soul only to enable the latter to experience object and realize its

distinction from matter (prakṛti). As soon as the soul satisfies itself by the experience and attains emancipation (release) it is separated from the body for ever. The Naiyāyika asks : "Why is not the soul, even after emancipation (release), again connected with a body to regains its experiential power?" Since, the opponent does not admit desert there is nothing else to stop the connection.

चरितार्थता विशेष इति चेत्?

न करणा करणयोराम्भदर्शनात्॥ 74॥

चरितार्थानि भूतानि दर्शनावसानाद् न शरीरान्तरमारभ्न्यते इत्ययं विशेषः, एवं चेदुच्यते? नकरणाकरणयोरारम्भदर्शनात्=चरितार्थानां भूतानां विषयोपलब्धिकरणात् पुनः पुनः शरीरारम्भो दृश्यते, प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्नानात्वदर्शनस्याऽकरणाद् निरर्थकः शरीरारम्भः पुनः पुनर्दृश्यते, तस्मादकर्मनिमित्तायां भूतसृष्टौ न दर्शनार्था शरीरोत्पत्तिर्युक्ता, युक्ता तु कर्मनिमित्ते सर्गे दर्शनार्था शरीरोत्पत्तिः।

कर्मविपाकसंवेदनं दर्शनमिति तददृष्टकारितमिति च कस्यचिद् दर्शनम्=अदृष्टं नाम परमाणूनां गुणविशेषः क्रियाहेतुस्तेन प्रेरिताः परमाणवः संमूर्च्छिताः शरीरमुत्पादयन्तीति तद् मनः समाविशति स्वगुणेनादृष्टेन प्रेरितम्, समनस्के शरीरे द्रष्टुरुपलब्धिर्भवतीति। एतस्मिन् वै दर्शने गुणानुच्छेदात् पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्ग=अपवर्गेऽपवर्गे शरीरोत्पत्तिः–परमाणुगुणस्या-दृष्टस्याऽनुच्छेद्यन्वादिति॥74॥

356. It is not reasonable, because the body is found to be produced in case of both fulfilment and non-fulfilment of its ends.—74.

In the previous aphorism it was stated that the body was produced only to enable the soul to experience objects and to realize its distinction from matter (prakṛti). In the present aphorism the Naiyāyika points out hte worthlessness of the statement by showing that the body is produced irrespective of the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of its ends, that is, it is produced in the case of athe sould experiencing objects and realizing its distinction from matter as well as in the case when the soul remains enchained on account of its failure to realize its distinction from matter.

In a certain scholl of philosphy the desrt is supposed to be a quality of the atoms and not of the soul. In virtue of the desert atoms are said to combine together into a body (endowed with a mind) to enable the soul to experience objects, and realize its distinction from matter. This school of philosophy fails to explain why the soul after it has attained emancipation (release) is not again connected with a body inasmuch as the atoms composing the body are never devoid of deserts.

मनःकर्म्मनिमित्तत्वाच्च संयोगानुच्छेदः॥ 75॥

मनोगुणेनादृष्टेन समावेशिते मनसि संयोगव्युच्छेदो न स्यात्, तत्र किंकृतं शरीरादपसर्पणं मनस इति?। कर्माशयक्षये तु कर्माशयान्तराद् विपच्यमानादपसर्पणोपपत्तिरिति। अदृष्टादेवापसर्पणमितिचेत्?, योऽदृष्टः शरीरोपसर्पणहेतुः स एवापसर्पणहेतुरपीति न–एकस्य जीवन प्रायणहेतूत्वानुपपत्तेः=एवं च सति एकमदृष्टं जीवनप्रायणयोर्हेतुरितिप्राप्तं नैतदुपपद्यते॥75॥

मनःकर्म्मनिमित्तत्वात् manaḥ-karma-nimitta-tvāt, from its being caused by the action of the mind; च cha, and; संयोगानुच्छेदः saṃyoga-an-uchchhedaḥ, non-termination of conjunction.

357. And there will be no cessation of the conjunction if it is caused by the desert of the mind.—75.

Those who maintain that the desert is a quality of the mind cannot explain why there should at all be a saperation of the body from the mind which is eternal. If it is said that the very desert which connected the body with the mind does also separate it therefrom, we shall be constrained to admit an absurd conclusion that one and the same thing a the cause of life and death.

नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गश्च प्रायणानुपपत्तेः॥ 76॥

विपाकसंवेदनात् कर्माशयक्षये शरीरपातः प्रायणम्, कर्माशयान्तराच्च पुनर्जन्म। भूतमात्रात्तु कर्मनिरपेक्षात् शरीरोत्पत्तौ कस्य क्षयात् शरीरपातः=प्रायणानुपपत्तेः खलु वे नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गं विद्मः, यादृच्छिके तु प्रायणभेदानुपपत्तिरिति॥76॥

नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः nitya-tva-prasaṅgaḥ, of eternality; च cha, and; प्रायणानुपपत्तेः prāyaṇa-an-upapatteḥ, from non-proof of departure.

358. Owing to there being no reason for destruction we should find the body to be eternal.—76.

If the body is supposed to be produced form elements independent of deserts, we should not find anything the absence of which will cause its destruction. In the event of the destruction being arbitrary, there will be not fixed cause to effect emancipation or rebirth there after as the elements will always remain the same.

"पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गे 73" एतत्समाधित्सुराह–

अणुश्यामतानित्यत्ववदेतत् स्यात्॥ 77॥

यथाऽणोः श्यामता नित्या अग्निसंयोगेन प्रतिबद्धा न पुनरुत्पद्यते एवमदृष्टकारितं शरीरमपवर्गे पुनर्नोत्पद्यते इति॥77॥

अणुश्यामतानित्यत्ववत् aṇu-śyāma-tābitya-tva-vat, like the eternality of the darkness of the atom; एतत् etat, this; स्यात् syāt, may be.

359. The disappearance of the body in emancipation (release) is, according to an opponent, eternal like the blackness of an atom.—77.

The opponent syas :—Just as the blackness of an atom suppressed by redness through contact with fire does not reappear, so the body which has once attained emancipation (release) will not reappear.

नाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात्।। 78।।

नायमस्ति दृष्टान्तः, कस्मात्?, अकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात्=अकृतम्=प्रमाणतोऽनुपपन्नं तस्याऽभ्यागमः=अभ्युपपत्तिः=व्यवसाः, एतत्श्रद्दधानेन प्रमाणतोऽनुपपन्नं मन्तव्यम्, तस्मान्नायं दृष्टान्तः-न प्रत्यक्षं न चानुमानं किंचिदुच्यते इति, तदिदं दृष्टान्तस्य साध्यसमत्वमभिधीयते इति। अथ वा-नाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात्=अणुश्यामतादृष्टान्तेनाऽकर्मनिमित्तां शरीरोत्पत्ति समादधानस्य अकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गः=अकृते सुखदुःखहेतौ कर्मणि पुरुषस्य सुखं दुःखमभ्यागच्छतीति प्रसज्येत, ओमितिब्रवतः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमविरोधः।

प्रत्यक्षविरोधस्तावत्-भिन्नमिदं सुखदुःखं प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयत्वात् प्रत्यक्षं सर्वशरीरिणाम्। को भेदः?, तीव्रं मन्दं चिरमाशु नानाप्रकारमेकप्रकारम् इत्येवमादिर्विशेषः। न चास्ति प्रत्यात्मनियतः सुखदुःखहेतुविशेष, न चाऽसति हेतुविशेषे फलविशेषो दृश्यते कर्मनिमित्ते तु सुखदुःखयोगे कर्मणां तीव्रमन्दतोपपत्तेः कर्मसंचयानां चोत्कर्षापकर्षभावाद् नानाविधैक-विधभावाच्च कर्मणां सुखदुःखभेदोपपत्तिः, सोयं हेतुभेदाभावाद् दृष्टः सुखदुःखभेदो न स्यादिति प्रत्यक्षविरोधः।।

तथानुऽमानविरोधः-दृष्टं हि पुरुषगुणव्यवस्थानात् सुखदुःखव्यवस्थानाम्=यः खलु चेतनावान् साधननिर्वर्तनीयं सुखं बुद्ध्वा तदीप्सन् साधनावाप्तये यतते स सुखेन युज्यते न विपरीतः, यश्च साधननिर्वर्तनीयं दुःखं बुद्ध्वा तज्जिहासुः साधनपरिवर्जनाय यतते स च दुःखेन त्यज्यते न विपरीतः, नास्ति चेदं यत्नमन्तरेण चेतनानां सुखदुःखव्यवस्थानां तेनापि चेतनगुणान्तरव्यवस्थाकृतेन भवितव्यमित्यनुमानम्, तदेतद् अकर्मनिमित्ते सुखदुःखयोगे विरुध्यते इति, तच्च गुणान्तरम् असंवेद्यत्वाददृष्टं विपाककालाऽनियमाच्चाऽव्यवस्थितम्। बुद्ध्यादयस्तु संवेद्याश्चाऽपवर्गिणश्चेति।

अथाऽऽगमविरोधः-बहु खल्विदमार्षम्=ऋषीणामुपदेशजातम् अनुष्ठानपरिवर्जनाश्रयम्, उपदेशफलं च शरीरिणां वर्णाश्रमविभागेनाऽनुष्ठानलक्षणा प्रवृत्तिः परिवर्जनलक्षणा निवृत्तिः। तच्चोभयमेतस्यां दृष्टौ 'नास्ति कर्म सुचरितं दुश्चरितं वाऽकर्मनिमित्तः पुरुषाणां सुखदुःखयोगः' इतिविरुद्ध्यते, सेयं पापिष्ठानां मिथ्यादृष्टिः-'अकर्मनिमित्ता शरीरसृष्टिकर्मनिमित्तः सुखदुःखयोगः' इति।।78।।

न na, no; अकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् a-kṛta-abhyāgama-prasaṅgāt, from implication of the acquisition of the unearned.

360. This is, we reply, not so because it would lead us to admit what was undemonstrable.—78.

The argument employed in the previous aphorism is, according to the Naiyāyika, futile for it cannot be proved that the blackness of an atom is suppressed by redness through contact with fire, for it is possible that the blackness is altother destroyed.

The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows :—

This is, we reply, not so, because it would lead us to acknowledge the consequences of actions not done by us.

Unless we acknowledge deserts there will be no principle governing he enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain. The absence of such a principle will be repugnant to all evidences—perception, inference and scripture.

।। इति वात्स्यायनीये न्यायभाष्ये तृतीयाऽध्याय द्वितीयमाह्निकं समाप्तम्।।

।। तृतीयाऽध्यायश्च समाप्तः।।

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 7 : Adṛṣṭa is the cause of the Body : Sūtras : 62-74.

Karma, *i.e.* the activity or the start made by speech, cognition and the body, produces a its fruit merit and demerit which abide in the soul. Moved by these and not independently the elements produce the body. Dwelling in the soul regards the body as itself. Being attached to the body and out of the craving for enjoyment in it the soul cognises objects and creates saṃskāras or appetencies in the form of merit and demerit which lead to rebirth where again the same sequence of cause and effect is repeated, and so on. This succession of events can be possible only on the explanation that the elements are moved for the production of the body under the influence of karma to subserve the ends of the soul. It is seen that a man, to serve his purposes, makes conveyances and the like from suitable materials. The Atheist says that in making a statue sand, stone, colouring and other materials are used as they exist in nature without reference to any karma and that so the case may be with the production of the body from the elements. We reply that it is yet to be established that sand, stone, etc. exist in nature by themselves without reference to any karma and not to serve the ends of the soul. Moreover, a statue is not produced from seeds whereas the

body is. This involves three karmas, *viz.*, of the soul experiencing life in the womb and of the parents enjoying the fruit in the shape of a son. Further, food taken by the mother nourishes and develops the embryo till birth through various processes of assimilation. It is thus clear that the action of the materials in forming and developing the body is dependent upon karma. The operation of karma is also manifest from the fact that every approach of the parents does not become fruitful.

Not only is karma the cause of the production of the body; it is also the cause of the conjnction of a particular body with a particular soul. The body is a highly intricate mechanism and cannot as such be brought about by the fortuitous concourse of atoms. Similarly, the bodies of no two men are exactly the same. This perplexing diversity of outfit in the form of the body can be explained only by karma, namely that every man has his own destiny to fulfil and that he gets the body which he merits.

The causality of karma in the producton of the body also accounts for the soul's disjunction from the body on the exhaustion of karma, through the removal of delustion by true knowledge. Thus, the seed of future birth is not produced and karma in fruition is exhausted by experience. Were the elements, on the other hand, which are indestructible, independent cause of the production of the body, there would be no release.

The Sāṅkhyas hold that the soul's non-experience of Prakṛti of Matter is the cause of the production of the body in and through which he soul is to experience Prakṛti, and that when the experience is accomplished the soul regains final separation from the body. On this theory a released soul also may again be connected with the body. For if experience is necessary for the soul when it had no body experience may be necessary also after its separation from the body. It cannot be argued that separation from the body takes place after the purpose of the soul's experience of Prakṛti has been accomplished and that therefore there is no reason for its being again connected with the body. For the experience of a single soul fulfils the purpose of the experience of Prakṛti, and Prakṛti which has performed before one soul has its object acomplished; yet we find that the production of bodies is uninterrupted. The production of the body is therefore not from non-karma and for the purpose of the soul's experience of Prakṛti. It is due to karma and for the experience of the fruit of karma.

Others maintain that the soul's experience is not of Prakṛti but of the fruits of karma and this is brought about by adṛṣṭa inhering in atoms.

This attribute of the atoms is a cause of activity. Impelled by it the atoms come together and form the body. The mind then enters the body. In the body so formed and possessed by the mind the soul cognises objects. But in this view also bodies can be produced even for a releaesed soul because the attribute of adṛṣṭa appertaining to the atoms is indestructible.

Others again opine that the mind by its own adṛṣṭa enters the body. In that case also there can be no separation of the mind from the body. For to what will this separation be due? On our theory karma in fruition in the present body is exhausted by experience and separation from the body takes place.The adṛṣṭa of the mind, on the other hand, cannot be the cause of both birth and death.

Further, if the elements as such could produce the body then the body once produced would, in the absence of any cause of destruction, continue for ever. If death were due to chance then there would not be so much diversity in the manner of death as is seen.

Some think that as the dark colour of the atom is destroyed for ever by the application of heat and red colour is produced in its place, so on the theory of the production of the body by adṛṣṭa the body will not be produced again in the state of release. This view is altogether unsupported by any reason. No familiar instance is cited. Neither perception nor inference is advanced.

Or "Akṛta—abhyāgama—prasaṅga," in the Sūtra (III-ii-78) means that the doctrine that the production of the body is not due to karma will entail that the experience of pleasure and pain is without any cause. This is contrary to perception, inference and scriptural texts. This would mean that acts are neither good nor bad and that the acts of men are not responsible for their experience of pleasure and pain. This the flase view of perverted minds.

।इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने तृतीयस्याऽध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम्।।2।।

Book IV, Chapter I

मनसोऽनन्तरं प्रवृत्तिः परीक्षितव्या, तत्र खलु यावद् धर्माधर्माश्रयशरीरादि परीक्षितं सर्वा सा प्रवृत्तेः परीक्षेत्याह–

प्रवृत्तिर्यथोक्ता॥ 1॥

तथा परीक्षितेति॥1॥

प्रवृत्तिः pravṛttiḥ, activity; यथोक्ता yathā-uktā, as explained.

361. Activity, as it is, has been explained.—1.

The definition of activiry is to be found in aphorism 1-1-17.

प्रवृत्त्यनन्तरास्तर्हि दोषाः परीक्ष्यन्तामित्यत आह–

तथा दोषाः॥ 2॥

परीक्षिता इति, बुद्धिसमानाश्रयत्वादात्मगुणाः प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वात् पुनर्भवप्रतिसंधान-सामर्थ्याच्च संसारहेतवः, संसारस्याऽनादित्वादनादिना प्रबन्धेन प्रवर्तन्ते। मिथ्याज्ञान-निवृत्तिस्तत्त्वाानात् तन्निवृत्तौ रागद्वेषप्रबन्धोच्छेदेऽपवर्ग इति। प्रादुर्भावतिरोधानधर्मका इत्येवमाद्युक्तं दोषाणामिति॥2॥

तथा tathā, similarly; दोषाः doṣāḥ, faults.

362. So the faults.—2.

The definition of faults has been given in aphorism 1-1-18. The faults which co-abide with intellect in the soul are caused by activity, produce rebirths and do not end until the attainment of final release (apavarga).

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 1 : Activity and Faults : Sūtras : 1-2.

Acitivity (I. i.17) and Faults (I.i.18) have already been explained. They have been examined in the examination of the body, etc. from which spring merits and demerits. The Faults, like cognition are attributes of the soul. They are the causes saṃsāra or transmigration, because

they are the causes of activity and re-birth. As saṃsāra is without beginning, they also proceed without beginning. They cease to be when false knolwedge is destroyed by knowledge of the truth.

''प्रवर्तनालक्षणा दोषाः 1-1-18'' इत्युक्तं तथा चेमे मानेर्ष्याऽसूयाविचिकित्सा-मत्सरादयः ते कस्मान्नोपसंख्यायन्ते? इत्यत आह–

तत्त्रैराश्यं रागद्वेषमोहार्थान्तरभावात्॥ 3॥

तेषां दोषाणां त्रयो राशयः=त्रयः पक्षाः–रागपक्षः–कामो मत्सरः स्पृहा तृष्णा लोभ इति, द्वेषपक्षः–क्रोध ईर्ष्याऽसूया द्रोहोऽमर्ष इति, मोहपक्षः–मिथ्याज्ञानं विचिकित्सा मानः इति, त्रैराश्यान्नोपसंख्यायन्ते इति। लक्षणस्य तर्ह्यऽभेदात् त्रित्वमनुपपन्नम्? नानुपपन्नम्-रागद्वेषमोहार्थान्तरभावात्=आसक्तिलक्षणो रागः, अमर्षलक्षणो द्वेषः, मिथ्याप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणो मोह इति, एतत् प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं सर्वशरीरिणाम्=विजानात्ययं शरीरी रागमुत्पन्नम्-'अस्ति मेऽध्यात्मं रागधर्मः' इति, विरागं च विजानाति-'नास्ति मेऽध्यात्मं रागधर्मः' इति, एवमितरयोरपीति। मानेर्ष्यासूयाप्रभृतयस्तु त्रैराश्यमनुपतिता इति नोपसंख्यायन्ते॥3॥

तत्त्रैराश्यम् tat-trai-rāśyam, their threefoldness; रागद्वेषमोहार्थान्तरभावात् rāga-dveṣa-moha-artha-antara-bhāvāt, according to the differences of affection, aversion, and stupidity, or attraction, repulsion and confusion.

363. The faults are divisible in three groups, as all of them are included in affection, aversion and stupidity.—3.

The faults are divided in three, groups, *viz.*, affection, aversion and stupidity. Affection includes lust, avarice, avidity and covetousness. Aversion includes anger, envy, malignity, hatred and implacability. Stupidity includes misapprehension, suspicion, arrogance and carelessness.

नैकप्रत्यनीकभावात्॥ 4॥

नाऽर्थान्तरं रागादयः, कस्मात्?, एकप्रत्यनीकभावात्=तत्त्वज्ञानम्=सम्यङ्मतिः=आर्यप्रज्ञा=संबोध इत्येकमिदं प्रत्यनीकं त्रयाणामिति॥4॥

न na, no; एकप्रत्यनीकभावात् eka-prati-anīka-bhāvāt, because they are only the opposites of the same thing, namely true knowledge.

364. It is, some say, not so, because they are the opposites of one single thing.—4.

The objection stands thus :—There is no distinction between

affection, aversion and stupidity, as all of them are destructible by one single thing, *viz.*, perfect knowledge. The three, in so far as they are destructible by one single thing, are of a uniform character.

व्यभिचारादहेतुः॥ 5॥

एकप्रत्यनीकाः पृथिव्यां श्यामादयोऽग्निसंयोगेनैकेन, एकयोनयश्च पाकजा इति॥5॥

व्यभिचारात् vyabhichārāt, on account of erring; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a mark.

365. This reason, we reply, is not good, because, it is erratic.—5.

To prove that there is no distinction between affeciton, aversion and stupidity, the opponent has advanced the reason that all the three are destructible by one single thing. This reason is declared by the Naiyāyika to be erratic, because it does not apply to all cases, *e.g.*, the blue, black, green, yellow, brown and other colours, although they are different form one another, are destructible by one single thing, *viz.*, contact with fire.

सति चार्थान्तरभावे–

तेषां मोहः पापीयान्नामूढस्येतरोत्पत्तेः॥ 6॥

मोहः पापः पापतरो वा द्वावभिप्रेत्योक्तम्, कस्मात्? नाऽमूढस्येतरोत्पत्तेः=अमूढस्य रागद्वेषौ नोत्पद्येते, मूढस्य तु यथासंकल्पमुत्पत्तिः=विषयेषु रञ्जनीयाः संकल्पा रागहेतवः कोपनीयाः संकल्पा द्वेषहेतवः उभये च संकल्पा न मिथ्याप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणत्वाद् मोहादन्ये, ताविमौ मोहयोनी रागद्वेषाविति, तत्त्वज्ञानाच्च मोहनिवृत्तौ रागद्वेषानुत्पत्तिरित्येकप्रत्यनीक-भावोपपत्तिः, एवं च कृत्वा तत्त्वज्ञानात् "दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः 1-1-2" इति व्याख्यातमिति॥6॥

तेषां teṣām, among them; मोहः mohaḥ, stupidity, confusion; पापीयान् pāpīyān the worst; न na, not; अमूढस्य a-mūḍhasya, of the non-stupid; इतरोत्पत्तेः itara-utpatteḥ, because of the production of the other two.

366. Of the three, stupidity is the worst, because in the case of a person who is not stupid, the other two do not come into existence.—6.

There are three faults, *viz.*, affection, aversion and stupidity, of which the last is the worst, because it is only a stupid person who may be influenced by affection and aversion.

प्राप्तस्तर्हि–

निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावादर्थान्तरभावो दोषेभ्यः॥ 7॥

अन्यद्धि निमित्तमऽन्यच्च नैमित्तकमिति दोषनिमित्तत्वाददोषो मोह इति॥7॥

निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावात् nimitta-naimittika-bhāvāt, owing to the relation of cause and effect; अर्थान्तरभावः artha-antara bhāvaḥ, condition of being a different object; दोषेभ्यः doṣebhyaḥ, from faults.

367. There is then, says an opponent, a difference between stupidity and other faults owing to their interrelation of cause and effect.—7.

The opponent argues as follows :—Since stupidity is the cause of the other two faults, it must be different from them. In fact there cannot be the relation of cause and effect between two things which are not different from each other.

न दोषलक्षणावरोधान्मोहस्य॥ 8॥

"प्रवर्तनालक्षणा दोषाः 1-1-18" इत्यनेन दोषलक्षणेनावरुध्यते दोषेषु मोह इति॥8॥

न na, not; दोषलक्षणावरोधात् doṣa-lakṣaṇa-avarodhāt, from inclusion by the definition of fault; मोहस्य mohasya, of stupidity.

368. It is, we reply, not so, because faults as already defined include stupidity.—8.

Stupidity is indeed a fault because it is homogeneous with or possesses the character of the same as defined in aphorism 1-1-18.

निमित्तनैमित्तिकोपपत्तेश्च तुल्यजातीयानामप्रतिषेधः॥ 9॥

द्रव्याणां गुणानां वाऽनेकविधविकल्पो निमित्तनैमित्तकभावो तुल्यजातीयानां दृष्ट इति॥9॥

निमित्तनैमित्तिकोपपत्तेः nimitta-naimittika-upapatteḥ, from the relation of cause and effect; च cha, and; तुल्यजातीयानां tulya-jātīyānām, of homogeneous things; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiciton.

369. And there is, we reply, no prohibition for homogeneous things to stand in the relation of cause and effect.—9.

It is not proper to exclude stupidity from the faults on the mere

ground that they stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. In fact the homogeneous things such as two substances or two qualities may stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect, *e.g.*, in the case of a jar being produced from its two halves we notice the relation of cause and effect between the jar and the halves which are homogeneous with each other.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 2 : Faults fall into three groups : Sūtras : 3-9.

There are three collections of Faults : (1) Attraction consisting of lust, greed, craving, longing and covetousness; (2) Aversion consisting of anger, envy, jealousy, hatred and implacability; (3) Delusion consisting of false knowledge, doubt, pride and carelessness. Attachment is the mark of Attraction; want of forbearance, of Aversion; and misapprehension, of Delusion. Every man is aware of their existence within himself. The fact that they are all liable to be destroyed by knowledge of the truth does not show that they do not fall into distinct classes. For the colours of the earth such as blue, etc. are distinct colours, though they can be all destroyed by the application of heat. The colours again are quite distinct though they have a common source, *viz.* fire. Similarly, the Faults are quite distinct from one another, though false knowledge is their common origin.

Among the Faults Delusion is the worst. For a man who is free from it is not influenced by the other two. Misapprehension runs through Attraction and Aversion also. Delusion therefore is their cause. And it is thus that they disappear on the removal of Delusion by knowledge of the truth.

दोषानन्तरं प्रेत्यभावः, तस्याऽसिद्धिः-आत्मनो नित्यत्वात्=न खलु नित्यं किंचित् जायते म्रियते वा इति, जन्ममरणयोर्नित्यत्वादात्मनोऽनुपपत्तिः उभयं च प्रेत्यभाव इति।

तत्रायं सिद्धानुवादः–

आत्मनित्यत्वे प्रेत्यभावसिद्धिः॥ 10॥

नित्योयमात्मा प्रैति=पूर्वशरीरं जहाति=म्रियते इति, प्रेत्य च=पूर्वशरीरं हित्वा **भवति**=जायते=शरीरान्तरमुपादत्ते इति, तच्चैतदुभयम्=पुनरुत्पत्तिः प्रेत्यभाव इति, तच्चैतन् **नित्यत्वे** संभवतीति। यस्य तु सत्त्वोत्पादः सत्त्वनिरोधः प्रेत्यभावस्तस्य कृतहानमकृताभ्यागमश्च **दोषः**, उच्छेदहेतुवादे ऋष्युपदेशाश्चानर्थका इति॥10॥

आत्मनित्यत्वे ātma-nitya-tve, the soul being eternal; प्रेत्यभावसिद्धिः pretya-bhāva-siddhiḥ, proof of re-birth, of existence after passing away.

370. Transmigration is possible if the soul is eternal. —10.

Transmigration defined in 1-1-19 belongs to the soul and not to the body. The series of births and deaths included in it is possible only if the soul is eternal. If the soul were destructible, it would meet with two unexpected chances, *viz.* destruction of acitons done by it (kṛta-hāni) and suffering from actions not done by it (akṛtābhyāgama).

कथमुत्पत्तिरितिचेत्?

व्यक्ताद्व्यक्तानां प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यात्॥ 11॥

केन प्रकारेण किंधर्मकात् कारणाद् व्यक्तं शरीरमुत्पद्यते इति? व्यक्तात्=भूतसमाख्यातात् पृथिव्यादितः परमसूक्ष्माद् नित्यात् व्यक्तम्=शरीरेन्द्रियविषयोपकरणाधारं प्रज्ञातं द्रव्यमुत्पद्यते, व्यक्तं च खल्विन्द्रियग्राह्यं तत्सामान्यात् कारणमपि व्यक्तम्। किं सामान्यम्? रूपादिगुणयोगः=रूपादिगुणयुक्तेभ्यः पृथिव्यादिभ्यो नित्येभ्यो रूपादिगुणयुक्तं शरीरादि उत्पद्यते-प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यात्=दृष्टो हि रूपादिगुणयुक्तेभ्यो मृत्प्रभृतिभ्यस्तथाभूतस्य द्रव्यस्योत्पादः तेन चाऽदृष्टस्यानुमानमिति=रूपादीनामन्वयदर्शनात् प्रकृतिविकारयोः पृथिव्यादीनां नित्यानामतीन्द्रियाणां कारणभावोऽनुमीयते इति॥11॥

व्यक्तात् vyaktāt, from the manifested; व्यक्तानाम् vyaktānām, of the manifested; प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यात् pratyakṣa-prāmāṇyāt, from the authority of perception.

371. There is evidence of perception as to the production of the distinct from the distinct.—11.

It is found that jars, etc., which are distinct, are produced from earth, etc., which are also distinct. Similarly our body is produced from the elements.

न घटाद् घटानिष्पत्तेः॥ 12॥

इदमपि प्रत्यक्षम्-न खलु व्यक्ताद् घटाद् व्यक्तो घट उत्पद्यमानो दृश्यते इति, व्यक्ताद् व्यक्तास्यानुत्पत्तिदर्शनान्न व्यक्तं कारणमिति॥12॥

न na, no; घटात् ghaṭāt, from the pot; घटानिष्पत्तेः ghata-a-niṣpatteḥ from the non-production of the pot.

372. It is, some say, not so, because a jar is not produced from another jar.—12.

The objection stands thus :—You cannot say that there **is the production of a distinct thing from another distinct thing, *e.g.*, a jar is** not produced from another jar.

व्यक्ताद्घटनिष्पत्तेरप्रतिषेधः॥ 13॥

न ब्रूमः सर्वं सर्वस्य कारणमिति किं तु यदुत्पद्यते व्यक्तं द्रव्यं तत् तथाभूतादेवोत्पद्यते इति, व्यक्तं च तद् मृद्द्रव्यं कपालसंज्ञकं यतो घट उत्पद्यते न चैतद् निह्नुवानः क्वचिद्भ्यनुज्ञां लब्धुमर्हतीति। तदेतत् तत्त्वम्॥13॥

व्यक्तात् vyaktāt, from the manifested, *i.e.* earth; घटनिष्पत्ते ghaṭani-ṣpatteḥ, from the production of the pot; अप्रतिषेध: a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

373. There is, we reply, no prohibition for a jar being produced from a distinct thing.—13.

A jar may not be produced from another jar but it is certainly produced from another distinct thing, *viz.*, from its bowl-shaped halves. There is therefore no bar against the production of the distinct from the distinct.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 3 : Pretyabhāva (Transmigration) : Sūtras : 10-13.

Birth is not production; death is not destruction. The eternity of the soul makes pretyabhāva possible. The eternal soul forsakes the former body and takes up another body. Both these processes constitute pretyabhāva. To say that the production and destruction of entities constitute pretyabhāva is to deny the moral law according to which one experiences the consequences of one's own acts. While the doctrine of total annihilation would render the teachings of the Ṛsis meaningless.

How, from causes of what character, are bodies, etc. produced? A body is not produced from another body. A pot is not produced from another pot. All is not the cause of all. Like produces like. A pot is produced from potsherds of the like of the like material. This is the testimoney of perception which is the highest evidence. On the strenght of this experience it can be inferred that the causes of the gross elements of earth, etc. are the most subtle supersensible eternal substances possessing colour and other attributes found in the gross elements. The existence of such substances is thus revealed. The inference is from the known to the unknown.

The gross elements which are produced from the most subtle eternal elements furnish the materials for the production of the body, senses and objects with which the soul becomes associated after leaving its previous body. This is the truth. The views of sectarians will be next considered.

अतः परं प्रावादुकानां दृष्टयः प्रदर्श्यन्ते–

अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात्॥ 14॥

असतः सदुत्पद्यते इत्ययं पक्षः कस्मात्?, उपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात्=उपमृद्य बीजमङ्कुर उत्पद्यते नाऽनुपमृद्य, न चेद् बीजोपमर्दोऽङ्कुरकारणम्? अनुपमर्देपि बीजस्याऽङ्कुरोत्पत्तिः स्यादिति॥14॥

आभावात् abhāvāt, from non existence; भावोत्पत्तिः bhāva-utpattiḥ, production of existence; न na, no; अनुपमृद्य an-upamṛdya, without destroying; प्रादुर्भावात् prādurbhāvāt, as there is production.

374. Some say that entity arises from non-entity, as there is no manifestation unless there has been destruction.—14.

A sprout cannot come into existence, unless the seed form which it comes has been destroyed. This shows that there is no manifestation of effect without the destruction of its cause.

अत्राभिधीयते–

व्याघातादप्रयोगः॥ 15॥

'उपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात्' इत्यऽयुक्तः प्रयोगः–व्याघातात्=यदुपमृद्नाति न तदुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भवितुमर्हति–विद्यमानत्वात्, यच्च प्रादुर्भवति न तेनाऽप्रादुर्भूतेन=अविद्यमानेनोषमर्द इति॥15॥

व्याघातात् vyāghātāt, on account of obstruction, inconsistency; अप्रयोग: a-prayogaḥ, non-application of the argument.

375. It is, we reply, not so because such an expression, inconsistent as it is, cannot be employed.—15.

To say that a thing comes into existence by destroying another thing which is its cause, is a contradiction in terms, for if that which, according to you, destroys the cause and takes the place thereof, was not existent prior to the destruction, then it cannot be said to be a destroyer, and if it existed prior to the cause, then it cannot be said to come into existence on the destruction thereof.

नातीतानागतयोः कारकशब्दप्रयोगात्॥ 16॥

अतीते चाऽनागते चाविद्यमाने कारकशब्दाः प्रयुज्यन्ते–पुत्रो जनिष्यते जनिष्यमाणं पुत्रमभिनन्दति, पुत्रस्य जनिष्यमाणस्य नाम करोति, अभूत् कुम्भो भिन्नं कुम्भमदुशोचतिभिन्नस्य कुम्भस्य कपालानि, अजाताः पुत्राः पितरं तापयन्ति इति बहुलं भाक्ताः प्रयोगा दृश्यन्ते। का पुनरियं भक्तिः? आनन्तर्यं भक्तिः=आनन्तर्यसामर्थ्यादुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावार्थः=प्रादुर्भविष्यन्नङ्कुर उपमृद्गातीति भाक्तं कर्तृत्वमिति॥16॥

न na, not; अतीतानागतयो: atīta anāgatayoḥ, to the past and the future; कारकशब्दप्रयोगात् kāraka-śabda-prayogāt, from application of the word doer.

376. There is, says the objector, no inconsistency, because terms expressive of action are figuratively applied to the past and future.—16.

The objecter says as follows :—There is no impropriety in the statement that a thing comes into existence by destroying another thing which is its cause, for terms expressive of action are figuratively employed to denote that which is not existent now but which existed in the past or will exist in the future, *e.g.*, he congratulates himself on the son that is to be born. In the sentence "a sprout comes into existence by destroying its cause"—the term expressive of destruction is figuratively applied to the sprout that will come into existence in the future.

न विनष्टेभ्योऽनिष्पत्तेः।। 17।।

न विनष्टाद् बीजादङ्कुरं उत्पद्यते इति तस्मान्नाऽभावाद् भावोत्पत्तिरिति।।17।।

न na, no; विनष्टेभ्य: vinaṣṭebhyaḥ, from what has been destroyed; अनिष्पत्ते: a-niṣpatteḥ, a there is no production.

377. It is, we reply, not so because nothing is produced from things destroyed.—17.

A sprout does not spring from a seed already destroyed. Hence, we can lay down the general rule that entity does not arise from non-entity.

क्रमनिर्देशादप्रतिषेधः।। 18।।

उषमर्दप्रादुर्भावयो: पौर्वापर्यनियम: क्रम: स खल्वभावाद् भावोत्पत्तेर्हेतुर्निर्दिश्यते स च न प्रतिषिध्यते इति।।

व्याहतव्यूहानामवयवानां पूर्वव्यूहनिवृत्तौ व्यूहान्तराद् द्रव्यनिष्पत्तिर्नाऽभावात्=बीजावयवा: कुतश्चिन्निमित्तात् प्रादुर्भूतक्रिया: पूर्वव्यूहं जहति व्यूहान्तरं चापद्यन्ते व्यूहान्तरादङ्कुर उत्पद्यते-दृश्यन्ते खलु अवयवास्तत्संयोगाश्चाङ्कुरोत्पत्तिहेतव:, न चानिवृत्ते पूर्वव्यूहे बीजावयवानां शक्यं व्यूहान्तरेण भवितुमिति उपमर्दप्रादुर्भावयो: पौर्वापर्यनियम: क्रम: तस्मान्नाऽभावाद् भावोत्पत्तिरिति, न चान्यद् बीजावयवेभ्योऽङ्कुरोत्पत्तिकारणमित्युपपद्यते बीजोपादाननियम इति।।18।।

क्रमनिर्देशात् karma-nirdeśāt, from the declaration of order or procession; अप्रतिषेध: a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

378. There is objection if destruction is pointed out only as a step in the processes of manifestation.—18.

In connection with earth, water, heat, etc., a seed undergoes destruction of its old structure and is endowed with a new structure. A sprout cannot grow from a seed, unless the old structure of seed is destroyed and a new structure is formed. It is in this sense allowable to say that manifestation is preceded by destruction. This does not preclude a seed from being the cause of a sprout. But we do not admit an unqualified assertion that production springs from destruction or entity arises from non-entity.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 4 : The Void is not the cause of the World : Sūtras : 14- 18.

Some say that the sprout comes into existence by destroying the seed, *i.e.*, that from the non-existence of the seed is the existence of the sprout. This is not correct. For if the sprout is the cause of the destruction of the seed then it must have existence before the seed is destroyed, and in that case it cannot be said to come into existence from the destruction of the seed. It is true that causal predication is made in respect of objects past and future; *e.g.*, a lost article causes sorrow; a son yet to be born causes pleasure. But such predication rests on mere sequence. So also when the sprout which is yet to appear is said to be the cause of the distruction of the seed the predication of causal it merely states a sequence, and not a true causal relation, namely that the sprout is produced from the destroyed seed, *i.e.*, that existence springs from non-existence. The truth is that the parts of a structure disintegrate and redintegrate into another structure, and that bodies are produced from such redintegration and not from non-existence or void. The relation of antecedent and consequent between these two processes is not denied.

अथाऽपर आह—

ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्म्माफल्यदर्शनात्।। 19।।

पुरुषोयं समीहमानो नावश्यं समीहाफलं प्राप्नोति तेनानुमीयते-पराधीनं पुरुषस्य कर्मफलाराधनमिति, यदधीनं स ईश्वर: तस्मादीश्वर: कारणमिति।।19।।

ईश्वर: Iśvaraḥ, the lord; कारणं kāraṇam, cause; पुरुषकर्म्माफल्यदर्शनात् puruṣa-karma-ā-phalya-darśanāt, from seeing the failure of the acts of man.

379. God, says some one, is the sole casue of fruits,

because man's acts are found occasionally to be unattended by them.—19.

Seeing that man does not often attain success proportionate to his exertions, some one infers that these are entirely subservient to God who alone can provide them with fruits.

न पुरुषकर्म्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः॥ 20॥

ईश्वराधीना चेत् फलनिष्पत्तिः स्याद् अपि तर्हि पुरुषस्य समीहामन्तरेण फलं निष्पद्येतेति।।20।।

न na, no; पुरुषकर्म्माभावे puruṣa-karma-abhāve, in the absence of the act of man; फलानिष्पत्तेः phala-a-niṣpatteḥ, because of non-production of fruit.

380. This is, some are afraid, not so, because in the absence of man's acts there is no production of fruits.—20.

The fear referred to arises thus :—If Good were the only source of fruits, man could attain them even without any exertions.

तत्कारितत्वादहेतुः॥ 21॥

पुरुषकारमीश्वरोऽनुगृह्णाति=फलाय पुरुषस्य यतमानस्येश्वरः फलं संपादयतीति, यदा न संपादयति तदा पुरुषकर्माऽफलं भवतीति, तस्मादीश्वरकारितत्वादऽहेतुः- "पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः" इति।

गुणविशिष्टमात्मान्तरमीश्वरः तस्याऽऽत्मकल्पात् कल्पान्तरानुपपत्तिः, अधर्ममिथ्या-ज्ञानप्रमादहान्या धर्मज्ञानसमाधिसंपदा च विशिष्टमात्मान्तरमीश्वरः तस्य च धर्मसमाधिफलम् अणिमाद्यष्टविधमैश्वर्यम्, संकल्पानुविधायी चास्य धर्मः प्रत्यात्मवृत्तीन् धर्माधर्मसंचयान् पृथिव्यादीनि च भूतानि प्रवर्तयति, एवं च स्वकृताभ्यागमस्याऽलोपेन निर्माणप्राकाम्यमीश्वरस्य स्वकृतकर्मफलं वेदितव्यम्।

आप्तकल्पश्चायम्=यथा पिताऽपत्यानां तथा पितृभूत ईश्वरो भूतानाम्, न चात्म-कल्पादन्यः कल्पः संभवति। न तावदस्य बुद्धिं विना कश्चिद् धर्मो लिङ्गभूतः शक्य उपपादयितुम्, आगमाच्च द्रष्टा बोद्धा सर्वज्ञाता ईश्वर इति। बुद्ध्यादिभिश्चात्मलिङ्गैर्निरुपाख्य-मीश्वरं प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमविषयातीतं कः शक्त उपपादयितुम्। स्वकृताभ्यागमलोपेन च प्रवर्तमानस्यास्य यदुक्तं प्रतिषेधजातम् अकर्मनिमित्ते शरीरसर्गे तत्सर्वं प्रसज्यते इति।।21।।

तत्कारितत्वात् tat-kārita-tvāt, from their being caused to arise by him; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a cause.

381. Since fruits are awarded by God, man's acts, we conclude, are not the sole cause thereof.—21.

Man performs acts which are endowed with fruits by God. The acts become fruitless without His grace. Hence, it is not ture that man's acts produce fruits by themselves.

God is a soul specially endowed with qualities. He is freed from misapprehension, carelessness, etc., and is enriched with merit, knowledge and concentration. He possesses eight supernatural powers (such as the power of becoming as small as an atom) which are the consequence of His merit and concentration. His merit, which conforms to His will, produces merit and demerit in each person and sets the earth and other elements in action. God is, as it were, the father of all beings. Who can demonstrate the existence of Him who transcends the evidences of perception, inference and scripture?

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 5 : Īśvara (God) is not the material cause of the World : Sūtras : 19-21.

Some say that the void may not be the material cause of the world but that Brahman is the material cause of the fabric of names and forms; because it is seen that the destiny of man does not depend upon the efforts of man alone but also on the dispensation of Gos also. This view is not correct. For Brahman cannot be conceived otherwise than as a soul. Īśvara is a soul which is all-doing, all-knowing, all-embracing. Aṇimā (power to become smaller than even an atom), etc. are His eight excellences. He acts by mere will (and not by physical mean) an disposes the merits and demerits appertaining to each soul and the elements of earth, etc. to activity. He is thus absolutely free in the work of creation. He is like a friend; He is the father of created brings. These attributes cannot be possible in Him without the possession of cognition. Therefore, He cannot be anything but a soul. So also declares the Śruti : "The seer, the cogniser, the all-knower, Lord." He cannot be comprehended by perception, inference and revelation. He can be indicated only by the analogy of our own souls.

अपर इदानीमाह-

अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्तिः कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात्॥ 22॥

अनिमित्ता शरीराद्युपत्तिः-कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात्=कण्टकस्य तैक्ष्ण्यं पर्वतधातूनां चित्रता ग्राव्णां श्लक्ष्णता, निनिर्मित्तं चोपादानं दृष्टं तथा शरीरसर्गोपीति।।22।।

अनिमित्ततः a-nimitta-taḥ, from to cause; भावोत्पत्तिः bhāva-utpattiḥ,

production of existence or entiry; कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात् kaṇṭakataikṣṇya ādi-darśanāt, from the observation of the sharpness of a thorn, and the like.

382. From an observation of the sharpness of thorn, etc., some say that entities are produced from no cause.—22.

The objectors argue as follows :—Thorns are by nature sharp, hills beautiful, and stones smooth. None has made them so. Similarly our bodies, etc., are fortuitous effects which did not spring from a cause, that is, were not made by God.

अनिमित्तनिमित्तत्वान्नानिमित्तत:।। 23।।

"अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्ति:" इत्युच्यते, यतश्चोत्पद्यते तन्निमित्तम्. अनिमित्तस्य निमित्तत्वाद नाऽनिमित्ता भावोत्पत्तिरिति।।23।।

अनिमित्तनिमित्तत्वात् a-nimitta-nimitta-tvāt, being caused by no-cause; न na, not; अनिमित्तत: a-nimitta-taḥ, from no cause.

383. Entities cannot be said to be produced form no-cause, because the no-cause is, according to some, the cause of the production.—23.

An opponent has said that entities are produced from no-cause. Some critics point out that the use of the fifth case-affix in connection with no-cause indicates that it is the cause.

निमित्तानिमित्तयोरर्थान्तरभावादप्रतिषेध:।। 24।।

अन्यद्धि निमित्तम् अन्यच्च निमित्तप्रत्याख्यानं, न च प्रत्याख्यानमेव प्रत्याख्येयं यथा–'अनुदक: कमण्डलु:' इति नोदकप्रतिषेध उदकं भवतीति।। स खल्वयं वाद: 'अकर्मनिमित्त: शरीरदिसर्ग:' इत्येतस्मान्न भिद्यते अभेदात् तत्प्रतिषेधेनैव प्रतिषिद्धो वेदितव्य इति।।24।।

निमित्तानिमित्तयो: nimitta-a-nimittayoḥ, between cause and no cause; अर्थान्तरभावात् artha-antara-bhāvāt, there being the relation of two different objects; अप्रतिषेध: a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

384. The aforesaid reason presents no opposition, because cause and non-cause are two entirely different things.—24.

Cause and no-cause cannot be identical, *e.g.*, a jar which is waterless cannot at the same time be full of water. The doctrine involved

in this aphorism does not differ from the one explained in 3-2-70, according to which our body cannot be made up independent of our desert (karma).

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 6 : The world is not the Result of Chance : Sūtras : 22-24.

Some say that like the sharpness of thorns, streaks of colour in rock minerals and the smoothness of the stone, the production of the body, etc. is from material causes without the intervention of an efficient cause. This view does not differ from the view that the creation of the body, etc. is not the result of the action of man, which has been refuted in III. ii. 64-78.

अन्ये तु मन्यन्ते–

सर्व्वमनित्यमुत्पत्तिविनाशधर्म्मकत्वात्।। 25।।

किमनित्यं नाम?, यस्य कदाचित् भावस्तदनित्यम्=उत्पत्तिधर्मकमनुत्पन्नं नास्ति, विनाशधर्मकं चाऽविनष्टं नास्ति। किं पुन:?, सर्वं भौतिकं च शरीरादि अभौतिकं च बुद्ध्यादि तदुीयमुत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकं विज्ञायते तस्मात्तत्सर्वमनित्यमिति।।25।।

सर्वं sarvam, all; अनित्यं a-nityam, non eternal; उत्पत्तिविनाशधर्म्मकत्वात् utpatti-vināśa-dharmaka-tvāt, because of their possessing the character of production and destruction.

385. All, says some one, are non-eternal, because they possess the character of being produced and destroyed.—25.

All things including our body which is material and our intellect which is immaterial are non-eternal inasmuch as they are subject to the law of production and destruction. All things which are produced and destroyed are non-erernal.

नानित्यतानित्यत्वात्।। 26।।

यदि तावत् सर्वस्याऽनित्यता नित्या? तन्नित्यत्वाद् न सर्वमनित्यम्। अथाऽनित्या? तस्यामऽविद्यमानायां सर्वं नित्यमिति।।26।।

न na, no; अनित्यतानित्यत्वात् a-nitya-tā-nitya-tvāt, non-eternaless being eternal.

386. These are, we reply, not so, because of the non-eternalness being eternal.—26.

If non-eternalness pervades all things you must admit it to be

eternal. Hence, all are not non-eternal, for there is at least one things *viz.*, non-eternalness, which is eternal.

तदनित्यत्वमग्नेर्दाह्यं विनाश्यानुविनाशवत्।। 27।।

तस्या अनित्यताया अप्यनित्यत्वम्। कथम्?, यथाऽग्निर्दाह्यं विनाश्याऽनुविनश्यति एवं सर्वस्यानित्यता सर्वं विनाश्यानुविनश्यतीति।।27।।

तदनित्यत्वम् tat-a-nitya-tvam, non-eternalness of that (*i.e.* non-eternalness); अग्नेः agneḥ, in the case of fire; दाह्यं dāhyam, combustible, fuel; विनाश्यानुविनाशवत् vināśya-anu-vināśa-vat, like the destruction following after the destructible.

387. Some hold non-eternalness to be not eternal on the analogy of a fire which dies out after the combustibles have perished.—27.

The objection is explained as follows :—Just as a fire dies out as soon as the things which caught it have perished, so the non-eternalness disappears as soon all non-eternal things have passed away. Hence, non-etenalness is not eternal.

नित्यस्याप्रत्याख्यानं यथोपलब्धि व्यवस्थानात्।। 28।।

अयं खलु वादो नित्यं प्रत्याचष्टे नित्यस्य च प्रत्याख्यानमनुपपन्नम्। कस्मात्?, यथोपलब्धि व्यवस्थानात्=यस्योत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वमुपलभ्यते प्रमाणतस्तदनित्यम्, यस्य नोपलभ्यते तद् विपरीतम्, न च परमसूक्ष्माणां भूतानामाऽऽकाशकालदिगात्ममनसां तद्गुणानां च केषांचित् सामान्यविशेषसमवायानां चोत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वं प्रमाणत उपलभ्यते तस्माद् नित्यान्येतानीति।।28।।

नित्यस्य nityasya, of the eternal; अप्रत्याख्यानं a-pratyākhyānam, non-denial; यथोपलब्धि yathā-upalabdhi, according to perception or knowledge; व्यवस्थानात् vyavasthānāt, from regulation.

388. There is no denial of the eternal, as there is a regulation as to the character of our perception.—28.

Whatever is perceived to be produced or destroyed is non-eternal and that which is not so is eternal, *e.g.*, there is no perceptual evidence as to the production or destruction of ether, time, space, soul, mind, generality, particularity and intimate relation. Consequently these are eternal.,

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 7 : All is not non-eternal : Sūtras : 25-28.

Some say that all things are non-eternal as production and destruction are their nature. Some oppose this tenet by asserting that the alleged non-eternality must itself be eternal and thus will furnish an opposition to the non-eternality of all things (including non-eternality.) But non-eternality cannot be eternal; like fire distroying itself along with the fuel, it ceases to be along with the destruction of all things. The true reply to the tenet of the non-eternality of all things is that there can be no denial of what is really eternal. What is eternal and what is non-eternal is to be settled by the test of cognition. Things which are found by means of the pramāṇas to be liable to production and destruction must be regarded as non-eternal, while things which are not found to be so liable must be regarded as eternal. The eternals thus determined are the most subtle elements, ether, time, space, soul, mind, their attributes, genus, species, combination.

अयमन्य एकान्तः–

सर्व्वं नित्यम्पञ्चभूतनित्यत्वात्।। 29।।

भूतमात्रम् इदं सर्वं, तानि च नित्यानि–भूतोच्छेदानुपपत्तेरिति।।29।।

सर्वं sarvam, all; नित्यं nityam, eternal; पञ्चभूतनित्यत्वात् pañcha-bhūta-nitya-tvāt, owing to the eternalness of the five elements.

389. Some say that all are eternal, because the five elements are so.—29.

The elements which are the material causes of all things are eternal, consequently the things themselves are eternal.

नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः।। 30।।

उत्पत्तिकारणं चोपलभ्यते विनाशकारणं च तत् सर्वनित्यत्वे व्याहन्यते इति।।30।।

न na, no; उत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः utpatti-vināśa-kāraṇa-uplabdheḥ, owing to perception of the causes of production.

390. These are, we reply, not so, because we perceive the causes of production and destruction.—30.

All things are non-eternal because we find them to be produced and destroyed. Whatever is produced or destroyed is non-eternal.

तल्लक्षणावरोधादप्रतिषेधः॥ 31॥

यस्योत्पत्तिविनाशकारणमुपलभ्यते इति मन्यसे न तद् भूतलक्षणहीनमर्थान्तरं गृह्यते, भूतलक्षणावरोधाद् भूतमात्रमिदम् इत्यऽयुक्तोयं प्रतिषेध इति॥31॥

तल्लक्षणावरोधात् tat-lakṣaṇa-avarodhāt, from inclusion by its definition; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

391. This is, some say, no refutation, because the character of the elements is possessed by the things which are produced or destroyed.—31.

The objecter says as follows :—A things which is made up of an element, possesses the character of the element. Since the elements is eternal, the things also must be so.

नोत्पत्तितत्कारणोपलब्धेः॥ 32॥

कारणसमानगुणस्योत्पत्तिः कारणं चोपलभ्यते न चेतदुभयं नित्यविषयम्, न चोत्पत्तितत्कारणोपलब्धिः शक्या प्रत्याख्यातुम्-न चाऽविषया काचिदुपलब्धिः, उपलब्धि-सामर्थ्यात् कारणेन समानगुणं कार्यमुत्पद्यते इत्यनुमीयते स खलूपलब्धेर्विषय इति, एवं च तल्लक्षणावरोधोपपत्तिरिति। उत्पत्तिविनाशकारणप्रयुक्तस्य ज्ञातुः प्रयत्नो दृष्ट इति। प्रसिद्धश्च-वयवी तद्धर्मा=उत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मा चावयवी सिद्ध इति। शब्दकर्मबुद्ध्यादीनां चाऽव्यापितः=पञ्चभूतनित्यत्वात् तल्लक्षणावरोधाच्चेत्यनेन शब्दकर्मबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्च न व्याप्तास्तस्मादनेकान्तः॥

स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवद् मिथ्यापलब्धिरितिचेत्? भूतौपलब्धौ तुल्यम्॥

यथा स्वप्ने विषयाभिमान एवमुत्पत्तिकारणाभिमान इति, एवं च एतद् भूतोपलब्धौ तुल्यम्=पृथिव्याद्युपलब्धिरपि स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवत् प्रसज्यते॥

पृथिव्याद्यभावे सर्वव्यवहारविलोप इतिचेत्? तदितरत्र समानम्।

उत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धिविषयस्याप्यभावे सर्वव्यवहारविलोप इति, सोयं नित्यानामीन्द्रियत्वादविषयत्वाच्चोत्पत्तिविनाशयोः 'स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवत्' इत्यहेतुरिति॥32॥

न na, no; उत्पत्तितत्कारणोपलब्धेः utpatti-tat-kāraṇa-upalabdheḥ, owing to perception of production and its cause.

392. This is, we reply, no opposition because we perceive production and the cause thereof.—32.

An effect inherits the character of its cause but the two are not indentical, *e.g.*, ether is the cause of sound, although the former is eternal and the latter non-eternal.

Moreover, we actually perceive that things are produced which convince us of their non-eternalness. If production is regarded as a mere vision of a dream, then the whole world is no better than an illusion which can serve no practical purpose.

If all things were eternal there could be no effort or activity on our part to attain any object. Hence, all are not eternal.

अवस्थितस्योपादानस्य धर्ममात्रं निवर्तते धर्ममात्रमुपजायते स खलूत्पत्तिविनाशयो-र्विषयः, यच्चोपजायते तत् प्रागप्युपजननादस्ति यच्च निवर्तते तद् निवृत्तमप्यस्तीति एवं च सर्वस्य नित्यत्वमिति—

न व्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः॥ 33॥

अयमुपजन इयं निवृत्तिरिति व्यवस्था नोपपद्यते-उपजातनिवृत्तयोर्विद्यमानत्वात्, अयं धर्म उपजातोऽयं निवृत्त इति सद्भावाऽविशेषादव्यवस्था, इदानीमुपजननिवृत्ती नेदानीमिति कालव्यवस्था नोपपद्यते-सर्वदा विद्यमानत्वात्, अस्य धर्मस्योपजननिवृत्ती नास्येति व्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः-उभयोरविशेषात्, अनागतोऽतीत इति च कालव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः-वर्तमानस्य सद्भावलक्षणत्वात्। अविद्यमानस्यात्मलाभ उपजनो विद्यमानस्यात्महानं निवृत्तिः इत्येतस्मिन् सति नैते दोषाः, तस्माद् यदुक्तम्-'प्रागप्युपजननादस्ति निवृत्तं चास्ति' (इति) तदयुक्तमिति॥33॥

न na, no; व्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः vyavasthā-an-upapatteḥ, from the impossibility of uniformity.

393. If all things were eternal there would be no regulation of time.—33.

Some say that things are eternal, because they existed even before they were produced and will continue even after they are destroyed. But this view, contends the Naiyāyika, is absurd. It destroys all regulation with regard to time, for if all things were perpetually existent, there could not be any use of such expressions as "was produced" and "will be destroyed" which presuppose a thing which was non-existent to come into existence or one which is existent to lose its existence.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 8 : All is not eternal : Sūtras : 29-33.

Some say that as al things are nothing but the five elements, and as the five elements are eternal, all things must, therefore, be eternal. This tenet is negatived by our actual cognition of the production and destruction of things. The mere resemblance of things to the elements in respects of their attributes is not a true mark of the inference of their eternality. For there are reasons also to account for their difference in

regard to duration. The resemblence in respect of attributes only shows that the elements are the material causes of the things. On the other hand, there is actual cognition of production, and of the cause of production, of things. This cognition proves their non-eternality. The activity of man who seeks to produce what is pleasant and to destroy what is painful, also presupposes that all things are not eternal. It is further well-known that composite substances undergo production and destruction. Again, sound, action, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are neither included among the elements nor possess their attributes. It cannot be said that the cognition of production is as unreal as cognition in a dream; for the same can be said about the cognition of the elements. Moreover, there is this fundamental difference between eternal and non-eternal things that the former are beyond the reach of the senses and are not subject to production and destruction. (Thus is the Sāṅkhya view refuted. The view of those who believe in autogenesis is next considered.)

It is said that production and destruction are mere changes of attributes and not of substance which is constant, and so eternal; in other words, that there are really not production and destruction but only developement and envelopment. But this view of the persistence of entities at all times fails to provide any means of differentiation as to (1) development and envelopment, (2) the attribute developed and the one enveloped, (3) the moments of development and envelopment, (4) the particular attribute developed and enveloped and another, (5) the past and the future. Hence, the view must be rejected.

अयमन्य एकान्तः–

सर्व्वं पृथग्भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वात्॥ 34॥

सर्वं नाना=न कश्चिदेको भावो विद्यते, कस्मात्?, भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वात्=भावस्य लक्षणम्=अभिधानम्=येन लक्ष्यते भावः स समाख्याशब्दः तस्य पृथग्विषयत्वात्=सर्वो भावसमाख्याशब्दः समूहवाची, 'कुम्भः' इति संज्ञाशब्दो गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शसमूहे बुध्नपार्श्व-ग्रीवादिसमूहे च वर्तते, निदर्शनमात्रं चेदमिति॥34॥

सर्वं sarvam, all; पृथक् pṛthak, diverse; भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वात् bhāva-lakṣaṇa-pṛthak-tvāt, owing to diversity of the marks of existence.

394. Some say that all are aggregates because each consists of several marks.—34.

A Jar, for instance, is an aggregate consisting of several parts, such as-bottom, sides, back, etc., and several qualities, such as, sound

smell, taste, colour, touch etc., There si not a single entity devoid of its several parts or qualities.

[This refers to the Buddhist doctrine which denies a substance apart from its qualities and a whole apart from its parts as is evident from the writings of Nāgārjuna[1], Ārya Deva[2] and others.]

नानेकलक्षणैरेकभावनिष्पत्तेः॥ 35॥

'अनेकविधलक्षणैः' इति मध्यपदलोपी समासः, गन्धादिभिश्च गुणैर्बुध्नादिभिश्चवयवैः संबद्ध एको भावो निष्पद्यते। गुणव्यतिरिक्तं च द्रव्यम् अवयवातिरिक्तश्चाऽवयवीति, विभक्तन्यायं चैतदुभयमिति॥35॥

न na, no; अनेकलक्षणैः an-eka-lakṣaṇaiḥ, by several marks; एकभावा-निष्पत्तेः eka-bhāva-niṣpatteḥ, because of constitution of one entity.

395. These are, we reply, not so because by several marks one single entity is constituted.—35.

The Naiyāyika says that there is certainly a substance apart from its qualities and a whole aprat from its parts, *e.g.*, we must admit an entity called a jar as the substratum of its several qualities, such as colour, smell, etc., and its several parts such as bottom, sides, back, etc.

[The Buddhists[3] oppose this view by saying that the substance

1. लक्ष्याल्लक्षणमन्यच्चेत् स्यात्तल्लक्ष्यमलक्षणम्।
तयोरभावोऽनन्यत्वे विष्पष्टं कथितं त्वया॥
(*Mādhyamika Sūtra*, Chap. I, p. 64; Prof. Poussin's edition)
रूपादिव्यतिरेकेण यथा कुम्भो न विद्यते।
वाय्वादिव्यतिरेकेण तथा रूपो न विद्यते॥इति॥
(*Mādhyamika Sūtra*, Chap. I, p. 71; Prof. Poussin's edition)
2. सर्वं एव घटोऽदृष्टो रूपे दृष्टे हि जायते।
ब्रूयात् कस्तत्त्वविन्नाम घटः प्रत्यक्ष इत्यपि॥
एतेनैव विचारेण सुगन्धि मधुरं मृदु।
प्रतिषेधयितव्यानि सर्वाण्युत्तमबुद्धिना॥
(Śataka quoted in the *Mādhyamika Vṛtti*, p. 71)
3. इह तु काठिन्यादिव्यतिरिक्तपृथिव्याद्यसम्भवे सति न युक्तो विशेषणविशेष्यभावः। तीर्थिकैर्व्यतिरिक्तलक्ष्याभ्युपगमात्तदनुरोधेन बिशेषणाभिधानमदुष्ठमितिचेत्। नैतदेवं नहि तीर्थिकपरिकल्पिता युक्तिविधुराः पदार्थाः स्वसमयेऽभ्युपगन्तुं न्याय्याः। प्रमाणान्तरादेरप्य-भ्युपगमप्रसङ्गात्।
(*Mādhyamikā Vṛtti*, Chap. I, p. 66; Prof. Poussin's edition)

independent of its qualities and the whole independent of its parts admitted by the Naiyāyikas are opposed to reason and cannot be accepted as realities though there is no harm in acknowledging them as "appearances"[1] for the fulfilment of our practical purposes.]

अथापि–

लक्षणव्यवस्थानादेवाप्रतिषेधः।। 36।।

'न कश्चिदेको भावः' इत्ययुक्तः प्रतिषेधः, कस्मात्?, लक्षणव्यवस्थानादेव= यदिह लक्षणं भावस्य संज्ञाशब्दभूतं तदेकस्मिन् व्यवस्थितम्-'यं कुम्भमद्राक्षं तं स्पृशामि' 'यमेवाऽस्प्राक्षं तं पश्यामि' इति, नाऽणुसमूहो गृह्यते इति, अणुसमूहे चागृह्यमाणे यद् गृह्यते तदेकमेवेति।।

अथाप्येतदनूक्तम्-नास्त्येको भावो यस्मात्समुदायः।

एकानुपपत्तेर्नास्त्येव समूहः। नास्त्येको भावो यस्मात् समूहे भावशब्दप्रयोगः, एकस्य चानुपपत्तेः समूहो नोपपद्यते-एकसमुच्चयो हि समूह इति, व्याहतवदनुपपन्नम्- 'नास्त्येको भावः' इति।। यस्य प्रतिषेधः प्रतिज्ञायते-'समूहे भावशब्दप्रयोगात्' इति हेतुं ब्रुवता स एवाभ्युनुज्ञायते-एकसमुच्चयो हि समूह इति। समूहे भावशब्दप्रयोगादिति च समूहमाश्रित्य प्रत्येकं समूहिप्रतिषेधः–नास्त्येको भाव इति, सोयमुभयो व्याघाताद् यत्किंचन वाद इति।।36।।

लक्षणव्यवस्थानात् lakṣaṇa-vyavasthānāt, from the distribution of marks; एव eva, surely; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

396. There is, moreover, no opposition on account of the very distribution of the marks.—36.

The Naiyāyika says as follows:—Our conclusion is unassailable owing to the marks abiding in one single entiry. A jar, for instance, possesses tow marks, *viz.*, tangibility and colour, by each of which it can be identified.

If there were no jar beyond its tangibility and colour we could not use such expression as "I see the jar which I touched yesterday." To enable us to ascertain the identiry there must be a substance called jar beyond its tangibility and colour which are two distinct qualities belonging to the same substance.

1. घटः प्रत्यक्ष इत्यत्र तु नहि घटो नाम कश्चिद्योऽप्रत्यक्षः पृथगुपलब्धो यस्योपचारात्प्रत्यक्षत्वं स्यात्। नीलादिव्यतिरिक्तस्य घटस्याभावादौपचारिकं प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति चेत्। एवमपि सुतरामुपचारो न युक्त उपवर्यमाणस्याश्रयस्याभावात्। नहि खरविषाणे तैक्ष्ण्यमुपचर्यते।
(*Mādhyamikā Vṛtti*, p. 70, Chap. I; Poussin's edition)

The opponent, has said that "all are aggregates." Whence, we ask does the aggregate arise if there are no units? The very reason given that "each consists of several marks" presupposes an "each" or unity or entiry beyond the marks or aggregate.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 9 : All is not discrete : Sūtras : 34-36.

Some say that an entity asa single unity does not exist, because the name by which entitles are denoted connote a plurality; *e.g.* a "Jar" is the name of a bundle of attributes such as colour, taste, touch and smell, and of parts such as bottom, sides, neck, etc. But this is not right; for attributes are different from substance and parts are from the whole, asalready explained (see II. i. 35-38). Moreover, names do not change; for instance, we say, "The jar I saw I touch, the jar I touched I see." Then, mere collocations of atoms are imperceptible, because atoms are so. That which is perceived in a collocation of atoms is a single entity. Again, the admission of a collocation whether of atoms or of attributes or of parts is the admission of a unity.

अयमपर एकान्तः–

सर्वमभावो भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः।। 37।।

यावद् भावजातं तत्सर्वमऽभावः, कस्मात्?, भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः='असन् गौरश्वात्मना', 'अनश्वो गौः', 'असन्नऽश्वो गवात्मना', 'अगौरश्वः' इत्यऽसत्प्रत्ययस्य प्रतिषेधस्य च भावशब्देन सामानाधिकरण्यात् सर्वभाव इति।।

प्रतिज्ञावाक्ये पदयोः प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोश्च व्याघातादयुक्तम्।।

अनेकस्याऽशेषता सर्वशब्दस्यार्थः भावप्रतिषेधश्चाऽभावशब्दस्यार्थः पूर्वं सोपाख्यम् उत्तरं निरुपाख्यम्, तत्र समुपाख्यायमानं कथं निरुपाख्यमऽभावः स्यादिति=न जात्वभावो निरुपाख्योऽनेकतया=अशेषतया शक्यः प्रतिज्ञातुमिति। सर्वमेतदभाव इति चेत्?=यदिदं सर्वमिति मन्से तदभाव इत्येवं चेत्? अनिवृत्तो व्याघातः-अनेकमशेषं चेति नाऽभावप्रत्ययेन शक्यं भवितुम्, अस्ति चायं प्रत्ययः-सर्वमिति, तस्मान्नाऽभाव इति। प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोश्च व्याघातः-'सर्वमभावः इति भावप्रतिषेधः प्रतिज्ञा, 'भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः' इतिहेतुः भावेष्वितरेतराभावमऽनुज्ञाय=आश्रित्य चेतरेतराभावसिद्धौ सर्वमभाव इत्युच्यते, यदि सर्वमभावः? "भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः" इति नोपपद्यते, अथ भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धिः? सर्वमभाव इति नोपपद्यते।।37।।

सर्वं sarvam, all; अभावः a-bhāvaḥ, non-existence; भावेषु bhāveṣu, in entities; इतरेतराभावसिद्धेः itara-itara-abhāva-siddheḥ, from proof of mutual non-existence.

397. All are non-entities because the entities are non-existent in relation to one another.—37.

In the expression "a horse is not a cow" there is the non-existence of "cow" in the "horse" and in the expression "a cow is not a horse" there is the non-existence of "horse" in the "cow." As a fact every things is non-existent in so far as it is not identical with another thing.

सूत्रेण चाभिसम्बन्धः–

न स्वभावसिद्धेर्भावानाम्॥ 38॥

न सर्वभावः, कस्मात्? स्वेन भावेन सद्भावाद् भावानाम्=स्वेन धर्मेण भावा भवन्तीति प्रतिज्ञायते। कश्च स्वो धर्मो भावानाम्?, द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां सदादि सामान्यम्, द्रव्याणां क्रियावदित्येवमादिर्विशेषः स्पर्शपर्यन्ताः पृथिव्या इति च, प्रत्येकं चाऽनन्तो भेदः, सामान्यविशेषसमवायानां च विशिष्टा धर्मा गृह्यन्ते, सोयमभावस्य निरुपाख्यात्वात् संप्रत्यायकोऽर्थभेदो न स्यात्, अस्ति त्वयं तस्मान्न सर्वमभाव इति।

अथ वा–"न-स्वभावसिद्धेर्भावानाम्" इति स्वरूपसिद्धेरिति, गौरितिप्रयुज्यमाने शब्दे जातिविशिष्टं द्रव्यं गृह्यते नाभावमात्रम्. यदि च सर्वमभावः गौरित्यभावः प्रतीयेत, गोशब्देन चाभाव उच्येत, यस्मात्तु गोशब्दप्रयोगे द्रव्यविशेषः प्रतीयते नाभावस्तस्मादयुक्तमिति।

अथ वा–"न-स्वभावसिद्धेः" इति 'असन् गोरश्वात्मना' इति गवात्मना कस्मान्नोच्यते? अवचनाद् 'गवात्मना गौरस्ति' इति स्वभावसिद्धिः, 'अनश्वोऽश्वः' इति वा 'गौरगौः' इति वा कस्मान्नोच्यते? अवचनात् स्वेन रूपेण विद्यमानता द्रव्यस्येति विज्ञायते।

अव्यतिरेकप्रतिषेधे च भावानामऽसत्प्रत्ययसामानाधिकरण्यम्।

संयोगादिसम्बन्धो व्यतिरेकः अत्राऽव्यतिरेकोऽभेदोख्यसम्बन्धः तत्प्रतिषेधे चासत्प्रत्ययसामानाधिकरण्यं यथा–'न सन्ति कुण्डे बदराणि' इति, 'असन् गौरश्वात्मना' 'अनश्वोगौः' इति च गवाश्वयोरव्यतिरेकः प्रतिषिध्यते=गवाश्वयोरेकत्वं नास्तीति. तस्मिन् प्रतिषिध्यमाने भावेन गवा सामाधिकरण्यमसत्प्रत्ययस्य–'असन् गौरश्वात्मना' इति, यथा 'न सन्ति कुण्डे बदराणि' इति बदरसंयोगे प्रतिषिध्यमाने सद्भिरसत्प्रत्ययस्य सामाधिकरण्यमिति॥38॥

न na, no; स्वभावसिद्धेः sva-bhāva-siddheḥ, from existence by own nature; भावानाम् bhāvānām, of entities.

398. It is, we reply, not so because the entities are existent in reference to themselves.—38.

A cow is a cow though it is not a horse : a thing is existent in

reference to itself though it is non-existent in so far as it is not another thing.

न स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात्॥ 39॥

अपेक्षाकृतम् आपेक्षिकम्, ह्रस्वापेक्षाकृतं दीर्घं दीर्घापेक्षाकृतं ह्रस्वम्, न स्वेनात्मनाऽवस्थितं किंचित्। कस्मात्? अपेक्षासामर्थ्यात्, तस्मान्न स्वभावसिद्धिर्भावाना-मिति॥39॥

न na, no; स्वभावसिद्धिः sva-bhāva-siddhiḥ, proof of own nature; आपेक्षिकत्वात् āpekṣika-tvāt, being relative.

399. Some say that entities are not self-existent inasmuch as they exist in relation to one another.—39.

The objection is explained as follows :—

A thing is called short only in relation to another things which is long, and *vice versa;* the long and short are inter-related.

[This refers to the Mādhyama Buddhist doctrine[1] of "relation" according to which all things are inter-dependent and nothing is self-existent].

व्याहतत्वादयुक्तम्॥ 40॥

यदि ह्रस्वापेक्षाकृतं दीर्घं किमिदानीमपेक्ष्य' ह्रस्वम्' इति गृह्यते?। अथ दीर्घापेक्षाकृतं ह्रस्वम्? दीर्घमनापेक्षिकम्, एवमितरेतराश्रययोरेकाभावेऽन्यतराभावादुभयाभाव इत्य-पेक्षाव्यवस्थानुपपन्ना। स्वभावसिद्धावऽसत्यां समयोः परिमण्डलयोर्वा द्रव्ययोरापेक्षिके दीर्घत्वह्रस्वत्वे कस्मान्न भवतः?। अपेक्षायामनपेक्षायां च द्रव्ययोरभेदः=यावती द्रव्ये अपेक्षामाणे तावती एवानपेक्षमाणे नाऽन्यतरत्र भेदः। आपेक्षिकत्वे तु सत्यऽन्यतरत्र विशेषोपजनः स्यादिति।

किमपेक्षासामर्थ्यमितिचेत्? द्वयोर्ग्रहणेऽतिशयग्रहणोपपत्तिः।

द्वे द्रव्ये पश्यन् एकत्र विद्यमानमतिशयं गृह्णाति तद् दीर्घमिति व्यवस्यति, यच्च हीनं गृह्णाति तद् ह्रस्वमिति व्यवस्यतीति, एतच्चापेक्षासामर्थ्यमिति॥40॥

व्याहतत्वाद् vyāhata-tvāt, being inconsistent; अयुक्तम् a-yuktam, not rational.

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1. न सम्भवः स्वभावस्य युक्तः प्रत्ययहेतुभिः।
स्वभावः कृतको नाम भविष्यति पुनः कथम्॥
(*Mādhyamika Sūtra*, Chap. XV, p. 93; B. T. Society's edition)

400. The doctrine, we reply, is unreasonable because it hurts itself.—40.

If the long and short are inter-dependent then neither of them can be established in the absence of the other, if neither of them is self-existent, then it will be impossible to established the inter-relation; and in the absence of all relations the doctrine of the opponent will fall to the ground.

[The Mādhyamikas say that there is no reality[1] underlying any entity, and that the entities exist only by virtue of their mutual relations which are mere illusions. Viewed from the standpoint of absolute truth the world is void, Śūnya[2], but measured by the standard of "relation" or "condition" it possesses an apparent existence which serves all our practical purposes.]

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 10 : All is not void : Sūtras : 37-40.

Some say that all is non-existences, because existence and non-existence appear in every entity; *e. g.* in a cow there is presence of cow-ness and there is absence of horse-ness and everything else. The argument involves a twofold contradiction. (1) "All" is definable, as it means more than one and without exception; while "non-existence" is not definable, as it is the negation of existence. (2) If all is non-existence then one thing, *e.g.* cowness, cannot be the negation of another thing *e.g.* horseness. Then, all entities have existence by their own nature; a cow is existent as a cow. There is no cognition of a cow as non-existence. when it is said that a cow is non-existent in the form of a horse and it is not said that a cow is non-existent in the form of a cow, it is admitted that a cow as a cow is existent. The statement that a cow is not a horse is a denial of their identity and not of the cow as an entity.

The opponent rejoins that what is called the nature or character of an entity has merely a relative existence like length and shortness. To this the reply is that relativity depends upon an absolute standard. If

1. शून्यविद्येनहि विद्यते क्वचित् अन्तरिक्षि शकुनस्य वा पदम्।
यन्न विद्यति स्वभावत: क्वचित् सा न जातु परहेतु भविष्यति।।
(Ārya Ratnākara Sūtra, quoted in *Mādhyamika Vṛtti*, Chap. 1. 24; B. T. Society's edition)
2. स्वभावं परभावञ्च भावञ्चाभावमेव च।
ये पश्यन्ति न पश्यन्ते तत्त्वं हि बुद्धशासने।।
(*Mādhyamika Sūtra*, Chap. XV, p. 96; B. T. Society's edition)

both the terms long and short are relative then they destroy each other. These terms, again, do not apply to atoms or objects of equal size. If relativity were a fact as asserted, then surely some difference would have appeared in them. What relativity really implies is that when two objects are seen together it enables us to see the excess of the one over the other.

अथेमे संख्यैकान्ता:-सर्वमेकम्-सदऽविशेषात्, सर्वं द्वेधा-नित्यानित्यभेदात्, सर्वं त्रेधा-ज्ञाता ज्ञानं ज्ञेयमिति, सर्वं चतुर्धा-प्रमाता प्रमाणं प्रमेयं प्रमितिरिति, एवं यथासंभवमन्येऽपीति। तत्र परीक्षा-

सङ्ख्यैकान्तासिद्धिः कारणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम्॥ 41॥

यदि साध्यसाधनयोर्नानात्वम्? एकान्तो न सिध्यति-व्यतिरेकात्, अथ साध्यसाधनयोरभेद:? एवमप्येकान्तो न सिध्यति-साधनाभावात्, न हि तमन्तरेण कस्यचित् सिद्धिरिति।।41।।

सङ्ख्यैकान्तासिद्धि: saṅkhyā-eka-anta-a-siddhiḥ, non-proof of the fixity of number; कारणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम् kāraṇa-na-upapatti-upapatibhyām, by proof and disproof of cause.

401. Neither through the reason being given nor through the reason being omitted there is the establishment of the fixity of number.—41.

Some say that there is only *one* thing (Brahma) pervading all the so-called varieties. Others say that things are of *two* kinds, *viz.*, the eternal and the non-eternal. Certain philosophers find *three* things, *viz.*, the knower, knowledge and the knowable, while others treat of *four* things, *viz.*, the agent of knowledge, means of knowledge, object of knowledge and act of knowledge. In this way the philosophers indulge themselves in a fixed number of things. The Naiyāyikas oppose them by syaing that there is no reason to establish the fixity of number. The fixed number is the *Sādhya* or that which is to be proved and the reason is that which is to prove it. Now, is the reason included in the *Sādhya* or excluded from it? In either case the fixity of number will be unfixed. If, on the other hand, the reason is not different from the *Sādhya,* there is no means to establish the *Sādhya*.

न कारणावयवभावात्॥ 42॥

न संख्यैकान्तानामसिद्धि:, कस्मात्? कारणस्यावयवभावात्=अवयव: कश्चित् साधनभूत इत्यऽव्यतिरेक:। एवं द्वैतादीनामपीति।।42।।

न na, no; कारणावयवभावात् kāraṇa-avayava-bhāvāt, the cause being a member or part.

402. This is, some say, not so, because the reason is a part of the number.—42.

The objection is this :—

The number of things is fixed, and there is no disturbance of the fixity on the score of the reason being included in, excluded from, or identical, with, the number, for the reason is a part of the number and as such is not different from it.

निरवयवत्वादहेतुः॥ 43॥

"कारणस्यावयवभावात्" इत्यहेतुः, कस्मात्? 'सर्वमेकम्' इत्यनपवर्गेण प्रतिज्ञाय कस्यचिदेकत्वमुच्यते तत्र व्यपवृक्तोऽवयवः साधनभूतो नोपपद्यते, एवं द्वैतादिष्वपीति। ते खल्विमे संख्यैकान्ता यदि विशेषकारितस्याऽर्थभेदविस्तरस्य प्रत्याख्यानेन वर्तन्ते? प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमविरोधाद् मिथ्यावादा भवन्ति। अथाभ्यनुज्ञानेन वर्तन्ते? समानधर्मकारितोऽर्थसंग्रहो विशेषकारितश्चार्थभेद इत्येवमेकान्तत्वं जहतीति। ते खल्वेते तत्त्वज्ञानप्रविवेकार्थमेकान्ताः परीक्षिता इति॥43॥

निरवयवत्वात् nir-avayava-tvāt, being without a member or part; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, no reason.

403. The reason, we reply, is not valid because there is no part available for the purpose.—43.

The opponent has argued that the number is fixed and that the reason is only a part of it. The Naiyāyika counterargues that the number cannot be fixed until the reason is fixed and it will be absurd to fix the number with an unfixed reason. The reason which is asserted by the opponent to be a part of the number will remain unfixed until the number itself is fixed.

The doctrine of the fixity of number, opposed as it is to the evidences of perception, inference and scripture, is a false doctrine which cannot refute the variety of things established through the speciality of their characters. If there is an agreement as to the number of things on the ground of their general character, and difference on the ground of their special characters, them the doctrine of fixity is admittedly to be abandoned.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 11: Reality is not numerically fixed : Sūtras : 41-43.

Some say that (1) all is one, being equally existent, (2) all is dual, being eternal and non-eternal, (3) all is a triad, being the cogniser, the means of cognition, and the cognisable, (4) all is a quartet, being the knower, the means of knowing, the knowable, and knowledge; and so forth. This is not correct, because of impossibility of proof. For if the matter to be proved and the reason for it are diverse then the number asserted is exceeded; if not, then in the absence of any reason there can be no proof. It is no answer to say that a part of the matter to be proved will furnish the reason for the proof. For in unity there can be no part. So in the case of duality, etc. These views deny the diversity of objects formed in special characters, and are thus opposed to perception, inference and testimony, and therefore false. The truth is that objects are classified according to their resemblances and diversified according to their differences.

प्रेत्यभावानन्तरं फलम्। तस्मिन्—

सद्यः कालान्तरे च फलनिष्पत्तेः संशयः॥ 44॥

'पचति दोग्धि' इति सद्यः फलम् ओदनपयसी, 'कर्षति वपति' इति कालान्तरे फलं शस्याधिगत इति, अस्ति चेयं क्रिया—"अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः" इति एतस्याः फले संशयः॥44॥

सद्यः sadyaḥ, immediately; कालान्तरे kāla-antare, at another time; च cha, and; फलनिष्पत्तेः phala-niṣpatteḥ, on account of production of fruit; संशयः saṃśayaḥ, doubt.

404. There arises doubt as to the fruit which is produced either instantly or after a long interval.—44.

Seeing that some action such as *cooking* produces its effect immediately while another action such as *ploughing* does not bring about any effect until sometime has passed away, a certain person asks whether the fruit of maintaining the sacred fire will be produced immediately or after a considerable lapse of time.

न सद्यः कालान्तरोपभोग्यत्वात्॥ 45॥

स्वर्गः फलं श्रूयते तच्च भिन्नेऽस्मिन् देहभेदादुत्पद्यते इति न सद्यः, ग्रामादिकामानामारम्भफलमिति॥45॥

405. The fruit, we reply, is not immediate because it is enjoyable after a lapse of time.—45.

The fruit of maintaining the sacred fire is the attainment of heaven

which is not possible untile the time of death when the soul departs from our body.

कालान्तरेणानिष्पत्तिर्हेतुविनाशात्।। 46।।

ध्वस्तायां प्रवृत्तौ प्रवृत्तेः फलं न कारणमन्तरेणोत्पत्तमर्हति–न खलु वै विनष्टात् कारणात् किंचिदुत्पद्यते इति।।46।।

कालान्तरेण kāla-antareṇa, after a lapse of time; अनिष्पत्ति a-niṣpattiḥ, non-production; हेतुविनाशात् hetu-vināśāt, because of the destruction of the cause.

406. It cannot, says some one, be produced after a lapse of time because the cause has disappeared.—46.

The objection is this :—

The fruit (*viz.*, the attainment of heaven) cannot be produced after our death because the action (*viz.*, maintaining the sacred fire) calculated to produce the fruit was destroyed before our death.

प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्वृक्षफलवत्तत् स्यात्।। 47।।

यथा फलार्थिना वृक्षमूले सेकादि परिकर्म क्रियते तस्मिंश्च प्रध्वस्ते पृथिवीधातुरब्धातुना संगृहीत आन्तरेण तेजसा पच्यमानो रसद्रव्यं निर्वर्तयति स द्रव्यभूतो रसो वृक्षानुगतः पाकविशिष्टो व्यूहविशेषेण संनिविशमानः पर्णादि फलं निर्वर्तयति एवं परिषेकादि कर्म चार्थवत्–न च विनष्टात् फलनिष्पत्तिः। तथा प्रवृत्त्या संस्कारो धर्माधर्मलक्षणो जन्यते स जातो निमित्तान्तरानुगृहीतः कालान्तरे फलं निष्पादयतीति, उक्तं चैतत्–''पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात् तदुत्पत्तिः 3-2-64'' इति।।47।।

प्राक् prāk, prior; निष्पत्ते niṣpateḥ, to production; वृक्षफलवत् vṛkṣaphala-vat, like the fruit of a tree; तत् tat, that; स्यात् syāt, will be.

407. This fruit, we reply, before it is produced, bears analogy to the fruit of a tree.—47.

Just as a tree, whose roots are now nourished with water, will be able to produce fruits in the future, so the sacred fire which is maintained now will enable the maintainer to attain heaven after death. The doctrine involved here has been explained in aphorism 3-2-64.

तदिदं प्राङ् निष्पत्तेर्निष्पद्यमानम्–

नासन्न सन्न सदसदसत्सतोर्वैधर्म्यात्।। 48।।

प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्निष्पत्तिधर्मकं नाऽसत्–उपादाननियमात्=कस्यचिदुत्पत्तये किंचिदुपादेयं न सर्वं सर्वस्येत्यऽसद्भावे नियमो नोपपद्यते इति। न सत्–प्रागुत्पत्तेर्विद्यमानस्योत्पत्तिरनुपपन्नेति। न सदसत्–सदसतोर्वैधर्म्यात्='सत्' इत्यर्थाभ्यनुज्ञा, 'असत्' इत्यर्थप्रतिषेधः एतयोर्व्याघातो वैधर्म्यं व्याघातादव्यतिरेकानुपपत्तिरिति।।48।।

न na, no; असत् a-sat, non-existent; न na, not; सत् sat, existent; न na, not; सदसत् sat-a-sat, existent-and-non-existent; असत्सतोः asat-satoḥ, of the non-existent and existent; वैधर्म्यात् vaidharmyāt, owing to dissimilarity, different.

408. Some say that the fruit, anterior to its production, is neither existent nor non-existent nor both, because existence and non-existence are incongruous.—48.

The fruit (or any effect) anterior to its production was not non-existent because the material causes are so regulated that each one things is not produced from each other things promiseuously. We cannot suppose the fruit to have been existent prior to its production because a things cannot be said to come into existence if it had already an existence. The fruit was not both existent and non-existent prior to its production because existence and non-existence are incompatible with each other.

[The aphorism refers to the Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophy which maintains that the effect, before it is produced, is neither existent nor non-existent nor both, as is evident from the writings of Nāgārjuna[1] and Ārya Deva[2].]

प्रागुत्पत्तेरुत्पत्तिधर्मकमऽसदित्यऽद्धा, कस्मात्?–

उत्पादव्ययदर्शनात्।। 49।।

उत्पादव्ययदर्शनात् utpāda-vyaya-darśanāt, from the observation of production and destruction.

409. It is, we reply, a fact that the fruit before it was produced was non-existent because we witness the production and destruction.—49.

1. सतश्च तावदुत्पत्तिरसतश्च न युज्यते।
न सतश्चासतश्चेति पूर्वमेवोपपादितम्।।
नैवासतो नैव सतः प्रत्ययार्थस्य युज्यते।
न सन्नासन्न सदसत् धर्म्मो निर्वर्त्तते सदा।।
(Nāgārjuna's, *Mādhyamika Sūtra*, Chap. VII, p. 51; B. T. Society's edition)

2. सदसत्सदसच्चेति यस्य पक्षो न विद्यते।
उपारम्भश्चिरेणापि तस्य वक्तुन्न शक्यते।।
(Ārya Deva's Śataka quoted in the *Mādhyamika Vṛtti*, Chap. I, p. 4; B.T. Society's Edition)

When a jar is produced we find that it was non-existent prior to the production.

यत्पुनरुक्तम्-'प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यं नाऽसत्-उपादाननियमात्' इति?—

बुद्धिसिद्धन्तु तदसत्।। 50।।

इदमस्योत्पत्तये समर्थं न सर्वमिति प्रगुत्पत्तेर्नियतकारणं कार्यं बुद्ध्या सिद्धम्-उत्पत्तिनियमदर्शनात् तस्मादुपादाननियमस्योपपत्तिः। सति तु कार्ये प्रागुत्पत्तेरुत्पत्तिरेव नास्तीति।।50।।

बुद्धिसिद्धं buddhi-siddham, established by the understanding; तु tu, but; तत् tat-that; असत् a-sat, non-existent.

410. That is was non-existent, is established by our understanding.—50.

It is only when a things is non-existent that we can apply ourselves to the production of it by means of suitable materials. A weaver, for instance, sets himself to work for a web which is non-existent but which he knows he can make by means of threads.

आश्रयव्यतिरेकाद्वृक्षफलोत्पत्तिवदित्यहेतुः।। 51।।

मूलसेकादि परिकर्म फलं चोभयं वृक्षाश्रयम्, कर्म चेह शरीरे फलं चाऽमुत्रेति आश्रयव्यतिरेकादहेतुरिति।।51।।

आश्रयव्यतिरेकात् āśraya-vyatirekāt, in the absence of a receptacle; वृक्षफलोत्पत्तिवत् vṛkṣa-phala-utpatti-vat, like the production of the fruit of a tree; इति iti, this; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, no reason.

411. Some say that the analogy to the fruit of a tree is ill-founded because a receptacle is awanting.—51.

It has been stated that the fruit obtainable from maintaining the sacred fire bears analogy to the fruit of a tree. An opponent finds fault with the analogy by showing that the tree which produces fruits now is the same tree which was previously nourished with water, but the body which is alleged to attain heaven after death is not the same body which maintained the sacred fire. The two bodies being different their analogy to the tree is ill-founded.

प्रीतेरात्माश्रयत्वादप्रतिषेधः।। 52।।

प्रीतिरात्मप्रत्यक्षत्वादात्माश्रया तदाश्रयमेव कर्म धर्मसंज्ञितम्-धर्मस्यात्मगुणत्वात् तस्मादाश्रयव्यतिरेकानुपपत्तिरिति।।52।।

प्रीते prīteḥ, of pleasure, satisfaction; आत्माश्रयत्वाद ātmā āśraya-tvāt, having the soul as its receptacle or support; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

412. The foregoing objection, we reply, is unreasonable because the soul is the receptacle of happiness.—52.

It is not our body that maintains the sacred fire or attains heaven. In reality the soul is the receptacle for both these acts. The soul which maintained the secred fire is identical with the soul which enjoys happiness in heaven. Consequently a receptacle is not awanting and the analogy to the tree is not ill-founded.

न पुत्रपशुस्त्रीपरिच्छदहिरण्यान्नादिफलनिर्द्देशात्।। 53।।

पुत्रादि फलं निर्दिश्यते न प्रीतिः-'ग्रामकामो यजेत्", "पुत्रकामो यजेत्" इति। तत्र यदुक्तम्-'प्रीतिः फलम्' इति एतदयुक्तम्।।53।।

न na, no; पुत्रपशुस्त्रीपरिच्छदहिरण्यान्नादिफलनिर्द्देशात् putra-paśu-strī-parichchhada-hiraṇya-anna ādi-phala-nirdeśāt, because the fruits declared are son, cattle, wife, clothes, gold, food, etc.

413. The soul, some say, cannot be the receptacle for the fruits which are mentioned, *viz.*, a son, a wife, cattle, attendants, gold, food, etc.—53.

The objection is this :—

If the fruit consists merely of happiness it can be lodged in the soul. But the soul cannot be the receptacle for such fruits as a son, a wife, cattle, etc. which are mentioned in the scripture.

तत्सम्बन्धात् फलनिष्पत्तेस्तेषु फलवदुपचारः।। 54।।

पुत्रादिसंबन्धात् फलं प्रीतिलक्षणमुत्पद्यते इति पुत्रादिषु फलबदुपचारो यथाऽन्ने प्राणशब्दः-"अन्नं वे प्राणाः" इति।।54।।

तत्सम्बन्धात् tat-sambandhāt, through connection with them; फलनिष्पत्तेः phala-niṣpatteḥ, because of production of fruit; तेषु teṣu, in them; फलवदुपचारः phala-vat-upachāraḥ, predication as fruit.

414. The fruit, we reply, is attributed to them because it is produced through their conjunction.—54.

In reality the fruit is happiness. We attribute the name fruit to a son, wife, etc., because happiness is produced through them.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 12 : Phala (Fruit) : Sūtras : 44-54.

It is seen that when a man cooks his food, he gets the fruit of his labour immediately while when he sows seed he gets the harvest after a lapse of time. Therefore, when it is said that heaven is the fruit of the preformance of *agnihotra* sacrifice, the doubt arises as to whether the fruit will be obtained immediately or after a lapse of time. We know that heaven is not obtained immediately. On the other hand, we do not see how it can be obtained afterward, for the activity in the shape of the performance of the sacrifice must have ceased to operate long ago. To this the reply is that activity produces Saṁskāra (potency) in the form of merit and demerit, which in co-operation with other condition produces the fruit at another time, in the same way as water poured at the root of a tree causes through intermediate agencies the appearance of flowers an fruits. It is true that in the case of the tree, the action and the result both appear in the same body, *i.e.*, the tree while in the case of the sacrifice, the action is performed in one body and the fruit is enjoyed in another body. But bodies are merely the fields, the performer-enjoyer is the soul. The soul performs the action, the merit resides in the soul, the fruit in the form of happiness accrues to the soul. Where the fruit of action is declared to be a son, a wife, cattle, wealth, etc., these are only the symbols and sources of happiness which is the real fruit.

फलानन्तरं दुःखमुद्दिष्टमुक्तं च–"बाधनालक्षणं दुःखम् 1-1-21" इति। तत् किमिदं प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयस्य=सर्वजन्तुप्रत्यक्षस्य सुखस्य प्रत्याख्यानम्? आहोस्विदन्यः कल्पः? इति, अन्य इत्याह, कथम्?, न वै सर्वलोकसाक्षिकं सुखं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुम्। अयं तु जनममरणप्रबन्धानुभवनिमिताद् दुःखाद् निर्विण्णस्य दुःखं जिहासतो दुःखसंज्ञाभावनोपदेशो दुःखहानार्थ इति। कया युक्त्या?, सर्वे खलु सत्त्वनिकायाः सर्वाण्युत्पत्तिस्थानानि सर्वः पुनर्भवो बाधनानुषक्तो दुःखसाहचर्यात् "दुःखम् 1-1-21" इत्युक्तम्, ऋषिभिर्दुःखसंज्ञा-भावनमुपदिश्यते, अत्र च हेतुरूपादीयते–

विविधबाधनायोगाद्दुःखमेव जन्मोत्पत्तिः॥ 55॥

जन्म=जायते इति शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धयः, शरीरादीनां संस्थानविशिष्टानां प्रादुर्भाव उत्पत्तिः, विविधा च बाधना–हीना मध्यमा उत्कृष्टा चेति, उत्कृष्टा नारकिणां, तिरश्चां तु मध्यमा, मनुष्यापां हीना, देवानां हीनतरा वीतरागाणां च, एव सर्वमुत्पत्तिस्थानं विविधबाधनानुषक्तं पश्यतः सुखे तत्साधनेषु च शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिषु दुःखसंज्ञा व्यवतिष्ठते, दुःखसंज्ञाव्यवस्थानात् सर्वलोकेष्वऽनभिरतिसंज्ञा भवति, अनभिरतिसंज्ञामुपासीनस्य सर्वलोकविषया तृष्णा विच्छिद्यते, तृष्णाप्रहाणात् सर्वदुःखाद् विमुच्यते इति, यथा विषयोगात् पयो विषमिति बुध्यमानो नोपादत्ते, अनुपाददानो मरणदुःखं नाप्नोति॥55॥

विविधबाधनायोगात् vividha-bādhanā-yogāt, through cannection with various distresses; दुःखं duḥkham, pain; एव eva, surely; जन्मोत्पत्तिः janmautpattiḥ, production of birth.

415. Birth is a pain because it is connected with various distresses.—55.

Birth is stated to be a pain because it signifies our connection with the body, the senses and the intellect which bring us various distresses. The body is the abode in which pain resides, the senses are the instruments by which pain is experienced, and the intellect is the agent which produces in us the feeling of pain. Our birth as connected with the body, the senses and the intellect is necessarily a source of pain.

दुःखोद्देशस्तु न सुखस्य प्रत्याख्यानम्, कस्मात्?–

न सुखस्यान्तरालनिष्पत्तेः॥ 56॥

न खल्वयं दुःखोद्देशः सुखस्य प्रत्याख्यानाम्, कस्मात्?, सुखस्यान्तरालनिष्पतेः= निष्पद्यते खलु बाधनान्तरालेषु सुखं प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं शरीरिणां तदशक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुमिति॥56॥

न na, not; सुखस्य sukhasya, of pleasure; अन्तरालनिष्पत्तेः antarālaniṣpatteḥ, because of production during intervals.

416. Pleasure is not denied because it is produced at intervals.—56.

We cannot altogether deny the existence of pleasure which often arises amidst pains.

अथापि–

बाधनाऽनिवृत्तेर्वेदयतः पर्य्येषणदोषादप्रतिषेधः॥ 57॥

सुखस्य दुःखोद्देशेनेति प्रकरणात्, पर्येषणम्=प्रार्थना=विषयार्जनतृष्णा। पर्येषणस्य दोषो यदयं वेदयमानः प्रार्थयते, तच्चाऽस्य प्रार्थितं न संपद्यते, संपद्य वा विपद्यते, न्यूनं वा संपद्यते, बहुप्रत्यनीकं वा संपद्यते, इत्येतस्मात् पर्येषणदोषात् नानाविधो मानसः संतापो भवति, एवं वेदयतः पर्येषणदोषाद् बाधनाया अनिवृत्तिः बाधनाऽनिवृत्तेर्दुःखसंज्ञाभावन-मुद्दिश्यते, अनेन कारणेन दुःखं जन्म न तु सुखस्याभावादिति। अथाप्येतदनूक्तम्–

कामं कामयमानस्य यदा कामः समृध्यते।
अथैनमपरः कामः क्षिप्रमेव प्रबाधते॥

"अपि चेदुदनेमि समन्ताद् भूमिमालभते सगवाश्वां न स तेन धनेन धनैषी तृप्यति किं नु सुखं धनकामे" इति॥57॥

बाधनाऽनिवृत्ते bādhanā-a-nivṛtteḥ, there being non-cessation of distress; वेदयतः vedayataḥ, of the feeling person; पर्य्येषणदोषात् paryeṣaṇa-doṣāt, from the fault of pursuit; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

417. This is, we reply, no opposition because distresses do not disappear from a person who enjoys one pleasure and seeks another.—57.

The substance of the Naiyāyika's reply is this :—Pleasure itself is to be regarded as pain because even a person who enjoys pleasure is tormented by various distresses. His objects may be completely fruistrated or fulfilled only partially, and while he attains one object he cannot resist the temptation of pursuing another which causes him uneasiness.

दुःखविकल्पे सुखाभिमानाच्च।। 58।।

दुःखसंज्ञाभावनोपदेशः क्रियते, अयं खलु सुखसंवेदने व्यवस्थितः सुखं परमपुरुषार्थं मन्यते-न सुखादन्यद् निःश्रेयसमस्ति, सुखे प्राप्ते चरितार्थः कृतकरणीयो भवति, मिथ्या-संकल्पात् सुखे तत्साधनेषु च विषयेषु संरज्यते। संरक्तः सुखाय घटते, घटमानस्याऽस्य जन्मजराव्याधिप्रायणाऽनिष्टसंयोगेष्टवियोगप्रार्थितानुपपत्तिनिमित्तमनेकविधं यावद् दुःखमुत्पद्यते तं दुःखविकल्पं सुखमित्याभिमन्यते। सुखाङ्गाभूतं दुःखं-न दुःखमनासाद्य शक्यं सुखमवाप्तुम्, तादर्थ्यात् सुखमेवेदमिति सुखसंज्ञोपहतप्रज्ञः-'जायस्व म्रियस्व संधाव' इति संसार नातिवर्तते, तदस्याः सुखसंज्ञायाः प्रतिपक्षो दुःखसंज्ञाभावनुपदिश्यते. दुःखानुषङ्गाद् दुःखं जन्मेति न सुखस्याभावात्। यद्येवं कस्मात् 'दुःख जन्म' इति नोच्यते? सोयमेवं वाच्ये यदेवमाह-"दुःखमेव जन्म 55" इति तेन सुखाभावं ज्ञापयतीति, जन्मतिनिग्रहार्थीयो वै खल्वयमेवशब्दः, कथम्? न दुःखं जन्म स्वरूपतः किं तु दुःखोपचारात्, एवं सुखमपीति एतदऽनेनैव निवर्त्यते न तु दुःखमेव जन्मेति।।58।।

दुःखविकल्पे duḥkha-vikalpe, in a form of pain; सुखाभिमानात् sukha-abhimānāt, from a conceit of pleausre; च cha, and.

418. And because there is conceit of pleasure in what is only another name for pain.—58.

Some persons thinking that pleausre is the *summum bonum* are addicted to the world which causes them various distresses through birth, infirmity, disease, death, connection with the undesirable, separation from the desirable, etc. It is therefore clear that one who

pursues pleasure does in reality pursue pain, or, in other words, pleasure is a synonym for pain.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 13 : Duḥkha (Pain) : Sūtras : 55-58.

Pain has been enumerated after Fruit (in I.i.9, and defined in I.i.21. Pleasure has been neither enumerated nor defined.) The omission however does not imply a total denial of pleasure; for such denial is impossible seeing that all beings ear testimony to the existence of pleasure. The teaching that pleasure is to be regarded as denoted by the word pain is given, for the purpose of the avoidance of pain, to one who, on account of the experience of the stream of births and deaths, has become indifferent and desires to aviod pain. For all beings, all the worlds, all re-births are, through the co-existence of pain, penetrated with bādhanā or impediment or hinderance or obstruction which is the characteristic of pain. In the text (IV.i. 55.) "Birth" means that which is born, namely the body, senses and cognition. The impediment is of various grades. It is the greatest in the case of those who are in hell; middling, of the lower animals; least, of men; less, of the celestial beings and of dispassionate men. Thus seeing that impediment in some degree of other exists in all the worlds the teachers apply the definition of pain to pleasure as well as to its means, namely the body, senses, cognition. Hereby attraction towards the worlds ceases, thirst for them is cut off, release is obtained from all pain. It is like the avoidance of the pain of death by one who throws away milk mixed with poison.

Pleasure no doubt appears in the intervals of pain. But the longing for and pursuit of pleasure and the attendant evils such as non-fulfilment of desire, its partial fulfilment, fulfilment with risks, etc., produce various mental suffering, and consequently even at the momemt of pleasure the impediment to the freedom of the soul continues. It is for this reason that "birth" is declared as pain, and not on account of the non-existence of pleasure. Again, there is no pleasure in the attainment and enjoyment of which pain in some form or other is not experienced. Moreover, "birth", infirmity, disease, contact with disagreeable things, separation form agreeable things, non-fulfilment of desire are the necessary conditions and inevitable consquences of the pursuit of pleasure. But a man with whom pleasure is the supreme good regards these also as grades of pleasure and thus never gets free from transmigration. For the awakening of such a man also "birth" is declared as pain. The expression "Birth is pain" (in IV.i. 55.) however does not

mean that the body, senses and cognition are by their own nature pain, but that they like pleasure are so being interpenetrated with impediment.

दु:खोपदेशानन्तरमपवर्ग: स प्रत्याख्यायते–

ऋणक्लेशप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादपवर्गाभाव:॥ 59॥

ऋणानुबन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्ग:–"जायमानो ह वै ब्राह्मणस्त्रिभिर्ऋणैर्ऋणवान् जायते–ब्रह्मचर्येण ऋषिभ्यो यज्ञेन देवेभ्य: प्रजाया पितृभ्य:" इति ऋणानि, तेषामनुबन्ध:=स्वकर्मभि: सम्बन्ध:–कर्मसम्बन्धवचनात्–"जरामर्यं वा एतत्सत्रं यदग्निहोत्रं दर्शपूर्णमासौ चेति=जरया ह एष तस्मात् सत्राद्विमुच्यते मृत्युना ह वा" इति ऋणानुबन्धादपवर्गानुष्ठानकालो नास्तीत्य–ऽपवर्गाभाव:। क्लेशानुबन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्ग:=क्लेशानुबद्ध एवायं म्रियते क्लेशानुबद्धश्च जायते नास्य क्लेशानुबन्धविच्छेदो गृह्यते। प्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धान्नास्त्यपवर्ग:=जन्मप्रभृत्यऽयं यावत्प्रायणं वाग्बुद्धिशरीराम्भेणाऽविमुक्तो गृह्यते तत्र यदुक्तम्–"दु:खजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानाना–मुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्ग: 1-1-2" इति। तदनुपपन्नमिति॥59॥

ऋणक्लेशप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धात् ṛna-kleśa-pravṛtti-anubandhāt, because debts, troubles and activity pursue us to the end; अपवर्गाभाव: apavarga-abhāvaḥ, absence of release.

419. There is, some say, no opportunity for us to attain release because of the continual association of our debts, troubles and activities.—59.

The objection stands thus :—The scripture declares that as soon as we are born we incur three debts which we must go on clearing off until the time of our decay and death; and troubles are our constant companions, while activities pursue us throughout our life. There is then no opportunity for us to attain release.

The three debts are :—

Debt to sages (Ṛṣi-ṛṇa)—which can be cleared off only by undergoing a course of student life.

Debt to gods (Deva-ṛṇa)—from which we can be freed only by performing sacrifices.

Debt to our progenitors (Pitṛ-ṛṇa)—which cannot be cleared of except by begetting children.

Activity has been defined in 1-1-17 and 1-1-18.

अत्राभिधीयते–यत्तावत् 'ऋणानुबन्धात्' इति?. ऋणैरिव ऋणैरिति–

प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेर्गुणशब्देनानुवादो निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्ते:॥ 60॥

"ऋणै:" इति नायं प्रधानशब्द:, यत्र खल्वेक: प्रत्यादेयं ददाति द्वितीयश्च प्रतिदेयं

गृह्णाति तत्रास्य दृष्टात्वात् प्रधानमृणशब्द:, न चैतदिहोपपद्यते प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेर्गुणशब्देनाय–मनुवाद:–ऋणैरिव ऋणैरिति, प्रयुक्तोपमं चैतद् यथा–"अग्निर्माणक:" इति=अन्यत्र दृष्टश्चायमृणशब्द इह प्रयुज्यते यथाग्निशब्दो माणवके। कथं गुणशब्देनानुवाद:? निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्ते:=कर्मलोपे ऋणीव ऋणाऽदानाद् निन्द्यते, कर्मानुष्ठाने च ऋणीव ऋणदानाद् प्रशस्यते स एवोपमार्थ इति।

"जायमान:" इति गुणशब्द:–विपर्ययेऽनधिकारात्="जायमानो ह वै ब्राह्मण:" इति च शब्दो गृहस्थ: संपद्यमान:, जायमान इति=यदायं गृहस्थो जायते तदा कर्मभिरधिक्रियते–मातृतो जायमानस्यानधिकारात्=यदा तु मातृतो जायते कुमारो न तदा कर्मभिरधिक्रियते–अर्थिन शक्तस्य चाधिकारात्=अर्थिन: कर्मभिरधिकार:–कर्मविधौ कामसंयोगस्मृते:–"अग्निहोत्रं स्वर्गकाम:" इत्येवामादि, शक्तस्य च प्रवृत्तिसंभवात्=शक्तस्य कर्मभिरधिकार:'–प्रवृत्तिसंभवात्=शक्त: खलु विहिते कर्मणि प्रवर्तते नेतर इति।

उभयाभावस्तु प्रधानशब्दार्थे।

मातृतो जायमाने कुमारे उभयम्=अर्थिता शक्तिश्च न भवतीति, **न भिद्यते** लौकिकाद् वाक्याद् वैदिकं वाक्यम्–प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिपुरुषप्रणीतत्वेन। तत्र लौकिकस्तावद–परीक्षकोपि न जातमात्रं कुमारमेवं ब्रूयात्–'अधीष्व यजस्व ब्रह्मचर्यं चर' **इति। कुत एष** ऋषिरुपपन्नाऽनवद्यवादी उपदेशार्थेन प्रयुक्त उपदिशति?, न खलु वै **नर्तकोन्धेषु प्रवर्तते** न गायनो **बधिरेष्विति।** उपदिष्टर्थविज्ञानं चोपदेशविषय:=यश्चोपदिष्टमर्थं विजानाति तं प्रत्युपदेश: **क्रियते** न **चैतदस्ति** जायमानकुमारके इति। गार्हस्थ्यलिङ्गं च **मन्त्रब्राह्मणं** कर्माभिवदति=यच्च मन्त्रब्राह्मणं कर्माभिवदति तत् पत्नीसम्बन्धादिना गार्हस्थ्यलिङ्गेनोपपन्नं तस्माद् गृहस्थोयं जायमानोऽभिधीयते इति॥

अर्थित्वस्य चाविपरिणामे जरामर्यवादोपपत्ति:।

यावच्चस्य फलेनार्थित्वं न विपरिणमते=न निवर्तते तावदनेन कर्मानुष्ठेयमित्युपपद्यते जरामर्यवादस्तं प्रतीति, "जरया ह वा" इत्यायुषस्तुरीयस्य=चतुर्थस्य प्रव्रज्यायुक्तस्य वचनम्–"जरया ह वा **एष** एतस्माद्विमुच्यते" इति। आयुषस्तुरीयम्=चतुर्थं प्रव्रज्यायुक्तं जरेत्युच्यते–तत्र हि प्रव्रज्यां विधीयते, अत्यन्तजरासंयोगे "जरया ह वा" इत्यनर्थकम्। 'अशक्तो विमुच्यते' इत्येतदपि नोपपद्यते–स्वयमशक्तस्य बाह्यां शक्तिमाह–"अन्तेवासी वा जुहुयात् ब्रह्मणा स परिक्रीत: क्षीरहोता वा जुहुयाद् धनेन स परिक्रीत:" इति।

अथापि विहितं वाऽनूद्यते? कामाद्वार्थ: परिकल्प्येत? विहितानुवचनं न्याय्यमिति, ऋणवानिवाऽस्वतन्त्रो गृहस्थ: कर्मसु प्रवर्तते इत्युपपन्नं वाक्यस्य सामर्थ्यम्। फलस्य हि साधनानि प्रयत्नविषयो न फलं, तानि संपन्नानि फलाय कल्पन्ते। विहितं च जायमानं विधीयते च जायमानं तेन य: संबध्यत सोयं जायमान इति।

प्रत्यक्षविधानाभावादितिचेत्? न–प्रतिषेधस्यापि प्रत्यक्षविधानाभावादिति।

प्रत्यक्षतो विधीयते गार्हस्थ्यं ब्राह्मणेन यदि चांश्रमान्तरमभविष्यत् तदपि व्यधास्यत् प्रत्यक्षत:, प्रत्यक्षविधानाभावान्नास्त्याश्रमान्तरमिति, न-प्रतिषेधस्यापि प्रत्यक्षविधानाभावात्=न प्रतिषेधोपि वै ब्राह्मणेन प्रत्यक्षतो विधीयते-'न सन्त्याश्रमान्तराणि एक एव गृहस्थाश्रम:' इति, प्रतिषेधस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽश्रवणादयुक्तमेतदिति।।60।।

प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्ते pradhāna-śabda-an-upapatteḥ, from failure of the word in the principal sense; गुणशब्देन guṇa śabdena, by the word in the secondary sense; अनुवाद: anuvādaḥ, interpretation; निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्ते: nindā-praśaṃsā-upapatteḥ, because of the establishment of blame and praise.

420. If an expression is inadimissble in its literal sense we are to accept it in its secondary meaning to suit blame or praise.—60.

"As soon as a person is born he incurs three debts"—this expression, inadmissible as it is in its literal sense, is to be taken in its secondary meaning, *viz.*, "as soon as a person enters the life of a householder, he incurs three debts the clearing off of which brings him credit." The expression "until the time of our decay and death" signifies that "as long as we do not arrive at the fourth stage when we are to adopt the life of a mendicant." If the scriptural texts are interpreted in this way, it becomes clear that our whole life does not pass away in the mere clearing off of our debts.

कथम्?—

अधिकाराच्च विधानं विद्यान्तरवत्।। 61।।

यथा शास्त्रान्तराणि स्वे स्वेऽधिकारे प्रत्यक्षतो विधायकानि नाऽर्थान्तराभावाद् एवमिदं ब्राह्मणं गृहस्थशास्त्रं स्वेऽधिकारे प्रत्यक्षतो विधायकं नाश्रमान्तराणामभावादिति। ऋग्ब्राह्मणं चापवर्गाभिधाय्यऽभिधीयते=ऋचश्च ब्राह्मणानि चापवर्गाभिवादीनि भवन्ति, ऋचश्च तावात्-"कर्मभिर्मृत्युमृषयो निषेदु: प्रजावन्तो द्रविणमिच्छमाना:, अथापरे ऋषयो मनीषिण:, परं कर्मभ्योऽमृतत्वमानशु:", "न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैके अमृतत्वमानाशु:", "परेण नाकं निहितं गुहायां विभ्राजते तद् यतयो विशन्ति", "वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्पवर्णं तमस: परस्तात्, तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति नान्य: पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय"। अथ ब्राह्मणानि-"त्रयो धर्मस्कन्धा:-यज्ञोऽध्ययनं दानमिति प्रथमस्तप एव द्वितीयो ब्रह्मचार्याऽचार्यकुलवासीति तृतीयोऽत्यन्तमात्मानमाचार्यकुलेऽवसादयन् सर्वे एवैते पुण्यलोका भवन्ति ब्रह्मसंस्थोऽमृतत्वमेति", "एतमेव प्रव्राजिनो लोकमभीप्सन्त: प्रव्रजन्तीति", "अथो खल्वाहु:-काममय एवायं पुरुष इति स यथाकामो भवति तथाक्रतुर्भवति यथाक्रतुर्भवति तत्कर्म कुरुते यत्कर्म कुरुते तदभिसंपद्यते" इति कर्मभि:

संसरणमुक्तवा प्रकृतमन्यदुपदिशन्ति-"इति तु कामयमानोऽथाऽकामयमानो योऽकामो निष्काम आत्मकाम आप्तकामो भवति न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति इहैव समवलीयन्ते ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति" इति, तत्र यदुक्तम्-'ऋणानुबन्धादपवर्गाभाव:' इति एतदयुक्तमिति। "ये चत्वार: पथयो देवयाना:" इति च चातुराश्रम्यश्रुतेरैकाश्रम्यानुपपत्ति:। फलार्थिनश्चेदं ब्राह्मणम्-"जरामर्यं वा एतत्सत्रं यदग्निहोत्रं दर्शपूर्णमासौ च" इति।।61।।

421. An injunciton must be appropriate to its occasion just as a topic must be appropriate to the treatise which deals with it.—61.

A treatise on Logic which is to deal with its own special problems cannot be expected to treat of etymology and syntax which form the subject of a separate treatise. A sacred book which professes to deal with the life of a householder can appropriately bestow every encomium on him. A certain Vedic text extols *karma* by saying that immortality is attained by the force of one's own acts, while another text lays down as a compliment to asceticism that immortality cannot be attained except through renunciation. Some text declares emphotically that it is by the knowledge of Brahman alone that one can attain immortality, there is not other way to it. There are again certain texts which attach an equal importance to study, sacrifice and charity each of which is to be performed by us at the different stages of our life. Hence, a text which aims at extolling the life of a householder can, without creating any missapprehension in us, lay down that as soon as we are born we incur three debts which we must go on clearing off until the time of our decay and death.

समारोपणादात्मन्यप्रतिषेध:।। 62।।

"प्राजापत्यामिष्टिं निरुप्य तस्यां सर्ववेदसं हुत्वा आत्मन्यग्नीन् समारोप्य ब्राह्मण: प्रव्रजेत्" इति श्रूयते तेन विज़ानीम:-प्रजावित्तलोकैषाणाभ्यो व्युत्थितस्य निवृत्ते फलार्थित्वे समारोपणं विधीयते इति, एवं च ब्राह्मणानि-"सोऽन्यद् व्रतमुपाकरिष्यमाणो याज्ञवल्क्यो मैत्रेयीमितिहोवाच-प्रव्रजिष्यन् वा अरे अहमस्मात् स्थानादस्मि हन्त तेऽनया कात्यायन्या सहान्तं करवाणीति, अथाप्युक्तानुशासनासि मैत्रयि एवावदरे खल्वमृतत्वमिति होक्त्वा याज्ञवल्क्य: प्रवव्राज" इति।।62।।

समारोपणात् samāropaṇāt, through transferring; आत्मनि ātmani, to the soul; अप्रतिषेध: a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

422. There is no lack of opportunity for our release because the sacrifices (to be performed for clearing off our debts) are trusted to the soul.—22.

A Brahman, while old, should refrain from all searches after sons, wealth and retinue. Śruti (Veda) instructs him to retire from the world when he has trusted to his soul the sacrifices which he used to perform to clear off his debts. By so doing he will imagine that his oul is the sacrificial fire in which his physical actions are offered as oblations. Freed from all debts, he will live on alms and find an ample opportunity for effecting his own release.

As regards the division of life into stages, there is the authority of Itihāsa, Purāṇa and Dharma Śāstra.

पात्रचयान्तानुपपत्तेश्च फलाभावः॥ 63॥

जरामर्ये च कर्मण्यऽविशेषेण कल्प्यमाने सर्वस्य पात्रचयान्तानि कर्मणीति प्रसज्यते तत्रैषणाव्युत्थानं न श्रूयते-"एतद्ध स्म वे तत्पूर्वे ब्राह्मणा अनूचाना विद्वांसः प्रजां न कामयन्ते किं प्रजया करिष्यामो येषां नोयमात्माऽयं लोक इति। ते ह स्म पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाऽथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति" इति, एषणाभ्यश्च व्युत्थितस्य पात्रचयान्तानि कर्माणि नोपपद्यन्ते इति नाऽविशेषेण कर्तुः प्रयोजकं फलं भवतीति। चातुराश्रम्यविधानाच्चेतिहासपुराणधर्मशास्त्रेष्वैकाश्रम्यानुपपत्तिः।

तदप्रमाणमितिचेत्? न-प्रमाणेन प्रामाण्याभ्यनुज्ञानात्।

प्रमाणेन खलु ब्राह्मणेनेतिहासपुराणस्य प्रामाण्यभ्यनुज्ञायते-"ते वा खल्वेते अथर्वाङ्गिरस एतदितिहासपुराणमभ्यवदन् इतिहासपुराणं पञ्चमं वेदानां वेदः" इति, तस्मादऽयुक्तमेतत्-अप्रामाण्यमिति। अप्रामाण्ये च धर्मशास्त्रस्य प्राणभृतां व्यवहारलोपात् लोकोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः, द्रष्ट्टप्रवक्तृसामान्याच्चऽप्रामाण्यानुपपत्तिः=ये एव मन्त्रब्राह्मणस्य द्रष्टारः प्रवक्तारश्च ते खल्वितिहासपुराणस्य धर्मशास्त्रस्य चेति। विषयव्यवस्थानाच्च यथाविषयं प्रामाण्यम्=अन्यो मन्त्रब्राह्मणस्य विषयोऽन्येश्चतिहासपुराणधर्मशास्त्राणामिति=यज्ञो मन्त्रब्राह्मणस्य, लोकवृत्तमितिहासपुराणस्य, लोकव्यवहारव्यवस्थानं धर्मशास्त्रस्य विषयः, तत्रैकेन न सर्वं व्यवस्थाप्यते इति यथाविषयमेतानि प्रमाणनीन्द्रियादिवदिति॥63॥

पात्रचयान्तानुपपत्ते pātra-chaya-anta-an-upapatteḥ, because of the non-proof of performances ending with the collection of the sacrificial vessels at death; च cha, and; फलाभाव: phala-abhāvaḥ, absence of fruit.

423. Because the performances ending with the collection of the sacrificial vessels at death cannot reasonably be supposed (to have been prescribed for all without

distinction), there would be an absence of fruits (which could impede release).—63.

For a householder keeping alive the sacrificial fire it is prescribed that at his death the sacrificial vessels should be collected and burnt with his body. Such a man continues to perform acts till the end and these acts must produce results which must be exhausted by experiencing them before release can be attained. But these acts are not meant for those who retire from the world and have no desire for sons, wealth or other worlds. Therefore, so far as such men are concerned, the Vedic injunctions in respect of the sacrificial vessels and the like do not cause any obstacle to the attainment of release.

यत्पुनरेतत्-क्लेशनुबन्धस्याविच्छेदादिति-

सुषुप्तस्य स्वप्नादर्शने क्लेशाभाववदपवर्गः॥ 64॥

यथा सुषुप्तस्य खलु स्वप्नादर्शने रागानुबन्धः सुखदुःखानुबन्धश्च विच्छिद्यते तथाऽपवर्गेपीति, एतच्च ब्रह्मविदो मुक्तस्यात्मनो रूपमुदाहरन्तीति॥64॥

सुषुप्तस्य suṣuptasya, of one in deep sleep; स्वप्नादर्शने svapna-a-darśane, in not seeing dreams; क्लेशाभाववत् kleśa-a-bhāva-vāt, like absence of troubles; अपवर्गः apavargaḥ, release.

424. As there is no distress in a person who is sound asleep and sees no dream, so there is no association of troubles in one who attains release.—64.

A person who has, through the knowledge of Brahma, attained release, is freed from all bonds of lust, pleasure, pain, etc.

[The word *kleśa* (here rendered as trouble) is a technical term very extensively used in the Buddhist, Sanskrit and Pāli literature to signify depravity, defilement, corruption or passion. *Kleśa,* called in Pāli *kileśo,* is the cause of all sinful actions and consequently of rebirths. Arhatship consists in the annihilation of *kleśa*. The Pāli, Piṭakas enumerate ten *kileśas,* of which five are prominent. The ten *kilesas* are :—

लोभो (greed), दोसो (hated), मोहो (stupidity), मानो (pride), दिटठि (heretical view), विचिकिच्छा (doubt), थीनम् (sloth), उद्धच्चम् (arrogance), अहिरिका (shamelessness) and अनोत्तप्यम् (recklessness).

The Buddhist Sanskrit books enumerate six *kleśas* and twenty-four *upakleśas.*

षट्क्लेशाः॥

रागः प्रतिघो मानोऽविद्या कुदृष्टिर्विचिकित्सा चेति॥

(*Dharmasaṅgraha* LXVII)

चतुर्विंशतिरूपक्लेशाः। तद्यथा॥

क्रोध उपनाहो म्रक्षः प्रदाश ईर्ष्या मात्सर्यं शाठ्यं माया मदो विहिंसाह्रीरनपत्रपा स्त्यानमश्राद्ध्यं कौसीद्यं प्रमादो मुषितस्मृतिर्विक्षेपोऽसंप्रजन्यं कौकृत्यं मिद्धं वितर्को विचारश्चेति॥ (*Dharmasaṁgraha* LXIX)

The word *kleśa* used in the Nyāya Sūtra 4-1-59, 4-1-64, 4-1-65 and 4-1-66 evidently conveys the meaning of moral depravity. *Hina-kleśa* (हिनक्लेश) used in 4-1-65 rings in my ears as a phrase borrowed from the Buddhist philosophy.

यदपि प्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादिति–

न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसन्धानाय हीनक्लेशस्य॥ 65॥

प्रक्षीणेषु रागद्वेषमोहेषु प्रवृत्तिर्न प्रतिसंधानाय, प्रतिसंधिस्तु पूर्वजन्मनिवृत्तौ पुनर्जन्म तच्चाऽदृष्टकारितं तस्यां प्रहीणायां जन्मान्तराभावः=अप्रतिसंधानम्=अपवर्गः।

कर्मवैफल्यप्रसङ्ग इतिचेत्? न–कर्मविपाकप्रतिसंवेदनस्याऽप्रत्याख्यानात्॥

पूर्वजन्मनिवृत्तौ पुनर्जन्म न भवतीत्युच्यते न तु कर्मविपाकप्रतिसंवेदनं प्रत्याख्यायते, सर्वाणि पूर्वकर्माणि ह्यन्ते जन्मनि विपच्यन्ते इति॥65॥

न na, no; प्रवृत्ति pravṛttiḥ, activity; प्रतिसन्धानाय prati-sandhānāya, for binding again to birth; हीनक्लेशस्य hīna-kleśa-sya, of one whose troubles have disappeared.

425. The activity of one who has got rid of the troubles does not tend to obstruction.—65.

Activity does not present any obstacle to release (apavarga) in respect of a person who is freed from the trouble of lust, hatred and stupidity. In his case activity produces neither merit nor demerit, and consequently no re-birth.

न क्लेशसन्ततेः स्वाभाविकत्वात्॥ 66॥

नोपपद्यते क्लेशबन्धविच्छेदः, कस्मात्?, क्लेशसंततेः स्वाभाविकत्वात्=अनादिरियं क्लेशसंततिः न चानादिः शक्य उच्छेत्तुमिति॥66॥

न na, no; क्लेशसन्ततेः kleśa-santateḥ, of the stream of troubles; स्वाभाविकत्वात् svābhāvika-tvāt, being natural.

426. There is, some say, no end of troubles because these are natural.—66.

The objection raised here is this :—None can attain release because it is impossible to get rid of troubles which are natural (beginningless).

अत्र कश्चित् परीहारमाह–

प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावानित्यत्ववत्स्वाभाविकेऽप्यनित्यत्वम्॥ 67॥

यथाऽनादिः प्रागुत्पत्तेरभाव उत्पन्नेन भावेन निवर्त्यते एवं स्वाभाविकी क्लेशसंततिरनित्येति॥67॥

प्राक् prāk, prior; उत्पत्तेः utpatteḥ, to production; आभावानित्यत्ववत् abhāva-a-nitya-tva vat, like the non-eternality of non-existence; स्वाभाविके svābhāvika, in the natural; अपि api, also; अनित्यत्वम् a-nitya-tvam, non-eternality.

427. Even the natural, says some one, are non-eternal like the non-existence that was antecedent to production.—67.

The objection raised in the previous aphorism is answered by some one as follows :—

A non-existence antecedent to production is natural (beginningless) but it disappears as soon as the production takes place. Similarly the troubles are natural (beginningless) but they terminate as soon as release is attained.

A jar before it is produced is non-existent. This non-existence is called antecedent non-existence. It has no beginning but it has an end for it disappears as soon as the jar is produced. The trouble like the antecedent non-existence are beginningless but not endless.

[It is only an existence, that is, an existent thing, that can be called eternal or non-eternal. We cannot apply the epithets "eternal"and "non-eternal" to non-existence except in a figurative senses.]

अणुश्यामताऽनित्यत्ववद्वा॥ 68॥

अपर आह–यथाऽनादिरणुश्यामता अथ चाग्निसंयोगादनित्या तथा क्लेशसंततिरपीति॥68॥

अणुश्यामताऽनित्यत्ववत् aṇu-śyāma-tā a-nitya-tva-vat, like the non-etenality of the darkness of the atom; वा vā, or.

429. Or non-eternal like the blackness of an atom.—68.

An earthy atom, which is naturally black, changes its colour when it is baked red in the kiln. Likewise the troubles which are natural disappear as soon as release is attained.

सतः खलु धर्मो नित्यत्वमनित्यत्वं च तत्त्वं भावेऽभावे भाक्तमिति। 'अनादिरणुश्यामता' इति हेत्वभावादयुक्तम्। अनुत्पत्तिधर्मकमनित्यमिति नात्र हेतुरस्तीति।

अयं तु समाधिः–

न सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वाच्च रागादीनाम्॥ 69॥

'कर्मनिमित्तत्वादितरेतरनिमित्तत्वाच्च' इति समुच्चयः, मिथ्यासंकल्पेभ्यो रञ्जनीयकोपीनयमोहनीयभ्यो रागद्वेषमोहा उत्पद्यनते, कर्म च सत्त्वनिकायनिर्वर्तकं नैयमिकान् रागद्वेषमोहान् निर्वर्तयति-नियमदर्शनात्=दृश्यते हि कश्चित्सत्त्वनिकायो रागबहुलः कश्चिद् द्वेषबहुलः कश्चिद् मोहबहुलः इति, इतरेतरनिमित्ता च रागादीनामुत्पत्तिः=मूढो रज्यति मूढः कुप्यति, रक्तो मुह्यति, कुपितो मुह्यति। सर्वमिथ्यासंकल्पानां तत्त्वज्ञानादनुत्पत्तिः कारणनुत्पत्तौ च कार्यानुत्पत्तेरिति रागादीनामत्यन्तमनुत्पत्तिरिति।

'अनादिश्च क्लेशसंततिः' इत्यऽयुक्तम्-सर्वे इमे खल्वाध्यात्मिका भावा अनादिना प्रबन्धेन प्रवर्तन्ते शरीरादयो, न जात्वत्र कश्चिदनुत्पन्नपूर्वः प्रथम उत्पद्यतेऽन्यत्र तत्त्वज्ञानात्। न चेवंसत्यऽनुत्पत्तिधर्मकं किंचिद् व्ययधर्मकं प्रतिज्ञायते इति। कर्म च सत्त्वनिकायनिर्वर्तकं तत्त्वज्ञानकृताद् मिथ्यासंकल्पविघातान्न रागाद्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तं भवति सुखदुःखसंवित्तिफलं तु भवतीति॥69॥

॥ इति वात्स्यायनविरचिते न्यायभाष्ये चतुर्थोऽध्यास्य प्रथममाह्निकं समाप्तम्॥

न na, no; सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वात् saṅkalpa-nimitta-tvāt, being caused by will or deliberation; च cha, and; रागादीनां rāga-ādīnām, of desire, etc.

429. It is, we reply, not so because affection, etc. are caused by misapprehension.—69.

The Naiyāyika says :—There is no necessity for us here to admit that a things which is natural (beginningless) may not be endless. The troubles are not in fact natural (beginningless) because they are caused by activity which springs from our affection, aversion and stupidity. There last are generated by our misapprehension. The troubles not being natural, there is no lack of opportunity for us to attain release.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 14 : Apavarga (Release) : Sūtras : 58-67.

Some say that the attainment of release is impossible on account of (1) the chain of debts, (2) the chain of perversions, and (3) the chain of activity. The repayment of debts of enjoined as follows : "A Brāhmaṇa, as he is born, is born encumbered with three debts : by celibacy and study he repays the debt to the Ṛṣis; by performing sacrifices, to the deities; and by begetting progeny, to the Pitṛs" (Śatapatha Brāmaṇa. 1-7-2-1). As regards sacrifices it is further laid down : "These sacrifices agnihorta, darśa and pūrṇamāsa shall be performed until death or infirmity intervenes. Either by infirmity or by death is one freed form the obligation to perform." So no time is left for the pursuit of release. (Perversions are false knowledge, egotism, attraction, aversion and love of life. Yoga-Sūtra, II. 3.) These cling to one from life to life. Again, from birth till death the activity of the speech, mind and body never leaves a man for a moment. Therefore, the attainment of release as described in I. i.2 is not established.

To the above the reply is as follows : (1) In the text of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa the word "debts" is used not in its primary but in a secondary senses. For primarily a debt and its repayment must be *inter vivos*. That condition is not present in the case under consideration. The secondary application of the word is for the sake of condemnation and commendation. Like a debtor who does not repay his debts a man who does not perform acts deserves condemantion; and like a debtor who repays his debts a man who performs acts deserves commendation. Again, the expression "as he is born" is also used in a secondary sense. For surely an infant has neither the desire for the fruit of, not the capacity to perform, all those acts, sacrifice, etc. Simiarly, the declaration about performance of acts till infirmity or death should be rationally interpreted. For if it is taken literally it becomes superfluous, for infirmity and death necessarily put a stop to all performance. The declaration really means that performance should be continued till the desire is satisfied with the attainment of fruit. The world "Jarā" which the objector has explained as infirmity really means the fourth stage of life, the stage of renunciation. For it is then that a man having, after realising the futility of all worldly objects, renounced the desire for worlds, wealth and progeny, is freed from the obligation to perform acts. "Jarā" cannot mean infirmity or inability here, for in the case of men who are not themselves able to perform acts, a proxy is allowed such as a disciple whose service is required by the gift of learning.

Again, the text in question is a re-inculcation (and not an original injunction, as there is no word in it to express an injunction). It can be interpreted either as a re-inclucation or as one pleases. The former interpretation is the more rational. The sense therefore is that a householder has no option but to perform prescribed acts as a debtor has no option but to repay debts. The performances which accomplish the fruit, and not the fruit, are the subject of a man's effort. Injunctions lay down the mens which is to be brought into operation and the fruit which is to be produced. "Jāyamāna", as he is born, therfore refers to him whom these concern, namely the householder. This is not to deny the other stage of life, namely the student, the renunciate and the recluse. For every Śāstra is confined to its own subject matter. These Brāhmaṇa texts are concerned with the duties of householders only.

Ṛks (sacred verses) and Brāhmaṇas (sacred prose texts) declare release (for all stages of life). Thus, there are the Ṛks : (a) Ṛṣis, begetting progeny and desiring wealth, entered death by reason of acts; other Ṛṣis, discriminative, attained immortality beyond the reach of acts.

(b) Neither by act nor by progeny nor by wealth but by renunciation some attained immortality; beyond heaven (*i.e.* outside the reign of Avidyā) hidden in the cave (*i.e.* beyond the reach of ordinary pramāṇas) that which shines, the yatis (recluses) enter.

(c) Know I this Person, great, of the splendour of the sun, beyond darkness; by knownig Him one crosses over death; there is no other path for the journey.

There are also the Brāhmaṇa : (a) There are three supports of Dharma, sarifice, study and gift. The first is penance; the second is the celibate-student residing in the university or college of the preceptor; the third is such a student who spends his life in the college. All of them go to the regions of the virtuous. He who is steady in Brahman attains immortality. (Chhāndogya Upaniṣad, II. xxiii. 1).

(b) Desiring this world only the renunciates take to renunciation. (Bṛhat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, IV. iv. 22).

(c) Now, they declare that man is in essence desire. As he desires so he resolves; as he resolves so he acts; as he acts so he becomes.

Thus declaring that transmigration is the result of acts, the texts teach what is good : Desiring, when he becomes non-desiring, desire-free, desire-less, self-desiring, desire-fulfilled, his prāṇas (vital forces) do not go out, they are withdrawn into the soul even here. Being truly Brahman, he attains Brahman. (Bṛhat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, IV. iv. 5,6).

Therefore itis unreasonable to say that the chain of debts prevents release. The text, Those four path leading to deities, (Taittirīya Saṁhitā, V. vii. 23), again, shows that there are four, and not one, stages of life.

The text about the performance of agnihotra; darśa and pūrṇamāsa applies only to those who desire the fruit. For the Veda enjoins the closing of sacrifices and renunciation. Thus, "Having fulfilled the prājāpatya sacrifice having offered all his possession in it, transplanting the fires in the soul, let a Brāhmaṇa walk away from the world". This shows that the removal of the sacrificial fires is enjoined for those who have risen above the desire for progeny, wealth and worlds and have ceased to desire the fruit of sacrifices. So declare the Brāhmaṇa texts; *e.g.* Resolving to take to another order of life Yājñavalkya addressed Maitreyī, thus : I wish, O dear one, to go away from this place; let me reconcile you to Kātyāyanī. O Maitreyī, you have received initiation from me. That much, O dear one, is immortality. So saying Yājñavalkya went away.

The performance of acts till infirmity and death could not be intended for all without distinction. For such acts end with the collection of the sacrificial vessels at death which can be possible in the case of householders only. Had that been the intention there would have been no declaration of rising above desires as in the text : It so happened in days of yore that Brāhmaṇas, versed in the sacred lore and learned, did not desire progeny; (they thought) what should we do with progeny? we for whom the soul is the whole world. They, rising above the desires for progeny, wealth and worlds, led the life of mendicants. (Bṛhat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, III.v. 1). For such men acts ending with the collection of the sacrificial vessels cannot be possible. Moreover, the fruit does not incite all men to activity to the same extent.

The order of the householder is not the only order of life. Itihāsas, Purāṇas and Dharmaśāstras declare four orders of life. These as well as the sacred verses and Brāhmaṇa texts are authoritative in regard to their respective subject matters, like the senses. Sacrifice is the subject matter of the scared verses and Brāhamaṇa texts; the character of men, of Itihāsas and Purāṇas; and social conduct, of the Dharmaśāstras. If Dharmaśāstras had no authority, chaos would ensue through non-regulation of the conduct of men. The authority, of Ithāsas and Purāṇas has been declared by the Brāhmaṇa text : Atharvāṅgirasa declared the Itihāsa and Purāṇa; they constititute the fifth of the Vedas (Chhāndogya Upaniṣad, III. iv. 2).

(2) The chain of perversions also can offer no obstacle to the attainment of release. For as in the case of a man in deep sleep, when he dreams no dreams, the chain of attraction and the chain of pleasure and pain are snapped, so also in the state of release. And this the knowers of Brahman instance as the condition of the released soul.

(3) In the case of a man whose perversions have suffered decay, the activity does not tend to re-birth at the end of the previous birth. Such re-birth is caused by adṛṣta, *i.e.* merit and demerit abiding in the soul. Absence of re-birth at the end of the previous birth is release. This does not entail the futility of acts. For what is declared is that re-birth does not take place at the end of the previous birth, and not that the experience of the consequences of acts is denied. In such a case all previous acts reach fruition in the last birth.

An objection is raised by some who say that the stream of perversions is natural and without beginning and therefore impossible of being cut short. It is no answer to this objection that just as antecedent non-existence (which is without beginning) of an entity is terminated by the entity when produced, so the natural stream of perversions is not eternal. Neither is the objection met by the argument that just as the natural dark colour of the atom from before time is terminated by the application of fire, even so is the stream of perversions. For eternality and non-eternality are attribute of positive entities only; their application to non-entities is only metaphorical. There is also no reason for the conclusion that the dark colour of the atom is without beginning. Nor is there any reason for the proposition that what is not in need of production is non-eternal.

The true answer to the objection is as follows : Subconscious will is the efficient cause of the perversion, attraction, etc. They are due to acts and to themselves mutually. Attraction, aversion and delusion arise from subconsciously produced wrong notions of things as attractive, repulsive and delusive. Acts produce the bodies of living being and in them the perversions of attraction, aversion and delusion according to a fixed rule. For it is actually seen that attraction is dominant in some bodies, and delusion in some others. There production is also reciprocal. The deluded man is attracted; the deluded man is angered; the attracted man is deluded; the angered man is deluded. Now, the production of the false notions of things ceases through knowledge of the truth and owing to the non-production of their cause there follows the absoulte non-production of attraction, etc. There is again to special force in the

statement that the stream of perversions is without beginning. For all these entities, the body, etc., associated with the soul, come down in sequence without beginning. There is nothing which was not produced before and has been produced for the first time, except knowledge of the truth. Such being the case it is not premised by us that what is not liable to production is capable of destruction. As regards acts which produce the bodies of living beings in diverse classes of animal life, they do not become the efficient cause of the production of attraction, etc., after the destruction of false notions of things is brought about by the knowledge of the truth about them. They continue, however, to be productive of pleasure and pain, for in producing them they are independent of false notions.

॥ इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने चतुर्थोऽध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम्॥1॥

Book IV, Chapter II

किं नु खलु भो यावन्तो विषयास्तावत्सु प्रत्येकं तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते? अथ क्वचिदुत्पद्यते? इति। कश्चात्र विशेष:?, न तावदेकैकत्र=यावद्विषमुत्पद्यते–ज्ञेयानामानन्त्यात् नापि क्वचिदुत्पद्यते–यत्र नोत्पद्यते तत्रानिवृत्तो मोह इति मोहशेषप्रसङ्ग:–न चान्यविषयेण तत्त्वज्ञानेनाऽन्यविषयो मोह: शक्य प्रतिषेद्धुमिति। मिथ्याज्ञानं वै खलु मोहो न तत्त्वज्ञानस्यानुत्पत्तिमात्रं तच्च मिथ्याज्ञानं यत्र विषये प्रवर्तमानं संसारबीजं भवति स विषयस्तत्त्वतो ज्ञेय इति। किं पुनस्तन्मिथ्याज्ञानम्?, अनात्मन्यात्मग्रह:=अहमस्मीति मोहोऽहङ्कार इति, अनात्मानं खल्वहमस्मीति पश्यतो दृष्टिरहङ्कार इति किं पुनस्तदर्थजातं यद्विषयोऽहङ्कार? शरीरेन्द्रियमनोवेदनाबुद्धय। कथं तद्विषयोऽहङ्कार: संसारबीजं भवति?, अयं खलु शरीराद्यर्थजातम् अहमस्मीति व्यवसित: तदुच्छेदेनात्मोच्छेदं मन्यमानोऽनुच्छेद–तृष्णापरिप्लुत: पुन: पुनस्तदुपादत्ते तदुपाददानो जन्ममरणाय यतते तेनाऽवियोगाद् नाऽत्यन्तं दु:खाद्विमुच्यते इति।

यस्तु दु:खं दु:खायतनं दु:खानुषक्तं सुखं च सर्वमिदं दु:खमिति पश्यति स दु:खं परिजानाति परिज्ञातं च दु:खं प्रहीणं भवति–अनुपादानात् सविषान्नावत्, एवं दोषान् कर्म च दु:खहेतुरिति पश्यति। न चाऽप्रहीणेषु दोषेषु दु:खप्रबन्धोच्छेदेन शक्यं भवितुमिति दोषान् जहाति, प्रहीणेषु च दोषेषु न प्रवृत्ति: प्रतिसंधानायेत्युक्तम्, प्रेत्यभावफलदु:खानि च ज्ञेयानि व्यवस्थापयति कर्म च दोषांश्च प्रहेयान् अपवर्गोऽधिगन्तव्यस्तस्याधिगमोपायस्तत्त्वज्ञानम्, एवं चतसृभिर्विधाभि: प्रमेयं विभक्तमासेवमानस्य=अभ्यस्यत:=भावयत: सम्यग्दर्शनम्=यथाभूतावबोध:=तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते।।

एवं च–

दोषनिमित्तानां तत्त्वज्ञानादहङ्कारनिवृत्ति:।। 1।।

शरीरादि दु:खान्तं प्रमेयं दोषनिमित्तम्, तद्विषयत्वान्मिथ्याज्ञानस्य तदिदं तत्त्वज्ञानं तद्विषयमुत्पन्नमऽहङ्कारं निवर्तयति–समानविषये तयोर्विरोधात्, एवं तत्त्वज्ञानात् "दु:खजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तराभावादपवर्ग 1-1-2" इति, स चायं शास्त्रार्थसंग्रहोऽनूद्यते नाऽपूर्वो विधीयते इति।।1।।

दोषनिमित्तानां doṣa-nimittānām, of the causes of faults; तत्त्वज्ञानात् tattvajñānāt, through knowledge of the truth; अहङ्कारनिवृत्ति: ahaṅkāra-nivṛttiḥ, cessation of ahaṅkāra.

430. Through knowledge about the true nature of the causes of faults, there is cessation of egotism.—1.

Egotism is stupidity of the form "I am." It consists of the notion, "I am," entertained by a person in respect of what is not self. It disappears as soon as we attain knowledge about the true nature of the faults which are caused by all objects such as body, etc. enumerated in aphorism 1-1-9.

प्रसंख्यानानुपूर्व्या तु खलु–

दोषनिमित्तं रूपादयो विषया: सङ्कल्पकृता:।। 2।।

कामविषया इन्द्रियार्था इति रूपादय उच्चयते, ते मिथ्या संकल्प्यमाना रागद्वेषमोहान् प्रवर्तयन्ति तान् पूर्वं। प्रसंचक्षीत, तांश्च प्रसंचक्षाणस्य रूपादिविषयो मिथ्यासंकल्पो निवर्तते, तन्निवृत्तौ अध्यात्मं शरीरादि प्रसंचक्षीत, तत्प्रसंख्यानादध्यात्मविषयोऽहङ्कारो निवर्तते, सोयमध्यात्मं बहिश्च विविक्तचित्तो विहरन् मुक्त इत्युच्यते।।2।।

दोषनिमित्तं doṣa-nimittam, the cause of faults; रूपादय: rūpa-ādayaḥ, form, etc. विषया: viṣayāḥ, objects; सङ्कल्पकृता: saṅkalpa-kṛtāḥ, adopted by the will.

431. The colour and other objects when regarded as good, become the causes of faults.—2.

It is only when we look upon colour or any other objects as a source enjoyment that it becomes a cause of our affection, aversion or stupidity.

अत: परं काचित् संज्ञा हेया काचिद् भावयितव्येत्युपदिश्यते, नार्थनिराकरणमऽर्थोपादानं वा, कथमिति–

तन्निमित्तन्त्ववयव्यभिमान:।। 3।।

तेषाम्=दोषाणां निमित्तं त्वऽवयव्यभिमान:, सा च खलु स्त्रीसंज्ञा सपरिष्कारा पुरुषस्य पुरुषसंज्ञा च स्त्रिया:, परिष्काश्च=निमित्तसंज्ञा अनुव्यञ्जनसंज्ञा च, निमित्तवसंज्ञा=रसनाश्रोत्रं दन्तोष्ठं चक्षुर्नासिकम्, अनुव्यञ्जननसंज्ञा= इत्थं दन्तौ इत्थमोष्ठाविति, सेयं संज्ञा कामं वर्धयति तदनुषक्तांश्च दोषान् विवर्जनीयान्। वर्जनं त्वस्या भेदेनावयवसंज्ञा=केशलोममांसशोणितास्थिस्नायुशिराकफपित्तोच्चारादिसंज्ञा तामशुभसंज्ञेत्याचक्षते। तामस्य भावयत:

कामरागः प्रहीयते। सत्येव च द्विविधे विषये काचित् संज्ञा भावनीया काचित् परिवर्जनीयेत्युपदिश्यते यथा विषसंपृक्तेऽन्ने अन्नसंज्ञोपादानाय विषसंज्ञा प्रहाणायेति।।3।।

तन्निमित्तं tat-nimittam, their cause; तु tu, but; अववयव्यभिमानः avayavi-ạbhimānaḥ, regard as a whole.

432. The faults are caused through a conception of the *whole* apart from its *parts*.—3.

The faults are produced if a man or woman looks upon each other as a *whole, viz.*, as a male or female with all his or her paraphernalia of teeth lips, eyes, nose, etc., together with their secondary marks; and they are shunned if he or she looks upon each other by *parts* only, *viz.*, upon his or her hair, flesh, blood, bone, nerve, head, phlegm, bile, excrement, etc., all of which are frail. The notion of the *whole* engenders lust while that of the *parts* produces equanimity, We must regard every thing from the standpoint of evil, *e.g.*, the rice boiled with poison is looked upon by a wordly man as rice and by an ascetic as poison.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 1 : Production of knowledge of Truth : Sūtras : 1-3.

Now, false knowledge is not mere non-production of true knowledge. It is not a negative but a positive thing. It is delusion. The object the false knowledge of which is the seed of saṃsāra or succession of births and deaths, is to be known in its essence. False knowledge consists in the apprehension of the not-soul as the soul, in the delusion, the ahaṅkāra (I—manufacture) in the form "I am (this)". Ahaṅkāra is the vision of one who sees the not-soul as "I am (this)". The objects of ahaṅkāra are the body, senses, mind, feelings and cognitions. When a man feels convinced about this assemblage of objects, the body, etc., as "I am (this)", as his very self, their destruction he regards as the destruction of himself, and being overcome with the desire for their non-destruction, adopts them again and again, and so adopting them, strives for birth and death; and as no separation from them takes place, he is never absolutely released from pain. He who sees all this as pain, the vehicle of pain, and pleasure tinged with pain, knows pain thoroughly, and pain so known decays for want of adoption or acceptance, like food mixed with poison. Similarly be sees the faults and action as causes of pain. So he abandons the faults. The faults having decayed, activity does not tend to re-birth (IV.i. 65). Thus, the man discriminates (1) that re-birth, fruit and pain are the things to be known, (2) that action and faults are to be aboided, (3) that release is to be attained, and (4) that knowldege of truth is the mens of its attainments. Having thus divided the knowlables as those which are wrongly identified with the soul, those to be known, those to be abandoned and those to be attained, when the man devotes himself to them, constantly turns them over in thought and influences them with thought, there appears to him perfect vision, awareness of the things as they are, knowledge of truth. The knowables from the body to pain (I.i. 9) are due to faults because they are the objects of false knowledge. True knowledge about them prevents ahaṅkāra or their identification with the soul. And so through knowledge of truth, on the successive removal of pain, birth, etc. (I. i. 2), release is obtained. This is a resume of the teachings of all Śāstras and is not a new teaching.

The objects of the senses are the objects of desire. They are colour, etc. When they are wrongly conceived they cause the operation of attraction, aversion and delusion. So meditation for the sake of true knowledge should be first concentrated on them. After wrong notions about them have ceased then thought should be focussed on the body, etc. which are more nearly connected with the soul so as to remove ahaṅkāra in respect of them. Thus, the man who is dispassionate to objects external as well as internal, is called released.

The cause of the faults is the conceit which regards objecs as wholes and pays no attention to their parts. For instance, when a man is attracted to a woman, and a woman is attracted to a man, they are attracted by the particular parts of the body such as the teeth, lips, eyes, nose, or by some special features in them. Such attention increases the passion for each other. The faults which it entails are to be abandoned. Attention should be directed to the impure aspects of the boys such as the hair, flesh, blood, bones, sinews, etc. By this means the attraction of passion is destroyed. Thus everything presents a twofold aspect, good and bad. It should be regarded as bad. Fod mixed with poison is considered as poison.

अथेदानीमर्थं निराकरिष्यताऽवयविन्युपपाद्यते—

विद्याऽविद्याद्वैविध्यात् संशयः।। 4।।

सदसतोरुपलम्भाद् विद्या द्विविधा सदसतोरनुपलम्भादऽविद्यापि द्विविधा, उपलभ्यमानेऽवयविनि विद्याद्वैविध्यात् संशयः, अनुपलभ्यमाने चाऽविद्याद्वैविध्यात् संशयः, सोयमऽवयवी यद्युपलभ्यते अथापि नोपलभ्यते न कथचनं संशयाद् मुच्यते इति।।4।।

विद्याऽविद्याद्वैविध्यात् vidyā-a-vidyā-dvaividhyāt, from twofoldness of knowledge and of ignorance; संशयः saṃśayaḥ, doubt.

433. Owing to the apprehension and non-apprehension being each of two kinds, there arises a doubt as to the existence of a whole apart from its parts.—4.

There are two kinds of apprehension, *viz.*, real and unreal. The apprehension of water in a tank is real while that of mirage as a mass of water is unreal. The non-apprehension is also of two kinds, *viz.*, real and unreal. The non-apprehension of a here's horn (which is non-existent) is an unreal non-apprehension and non-apprehension being both real and unreal there arises a doubt as to whether there is really a whole apart from its parts. If we apprehend a whole apart from its parts, our apprehension may be unreal. If we do not apprehend a whole our non-apprehension too may be unreal.

तदसंशयः पूर्वहेतुप्रतिद्धत्वात्॥ 5॥

तस्मिन्नऽनुपपन्नः संशयः, कस्मात्?, पूर्वोक्तहेतूनामप्रतिषेधादस्ति द्रव्यान्तरारम्भ इति॥5॥

तदसंशयः tat-a-saṃśayaḥ, no doubt about it; पूर्वहेतुप्रतिद्धत्वात् pūrva-hetuprasiddha-tvāt, having been established by reasons already stated.

434. There is no room from doubt with regard to the existence of a whole already established through arguments. —5.

No one has yet set aside the arguments employed in aphorism 2-1-36 to establish a whole apart from its parts.

वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि तर्हि न संशयः॥ 6॥

वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि तर्हि संशययानुपपत्तिः-नास्त्यवयवीति॥6॥

वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि vṛtti-an-upapatteḥ, from absence of proof of inclusion; अपि api, also; तर्हि tarhi, then; न na, not; संशयः saṃśayaḥ doubt.

435. There is, says some one, no room for doubt even with regard to the non-existence of a whole on account of the impossibility of the whole residing anywhwere.—6.

In the preceding aphorism the Naiyāyika has said that there is no doubt as to the existence of a whole apart from its parts as demonstreated in aphorism 2-1-36. In the present aphorism his opponent says that there is no doubt as to the non-existence of a whole apart from its parts because neither the whole can reside in its parts nor the latter in the

former. One affirms that there is a whole while the other affirms that there is a no-whole. In either case there is no room for doubt.

तद्विभजते—

कृत्स्नैकदेशावृत्तित्वादवयवानामवयव्यभावः॥ 7॥

एकैकोऽवयवो न तावत् कृत्स्नेऽवयविनि वर्तते-तयोः परिमाणभेदादऽवयवान्तर-सम्बन्धाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च, नाप्यवयव्येकदेशे-न ह्यस्यान्ये अवयवा एकदेशभूताः सन्तीति॥7॥

कृत्स्नैकदेशावृत्तित्वात् kṛtsna-eka-deśa-a-vṛtti-tvāt, because of not being co-extensive with the whole; अवयवानाम् avayavānām, of the parts; अवयव्यभावः avayavi-abhāvaḥ, non-existence of the whole.

436. There is, says the objector, no whole because its parts reside in it neither totally nor partially.—7.

A part does not occupy the whole in its totality owing to the difference of their dimension; neither does it occupy the whole partially because the part can reside neither reside neither in itself nor in another part.

अथावयवेष्ववयती वर्तते?—

तेषु चावृत्तेरवयव्यभावः॥ 8॥

न तावत् प्रत्यवयवं वर्तते-योः परिमाणभेदाद् द्रव्यस्य, चैकद्रव्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्, नाप्येकदेशे-सर्वेष्वन्यावयावाभावात्, तदेवं न युक्तः संशयः-नास्त्यवयवीति॥8॥

तेषु teṣu, in them; च cha, and; अवृत्तेः a-vṛtteḥ, because of non-residence; अवयव्यभावः avayavi-abhāvaḥ, non-existence of the whole.

437. Also because the whole does not, continues the objector, reside in its parts.—8.

The *whole* does not reside in each of its parts separately on account of the difference of their dimension. Neither does it reside in some of its parts collectively because in that case it loses its connection with the other parts.

पृथक् चावयवेभ्योऽवृत्तेः॥ 9॥

पृथक् चावयवेभ्यः=धर्मिभ्यो धर्मस्याग्रहणादिति समानम्॥9॥

पृथक् pṛthak, other; च cha, and; अवयवेभ्य avayavebhyaḥ, then the parts; अवृत्तेः a-vṛtteḥ, because of non-residence.

438. Owing to the lack of residence, affirms the objector, there is no whole apart from its parts.—9.

The *whole* does not exist as the relation between it and its parts is not that of the container and the contained.

न चावयव्यवयवा:॥ 10॥

न na, not; च cha, and; अवयवी avayavī, the whole; अवयवा: avayavāḥ, parts.

439. And the parts are not the whole.—10.

The objector says that the relation between the whole and its parts is not that of identiry. No one says that thread is the web or the pillar is the house.

एकस्मिन् भेदाभावाद्भेदशब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्तेरप्रश्न:॥ 11॥

किं प्रत्यवयवं कृत्स्नोऽवयवी वर्तते अथैकदेशेनेति नोपपद्यते प्रश्न:, कस्मात्?, एकस्मिन् भेदाभावाद् भेदशब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्ते:='कृत्स्नम्' इत्यनेकस्याशेषाभिधानम्। 'एकदेश:' इति नानात्वे कस्यचिदभिधानम्, ताविमौ कृत्स्नैकदेशशब्दौ भेदविषयौनैकस्मिन्नऽवयविन्युपपद्येतेंभेदाभावादिति॥11॥

एकस्मिन् ekasmin, in one; भेदाभावात् bheda-abhāvāt, owing to absence of difference; भेदशब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्ते bheda-śadba-prayoga-an-upapatteḥ, because of impropriety of use of the word difference; अप्रश्न: a-praśnaḥ, no question.

440. There is, we reply, no room for the question owing to the impropriety in the use of the term "variety" in reference to what is *one.*—11.

In aphorism 4-2-7 an poonent raised the question as to whether the whole occupied its parts totally or partially. The Naiyāyika disposses of the question by saying that there is no room for it because the terms "totally" and "pertially" cannot be applied to "*one.*" The term "totally" is employed only in the case of several things of which no one has been left out while the word "partially" refers to an aggregate of which some parts have been left out. Now, neither the term "totally" nor the term "partially" is applicable to what is "one", that is, to a "whole." In the case of a whole the employment of language implying variety is unjustifiable.

अन्यावयावाभावाद् नैकदेशेन वर्तते इत्यहेतु:–

अवयवान्तराभावेप्यवृत्तरेहेतु:॥ 12॥

अवयवान्तराभावादिति, यद्यप्येकदेशोऽवयवान्तरभूत: स्यात् तथाप्यवयवेऽवयवान्तरं वर्तेत नावयवीति–अन्योऽवयवीति। अन्यावयवभावेप्यवृत्ते:–'अवयविनो नैकदेशेन वृत्ति:–अन्यावयवाभावात्' इत्यहेतु:। वृत्ति: कथमितिचेत्? एकस्याऽनेकत्राऽऽश्रयाश्रितसम्बन्धलक्षणा प्राप्ति:। आश्रयाश्रितभाव: कथमितिचेत्? यस्य यतोऽन्यत्राऽऽत्मलाभानुपपत्ति: स आश्रय: न कारणद्रव्येभ्योऽन्यत्र कार्यद्रव्यमात्मानं लभते, विषर्यवस्तु कारणद्रव्येष्विति।

नित्येषु कथमितिचेत्? अनित्येषु दर्शनात् सिद्धम्।

नित्येषु द्रव्येषु कथमाश्रयाश्रयिभाव इतिचेत्? अनित्येषु द्रव्यगुणेषु दर्शनादाश्रयाश्रयिभावस्य नित्येषु सिद्धिरिति। तस्मादवयव्याभिमान: प्रतिषिध्यते नि:श्रेयसकामस्य, नावयवी, यथा रूपादिषु मिथ्यासंकल्पो न रूपादय इति॥12॥

अवयवान्तराभावे avayava-antara-abhāve, in the absence of another part; अपि api, also; अवृत्ते: a-vṛtteḥ, owing to non-residence or non-function; अहेतु: a-hetuḥ, no mark or reason or argument.

441. The question, we further reply, is unreasonable because even of one part could be the residence of another part, it would not be the residence of the *whole.*—12.

When we speak of a whole residing in its parts we must not understand that the term residence refers to any space, in fact it refers to the relation of refuge and refugee. A refuge is that with which the refugee is inseparably connected and without which it can never exist. Hence, there is no impossibility of the whole residing in its parts.

"सर्वाग्रहणमवयव्यऽसिद्धे: 2-1-35" इतिप्रत्यवस्थितोप्येतदाह–

केशसमूहे तैमिरिकोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धि:॥ 13॥

यथैकैक: केशस्तैमिरिकेण नोपलभ्यते केशसमूहस्तमपलभ्यते तथैकैकोऽणुर्नोपलभ्यते अणुसंचयस्तूपलभ्यते तदिदमणुसमूहविषयं ग्रहणमिति॥13॥

केशसमूहे keśa-samūhe, in respect of a collection of hairs; तैमिरिकोपलब्धिवत् taimirika-upalabdhi-vat, lie the perception of the affected with a diness of sight; तदुपलब्धि: tat-upalabdhiḥ, its perception.

442. The perception of a "whole" bears analogy to that of a collection of hairs by a person affected with a dimness of sight.—13.

Just as a person of dim sight cannot perceive hairs separately but can perceive them in a mass, so we cannot perceive the atoms separately but can perceive them in a mass in the form of a jar or the like.

स्वविषयानतिक्रमेणेन्द्रियस्य पटुमन्दभावाद्विषयग्रहणस्य तथा भावो नाविषये प्रवृत्तिः॥ 14॥

यथाविषयविमन्द्रियाणां पटुमन्दभावाद् विषयग्रहणानां पटुमन्दभावो भवति=चक्षुः खलु प्रकृष्यमाणं नाऽविषयं गन्धं गृह्णाति, निकृष्यमाणं च न स्वविषयात् प्रच्यवते, सोयं तैमिरिकः कश्चिच्चक्षुर्विषयं केशं न गृह्णाति च केशसमूहम्, उभयं ह्यऽतैमिरिकेण चक्षुषा गृह्यते, परमाणवस्त्वऽतीन्द्रियाः=इन्द्रियाविषयभूता न केनचिदिन्द्रियेण गृह्यन्ते समुदितास्तु गृह्यन्ते इत्यविषये प्रवृत्तिरिन्द्रियस्य प्रसज्येत–न जात्वऽर्थान्तरमणुभ्यो गृह्यते इति, ते खल्विमे परमाणवः संहता गृह्यमाणा अतीन्द्रियत्वं जहति वियुक्ताश्चागृह्यमाणा इन्द्रियविषयत्वं न लभन्ते इति सोमं द्रव्यान्तरानुत्पत्तावतिमहानृ व्याघात इत्युपपद्यते द्रव्यान्तरं यद् ग्रहणस्य विषय इति।

संचयमात्रं विषय इतिचेत्? न-संचयस्य संयोगभावात्तस्य चातीन्द्रियस्याऽग्रहणादयुक्तम्।

संचयः खल्वनेकस्य संयोगः स च गृह्यमाणाश्रयो गृह्यते नाऽतीन्द्रियाश्रयः, भवति हि 'इदमनेन संयुक्तम्' इति, तस्मादयुक्तमेतदतिं गृह्यमाणस्य चेन्द्रियोण विषस्याऽऽवरणादि अनुपलब्धिकारणमुपलभ्यते तस्मान्नेन्द्रियदौर्बल्यादनुपलब्धिरणूनां यथा नेन्द्रियदौर्बल्याच्चक्षुषा-ऽनुपलब्धिर्गन्धादीनामिति॥14॥

स्वविषयानतिक्रमेण sva-viṣaua-an-atikramena, by reason of its not going beyond its own object; इन्द्रियस्य indriyasya, of the sense; पटुमन्दभावात् paṭumanda-bhāvāt, according to keenness and dullness; विषयग्रहणस्य viṣayagrahaṇa-sya, of the apprehension of object; तथा tathā, like; भावः bhávaḥ, condition; न na, no; अविषये a-viṣaye. to what is not its object; प्रवृत्तिः pravṛttiḥ, operation.

443. A sense is inoperative in reference to what is not its object because its acuteness or dullness of apprehension is restricted to its own object which it connot transcend.—14.

The eye, whether it is acute or dim, cannot apprehend a sound. Similarly the ear, sharp or dull, cannot see a colour. All senses have their special objects to which their operation is restricted. An atom which is supersensuous, cannot be apprehended by any of oursenses—no matter whether these are acute or dim. Each hair being perceptible, its collection also is capable of being perceived whereas the atoms being imperceptible their collection cannot be perceived. As we can perceive the collection of atoms in the shape of a jar or the like, we must admit that the collection or the whole is a reality independent of its parts (the atoms).

अवयवावयविप्रसङ्गश्चैवमाप्रलयात्॥ 15॥

यः खल्ववयविनोऽवयवेषु वृत्तिप्रतिषेधादभावः सोयमवयवस्यावयवेषु प्रसज्यमानः सर्वप्रलयाय वा कल्पेत निरवयवाद्वा परमाणुतो निवर्तेत। उभयथा चोपलब्धिविषयस्याभावः तदभावादुपलब्ध्यभावः, उपलब्ध्याश्रयश्चायं वृत्तिप्रतिषेधः स आश्रयं व्याघ्नन् आत्मघाताय कल्पते इति॥15॥

अवयवावयविप्रसङ्गः avayava-avayavi-prasaṅgaḥ, relation of whole and parts; च cha, and; एवं evam, then; आ ā. up; प्रलयात् pralayāt, to pralaya, dissolution.

444. The whole and its parts should in that case be supposed to continue up to the time of annihilation.—15.

Even if we admit the existence of a whole and its parts, we cannot suppose them to continue for ever because they are subject to destruction at the time of annihilation. A whole has got its parts and the parts again have their parts which do not cause until they become non-existent at the time of annihilation.

अथापि–

न प्रलयोऽणुसद्भावात्॥ 16॥

अवयवविभागमाश्रित्य वृत्तिप्रतिषेधादभावः प्रसज्यमानो निरवयवात् परमाणोर्निवर्तते न सर्वप्रलयाय कल्पते। निरवयवत्वं खलु परमाणोर्विभागैरल्पतरप्रसङ्गस्य (अभावात्) यतो नाल्पीयस्तत्रावस्थानात्। लोष्टस्य खलु प्रविभज्यमानावयवस्याऽल्पतरमल्पतममुत्तरमुत्तरं भवति स चायमल्पतरप्रसङ्गः यस्मन्नाल्पतरमस्ति=यः परमोऽल्पस्तत्र निवर्तते, यतश्च नाल्पीयोस्ति तं परमाणुं प्रचक्ष्महे इति॥16॥

न na, no; प्रलय pralayaḥ, dissolution; अणुसद्भावात् Aṇu-sad-bhāvāt, owing to the existence of the atom.

445. There is, we reply, no annihilation because; there are atoms.—16.

There will never come a time when there will be an utter annihilation, for things will even them continue to exist in the state of

atoms. An atom is a thing of the smallest dimension, that is, a thing which is not capable of being of smaller dimension.

परं वा त्रुटेः॥ 17॥

अवयवविभागस्याऽनवस्थानाद् द्रव्याणामसंख्येयत्वात् त्रुटित्वनिवृत्तिरिति॥17॥

परं param, beyond; वा vā, or; त्रुटेः truṭeḥ, of truṭi, a minute part.

446. An atom is that which is not capable of being divided.—17.

An atom is not divisible into further parts.

[Two atoms make a *dvyaṇuka* (dyad) and three *dvyaṇukas* make a *tryasareṇu* (triad). All things which we perceive are composed of *tryasareṇus*. An atom (aṇu) is finer than a *dvyaṇuka* and the latter finer then a *tryasareṇu*].

Topic 2 : Relation of the Whole and Parts : Sūtras : 4-17.

There can be no doubt about the existence of the whole over and above the parts (see II.i.35 *et. seq.)*. To this the following objections are urged : (1) Each single part cannot exist in the entire whole owing to the difference of their size and as that would entail the exclusion of the other parts. (2) It cannot occupy a portion of the whole because the whole as conceived has no such portions. (3) The whole cannot reside in each single part as their sizes are different and as that would entail that a substance is constituted by a single component. (4) It cannot reside in a portion of a part because parts have no portions. (5) It is not known to exist away from the parts. (6) It cannot be an attribute of the parts for the reason stated before.

To this the reply is : The doubt is not justified; for the whole being a single entity, the distinction of entire and parts is inapplicable to it. When it is said that the whole resides in the parts what is meant is that the whole covers the parts, *i.e.* it makes possible for the parts to combine to form a single entity. So that part may have independent existence, but there can be no whole unless there were parts.

Therefore in the case of a person who seeks the supreme good what is prohibited is the conceit which regards objects as wholes, and not that the existence of wholes is denied. Just as false notions in respect to colour, etc. is prohibited and not that colour, etc. are denied.

Again, single atoms are not perceptible. They cannot be therefore

perceptible in mass. Yet bodies constituted by atoms are perceptible. What makes them perceptible is the existence of wholes over and above the parts. The something perceptible in the collocation of atoms is the whole. To say that there is no perception of the whole in the parts is suicidal; for in the last analysis only the atoms are left and they are not object of perception; so that the requird object of perception, *i.e.* parts, is reduced to something imperceptible. On the other hand, the argument cannot be pushed to the extreme conclusion denying the total existence of all things. For atoms cannot be so negated. They are the least indivisible parts of bodies.

अथेदानीमानुपलम्भिकः सर्वं नास्तीति मन्यमान आह—

आकाशव्यतिभेदात् तदनुपपत्तिः॥ 18॥

तस्याऽणोर्निरवयवस्य नित्यस्यानुपपत्तिः, कस्मात्? आकाशव्यतिभेदात्=अन्तर्बहिश्चाणुराकाशेन समाविष्टः=व्यतिभिन्नो व्यतिभेदात् सावयवः सावयवत्वादनित्य इति॥18॥

आकाशव्यतिभेदात् ākáśa-vyatibhedāt, owing to interpenetration of ether; तदनुपपत्तिः tat-an-upapattiḥ, its non-proof.

447. There is, say some one, an impossibility of such a thing as it is divided throughout by ether.—18.

The Naiyāyika defines the atom as a whole which has no parts that is, a things which is not divisible into further parts. Some one controverts the definition by saying that an atom is not devoid of parts because it is intersected by ether *within* and *without*.

आकाशासर्व्वगतत्वं वा॥ 19॥

अथैतन्नेष्यते=परमाणोरन्तर्नास्त्याकाशमिति? असर्वगतत्वं प्रसज्यते इति॥19॥

आकाशासर्व्वगतत्वं akáśa-a-sarva-gata-tvam, non-omnipenetration ether; वा vā, or.

448. Else there would not be the omnipresence of the ether.—19.

The ether would not be called omnipresent if it could not reside within the atoms.

अन्तर्बहिश्च कार्य्यद्रव्यस्य कारणान्तरवचनादकार्य्ये तदभावः॥ 20॥

'अन्तः' इति पिहितं कारणान्तरैः कारणमुच्यते, 'बहि' इति च व्यवधायकमव्यवहितं कारणमेवोच्यते, तदेतत् कार्यद्रव्यस्य संभवति। नाऽणोः-अकार्यत्वात्=अकार्ये हि

परमाणावऽन्तर्बहिरित्यस्याभावः, यत्र चास्य भावोऽणुकार्यं तत् न परमाणुः, यतो हि नाल्पतरमस्ति स परमाणुरिति।।20।।

अन्तः antaḥ, in; बहिः bahiḥ, out; च cha, and; कार्य्यद्रव्यस्य kārya-dravyasya of the effect substance; कारणान्तरवचनात् kāraṇa-antara-vachanāt, owing to declaration of another cause; अकार्य्ये a-kārye, in a non-effect; तदभावः tat-a-bhāvaḥ, its absence.

449. There is no "within", "without" of an eternal thing. The terms are applicable only to factitious things inasmuch as they imply constituents other than those which are seen.—20.

The word "within" refers to that constituent of a thing which is enclosed by another constituent thereof while the word "without" refers to the constituent which encloses another constituent, but is not enclosed by it. These terms cannot be applied to eternal things such as atoms which do not possess constituents some of which may enclose the rest.

शब्दसंयोगविभवाच्च सर्व्वगतम्।। 21।।

यत्र क्वचिदुत्पन्नाः शब्दा विभवन्त्याकाशे=तदाश्रया भवन्ति, मनोभिः परमाणुभिस्तत्कार्यैश्च संयोगा भवन्त्याकाशे, नाऽसंयुक्तमाकाशेन किंचिन्मूर्तद्रव्यमुपलभ्यते तस्मान्नाऽसर्वगतमिति।।21।।

शब्दसंयोगविभवात् śabda-saṃyoga-bibhavāt, owing to universality of conjunction of sound; च cha, and; सर्वगतम् sarva-gatam, all-penetrating.

450. The ether is omnipresent because of the universality of its conjunction which is a cause of sound.—21.

Owing to sound being produced everywhete it is inferred that the ether is omnipresent. It a certain place were devoid of contact with ether there would be no sound there. There is in fact a conjunction of ether everywhere.

अव्यूहाविष्टम्भविभुत्वानि चाकाशधर्माः।। 22।।

संसर्पता प्रतिघातिना द्रव्येण न व्यूह्यते यथा काष्ठेनोदकम्, कस्मात्?, निरवयवत्वात्, सर्पच्च प्रतिघाति द्रव्यं न विष्टभ्नाति=नास्य क्रियाहेतुं गुणं प्रतिबध्नाति, कस्मात् अस्पर्शत्वात्, विपर्यये हि विष्टम्भो दृष्ट इति, सावयवे स्पर्शवति द्रव्ये दृष्टं धर्मं विपरीते नाशङ्कितुमर्हति।।

अण्ववयवस्याणुतरत्वप्रसङ्गादणुकार्यप्रतिषेधः।।

सावयत्वे चाऽणोरण्ववयोऽणुतर इति प्रसज्यते, कस्मात्?, कार्यकारणद्रव्ययोः

परिमाणभेददर्शनात्, तस्मादण्ववयवस्याणुतरत्वम्, यस्तु सावयवः अणुकार्यं तदिति, तस्मादणुकार्यमिदं प्रतिषिध्यते इति। कारणविभागाच्च कार्यस्यानित्यत्वं नाऽऽकाशव्यतिभेदात्=लोष्टस्यावयवविभागादनित्यत्वं नाऽऽकाशसमावेशादिति।।22।।

अव्यूहाविष्टम्भविभुत्वानि a-vyūha-viṣtambha-vibhu-tvāni, characteristics not being massed, not offering obstruction, and being universal; च cha, and; आकाशधर्माः ākāśa-dharmāḥ, the attributes or properties of ether.

451. The ether possesses three properties, *viz.*, that it is not repelled, that it does not obstruct and that it is all-pervading.—22.

The ether is not repelled because it does not possess any form, it does not obstruct because it is intangible, and it is all-pervading because it is omnipresent.

मूर्त्तिमताञ्च संस्थानोपपत्तेरवयवसद्भावः।। 23।।

परिच्छिन्नानां हि स्पर्शवतां संस्थानां त्रिकोणं चतुरस्रं समं परिमण्डलमित्युपपद्यते यत्तत् संस्थानं सोऽवयवसंनिवेशः परिमण्डलाश्चाणवस्तस्मात् सावयवा इति।।23।।

मूर्त्तिमतां mūrti-matām, of things possessing a form; च cha, and; संस्थानोपपत्ते saṃsthāna-upapatteḥ, from proof of position, shape; अवयवसद्भावः avayava-sad-bhāvaḥ, existence of parts.

452. There are, says some one, parts in an atom because a thing that is endowed with a form must also possess a collocation of parts.—23.

The objection stands thus :—

An atom is divisible into parts because it possesses a form, that is, it is of a limited dimension.

[The ether, soul, space and time being of unlimited dimensions are not divisible into parts.]

संयोगोपपत्तेश्चः।। 24।।

मध्ये सन्नऽणुः पूर्वापराभ्यामणुभ्यां संयुक्तस्योर्व्यवधानं कुरुते, व्यवधानेनाऽनुमीयते पूर्वभागेन पूर्वेणाणुना संयुज्यते परभागेन परेणाणुना संयुज्यते, यौ तौ पूर्वापरौ भागौ तावऽस्याऽवयवौ, एवं सर्वतः संयुज्यमानस्य सर्वतो भागा अवयवा इति।।24।।

संयोगोपपत्तेश्चः saṃyoga-upapatteḥ, from proof of conjunction; च cha, and.

453. An atom, continues the objector, must possess parts because it is capable of being conjoined with another atom.—24.

The objection is this :—

The fact that atoms possess the quality of conjunction proves the they have parts, because an atom an come in conjunction with another only in some of its parts.

यत्तावत्-"मूर्तिमतां संस्थानांपपत्तेरवयवसद्भाव: 23" इति, अत्रोक्तम्। किमुक्तम्? 'विभागाल्पतरप्रसङ्गस्य यतो नाल्पीयस्तत्र निवृत्तेः, अण्ववयवस्य चाणुतरत्वप्रसङ्गादणुकार्य-प्रतिषेधः' इति। यत्पुनरेतत्-"संयोगोपपत्तेश्च" इति?, स्पर्शवत्त्वाद् व्यवधानम्, आश्रयस्य चाऽव्याप्त्या भागभक्तिः उक्तं चात्र-स्पर्शवानणुः स्पर्शवतोरण्वोः प्रतिघातात् व्यवधायको न सावयवत्वात्, स्पर्शवत्त्वच्चा व्यवधाने सत्यऽणुसंयोगो नाश्रयं व्याप्नोतीति भागभक्तिर्भवति= भागवानिवायमिति, उक्तं चात्र-'विभागेऽल्पतरप्रसङ्गस्य यतो नाल्पीयस्तत्रावस्थानात्, तदवयवस्य चाणुतरत्वप्रसङ्गादणुकार्यप्रतिषेधः' इति॥

मूर्तिमतां च संस्थानोपपत्तेः संयोगोपपत्तेश्च परमाणूनां सावयवत्त्वमितिहेत्वोः—

अनवस्थाकारित्वादनवस्थानुपपत्तेश्चाप्रतिषेधः॥ 25॥

यावद् मूर्तिमद् चावच्च संयुज्यते तत् सर्वं सावयवमित्यनवस्थाकारिणाविमौ हेतू, सा चानवस्था नोपपद्यते। सत्यामनवस्थायां सत्यौ हेतू स्यातां। तस्मादप्रतिषेधोयं निरवयवत्वस्येति। विभागश्च विभज्यमानहानेर्नोपपद्यते तस्मात् प्रलयान्तता नोपपद्यते इति। अनवस्थायां च प्रत्यधिकरणं द्रव्यावयवानामानन्त्यात् परिमाणभेदानां गुरुत्वस्य चाग्रहणं समानपरिमाणत्वं चाऽवयवावयविनोः परमाण्ववयवविभागादूर्ध्वमिति॥25॥

अनवस्थाकारित्वात् an-avasthā-kāri-tvāt, as causing instability, regression; अनवस्थानुपपत्ते an-avasthā-an-upapatteḥ, because of unreasonableness of regresion; च cha, and; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

454. The doctrine of the indivisibility of atom cannot, we reply be refuted because such a refutation would give rise to a *regressus ad infinitum* which is not proper.—25.

If you say that an atom is divisible into parts, you will have to admit that those parts again are divisible into futher parts. This would give rise to a *regressus ad infinitum* which should, if possible, be avoided. If all things were indefinitely divisible we should find a large things and a small one to be of equal dimension as both would possess an infinite number of parts. A thing although indefinitely divided should not lose itself. There must remain a particle, *viz.*, an atom which should not perish even at the time of annihilation.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 3 : The Partless : Sūtras : 18-25.

Nothing exists, rejoins the pessimist; the wholes are reduced to partless atoms, but partless eternal atoms are an impossibility, bucause the ether must pervade them both inside and outside in which case they cannot be partless, or, if the ether does not so pervade them, then the ether cannot be all-pervading as is claimed for it. To this the reply is that the terms inside and outside can be applied only to a body composed of parts and are inapplicable to the atoms themselves which are partless. As regards the ether it cannot but be all-pervading. For nothing ponderable or corporeal exists which is not in conjunction with the ether. A sound produce spreads over the ether. Conjunctions with mind, atoms, and their effects also spread over the ether. The characteristics of the ether are that it is nowhere parted and re-united like water by a passing boat, and that nowhere does it offer resistance to moving bodies. This shows that it is partless and intangible.

Then an atom cannot be a product; for if it is a product its constitutents must be more minute and in that case it will not be an atom. As partless it is eternal. A product is non-eternal, not because of the pervasion of the ether but because of the disintegration of the parts. The pessimist rejoins that the atoms cannot be partless, for the reason that they possess a definite shape (spherical) and also enter into conjunctions among themselves. The objection to this rejoinder is that it will lead to infinite regression which is illogical, and will also eliminate gravity and diversity of dimensions and entail equality of dimension between the whole and the part as a consequence of infinity of part in each part and part of a part.

यदिदं भवान् बुद्धिराश्रित्य 'बुद्धिविषयाः सन्ति' इति मन्यते मिथ्याबुद्धय एताः, यदि हि तत्त्वबुद्धयः स्युर्बुद्ध्या विवेचने क्रियमाणे याथात्म्यं बुद्धिविषयाणामुपलभ्येत—

बुद्ध्या विवेचनात्तु भावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिस्तन्त्वपकर्षणे पटसद्भावानुपलब्धिवत् तदनुपलब्धिः॥ 26॥

यथा 'अयं तन्तुरयं तन्तुः' इति प्रत्येकं तन्तुषु विविच्यमानेषु नार्थान्तरं किंचिदुपलभ्यते यत् पटबुद्धेर्विषयः स्यात्-याथात्म्यानुपलब्धेः, असति विषये पटबुद्धिर्भवन्ती मिथ्याबुद्धिर्भवति, एवं सर्वत्रेति॥26॥

बुद्ध्या buddhyā, by the understanding; विवेचनात् vivechanāt, from separation; तु tu, but; याथात्म्यानुपलब्धि yāthātmya-an-upalabdhiḥ, non-perception of reality; तन्त्वपकर्षणे tantu-apakarṣaṇe, one the separation

of the threads; पटसद्भावानुपलब्धिवत् paṭa-sadbhāva-an-upalabdhi-vat, like the non-perception of the existence of fabric; तदनुपलब्धिः tat-an-upalabdiḥ, its non-perception;

455. Things, some say, do not possess a reality if they are separated from our thoughts, just as there is no reality in a web separated from its threads.—26.

The objection is this :—

Thing do not possess a reality independent of our thoughts just as a web does not possess a reality independent of its threads. Hence, it is our thoughts alone that are real, external things are all unreal.

[This aphorism refers to the doctrine of the Yogāchāra Buddhist philosophy explained in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.][1]

व्यहतत्वादहेतुः।। 27।।

यदि बुद्ध्या विवेचनं भावानाम्? न सर्वभावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिः, अथ सर्वभावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिः, न बुद्ध्या विवेचनं भावानाम्, बुद्ध्या विवेचनं च याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिश्चेति व्याहन्यते, तदुक्तम्–"अवयवावयवप्रसङ्गश्चैवमाप्रलयात् 15" इति।।27।।

व्याहतत्वात् vyāhata-tvāt, being obstructed; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a mark.

456. The reason, we reply, is not good as it hurts itself.—27.

The Naiyāyika says that his opponent's reason, *viz.*, that things do not possess a reality if they are separated from our thoughts, is self-destructive because if things are capable of being separated from our thoughts they cannot be said to be unreal, and on the other hard if things are unreal they are incapable of being separated from our thoughts. The opponent commits a contradiction by saying that things are unreal and at the same time by going to separate them from our thoughts.

तदाश्रयत्वादपृथग्ग्रहणम्।। 28।।

कार्यद्रव्यं कारणद्रव्याश्रितं तत्कारणेभ्यः पृथङ् नोपलभ्यते। विपर्यये पृथग् ग्रहणात्=यत्राऽऽश्रयाश्रितभावो नास्ति तत्र पृथग् ग्रहणमिति, बुद्ध्या विवेचनात्तु भावानां पृथग् ग्रहणम्=अतीन्द्रियेष्वणुषु यदिन्द्रियेण गृह्यते तदेतया बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानमन्यदिति।।28।।

तदाश्रयत्वात् tat-āśraya-tvāt, because an effect is dependent on the cause; अपृथग्ग्रहणम् a-pṛthak-grahaṇam, non-apprehension as separate.

457. There is, we reply, on separate perception of a refuge and its refugee.—28.

A web being the refuge o its threads, the perception of the former includes that of the latter so that there are no separate perceptions of them. If our thoughts were the refuge of external things, then there would be no separate perceptions of them. But the opponent's argument, *viz.*, that "if things are separated from our thoughts," makes if manifest that our thoughts are not the refuge of external things.

प्रमाणतश्चाऽर्थप्रतिपत्तेः।। 29।।

बुद्ध्या विवेचनाद् भावानां याथात्म्योपलब्धिः=यदस्ति यथा च यन्नास्ति यथा च तत्सर्वं प्रमाणत उपलब्ध्या सिध्यति, या च प्रमाणत उपलब्धिस्तद् बुद्ध्या विवेचनं भावानां तेन सर्वशास्त्राणि सर्वकर्माणि सर्वे च शरीरिणां व्यवहारा व्याप्ताः–परीक्षमाणो हि बुद्ध्याऽध्यवस्यति–'इदमस्ति इदं नास्ति' इति। तत्र च न सर्वभावानुपपत्तिः।।29।।

प्रमाणतः pramāṇa-taḥ, by means of proof; च cha, and; अर्थप्रतिपत्तेः artha-pratipatteḥ, because of establishment of object.

458. And things are established by evidences.—29.

The reality of things is proved by evidences such as perception. Every thing requires an evidence for its establishment. The very assertion that "things are not real if they cannot be separated from our thoughts" must be based on an evidence if it is to commnd itself to our acceptance. Hence, we cannot deny things if they are established by evidences.

प्रमाणनुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम्।। 30।।

एवं च सति सर्वं नास्तीति नोपपद्यते, कस्मात्? प्रमाणनुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्यान्=यदि सर्वं नास्तीति प्रमाणमुपपद्यते? सर्वं नास्तीत्येतद् व्याहन्यते, अथ प्रमाणं नोपपद्यते? सर्वं नास्तीत्यस्य कथं सिद्धिः? अथ प्रमाणमन्तरेण सिद्धिः, सर्वमस्तीत्यस्य कथं न सिद्धिः।।30।।

प्रमाणनुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम् pramāṇa-an-upapatti-upapatti-bhyām, by reason of application and non-application of proofs.

459. The non-reality of things is demonstrated neither by evidence nor without them.—30.

1. बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्य्यते।
यस्मात् तस्माद् अनभिलाप्यास्ते निःस्वभावाश्च देशिताः।
(लंकावतार सूत्र, 2 परिवर्त्त, पृष्ठ 50)
बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्य्यते।
यस्मादनभिलाप्यास्ते निःस्वभावाश्च देशिताः।।
(लंकावतार सूत्र, 10 परिवर्त्त, पृष्ठ 115)

The proposition that "there is nothing" cannot be proved in any way. If you say that there is an evidence to prove it, you hurt your own proposition, *viz.*, that, there is nothing. If again you say that there is no evidence, how do you then establish your porposition?

स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवदयं प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानः॥ 31॥

यथा स्वप्ने न विषयाः सन्ति अथ चाभिमानो भवति, एवं न प्रमाणानि प्रमेयाणि च सन्ति अथ च प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानो भवति॥31॥

स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवत् svapna, viṣaya-abhimāna-vat, like the idea of objects seen in a dream; अयं ayam, this; प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमान: pramāṇ-prameya-abhimānaḥ, idea of proof and the object of proof.

460. The concept of the means and the objects of knowledge, says some one, bears analogy to that of things appearing in a dream.—31.

The means and the objects of knowledge are as delusive as things appearing in a dream.

[The aphorism 4-2-31 and 4-2-32 evidently refer to the Buddhist doctrine of "non-reality" expounded in the Ārya Upāli-pṛcchā-Samādhi rāja-sūtra, Ārya-gagana-gañja-sūtra, Mādhyamika-sūtra, Ārya-ratnāvalī, Lalitavistara-sūtra and other Mahāyāna works.][1]

मायागन्धर्व्वनगरमृगतृष्णिकावद्वा॥ 32॥

मायागन्धर्व्वनगरमृगतृष्णिकावत् māyā-gandharva-nagara-mṛga-triṣṇikā-vat, like illusion, the city of the celestial musicians, and mirage; वा vā, or.

461. It may, continues the objector, be likened to jugglery, the city of the celestial quiristers or a mirage.—32.

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1. यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गन्धर्वनगरं यथा।
तथोत्पादस्तथा स्थानं तथा भङ्ग उदाहृतम्। (*Mādhyamika-Sūtra*, Chap. VII)
यथैव गन्धवपुरं मरीचिका यथैव माया सुपिनं यथैव।
स्वभावशून्या तु निमित्तभावना तथोपमान् जानत सर्वधर्म्मान्॥
(Quoted in *Mādhyamikā Vṛtti*, p. 57)
माया मरीचि समो हि विकल्पः। (*Ārya-Upālipṛccha*, quoted in *M.V.* 63)
मायोपमा गगनविद्युत्समोदकचन्द्रसन्निभमरीचिसमाः। (*Ārya-Samādhirāja-Bhṭṭāraka* quoted in *Mādhamikā Vṛtti*, Chap. XXI.)

The means and the objects of knowledge are as unreal as things exhibited in jugglery, etc.

हेत्वभावादसिद्धिः॥ 33॥

'स्वप्नान्ते विषयाभिमानवत् प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानो न पुनर्जागरितान्ते विषयोपलब्धिवत्' इत्यत्र हेतुर्नास्ति, हेत्वभावादसिद्धिः। स्वप्नान्ते चासन्तो विषया उपलभ्यन्ते इत्यत्रापि हेत्वभावः॥

प्रतिबोधेऽनुपलम्भादितिचेत्? प्रतिबोधविषयोपलम्भादप्रतिषेधः।

यदि प्रतिबोधेऽनुपलम्भात् स्वप्ने विषया न सन्तीति? तर्हि ये इमे प्रतिबुद्धेन विषया उपलभ्यन्ते(ते) उपलम्भात् सन्तीति–विपर्यये हि हेतुसामर्थ्यम्=उपलम्भाभावे सति अनुपलम्भादभावः सिध्यति, उभयथा त्वभावे नानुपलम्भस्य सामर्थ्यमस्ति, यथा प्रदीपस्याभावाद् रूपस्यादर्शनमिति, तत्र भावेनाभावः समर्थ्यते इति।

स्वप्नान्तविकल्पे च हेतुवचनम्।

"स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवत्" इतिब्रुवता स्वप्नान्तविकल्पे हेतुर्वाच्यः, कश्चित्स्वप्नो भयोपसंहितः कश्चित् प्रमोदोपसंहितः कश्चिदुभयविपरीतः कदाचित् स्वप्नमेव न पश्यतीति, निमित्तवतस्तु स्वप्नविषयाभिमानस्य निमित्तविकल्पाद् विकल्पोपपत्तिः॥33।

हेत्वभावात् hetu-a-bhāvāt, owing to non-existence of cause; असिद्धिः a-siddhiḥ, non-proof.

462. This cannot, we reply, be proved, as there is no reason for it.—33.

There is no reason that the concept of the means and the objects of knowledge should hear an analogy to the concept of things appearing is a dream but no to that of things appearing in our wakeful state. If you, to prove the unrealty of things in a dream, adduce the reason that these are not perceived in our wakeful state, we would, to prove the reality of the means and the objects of knowledge, adduce the reason that these are perceived in our wakeful state.

स्मृतिसङ्कल्पवच्च स्वप्नविषयाभिमानः॥ 34।

पूर्वोपलब्धविषयः यथा स्मृतिश्च संकल्पश्च पूर्वोपलब्धविषयौ न तस्य प्रत्याख्यानाय कल्पेते, तथा स्वप्ने विषयग्रहणं पूर्वोपलब्धविषयं न तस्य प्रत्याख्यानाय कल्पते इति, एवं दृष्टविषयश्च स्वप्नान्तो जागरितान्तेन। यः सुप्तः स्वप्नं पश्यति स एवं जाग्रत् स्वप्न-दर्शनानि प्रतिसंधत्ते–'इदमद्राक्षम्' इति. तत्र जाग्रद्बुद्धिवृत्तिवशात् स्वप्नविषयाभिमानो मिथ्येति व्यवसायः=सति च प्रतिसंधाने या जागतो बुद्धिवृत्तिस्तद्वशादयं व्यवसायः–स्वप्नविषया-भिमानो मिथ्येति।

उभयाविशेषे तु साधनानर्थक्यम्।

यस्य स्वप्नान्तजागरितान्तयोरविशेषस्तस्य ''स्वप्नविषयाविभमानवत्'' इति साधन-मनर्थकम्-तदाश्रयप्रत्याख्यानात्=अतस्मिंस्तदिति च व्यवसाय: प्रधानाश्रय:=अपुरुषे स्थाणौ पुरुष इति (य:) व्यवसाय: स प्रधानाश्रय:-न खलु पुरुषेऽनुपलब्धे पुरुष इत्यपुरुषे व्यवसायो भवति, एवं स्वप्नविषयस्य व्यवसाय:-'हस्तिनमद्राक्षम्', 'पर्वतमद्राक्षम्' इति प्रधानाश्रयो भवितुमर्हति।।34।।

स्मृतिसङ्कल्पवत् smṛti-saṅkalpa-vat, like memory and imagination; च cha, and; स्वप्नविषयाभिमान: svapna-viṣaya-abhimānaḥ, idea of object seen in a dream.

463. The concept of things in a dream arises in the same way as remembrance and imagination.—34.

The things that appear in a dream are not unreal. We can conceive of them in a dream just as we can do in our wakeful state. Our concept of things in the dream is due to our memory and imagination.

It is by a reference to the knowledge in our wakeful condition, that we ascertain our knowledge in the dream to be unreal. But in the event of there being only one condition, *viz.*, the of wakefulness, the analogy to the dream would not be appropriate.

एवं च सति–

मिथ्योपलब्धिविनाशस्तत्त्वज्ञानात् स्वप्नविषयाभिमानप्रणाशवत् प्रतिबोधे।। 35।।

स्थाणौ 'पुरुषोयम्' इतिव्यवसायो मिथ्योपलब्धि:=अतस्मिंस्तदितिज्ञानम्, स्थाणौ 'स्थाणु' इतिव्यवसायस्तत्त्वज्ञानम्, तत्त्वज्ञानेन च मिथ्योपलब्धिर्निवर्त्यते-नार्थ: स्थाणुपुरुष-सामान्यलक्षण: यथा प्रतिबोधे या ज्ञानवृत्तिस्तया स्वप्नविषयाभिमानो निवर्त्यते-नार्थो विषयसामान्यलक्षण:, तथा मायागन्धर्वनगरमृगतृष्णिकाणामपि या बुद्धय: (ता:) अतस्मिंस्त-दितिव्यवसायास्तत्राप्यनेनैव कल्पेन मिथ्योपलब्धिविनाशस्तत्त्वज्ञानाद्, नार्थप्रतिषेध इति। उपादानवच्च मायादिषु मिथ्याज्ञानम्, प्रज्ञापनीयसरूपं च द्रव्यमुपादाय साधनवान् परस्य मिथ्याध्यवसायं करोति सा माया, नीहारप्रभृतीनां नगरसरूपसंनिवेशे दूराद् नगरबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते विपर्यये तदभावात्, सूर्यमरीचिषु भौमेनोष्मणा संसृष्टेषु स्पन्दमानेषूदकबुद्धिर्भवति-सामान्यग्रहणात्, अन्तिकस्थस्य विपर्यये तदभावात्, क्वचित् कदाचित् कस्यचिच्च भावाद् नाऽनिमित्तं मिथ्याज्ञानम्। दृष्टं च बुद्धिद्वैतं मायाप्रयोक्तु: परस्य च दूरान्तिकस्थयोर्गन्धर्व-नगरमृगतृष्णिकासु सुप्तप्रतिबुद्धयोश्च स्वप्नविषये, तदेतत् सर्वस्याभावे=निरुपाख्यतायाम्=निरात्मकत्वे नोपपद्यते इति।।35।।

मिथ्योपलब्धिविनाश: mithyā-upalabdhi-vināśaḥ, destruction of false perception or cognition; तत्त्वज्ञानात् tattva-jñānāt, from knowledge of reality; स्वप्नविषयाभिमानप्रणाशवत् svapna-viṣaya-abhimāna-praṇāśa-vat, like the destruction of the idea of things seen in a dream; प्रतिबोधे prati-bodhe, on awakening.

464. Our false apprehension is destroyed by a knowledge of the truth, just as our concept of objects in a dream comes to an end on our awaking.—35.

In the case of jugglery, the city of the celestial quiristers and the mirage, our apprehension, if it is false, consists of our imputing "that" to what is "not that" just as when we mistake an post for a man. The objects the apprehension are, however, not unreal, inasmuch as they arise from our memory and imagination.

Jugglery (māyā) consists of a false apprehension produced in others by an artifice through the use of materials similar to those originally announced by him.

Just as our concept of objects in a dream passes away as soon as we are awake, so also our false apprehension of objects disappears as soon as we attain a true knowledge of those objects.

बुद्धेश्चैवं निमित्तसद्भावोपलम्भात्।। 36।।

मिथ्याबुद्धेश्चार्थवदऽप्रतिषेध:, कस्मात्? निमित्तोपलम्भात् सद्भावोपलम्भाच्च=उपलभ्यते मिथ्याबुद्धिनिमित्तं मिथ्याबुद्धिश्च प्रत्यात्ममुत्पन्ना गृह्यते-संवेद्यत्वात्, तस्मात् मिथ्याबुद्धि-रप्यस्तीति।।36।।

बुद्धे buddheḥ, of the understanding, of (false) knowledge; च cha, also; एवं evam, like wise; निमित्तसद्भावोपलम्भात् nimitta-sadbhāva-upalambhāt, from perception or cognition of the cause and its existence.

465. There is therefore no denial of false knowledge, inasmuch as we perceive that there is cause for that knowledge.—36.

It has already been shown that our *concept* of objects in a dream is unreal, inasmuch as we do not actually perceive them at that time, but that the *objects* of the dream are not unreal, inasmuch as they arise from our memory and imagination. In fact, the objects that give rise to false knowledge are never unreal, although the knowledge itself may be false.

तत्त्वप्रधानभेदाच्च मिथ्याबुद्धेर्द्वैविध्योपपत्तिः॥ 37॥

तत्त्वं स्थाणुरिति, प्रधानं पुरुष इति, तत्त्वप्रधानयोरलोपात्=भेदात् स्थाणौ पुरुष इति मिथ्याबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते-सामान्यग्रहणात्, एवं पताकायां बलाकेति लोष्टे कपोत इति, न त्वऽसमाने विषये मिथ्याबुद्धीनां समावेशः-सामान्यग्रहणव्यवस्थानात्। यस्य तु निरात्मकम्= निरुपाख्यं सर्वं तस्य समावेशः प्रसज्यते। गन्धादौ च प्रमेये गन्धादिबुद्धयो मिथ्याऽभिमता-स्तत्त्वप्रधानयोः सामान्यग्रहणस्य चाभावात् तत्त्वबुद्धय एव भवन्ति, तस्मादयुक्तमेतत्-'प्रमाणमप्रेयबुद्धयो मिथ्या' इति॥37॥

तत्त्वप्रधानभेदात् tattva-pradhāna-bhedāt, owing to the distinction of the reality and the primary idea or appearance; मिथ्याबुद्धे mithyā-buddheḥ, of false knowledge; द्वैविध्योपपत्तिः dvai-vidhya-upapattiḥ, proof of twofoldness.

466. And false knowledge involves a two-fold character on account of the distinction between the essence and appearance of its object.—37.

When we mistake a post for a man, our knowledge assumes the form "that is man." Our knowledge of the post, in so far as it is called "that", is a true knowledge, but in so far as it is described as "man", is a false knowledge. This falsity of knowledge is due to our recognition of certain properties common to the post and the man.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 4 : External objects are not transient : Sūtras : 26-37.

(The Buddhist addresses the Naiyāyika thus :) You defend the existence of external objects on the ground of our cognitions of those objects. But they are false cognitions. For instance, the cognition of a piece of cloth if a figment of the imagination. Because when a cloth is dissected only the yarns are left, and no cloth is found. Similarly in all cases. (The Naiyāyika replies :) This argument involves a self-contradiction. If an analysis of things by reason is possible then the non-cognition of the real nature of the thing is impossible. The product is not perceived separately from its becauses ecause it subsists in them. Where the causes are imperceptible analysis of their products by reason surely causes their distinct apprehension; as in the case of the atoms. Moreover, analysis by reason is the same as cognition by means of the pramāṇas establish the existence of external objects. On the other hand, there can be on proof of the propositon that all is non-existent. For if there is any proof then "all" which includes proof is not non-existence. If there is no proof the proposition is not established. It cannot be said that there is no existence, but only a conceit, of pramāṇas and premeyas as in the case of objects seen in a dream, hallucination, marage, etc. For there is no reason to support the supposition. In the first place, there is no reason to believe that objects seen in a dream are unreal. On the contrary, there are reason to show that they are real. Diversity of dream cognitions must be due to different causes. In the second place, if it is said that dream cognitions are unreal because they disappear on waking then it is admitted that apprehension and non-apprehension are respectively the marks of inference of the existence of things existent and non-existent. Objects of dream are no more unreal than objects of recollection and imagination. All these objects are based on reality previously apprehended. After waking, by comparison with waking cognitions, dreams are found to be unreal. So that the experiences of the waking consciousness from the real basis of dream cognitions.

Thus, there are objects and wrong cognitions of objects. Wrong cognitions of objects are destroyed through true knowledge as the conceit of the cognition of objects in dreams disappears on waking. Similarly the sun's rays opposed by the radiation of heat from the earth quiver and are mistaken for water. On nearer view the wrong cognition is removed. So everywhere what is destroyed is the wrong cognition, and the object. No man has ever at any place a wrong cognition which is not without a real cause. Moreover, there is a duality of cognition in each of the cases cited : the magician, the waking man and the man near by know the phenomena of the magic, dream and mirage as unreal, while the spectators, the sleeping man and the man at a distance know them as real. These diverese cognitions could not be possible if all things were non-existent.

(As to the Nihilist) : Wrong cognition itself cannot be negated; for its cause and its existence are apprehended. Every man is aware of wrong cognition and of its cause. Wrong cognition therefore has existence. Wrong cognition embraces a twofold object, reality and appearance, *e.g.* the pillar and man, where a pillar is mistaken for a man. It arises from the perception of the common attributes of two similar things. Where, on the other hand, all objects are of a uniform character devoid of name and reality (as with the opponent), there can be no possibility of wrong cognition. In the case of smell and other prameyas, the cognition of which are said to be wrong, the cognitions are certainly true cognition, because they do not embrace the duality of reality and appearance. Therefore, it is unreasonable to hold that the cognitions of pramāṇas and prameyas are wrong.

''दोषनिमित्तानां तत्त्वज्ञानादहङ्कारनिवृत्तिः 4-2-1'' इत्युक्तम् अथ कथं तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते ? इति–

समाधिविशेषाभ्यासात्॥ 38॥

स तु प्रत्याहृतस्येन्द्रियार्थेभ्यो मनसो धारकेण प्रयत्नेन धार्यमाणस्यात्मना संयोगस्तत्त्वबुभुत्साविशिष्टः सति हि तस्मिन्निन्द्रियार्थेषु बुद्धयो नोत्पद्यन्ते तदभ्यासवशात् तत्त्वबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते॥38॥

समाधिविशेषाभ्यासात् samādhi-viśeṣa-abhyāsāt, from the practice of a particular contemplation.

467. The knowledge of truth is rendered habitual by a special practice of meditation.—38.

Meditation is the soul's union with the mind abstracted from the senses whose contact with objects does not produce any perception. The knowledge of the truth is rendered habitual by the repeated practice of this meditation.

यदुक्तम्-'सति हि तस्मिन्निन्द्रियार्थेषु बुद्धयो नोत्पद्यन्ते' इत्येतत्–

नार्थविशेषप्राबल्यात्॥ 39॥

अनिच्छतोपि बुद्ध्युत्पत्तेर्नैतद् युक्तम्, कस्मात्? अर्थविशेषप्राबल्यादऽबुभुत्समानस्थापि बुद्ध्युत्पत्तिर्दृष्टा यथा स्तनयित्नुशब्दप्रभृतिषु, तत्र समाधिविशेषो नोपपद्यते॥39॥

न na, no; अर्थविशेषप्राबल्यात् artha-viśeṣa-prābalyāt, owing to predominance of certain objects.

468. Meditation, some say, is not practicable by reason of the predominance of certain external objects.—39.

There are innumerable obstacles to meditation, *e.g.* hearing the thundering noise of a cloud, one is prevented from practising meditation.

क्षुदादिभिः प्रवर्त्तनाच्च॥ 40॥

क्षुत्पिपासाभ्यां शीतोष्णाभ्यां व्याधिभिश्चानिच्छतोपि बुद्धयः प्रवर्तन्ते तस्मादै-काग्र्यानुपपत्तिरिति॥40॥

क्षुधादिभिः kṣut-ādi-bhiḥ, by hunger, etc.; प्रवर्त्तनात् pravarttanāt, from incitement; च cha, and.

469. And by reason of our being impelled to action by hunger etc.—40.

Hunger and thirst, heat and cold, disease, etc. sometimes prevent us from practising meditation.

अस्त्वेतत् समाधिव्युत्थाननिमित्तं समाधिप्रत्यनीकं च, सति त्वेतस्मिन्–

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात् तदुत्पत्तिः॥ 41॥

पूर्वकृतः=जन्मान्तरोपचितस्तत्त्वज्ञानहेतुर्धर्मप्रविवेकः, फलानुबन्धः=योगाभ्याससामर्थ्यं, निष्फले ह्यभ्यासे नाभ्यासमाद्रियेरन्, दृष्टं हि लौकिकेषु कर्मस्वऽभ्याससामर्थ्यम्॥41॥

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात् pūrve-kṛta-phala-anubandhāt, from sequence of fruits of previous acts; तदुत्पत्तिः tat-utpattiḥ, its production.

470. It arises, we reply, through possession of the fruits of our former works.—41.

We acquire a habit of practising meditation in consequence of our good deeds of a previous life.

प्रयत्नीकपरिहारार्थं च–

अरण्यगुहापुलिनादिषु योगाभ्यासोपदेशः॥ 42॥

योगाभ्यासजनितो धर्मो जनमान्तरेप्यनुवर्तते, प्रचयकाष्ठागते तत्त्वज्ञानहेतौ धर्मे प्रकृष्टायां समाधिभावनायां तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते इति, दृष्टश्च समाधिनाऽर्थविशेषप्राबल्याभिभवः:- 'नाहमेतदश्रौषम् नाहमेतदज्ञासिषम्'-अन्यत्र मे मनोऽभूत, इत्याह लौकिक इति॥42॥

अरण्यगुहापुलिनादिषु araṇya-guhā-pulina-ādi-ṣu, in forests, caves and river bank; योगाभ्यासोपदेशः yoga-abhyāsa-upadeśaḥ, instruction of the practice of yoga or contemplation.

471. We are instructed to practise meditation in such places as a forest, a cave or a sand-bank.—42.

The meditaiton practise in these places is not seriously disturbed by any obstacle.

यद्यर्थविशेषप्राबल्यादनिच्छतोपि बुद्ध्युत्पत्तिरनुज्ञायते?–

अपवर्गेऽप्येवं प्रसङ्गः॥ 43॥

मुक्तस्यापि बाह्यार्थसामर्थ्याद् बुद्धय उत्पद्येरन्निति॥43॥

अपवर्गे apavarge, in release; अपि api, also; एवं evaṃ, similar; प्रसंगः prasaṅgaḥ, implication.

472. Such possibilities may occur even in release.—43.

Even a person who has attained release may be disturbed by the voilence of an external object.

न निष्पन्नावश्यम्भावित्वात्॥ 44॥

कर्मवशान्निष्पन्ने शरीरे चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रये निमित्तभावादवश्यम्भावी बुद्धीनामुत्पादः, न च प्रबलोपि सन् बाह्योऽर्थ आत्मनो बुद्ध्युत्पादे समर्थो भवति-तस्येन्द्रियेण संयोगाद् बुद्ध्युत्पादे सामर्थ्यं दृष्टमिति॥44॥

न na, no; निष्पन्नावश्यम्भावित्वात् niṣpanna-avaśyambhāvi-tvāt, being inevitable only where (a body has already been) formed.

473. It is, we reply, not so because knowledge must spring up only in a body already in the state of formation.—44.

A violent external object produces knowledge only in a body which has been formed, in consequence of our previous deeds, and which is endowed with senses, etc.

तदभावश्चापवर्गे॥ 45॥

तस्य=बुद्धिनिमित्ताश्रयस्य शरीरेन्द्रियस्य धर्माधर्माभावादभावोऽपवर्गे, तत्र यदुक्तम्–"अपवर्गेऽप्येवं प्रसङ्गः 43" इति तदयुक्तम्, तस्मात् सर्वदुःखविमोक्षोपवर्गः। यस्मात् सर्वदुःखबीजं सर्वदुःखायतनं चापवर्गे विच्छिद्यते तस्मात् सर्वेण दुःखेन विमुक्तिरपवर्गः, न निर्बीजं निरायतनं च दुःखमुत्पद्यते इति॥45॥

तदभावः tat-abhāvaḥ, its non-existence; च cha, and; अपवर्गे apa-varge in release.

474. And there is absence of a body in our release.—45.

Our merits and demerits having already been exhausted, we cannot get a body after we have attained release. Release is the perfect freedom from all sufferings: it consists in a complete destruction of all the seeds and seats of sufferings.

तदर्थं यमनियमाभ्यामात्मसंस्कारो योगाच्चाध्यात्मविध्युपायैः॥ 46॥

तस्य=अपवर्गस्याधिगमाय यमनियमाभ्यामात्मसंस्कारः, यमः=समानमाश्रमिणां धर्मसाधनम्, नियमस्तु विशिष्टम्, आत्मसंस्कारः पुनरधर्महानं धर्मोपचयश्च, योगशास्त्राच्चा-ध्यात्मविधिः प्रतिपत्तव्यः स पुनः–तपः प्राणायामः प्रत्याहारो ध्यानं धारणेति, इन्द्रियविषयेषु प्रसंख्यानाभ्यासो रागद्वेषप्रहाणार्थः, उपायस्तु योगाचारविधानमिति॥46॥

तदर्थं tat-artham, to that end; यमनियमाभ्या: yama-niyamābhyām, by

means of external and internal self-control; आत्मसंस्कार: ātma-saṃskāraḥ, purification of the soul; योगात् yogāt, from treatise on yoga or contemplation; च cha, and; अध्यात्मविध्युपायैः adhyātma-vidhi-upāyaiḥ, by means of injunctions and practices regarding the soul.

475. For that purpose there should be a purifying of our soul by abstinence from evil and observance of certain duties as well as by following the spiritual injunctions gleaned from the Yoga institute.—46.

In order to attain release we must practise meditation after the soul has been purified by our abstinence, etc. The injunctions gleaned from the Yoga institute refer to penances, the controlling of our breaths, the fixing of our mind, etc.

ज्ञानग्रहणाभ्यासस्तद्विद्यैश्च सह संवादः॥ 47॥

"तदर्थम्" इतिप्रकृतम्। ज्ञायतेऽनेनेति ज्ञानम्=आत्मविद्याशास्त्रं तस्य ग्रहणम्=अध्ययनधारणे, अभ्यासः=सततक्रिया=अध्ययनश्रवणचिन्तनानि, तद्विद्यैश्च सह संवाद इति प्रज्ञापरिपाकार्थं परिपाकस्तु संशयच्छेदनम् अविज्ञातार्थबोधः अध्यवसिताभ्यनुज्ञानमिति, समापवादः संवादः॥47॥

ज्ञानग्रहणाभ्यासः jñāna-grahaṇa-abhyāsaḥ, study of the science of the soul and constant application to it; तद्विद्यै tat-vidyaiḥ, with those who are versed in it; च cha, and; सह saha, with; संवादः saṃvādaḥ, conversation.

476. To secure release, it is necessary to study and follow this treatise on knowledge as well as to hold discussions with those learned in that treatise.—47.

The spiritual injunctions furnished by the Yoga institute cannot be properly assimilated unless we have already acquired a true knowledge of the categories explained in the Nyāya Śāstra. It is therefore very useful to study the Nyāya Śāstra and to hold discussions with persons learned in the Śāstra.

"तद्विद्यैश्च सह संवादः" इत्यविभक्तार्थं वचनं विभज्यते–

तं शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिविशिष्टश्रेयोर्थिभिरनसूयिभिर भ्युपेयात्॥ 48॥

एतन्निगदेनैव नीतार्थमिति॥48॥

तं tam, conversation; शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिविशिष्टश्रेयोर्थिभिः śiṣya-guru-

sabrahmachāri-viśiṣṭa-śreyorthibhiḥ, with disciples, preceptors, fellow students, and seekers after the supreme good; अनसूयिभिः an-asūyibhiḥ, with unenvious; अभ्युपेयात् abhyupeyāt, resort to.

477. One should enter upon discussions with unenvious persons, such as disciples, preceptors, fellow-students and seekers of the *summum bonum*.—48.

The epithet "unenvious" excludes those who do not seek truth but desire victory. Discussion has ben defined in aphorism 1-2-1.

यदि मन्येत-पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहः प्रतिकूलः परस्येति–

प्रतिपक्षहीनमपि वा प्रयोजनार्थमर्थित्वे।। 49।।

''तमभ्युपेयात्'' इतिवर्तते, परतः प्रज्ञामुपादित्समानस्तत्त्वबुभुत्साप्रकाशनेन स्वपक्षमनवस्थापयन् स्वदर्शनं परिशोधयेदिति।।49।।

प्रतिपक्षहीनं pratipakṣa-hīnam, without advancing opposition; अपि api, even; वा vā, or; प्रयोजनार्थ prayojana-artham, for the sake of the purpose; अर्थित्वे arthi-tve, where one needs it.

478. In case of a necessity for the search of truth, discussion may be held even without an opposing side.—49.

A person desirous of knowledge may submit his views for examination by simply expressing his curiosity for truth without an attempt to establish the views.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 5 : Development of True Knowledge : Sūtras : 38-49.

When the mind is withdrawn from the senses and is held steadfast by the retentive effort, its conjunction with the soul takes place (as in the state of deep sleep). When this conjunction of the mind with the soul is associated with the desire to know the truth (which is not the case in deep sleep), cognitions in respect of the objects of the senses are not produced. From the habitual cultivation of this state does cognition of truth arise. There are objects however which by their intensity or by their nature force themselves upon consciousness even in this state of the mind; *e.g.* thunderclap, hunger, thirst, heat, cold, diseases, etc. Nevertheless the habit of Yoga or concentration or communion is possible as the result of excellence of virtue or merit which is the cause of true knowledge, accumulated by practice preformed in previous lives. For the purpose of avoiding distraction instruction has been given for the practice of Yoga in forests, caves and river beds.

The virtue born of the practice of Yoga accompanies a man even in another life. In the fullness of its accumulation as the cause of true knowledge, and there being the contemplation of Samādhi or the repose of the mind in the soul, true knowledge is produced. Even in ordinary affairs a man is heard to say: "I did not see, my mind was elsewhere."

In the state of release objects, however intense, cannot force themselves on the soul. For they can produce cognition only throgh conjunction with the senses. And the necessary condition of the production of cognitions is the body brought into existence under the influence of past acts, as the seat of effort, senses and objects. Release is the non-existence, through the non-existence of merit and demerit, of the body and senses as the seat of the condition of the production of cognitions. It follows therefore, that release is deliverance from all pain. Because in the state of release the seed of all pain, the vehicle of all pain, is destroyed.

For the attainment of release reclamation of the soul is to be accomplished by means of Yama and Niyama and of the practices enjoined by the rules of self-culture. Yama (non-violence, veracity, non-covetousness, study and non-accumulation of wealth) is enjoined for all men. Niyama (cleanliness of body and mind, contentment, penance, sacred study and contemplation of God) is enjoined for special classes. Reclamation of the soul means decrease of demerit and increase of merit. Rules of self-culture are to be known from the treatises on Yoga. The practices therein taught are Tapas (penance), Prāṇāyāma (control of breath), Pratyāhāra (withdrawal of the mind), Dhyāna (contemplation) and Dhāraṇā (fixity of contemplation). The parctice of meditation in respect of the objects of the senses is for the sake of the destruction of attraction and aversion. The means is the adoption of the conduct of the Yogins.

The other means are the study and practice of the science of the soul, *i.e.* Ānvīkṣikī, the spiritual science. Practice consists in constant study, hearing and judging. For the maturity of the wisdom so acquired, in the form of removal of doubt and awakening to unknown objects, in other words, for the confirmation of what has been ascertained by oneself as the truth, converse should be held with those who are versed in the lore, whether they be disciples, preceptors, or fellow students, who are eager to attain the supreme good, provided they are not jealous. If it is considered that the advancement of a counter-thesis to the thesis propounded by them may not be welcome to them, attempt need not be

made to establish one's own thesis. One should merely express the desire to know the truth and be willing to receive wisdom. In this way one should engage in converse with them and correcst one's own view as well as the conflicting views of extreme thinkers.

अन्योन्यप्रत्यनीकानि च प्रावादुकानां दर्शनानि स्वपक्षरागेण चैके न्यायमतिवर्तन्ते, तत्र–

तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे वीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं कण्टकशाखावरणवत्॥ 50॥

अनुत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानानामऽप्रहीणदोषाणां तदर्थं घटमानानामेतदिति॥50॥

तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं tattve-adhyavasāya-saṃrakṣaṇa-artham, for the sake of the conservation of the true and certain knowledge about reality; जल्पवितण्डे jalpa-vitaṇḍe, sophistry and cavil; वीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं vīja-praroha-saṃrakṣaṇa-arthaṃ, for the sake of the preservation of the shoots from seeds; कण्टकशाखावरणवत् kaṇṭaka-śākhā-āvaraṇa-vat, like the fencing or covering of thorns and branches.

479. Wranglings and cavils may be employed to keep up our zeal for truth just as fences of thorny boughs are used to safeguard the growth of seeds.—50.

Certain talkative people propound philosophies which are mutually opposed, while others violate all sense of rectitude out of a bias for their own side. Seeing that these people have not attained true knowledge and are not freed from faults, we may, in our disputation against them, employ wranglings and cavils which do not in themselves deserve any profit or encomium.

विद्यानिर्वेदादिभिश्च परेणावज्ञायमानस्य–

ताभ्यां विगृह्य कथनम्॥ 51॥

विगृह्येति विजिगीषया न तत्त्वबुभुत्सयेति, तदेतद् विद्यापालनार्थं न लाभपूजाख्यात्यर्थमिति॥51॥

॥ इति श्रीवात्स्यायनविरचिते न्यायभाष्ये चतुर्थोऽध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकं समाप्तम्॥
॥ चतुर्थोऽध्यायश्च समाप्तः॥

ताभ्यां tābhyām, by means of them, sophistry and cavil; विगृह्य vigṛhya, for overcoming; कथनं kathanam, statement.

480. Sophistry and cavil should be employed also in declaring the truth to overcome the attack of the erratic.—51.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 6 : Maintenance of True Knowledge : Sūtras : 50-51.

Like the cover of thorns for the safety of the sprouting seed, sophism and cavil may be employed for the safety of the search for the truth, by those who are not yet free from faults and who have not yet attained true knowledge, against those who launch an attack out of zeal for their own views. And a counter-attack may be made upon those who offer insult from pride of learning, for their subjugation and not out of the desire to know the truth. This permission is only for the sake of maintaining the knowledge acquired and not for the sake of gain, worship or reputation.

॥ इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने चतुर्थोऽध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम्॥2॥

Book V, Chapter I

साधर्म्म्यवैधर्म्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानस्य विकल्पाज्जातिबहुत्वमिति संक्षेपेणोक्तं तद्विस्तरेण विभजते, ताः खल्विमा जातयः स्थापनाहेतौ प्रयुक्तो चतुर्विंशतिः प्रतिषेधहेतवः।

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्म्यात्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्ग प्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्ति संशयप्रकरणाहेत्वर्थापत्त्यविशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्य कार्य्यसमाः॥ 1॥

साधर्म्येण प्रत्यवस्थानमऽविशिष्यमाणं स्थापनाहेतुतः साधर्म्यसमः, विशेषं तत्र तत्रोदाहरिष्याम्यः, एवं वैधर्म्यसमप्रभृतयोपि निर्वक्तव्याः॥1॥

साधर्म्म्यवैधर्म्म्योत् कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्य विकल्पसाध्य प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्ग प्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्ति संशयप्रकरणाहेत्वर्थापत्त्य विशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्य कार्य्यसमाः sādharmya-vaidharmya-utkarṣa-apakarṣa-varṇya-avarṇya-vikalpa-sādhya-prāpti-aprāpti-prasaṅga-pratidṛṣṭānta-anutpatti-saṃśaya-prakaraṇa-ahetu-arthāpatti-aviśeṣa-upaptti-upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-nitya-anitya-kārya-samāḥ, identicals in respect of resemblance, differene, addition, subtraction, questionable, unquestionable, alternative, things to be established, presence, absence, regression, counter-example, non-production, doubt, topic, non-reason, presumption, non-difference, demonstration, perception, non-perception, eternal, non-eternal, and effect.

481. Futilities are as follows :—(1) Balancing the homogeneity, (2) balancing the heterogeneity, (3) balancing an addition, (4) balancing a subtraction, (5) balancing the questionable, (6) balancing the unquestionable, (7) balancing the alternative, (8) balancing the reciprocity, (9) balancing the co-presence, (10) balancing the mutural absence, (11) balancing the infinite regression, (12) balancing the counter example, (13) balancing the non-produced, (14) balancing

the doubt, (15) balancing the controversy, (16) balancing the non-reason, (17) balancing the presumption, (18) balancing the non-difference, (19) balancing the non-demonstration, (20) balancing the perception, (21) balancing the non-perception, (22) balancing the non-eternality, (23) balancing the eternality and (24) balancing the effect.—1.

Futility, which is a fallacious argument, has been in general termas defined in aphorism 1-2-18. The twentyfour kinds of futility enunciated here will each be defined in due course. The fallacious character of the twentyfour kinds will also be exposed in separate aphorisms.

लक्षणं तु–

साधर्म्म्यवैधर्म्म्याभ्यामुपसंहारे तद्धर्म्मविपर्य्ययोपपत्तेः साधर्म्म्य-वैधर्म्म्यसमौ॥ 2॥

साधर्म्येणोपसंहारे साध्यधर्मविपर्ययोपपत्तेः साधर्म्येणैव प्रत्यवस्थानमऽविविशष्यमाणं स्थापनाहेतुतः साधर्म्यसमः प्रतिषेधः, निदर्शनम्–'क्रियावानात्म–द्रव्यस्य क्रियाहेतुगुणयोगात्, द्रव्यं लोष्टः क्रियोहेतुगुणयुक्तः क्रियावान् तथा चात्मा तस्मात् क्रियावान्' इति एवमुपसंहृते परः साधर्म्येणैव प्रत्यवतिष्ठते–'निष्क्रिय आत्मा–विभुनो द्रव्यस्य निष्क्रियत्वात्, विभु चाकाशं निष्क्रियं च तथा चात्मा तस्माद् निष्क्रिम्:' इति, न चास्ति विशेषहेतुः–क्रियावत्साधर्म्यात् क्रियावता भवितव्यं न पुनरक्रियसाधर्म्याद् निष्क्रियेणेति, विशेषहेत्वभावात् साधर्म्यसमम: प्रतिषेधो भवति।

अथ वैधर्म्यसमः–'क्रियाहेतूगुणयुक्तो लोष्टः परिच्छिन्नो दृष्टो न तथात्मा तस्मान्न लोष्टवत् क्रियावान्' इति. न चास्ति विशेषहेतुः–क्रियावत्साम्र्यात् क्रियावता भवितव्यं न पुनः क्रियावद्वैधर्म्यादक्रियेणेति, विशेषहेत्वभावाद् वैधर्म्यसमः।

वैधर्म्येण चोपसंहारे–'निष्क्रिय आत्मा–विभुत्वात्. क्रियावद् द्रव्यमविभु दृष्टं यथा लोष्टः न च तथात्मा तत्माद् निष्क्रियः' इति, वैधर्म्येण प्रत्यवस्थानाम्–'निष्क्रियं द्रव्यमाकाशं क्रियाहेतुगुणरहितं दृष्टं न तथात्मा तस्मान्न निष्क्रियः' इति न चास्ति विशेषहतुः–क्रियावद्वैधर्म्याद् निष्क्रियेण भवतिव्यं न पुनरक्रियवैधर्म्यात् क्रियावतेति, विशेषहेत्वभावाद् वैधर्म्यसमः।

अथ (पुनः) साधर्म्यसमः–'क्रियावान् लोष्टः क्रियाहेतुगुणयुक्तो दृष्टः तथा चात्मा तस्मात् क्रियावानृ' इति. न चास्ति विशेषहेतुः–क्रियावद्वैधर्म्याद् निष्क्रियो न पुनः क्रियावत्साधर्म्यात् क्रियावानिति. विशेषहेत्वभावात् साधर्म्यसमः॥2॥

साधर्म्म्यवैधर्म्म्याभ्याम् sādharmya-vaidharmyā-bhyām, by means of resemblance and difference; उपसंहारे upasaṃhāre, in case of a conclusion; तद्धर्म्मविपर्य्ययोपपत्तेः tat-dharma-viparyaya-upapatteḥ, on account of the

absence of that characteristic; साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यसमौ sādharmya-vaidharmya-samau, identicals in respect of resemblace and difference.

482. If against an argument based on a homogeneous or heterogeneous example one offers an opposition based on the same kind of example, the opposition will be called "balancing the homogeneity" or "balancing the heterogeneity".—2.

Balancing the homogeneity—A certian person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
like a pto.

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the sky.

The argument, *viz.*, sound is non-eternal, is based on the homogeneity of sould with the non-eternal pot on the ground of both being products. The opposition, *viz.*, sound is eternal, is said to be base on the homogeneity of sound with the eternal sky on the alleged ground of both being incorporeal. This sort of opposition, futile as it is, is called "balancing the homogeneity", which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the homogeneity of examples employed by them.

Balancing the heterogeneity—A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
whatever is not non-eternal is not a product,
as the sky.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal,
as a pot.

The argument, *viz.*, sound is non-eternal, is based on the heterogeneity of sound from the not-non-eternal sky, which are mutually incompatible. The opposition, *viz.*, sound is eternal, is said to be based

on the heterogeneity of sound from the not-incorporeal opt which are alleged to be incompatible with each other. This sort of opposition, futile as it is, is called "balancing the heterogeneity", which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the heterogeneity of examples employed by them.

अनयोरुत्तरम्–

गोत्वाद्गोसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धिः॥ 3॥

साधर्म्यमात्रेण बैधर्म्यमात्रेण च साध्यसाधने प्रतिज्ञायमाने स्यादव्यवस्था सा तु धर्मविशेषे नोपपद्यते, गोसाधर्म्याद् गोत्वाज्जातिविशेषाद् गौः सिध्यति नतु सास्नादिसम्बन्धात्। अश्वादिवैधम्याद् गोत्वादेव गौः सिध्यति न गुणादिभेदात्, तच्चैतत् कृतव्याख्यानमवयवप्रकरणे, प्रमाणानामभिसंबन्धांच्चैकार्थकारित्वं समानं वाक्ये इति, हेत्वाभासाश्रया खल्वियमऽव्यवस्थेति॥3॥

गोत्वात् go-tvāt, from bovineness, the generic idea of a cow; गोसिद्धिवत् go-siddhi-vat, like the proof of a cow; तत्सिद्धिः tat-siddhiḥ, its proof.

483. That is, we say, to be established like a cow through cowhood (or cow-type).—3.

The Naiyāyika says :—If the opposition referred to in the previous aphorism is to be valid it must be based on the example, homogeneous or heterogeneous, exhibiting a universal connection between the reason and the predicate such as we discern between a cow and cowhood or a universal disconnection between the reason and the absence of the predicate such as we discern between a cow and absence of cowhood. In the argument—"sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot", the homogeneous example "pot" exhibits a universal connection between productivity and non-eternality, all products being non-eternal, but in the opposition—"sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, like the sky"—the homogeneous example "sky" does not exhibit a universal connection between incorporeality and eternality because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which are incorporeal but not eternal. A similar observation is to be made with regard to the opposition called "balaning the heterogeneity." In the opposition "sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot", the heterogeneous example "pot" does not exhibit a universal disconnection between incorporeality and absence of eternality because there area things, such as intellect or knowledge, which are incorporeal but not eternal.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 1 : Examination of Jātis by resemblance and difference : Sūtras : 1-3.

Jātis are reasons urged in opposition to the reason advanced in support of a demonstration. They are of twenty-four kinds. They do not succeed in refuting the opposition. Their common function is to equate or to reduce the opponent's reason to the same class with themselves. This they do in twenty-four different was and from these they derive their respective dofinition. Thus, (1) to oppose resemblance to resemblance as the reason : The soul possesses action, because it possesses volition or adrṣṭa (merit and demerit) which is the cause of action, in the same way as does a pebble possess action as it is shot from a catapult which is a cause which is a cause of action. This demonstration by means of resemblance is opposed by the following equally based on resemblance. The soul does not possess action, because it is all-pervading, in the same way as the sky, being all-pervading, does not possess action. And no special reason exists to determine the validity of the one as against the other conclusion. In the absence of such a reason the opposition counteracts the demonstration. (2) To oppose difference to (a) resemblance and (b) difference : (i) the pebble shot from a catapult is finite but the soul is not finite, therefore the soul does not possess action like the pebble. (ii) The sky is inactive because it does not possess the cause of activity; but the soul possess the cause of activity, therefore it is not inactive. The reply to these antinomies of reason is that the thesis or the counter-thesis is established in the same way as a particular animal is established to be a cow through its possession of cowness. Antionmies arise where the demonstration is based on mere resmeblance or mere difference, and not on the possession of a distinctive attribute or character. An animal is established as a cow, not merely through its resemblance to another animal possessing dewlap, etc., but through such resemblance and the possession of the particular or distinctive genus, *viz.*, cowness. Similarly mere dissimilarity to a horse does not establish a cow, but disimilarity of charactersist attribute. Antinomies arise from fallacies of reason.

साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्धर्म्मविकल्पादुभयसाध्यत्वाच्चोत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्य-विकल्पसाध्यसमा:।। 4।।

दृष्टान्तधर्मं साध्ये समासजत उत्कर्षसम:–यदि क्रियाहेतुगुणयोगाल्लोष्टवत् क्रियावानात्मा (तदा) लोष्टवदेव स्पर्शवानपि प्राप्नोति, अथ न स्पर्शवान् लोष्टवत् क्रियावानपि न प्राप्नोति, विपर्यये वा विशेषो वक्तव्य इति।

साध्ये धर्माभावं दृष्टान्तात् प्रसजतोऽपकर्षसम:–लोष्ट: खलु क्रियावानऽविभुर्दृष्ट: काममात्मापि क्रियावानविभुरस्तु। विपर्यये वा विशेषो वक्तव्य इति।

ख्यापनीयो वर्ण्यो विपर्ययादवर्ण्य: तावेतौ साध्यदृष्टान्तधर्मौ विपर्यस्यतो वर्ण्यावर्ण्यसमौ भवत:।

साधनधर्मयुक्ते दृष्टान्ते धर्मान्तरविकल्पात् साध्यधर्मविकल्पं प्रसजतो विकल्पसम:– क्रियागुणहेतुयुक्तं किंचिद् गुरु यथा लोष्ट: किंचिच्च लघु यथा वायुरेवं क्रियाहेतुगुणयुक्तं किंचित् क्रियावत् स्याद् यथा लोष्ट: किंचिदक्रियं यथाऽऽत्मा, विशेषो वा वाच्य इति।

हेत्वाद्यवयवसामर्थ्ययोगी धर्म: साध्यस्तं दृष्टान्ते प्रसजत: साध्यसम:–यदि 'यथा लोष्टस्तथाऽऽत्मा?' प्राप्तस्तर्हि 'यथात्मा तथा लोष्ट' इति। साध्यश्चायमात्मा क्रियावानिति कामं लोष्टेपि साध्य:, अथ नैवम्? न तर्हि 'यथा लोष्टस्तथात्मा' इति ।।4।।

साध्यदृष्टान्तयो: sādhya-dṛṣṭāntayoḥ, of the things to be established and the example; धर्म्मविकल्पात् dharma-vikalpāt, from exchange or mutual transfer of properties; उभयसाध्यत्वात् ubhaya-sādhya-tvāt, both being in need of proof; च cha, and; उत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यसमा: utkarṣa-apakarṣa-varṇya-avarṇya-vikalpa-sādhya-samāḥ, identicals in respect of addition, subtraction, doubtful, not-dountful, alternative and the things to be established.

484. The subject and example alternating their characters or both standing in need of proof, there occur (futilities called) "ballancing an addition", "balancing a subtraction", "balancing the questionbale", "balacing the unquestionable", "balancing the alternative" and "balancing the reciprocity".—4.

Balancing an adition—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on an additional character thereof, the opposition will be called "balancing an addition."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal.
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is non-eternal (and corporeal),
because it is a product,
like a pot (which is non-eternal as well as corporeal).

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal like a pot, it must also be corporeal like it: if it is not corporeal let it be also not non-eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing an addition" which aims at a showing an enquality of the argument of two sides in respect of an additional character (possessed by the example and attributed to the subject).

Balancing a subtraction—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example on offers an opposition based on another character wanting in it, the opposition will be called "balancing a subtraction."

A certion person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition :—

Sound is non-eternal (but not audible).
because it is a product,
like a pot (which is non-eternal but not audible.)

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal like a pot, it cannot be audible, for a pot is not audible; and if sound is still held to be audible, let it be also not non-eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing a subtraction" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of a certain character wanting in the example (and consequently also in the subject).

Balancing the questionable—If one opposes an argument by maintaining that the character of the example is as questionable as that of the subject, the opposition will be called "balancing the questionable."

A certian person, to prove the non-etrnality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like sound.

The opponent alleges that if the non-eternality of sound is called in question, why is not that of the pot too called in question, as the pot and sound are both products? His object is to set aside the argument on the ground of its example being of a questionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the questionable" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the questionable character of the subject as well as of the example.

Balancing the unquestionable—If one opposes an argument by alleging that the character of the subject is as unquestionable as that of the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the unquestionable."

A certian person, to prove the non-erernality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like sound.

The opponent alleges that if the non-eternality of a pot is held to be unquestionable, why is not that of sound too held to be so, as the pot and sound are both products? His object is to render the argument unnecessary on the ground of its subject being of an unquestionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the unquestionable" which aims at showing the equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the unquestionable character of the example as well as of the subject.

Balancing the alternative—If one opposes an argument by attributing alternative character to the subject and the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the alternative."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal and formless,
because it is a product,
like a pot (which is non-eternal and has forms).

The opponent alleges that the pot and sound are both-products, yet one has form and the other is formless: why on the same principle is not one (the pot) non-eternal and the other (sound) eternal? This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the alternative" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the alternative characters attributed to the subject and example.

Balancing the reciprocity—If one opposes an argument by alleging a reciprocity of the subject and the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the reciprocity."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like sound.

The opponent alleges that the pot and sound being both products one requires proof for its non-eternality as much as the other does. Sound is to be proved non-eternal by the example of a pot and the pot is to be proved non-eternal by the example of a pot and the pot is to be proved non-eternal by the example of sound. This leads to a reciprocity of the pot (example) and sound (subject) resulting in no definite conclusion as to the eternality or non-eternality of sound. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the reciprocity" which brings an argument to a stand-still by alleging the reciprocity of the subject and the example.

एतेषामुत्तरम्–

किंचित्साधर्म्यादुपसंहारसिद्धेवैधर्म्यादप्रतिषेधः।। 5।।

अलभ्यः सिद्धस्य निह्नवः, सिद्धं च किंचित्साधर्म्यादुपमानम्–'यथा गौस्तथा गवयः' इति, तत्र न लभ्यो गोगवययोर्धर्मविकल्प श्चोदयितुम्, एवं साधके धर्मे दृष्टान्तादिसामर्थ्ययुक्ते न लभ्यः साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्धर्मविकल्पात्=वैधर्म्यात् प्रतिषेधो वक्तुमिति।।5।।

किंचित् kiñchit, partial; साधर्म्यात् sādharmmyāt, from resemblance; उपसंहारसिद्धे upasaṃhāra-siddheḥ, from proof of the conclusion; वैधर्म्यात् vaidharmmyāt, from difference; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non contradiction.

485. This is, we say, no opposition because there is a difference between the subject and the example although the conclusion is drawn from a certain enquality of their characters.—5.

The Naiyāyika says :—The futilities called "balancing an addition," "balancing a subtraction," "balancing the questionable," "balancing the unquestionable" and "balancing the alternative" are all based on the false supposition of a complete equality of the subject and the example. Though there is no denial of an equality of the subject and the example in certain characters, there is indeed a great difference between them in other characters.

Sound is non-eternal.
because it is a product,
like pot.

In this argument although there is an equality of "sound" and "pot" in respect of their being both products, there is a great difference between them in other respects. A cow possesses some characters in common with a *bos gavaeus* but there is no complete identity between them. No body can commit the futilities mentioned above if he bears in mind the equlity of the subject and the example only in those characters which are warranted by the reason (middle term). In the case of the futility called "balancing an addition" it is clear that the equality supposed to exist between the pot and sound in respect of corporeality is not warranted by the reason (*viz.* being a product), because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which are producs but not corporeal. Similarly with regard to the futility called "balancing a subtraction," the reason (*viz.* being a product) does not justify an equality of sound and pot in respect of their being not audible. As regards the futilities called "balancing the questionable" and "balancing the unquestioable," we cannot ignore the difference between the subject and the example without putting an end to all kinds of inference. The futility called "balancing the alternative" introduces an equality between the pot and sound in respect of a character (*viz.* being eternal) which is not warranted by the reason, *viz,* being a product.

साध्यातिदेशाच्च दृष्टान्तोपपत्तेः॥ 6॥

यत्र लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां बुद्धिसाम्यं तेनाऽविपरीतोऽर्थोऽतिदिश्यते प्रज्ञापनार्थम्, एवं साध्यातिदेशाद् दृष्टान्ते उपपद्यमोन साध्यत्वमनुपपन्नमिति।।6।।

साध्यातिदेशात् sādhya-atideśāt, from extension of the thing to be established; च cha, and; दृष्टान्तोपपत्तेः dṛṣṭānta-upapatteḥ, because of proof of the example.

486. And because the example happens to surpass the subject.—6.

The futility called "balancing the reciprocity" si based on the false supposition that the example stands exactly on the same footing as the subject. But that one surpasses the other is evident form aphorism 1-1-25 which states that the example does not stand in need of proof as to its characters.

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

In the argument sound (the subject) may not be known by some to be non-eternal but a pot (the example) is known by all to be product as well as non-eternal. "Balancing the reciprocity" is therefore a fallacious argument.

Topic 2 : Six Jātis relative to the Sādhya and Dṛṣṭānta : Sūtras : 4-6.

These arise from confusion of the diverse attributes of the sādhya (the thing to be established) and the dṛṣṭānta (example). (1) If the soul is active like a pebble, it is also touchable like the pebble, on the other hand, if it is not touchable, it cannot be active. (2) The pebble which is active is not all-pervading; therefore, the soul which is active like the pebble, must also be not all-pervading. (3) The activity of the ebble is certain, therefore, the activity of the soule is equally certain. (4) The activity of the soul uncertain, being yet to be demonstrated, therefore the activity of the pebble is equally uncertain. (5) Objects possessing the cause of action are some heavy, *e.g.*, the pebble, and some light, *e.g.* are; therefore objects possessing the cause of action are some active, *e.g.*, the pebble and some inactive, *e.g.*, the soul. (6) If, as is the pebble so is the soul, them as is the soul so is also the pebble.

The reply to the above is that what is established cannot be

repudiated and that comparison through resemblance in parts is established as in the case : as the cow so the *bos gavaeus*, where their difference in many respects is no reason against the inference. Similarly where the inferential attribute is found in the dṛṣṭānta in universal relation with the attribute to be established, the difference between the sādhya and the dṛṣṭānta in other respects cannot hinder the inference. As regards the assumption of uncertainty in the dṛṣṭānta and certainty in the sādhya, (3), (4) and (6) above, no such confusion is possible, because a dṛṣṭānta for the purpose of demonstration is that object in respect of which there is unanimity of opinion amongst men both trained and untained.

प्राप्य साध्यमप्राप्य वा हेतोः प्राप्त्या अविशिष्टत्वादप्राप्त्या असाधकत्वाच्च प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिसमौ॥ 7॥

हेतुः प्राप्य वा साध्यं साधयेदप्राप्य वा?, न तावत् प्राप्य-प्राप्त्यामविशिष्टत्वाद-ऽसाधकः=द्वयोर्विद्यमानयोः प्राप्तौ सत्यां किं कस्य साधकं साध्यं वा?। अप्राप्य साधकं न भवति-नाऽप्राप्तः प्रदीपः प्रकाशयतीति। प्राप्त्या प्रत्यवस्थानं प्राप्तिसमः, आप्राप्त्या प्रत्यवस्थानमऽप्राप्तिसमः।।7।।

प्राप्तय prāpya, reaching, covering; साध्यम् sādhyam, the thing to be established; अप्राप्य a-prāpya, not reaching; वा vā, or; हेतोः hetoḥ, of the mark or reason; प्राप्त्या prāptyā, by the fact of covering or co-extension; अविशिष्टत्वात् a viśiṣṭa-tvāt, being undistinguished or identical; अप्राप्त्या a-prāptyā, by reason of non-co-extension; असाधकत्वात् a sādhaka-tvāt, not being a means of establishment; च cha, and; प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिसमौ prāpti-aprāpti-samau, identicals in respect of presence and absence.

487. If against an argument based on the co-presence of the reason and the predicate or on the mutual absence of them one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co-presence or mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-distinguished from or being non-conducive to the predicate, be called "balancing the co-presence" or "balancing the mutual absence."—7.

Balancing the co-presence—If against an argument based on the co-presence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co-presence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-distinguished from the predicate, be called "balancing the co-presence."

A certain person, to prove that there is fiare in the hill, argues as follows :—

The hill has fire,
because it has smoke,
like a kitchen.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

The hill has smoke,
because it has fire,
like a kitchen.

The arguer has taken the smoke to be the reason and the fire to be the predicate. The opponent raises a question as to whether the smoke it present at the same site which is occupied by the fire or is absent from that site. If the smoke is present with the fire at the same site, there remains, according to the opponent, no criterion to distinguish the reason from the predicate. The smoke is, in his opinon, as much a reason for the fire as the fire for the smoke. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the co-presence" which aims at stopping an argument on the alleged ground of the co-presence of the reason and the predicate.

Balancing the mutual absence—If against an argument based on the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-conducive to the predicate, be called "balancing the mutual absence."

A certain person, to prove that there is fire in the hill, argues as follows :—

The hill has fire,
because it has smoke,
like a kitchen.

A certian other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

The hill has smoke.
because it has fire,
like a kitchen.

The opponent asks : "Is the smoke to be regarded as the reason because it is absent form the site of the fire?" "Such a supposition is indeed absurd." The reason cannot establish the predicate without heing connected with it, just as a lamp cannot exhibit a thing which is not within its reach. If a reason unconnected with the predicate could establish the latter, then the fire could be as much the reason for the

smoke as the smoke for the fire. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the mutual absence" which aims at bringing an argument to a close on the alleged ground of the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate.

अनयोरुत्तम्–

घटादिनिष्पत्तिदर्शनात् पीडने चाभिचारादप्रतिषेधः।। 8।।

उभयथा खल्वयुक्तः प्रतिषेधः-कर्तृकरणाधिकरणानि प्राप्त मृदं घटादिकार्यं निष्पादयन्ति, अभिचाराच्च पीडने सति दृष्टमऽप्राप्य साधकत्वमिति।।8।।

घटादिनिष्पत्तिदर्शनात् ghaṭa-ādi-niṣpatti-darśanāt, from the observation of the production of the pot and the like; पीडने pīḍane, in the case of oppression; च cha, and; अभिचारात् abhichārāt, from spells; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

488. This is, we say, no opposition because we find the production of pots by means of clay as well as the oppression of persons by spells.—8.

A potter cannot produce a pot without getting clay within his reach but an exorcist can destroy persons by administering spells from a distance. Hance, it is clear that a thingis accomplished sometimes by the cause being present at its site and sometimes by being absent from it. "Balancing the co-presence" and "balancing the mutual absence" which attach an undue importance to the proximity or remoteness of sites, are therefore totally fallacious arguments.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 3 : Extension or Non-extension of the Hetu to the Sādhya : Sūtras : 7-8.

The opposition to the demonstration takes this form : The inferential mark and the attribute to be established either co-exits or do not co-exist in the sādhya or subject. If they co-exist then nothing else remains to be demonstrated. If they do not co-exist, than there can be no demonstration; for a lamp cannot illumine an object with which it does not co-exist in the same place. To this the reply is that the co-existence or non-co-existence of the two attributes is not material factor in the production of an effect. For it is seen that a pot is produced when the agent, instruments and the ground come into contact with the lump of clay, while suffering may be caused to a man by means of supernatural powers directed from a distance.

दृष्टान्तस्य कारणानपदेशात् प्रत्यवस्थानाच्च प्रतिदृष्टान्तेन प्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तसमौ।। 9।।

साधनस्यापि साधनं वक्तव्यमिति प्रसङ्गेन प्रत्यवस्थानं प्रसङ्गसमः प्रतिषेधः- क्रियाहेतुगुणयोगी क्रियावान् लोष्ट इतिहेतुर्नापदिश्यते न च हेतुमन्तरेण सिद्धिरस्तीति।

प्रतिदृष्टान्तेन प्रत्यवस्थानं प्रतिदृष्टान्तसमः-'क्रियावानात्मा क्रियाहेतुगुणयोगात् लोष्टवत्' इत्युक्ते प्रतिदृष्टान्त उपादीयते-'क्रियाहेतुगुणयुक्तमाकाशं निष्क्रियं दृष्टम्' इति, कः पुनराकाशस्य क्रियाहेतुर्गुणः? वायुना संयोगः संस्कारापेक्षः वायुवनस्पतिसंयोगवदिति।।9।।

दृष्टान्तस्य dṛṣṭāntasya, of the example; कारणानपदेशात् kāraṇa-an-apadeśāt, from non-application of the cause; प्रत्यवस्थानात् prati-avasthānāt, from counter-opposition; च cha, and; प्रतिदृष्टान्तेन prati-dṛṣṭāntena, by a counter example; प्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तसमौ prasaṅga-pratidṛṣṭānta-samau, identicals in respect of regression and counter-example.

489. If one opposes an argument on the ground of the example having been established by a series of reasons or on the ground of the existence of a mere counter-example, the oppostion will be called "balancing the infinite regression" or "balancing the counter-example."—10

Balancing the infinite regression—A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
bacause it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

If sound is proved to be non-eternal by the example of a pot, how is the pot again to be proved as non-eternal? The reason which proves the non-eternality of the pot is to be proved by a further reason. This gives rise to an infinite regression which injures the proposition "sound is non-eternal" not less than the proposition "sound is eternal." This sort of futile oppositon is called "balancing the infinite regression" which aims at stopping an argument by introducing an infinite regression which is said to baset the example.

Balancing the counter-example—A certian person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain othe person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that if sound is held to be non-eternal by the example of a pot, why it should not be held to be etenal by the example of the sky? If the example of the sky is set aside, let the example of the pot too be set aside. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the counter-example" which aims at setting aside an argument by the introduction of a counter-example.

अनयोरुत्तम्-

प्रदीपोपादानप्रसङ्गनिवृत्तिवत्तद्विनिवृत्तिः।। 10।।

इदं तावदयं पृष्टो वक्तुमर्हति-अथ के प्रदीपमुपाददते किमर्थं चेति?, दिदृक्षमाणा दृश्यदर्शनार्थमिति। अथ प्रदीपं दिदृक्षमाणाः प्रदीपान्तरं कस्मान्नोपाददते?, अन्तरेणापि प्रदीपान्तरं दृश्यते प्रदीपस्तत्र प्रदीपदर्शनार्थं प्रदीपोपादानं निरर्थकम्। अथ दृष्टान्तः किमर्थमुच्यते इति? अप्रज्ञातस्य ज्ञापनार्थमिति। अथ दृष्टान्ते कारणापदेशः किमर्थं मृग्यते?, यदि प्रज्ञापनार्थम्?, प्रज्ञातो दृष्टान्तः स खलु-"लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः 1-1-25" इति तत्प्रज्ञापनार्थः कारणापदेशो निरर्थक इति प्रसङ्गसमस्योत्तरम्।।10।।

प्रदीपोपादानप्रसङ्गनिवृत्तिवत् pradīpa-upādāna-prasṅga-nivṛtti-vat, like the cessation of the need for a collection of lamps; तद्विनिवृत्तिः tat-vinivṛttiḥ, its cessation.

490. The example does not, we say, require a serise of reasons forits establishment just as a lamp does not require a series of lamps to be brought in for its illumination.—10

The Naiyākika says :—

An example is a thing the characters of which are wellknown to an ordinary man as well as to an expert. It does not require a series of reason to reveal the character of the subject with which it stands in the relation of homogeneity or heterogeneity. In this respect it resembles a lamp which illumines itself as well as the things lying within its reach.

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like pot.

In this argument the pot is the example which is so well-known that it requires no proof as to its being a product or being non-eternal.

Hence, the opposition called "balancing the infinite regression" is not founded on a sound basis.

अथ प्रतिदृष्टान्तसमस्योत्तरम्–

प्रतिदृष्टान्तहेतुत्वे च नाहेतुर्दृष्टान्तः॥ 11॥

प्रतिदृष्टान्तं ब्रुवता न विशेषहेतुरपदिश्यते–अनेन प्रकारेण प्रतिदृष्टान्तः साधको न दृष्टान्त इति, एवं प्रतिदृष्टान्तहेतुत्वे नाऽहेतुर्दृष्टान्त इत्युपपद्यते, स च कथं हेतुर्न स्याद् यद्यप्रतिषिद्धः साधकः स्यादिति॥11॥

प्रतिदृष्टान्तहेतुत्वे pratidṛṣṭānta-hetu-tve, the counter-example being a reason; च cha, and; न na, not; अहेतु a-hetuḥ, not a reason; दृष्टान्तः dṛṣṭāntaḥ, the example.

491. The example, we say, cannot be set aside as unreasonable only because a counter-example is advanced as the reason.—11.

The Nāiyāyika says :—

The opponent must give a special reason why the counter-example should be taken as specially fitted to lead to a conclusion and the example should not be taken as such. Until such a special reason is given, the counter-example cannot be accepted as leading to a definite conclusion. In fact a mere counter-example without a reason (middle term) attending it cannot be conducive to any conclusion. Hence, we must rely on an example attended by reason but not on a counter example unattended by reason.

Sound is eternal,
like the sky.

This opposition which is founded on a mere counter-example is thereofore to be rejected as unreasonable.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 4 : Regression and Counter-example : Sūtras : 9-11.

The opposition is to the effect that the example itself requires demonstration and that an equally suggestive counter-example exists. To this the reply is : (1) Those who wish to see, bring a lamp for the illumination of the object to be seen, while the lamp itself is seen without another lamp. Similarly an example is an already known object and serves the purpose of making known what is yet unknown. It is useless to establish its cause. (2) If the counter-example can cause an inference why not an example? The absence of any special character is common to both.

प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणाभावादनुत्पत्तिसमः॥ 12॥

अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वाद् घटवदित्युक्ते अपर आह–प्रागुत्पत्तेरनुत्पन्ने शब्दे प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वमनित्यत्वकारणं नास्ति तदभावाद् नित्यत्वं प्राप्तं नित्यस्य चोत्पत्तिर्नास्ति। अनुत्पत्त्या प्रत्यवस्थानमऽनुत्पत्तिसमः॥12॥

प्राक् prāk, prior; उत्पत्तेः utpatteḥ, to production; कारणाभावात् kāraṇa-abhāvāt, from the non-existence of the cause; अनुत्पत्तिसमः an-utpatti-samaḥ, identical in respect of non-production.

492. If one opposes an argument on the ground of the property connoted by the reason being absent from the thing denoted by the subject while it is not yet produced, the opposition will be called "balancing the non-produced."—12.

A certain person, to prove that sound is non-eternal, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is a non-effect of effort,
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that the property connoted by the reason, *viz.*, being an effect of effort, is not predicable of the subject, *viz.*, sound (while it is not yet produced). Consequently sound is not non-eternal, it must then be eternal. There is, according to the opponent, an apparent agreement between the two sides as to the sound being non-eternal on account of its being a non-effect-of-effort. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the non-produced" which pretends to show an equality of the argument of two sides assuming the thing denoted by the subject to be as yet non-produced.

अस्योत्तरम्–

तथाभावादुत्पन्नस्य कारणोपपत्तेर्न कारणप्रतिषेधः॥ 13॥

तथाभावादुत्पन्नस्येति–उत्पन्नः खल्वयं शब्द इति भवति, प्रागुत्पत्तेः शब्द एव नास्ति–उत्पन्नस्य शब्दभावात्, शब्दस्य सतः प्रयत्नानन्तरीकयत्वम् अनित्यत्वकारणमुपपद्यते, कारणोपपत्तेरयुक्तोयं दोषः–''प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणाभावात्'' इति॥13॥

तथाभावात् tathā-bhāvāt, from the nature give to a thing when it is produced; उत्पन्नस्य utpannasya, of the thing produced; कारणोपपत्तेः kārana-upapatteḥ, owing to proof of the cause; न na, not कारणप्रतिषेधः kāraṇatiṣ edhaḥ, contradiction of the cause.

493. This is, we say, no opposition against our reason so well predicable of the subject which becomes as such only when it is produced.—13.

The Naiyāyika disposes of the futile opposition called "balancing the non-produced" by stating that the subject an become as such only when it is produced, and that there is then no obstacle to the property of the reason being predicated of it. The opposition, *viz.*, "sound (while non-produced) is eternal, because it is not then an effect of effort," carries no weight with it, since we do not take the sound to be the subject before it is produced. Sound, while it is produced, is certainly an effect of effort and as such is non-eternal.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 5 : Non-production : Sūtras : 12-13.

The opposition is to the effect that sound, *e.g.*, is said to be non-eternal because it comes after effort, but that prior to its production when sound is not produced the character of coming after effort which is the cause of non-eternality, does not exist, and that therefore sound is eternal and cannot be produced. To this the reply is that when sound becomes sound it is produced and in being produced comes after effort and that thus the cause of its non-eternality is obtained.

सामान्यदृष्टान्तयोरैन्द्रियकत्वे समाने नित्यसाधर्म्म्यात् संशयसमः॥ 14॥

अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वाद् घटवदित्युक्ते हेतौ, संशयेन प्रत्यवतिष्टते–सति प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वे अस्त्येवास्य नित्येन सामान्येन साधर्म्यम्–ऐन्द्रियकत्वम्; अस्ति च घटेनानित्येन, अतो नित्यानित्यसाधर्म्यादनिवृत्तः संशय इति॥14॥

सामान्यदृष्टान्तयो sāmānya-dṛṣṭāntayoḥ, of the genus and the (individual put forward as) example; ऐन्द्रियकत्वे aindriyaka-tve, being sensible; समाने samāne, equally; नित्यसाधर्म्म्यात् nitya-anitya-sādharmmyāt, from

resemblance of things eternal (genus) and non-eternal (individual); संशयसमः saṃśaya-samaḥ, identical in respect of doubt.

494. If one opposes an argument on the ground of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal consequent on the example and its genus (or type) being equally objects of perception the opposition will be called "balancing the doubt."—14.

A certain person, to ptove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers futile opposition thus :—

Sound is non-eternal or eternal (?)
because it is an object of perception,
like a pot or pot-ness.

The opponent alleges that sound is homogeneous with a pot as well as pot-ness inasmuch as both are objects of perception; but the pot being non-eternal and pot-ness (the genus of pots or pot-type) being eternal there arises a doubt as to whether the sound is non-eternal or eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the doubt" which aims at rejecting an argument in consequence of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal.

अस्योत्तरम्–

साधर्म्म्यात्संशये न संशयो वैधर्म्म्यादुभयथा वा संशयेऽत्यन्तसंशय-प्रसङ्गो नित्यत्वानभ्युपगमाच्च [1]सामान्यस्याप्रतिषेधः॥ 15॥

विशेषाद् वैधर्म्यादवधार्यमाणेऽर्थे 'पुरुषः' इति न स्थाणुपुरुषसाधर्म्यात् संशयोऽवकाशं लभते, एवं वैधर्म्याद् विशेषात् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वादवधार्यमाणे शब्दस्यानित्यत्वे नित्याऽनित्यसाधर्म्यात् संशयोऽवकाशं न लभते, यदि वै लभेत? ततः स्थाणुपुरुषसाधर्म्या-ऽनुच्छेदादत्यन्तं संशयः स्यात्, गृह्यमाणे न विशेषे नित्यसाधर्म्यं संशयहेतुरिति नाभ्युपगम्यते–नहि गृह्यमाणे पुरुषस्य विशेषे स्थाणुपुरुषसाधर्म्यं संशयहेतुर्भवति॥15॥

साधर्म्म्यात् sādharmmyāt, from resemblance; संशये saṃśaye, doubt

1. The term *sāmānya* in the sense of "general notion, genus or type" was evidently taken form the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

arising; न na, and; संशय: saṃśayaḥ, doubt; वैधर्म्यात् vaidharmmyāt, from difference; उभयथा ubhaya-thā, in both ways; वा vā, or; संशये saṃśaye, doubt arising; अत्यन्तसंशयप्रसङ्ग: atyanta-saṃśaya-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of unending doubt; नित्यत्वानभ्युपगमात् nitya-tva-an-abhyupagamāt, from non-admission of eternality; च cha, and; सामान्यस्य sāmānya-sya, of the genus; अप्रतिषेध: a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

495. This is, we say, no opposition because we do not admit that eternality can be establisehd by the homogeneity with the genus : a doubt that arises from a knowledge of the homogeneity vanishes from that of the heterogeneity, and that which arises in both ways never ends.—15.

The Naiyāyika says :—

Sound cannot be said to be eternal on the mere ground of its homogeneity with pot-ness (the genus of pots or pot-type) but must be pronounced to be non-eternal on the ground of its heterogeneity from the same in respect of being a product. Though on the score of homogeneity we may enterain doubt as to whether sound is eternal or non-eternal, but on the score of heterogeneity we can pronounce it undoubtedly to be non-eternal. In this case we must bear in mind that we cannot ascertain the true nature of a things unless we weigh it in respect of its homogeneity with as well as heterogeneity from other things. If even then there remains any doubt as to its true nature, that doubt will never end.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 6 : Doubt : Sūtras : 14-15.

The opposition is to the effect that there is resemblance of sound, *e.g.* to the eternal, namely potness, both being cognisable by the senses, and also to the non-eternal, namely pot, the character of coming after an effort appertaining to both, and that therefore it is doubtful whether sound be eternal or non- eternal. To this the reply is that where doubt arises from the, cognition of resemblance without the cognition of difference the doubt ceases on the cognition of difference, *e.g.*, the cognition of coming after effort; that where doubt arises from the cognition of both resemblance and difference the doubt can never cease; and that mere resemblance can never be an eternal source of doubt.

उभयसाधर्म्यात् प्रक्रियासिद्धेः प्रकरणसमः॥ 16॥

उभयेन=नित्येन चानित्येन साधर्म्यात् पक्षप्रतिपक्षयोः प्रवृत्तिः प्रक्रिया, 'अनित्यः

शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वाद् घटवत्' इत्येकः पक्षः प्रवर्तयति, द्वितीयश्च नित्यसाधर्म्यात्, एवं च सति 'प्रयत्नानन्तरीयत्वाद्' इतिहेतुरनित्यसाधर्म्येणोच्यमानो न प्रकरणमतिवर्तते, प्रकरणानतिवृत्तेर्निर्णयानतिवर्तनम्, समानं चैतन्नित्यसाधर्म्येणोच्यमाने हेतौ, तदिदं प्रकरणानतिवृत्त्या प्रत्यवस्थानं प्रकरणसमः। समानं चैतद्वैधर्म्येपि=उभयवैधर्म्यात् प्रक्रियासिद्धेः प्रकरणसम इति॥16॥

उभयसाधर्म्यात् ubhaya-sādharmmyāt, from resemblance to both; प्रक्रियासिद्धेः prakriyā-siddheḥ, because of proof of the operation (of the subject and its opposite); प्रकरणसम: prakaraṇa-samaḥ, identical in respect of the topic.

496. "Balancing the controversy" is an opposition which is conducted on the ground of homogeneity with (or heterogeneity from) both sides.—16.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is audible.
like sound-ness.

The opponent alleges that the proposition, *viz.*, sound is non-eternal, cannot be proved because the reason, *viz.*, audibility which is homogeneous with both sound (which is non-eternal) and soundness (which is eternal), provokes they very controversy for the settlement of which it was employed. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the controversy" which hurts a argument by giving rise to the very controversy which was to be settled.

अस्योत्तरम्—

प्रतिपक्षात् प्रकरणसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः प्रतिपक्षोपपत्तेः॥ 17॥

उभयसाधर्म्यात् प्रक्रियासिद्धिं ब्रुवता प्रतिपक्षात् प्रक्रियासिद्धिरुक्ता भवति, यद्युभय-साधर्म्यं तत्रैकतरः प्रतिपक्ष इत्येवं सत्युपपन्नः प्रतिपक्षो भवति, प्रतिपक्षोपपत्तेरनुपपन्नः प्रतिषेधः-यतः प्रतिपक्षोपपत्तिः प्रतिषेधोपपत्तिश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धमिति। तत्त्वानवधारणाच्च प्रक्रियासिद्धिः-विपर्यये प्रकरणावसानात्=तत्त्वाधारणे ह्यवसितं प्रकरणं भवतीति॥17॥

प्रतिपक्षात् pratipakṣāt, from the counter-subject; प्रकरणसिद्धेः prakaraṇa-siddheḥ, because of proof of the topic; प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः pratiṣedha-an-upapattiḥ, non-proof of the contradiction; प्रतिपक्षोपपत्तेः pratipakṣaupapatteḥ, because of proof of the counter-subject.

497. This is, we say, no opposition because it provekes a controversy which has an opposing side.—17.

The Naiyāyika says :—The opposition called "balancing the controversy" cannot set aside the main argument because it leads to a controversy which supports one side quite as strongly as it is opposed by the other side.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 7 : Prakaraṇa (Topic) : Sūtras : 16-17.

Here the opposition moves within the topic and does not advance any outside reason for or against the thesis or counter-thesis which constitutes the topic. Thus, sound is non-eternal because it comes after effort, like a pot; and sound is eternal because it resembles potness which is eternal, both being perceptible to the senses. It is required to determine which of these two views represents the truth. To say that sound resembles the non-eternal because it comes after effort is futile. It leaves the counter-thesis unimpared. For both proceed upon resemblance. The truth is that the thesis and counter-thesis arise not from resemblance but from absence of true knowledge. As soon as truth is determined the topic to an end.

त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेर्हेतोरहेतुसमः॥ 18॥

हेतुः=साधनं तत् साध्यात् पूर्वं पश्चात् सह वा भवेत्, यदि पूर्वं साधनम्? असति साध्ये कस्य साधनम्, अथ पश्चात्? असति साधने कस्येदं साध्यम् अथ युगपत् साध्यसाधने? द्वयोर्विद्यमानयोः किं कस्य साधनं किं कस्य साध्यम्, इति हेतुरहेतुना न विशिष्यते। अहेतुना साधर्म्यात् प्रत्यवस्थानमऽहेतुसमः॥18॥

त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः traikālya-a-siddheḥ, because of non-operation in all the three times; हेतोः hetoḥ, of the reason; अहेतुसमः a-hetu-samaḥ, identical in respect of non-reason.

498. "Balancing the non-reason" is an opposition which is because on the reason being shown to be impossible at all the three times.—18.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argument as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is product,
like a pot.

Here "being a product" is the reason or sign for "being non-eternal" which is the predicate or significate.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

The reason or sign is impossible at all the three times because it cannot precede, succeed, or be simultaneous with the predicate or significate.

(a) The reason (or sign) does not precede the predicate (or significate) because the former gets its name only when it establishes the latter. It is impossible for the reason to be called as such before the establishment of the predicate.

(b) The reason (or sign) does not succeed the predicate (or significate) because what would be the use of the former if the latter existed already?

(c) The reason (or sign) and the predicate (or significate) cannot exist simultaneously for they will then be reciprocally connected like the right and left horns of a cow.

This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the non-reason" which aims at setting aside an argument by showing that the reason is impossible at all the three times.

अस्योत्तरम्—

न हेतुतः साध्यसिद्धेस्त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः॥ 19॥

न त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः, कस्मात्? हेतुतः साध्यसिद्धेः, निर्वर्तनीयस्य निर्वृत्तिः विज्ञेयस्य विज्ञानम् उभयं कारणतो दृश्यते, सोयं महान् प्रत्यक्षविषय उदाहरणमिति। यत्तु खलूक्तम्-असति साध्ये कस्य साधनमिति? यत्तु निर्वर्त्यते यच्च विज्ञाप्यते तस्येति॥19॥

न na, no; हेतुतः hetu-taḥ, from the reason; साध्यसिद्धे sādhya-siddheḥ, from the establishment of the thing to be establisehd; त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः traikālya-a-siddhiḥ, non-proof of operation in the three times.

499. There is, we say, no impossibility at the three times because the predicate or significate is established by the reason or sign.—19.

The Naiyāyika says :—The knowledge of the knowable and the

establishment of that which is to be established take place from reason which must precede that which is to be know and that which is to be established.

प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेः प्रतिषेद्धव्याप्रतिषेधः॥ 20॥

'पूर्वं पश्चाद् युगपद्वा' प्रतिषेध इति नोपपद्यते, प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेः स्थापनाहेतुः सिद्ध इति॥20॥

प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेः pratiṣedha-an-upapatteḥ, from non-proof of contradiction or opposition; प्रतिषेद्धव्याप्रतिषेधः pratiṣeddhavya-an-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction of the thing to be contradicted.

500. There is, we further say, no opposition of that which is to be opposed, because the opposition itself is impossible at all the three times.—20.

It being imposible for the opposition to precede, succeed or be simultaneous with that which is to be opposed, the opposition itself is invalid and consequently the original argument holds good.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 8 : Hetu (Reason, Mark) : Sūtras : 18-20

The opposition is to effect that the Mark is no Mark, because, if it exists before or after the sādhya (subject), it can have no operation, and if it exists along with sādhya there is no knowing which is the sādhya and which the Mark. To this the reply is that the same argument would apply to the opponent's denial of the Mark. The truth is that it is a matter of common experience that the production of what is to be produced and the knowledge of what is to be known do follow from causes. The opposition based on the points of time is futile.

अर्थापत्तितः प्रतिपक्षसिद्धेरर्थापत्तिसमः॥ 21॥

'अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वाद् घटवत्' इति स्थापिते पक्षे अर्थापत्त्या प्रतिपक्षं साधयतोऽर्थापत्तिसमः, यदि प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वादनित्यसाधर्म्यादनित्यः शब्द इति? (तदा) अर्थादापद्यते-नित्यसाधर्म्यान्नित्य इति, अस्ति त्वस्य नित्येन साधर्म्यम् अस्पर्शत्वमिति॥21॥

अर्थापत्तितः arthāpatti-taḥ, form presumption; प्रतिपक्षसिद्धेः prati-pakṣa-siddheḥ, from proof of counter-subject; अर्थापत्तिसमः arthāpatti-samaḥ, identical in respect of presumption.

501. If one advances an opposition on the basis of a presumption the opposition will be called "balancing the presumption."—21.

A cettain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is presumed to be eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal on account of its homogeneity with non-eternal things (*e.g.* in respect of its being a product), it may be concluded by presumption that sound is eternal on account of its homogeneity with eternal things (*e.g.* in respect of its being incorporeal). This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the presumption" which aims at stopping an argument by setting presumption as a belance against it.

अस्योत्तरम्–

अनुक्तस्यार्थापत्तेः पक्षहानेरुपपत्तिरनुक्तत्वादनैकान्तिकत्वाच्चार्थापत्तेः॥ 22॥

अनुपपाद्य सामर्थ्यमऽनुक्तमर्थादापद्यते इतिब्रुवतः पक्षहोनेरुपपत्तिः-अनुक्तत्वात्= अनित्यपक्षसिद्धौ अर्थादापन्नम्-नित्यपक्षस्य हानिरिति। अनैकान्तिकत्वाच्चर्थापत्तेः= उभयपक्षासमा चेयमर्थापत्तिः-यदि नित्यसाधर्म्यादस्पर्शत्वादाकाशवच्च नित्यः शब्दः? (तदा) अर्थादापन्नम्-अनित्यसाधर्म्यात् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वादनित्य इति, न चेयं विषर्यय-मात्रादेकान्तेनार्थपत्तिः न खलु वै घनस्य ग्राव्णः पतनमिति अर्थादापद्यते-द्रवाणामपां पतनाभाव इति॥22॥

अनुक्तस्य an-ukta-sya, of things not stated; अर्थापत्तेः arthāpatteḥ, from presumption; पक्षहाने pakṣa-hāneḥ, of injury to, or loss of, position; उपपत्तिः upapattiḥ, proof; अनुक्तत्वात् an-ukta-tvāt, because it is unsaid; अनैकान्तिकत्वात् an-aikantika-tvāt, because of multifariousness; अर्थापत्तेः arthāpatteḥ, of presumption.

502. If things unsaid could come by presumption, there would, we say, arise a possibility of the opposition itself

being hurt on account of the presumption being erratic and conducive to an unsaid conclusion.—22.

Sound is etenal,
because it is incorporeal.
like the sky.

If by presumption we could draw a conclusion unwarranted by the reason, we could from the opposition cited above draw the following conclusion:—

Sound is presumed to be non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

This would hurt the opposition itself. If one says that "sound is non-eternal because of its homogeneity with non-eternal things", the presumption that naturally follows is that "sound is eternal because of its homogeneity with eternal things" and *vice versa*. There is no rule that presumption should be made in one case and not in the case opposed to it; and in the event of two mutually opposed presumptions no definite conclusion would follow. Hence, the opposition called "balancing the presumption" is untenable.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 9 : Arthāpatti (Presumption) : Sūtras : 21-22.

The opposition is that the argument that sound is non-eternal by reason of its resemblance to non-eternal objects, namely in coming after effort, implies that sound is eternal by reason of its resemblance to eternal objects, namely in being touchless. To this the reply is that the argument by presumption would apply equally against the opponent, thet the presumptive argument does not determine the truth, and that mere divergence of nature is no ground for presumption, *e.g.*, the fact that pebbles which are solid fall to the ground, does not imply that water which is liquid does not fall to the ground.

एकधर्म्मोपपत्तेरविशेषे सर्व्वाविशेषप्रसङ्गात् सद्भावोपपत्तेरविशेष-सम:॥ 23॥

एको धर्मः प्रयत्नानन्तरीकत्वं शब्दघटयोरुपपद्यते इत्यविशेषे उभयोरनित्यत्वे सर्वस्याऽविशेषेः प्रसज्यते। कथम्? सद्भावोपपत्तेः=एको धर्मः सद्भावः सर्वस्योपपद्यते। सद्भावोपपत्तेः सर्वविशेषप्रसङ्गात् प्रत्यवस्थानमऽविशेषसमः॥23॥

एकधर्मोपपत्तेः eka-dharma-upapatteḥ, from proof of one property; अविशेषे aviśeṣe, in case of non-difference; सर्व्वाविशेषप्रसङ्गात् sarva-

aviśeṣa-prasaṅgāt, from implicatiion of non-difference in all respect; सद्भावोपपत्तेः sabdhāva-upapatteḥ, because of proof of existence; अविशेषसमः a-viśeṣa-samaḥ, identical in respect of non-difference.

503. If the subject and example are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of a certain property on account of their possessing in common the property connoted by the reason, it follows as a conclusion that all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possesion of every property on account of their being existent : this sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference."—23.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

If the pot and sound are treated as non-different in respect of non-eternality in consequence of their both being products, it follows as a conclusion that all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possession of every property in consequence of their being existent. Therefore, no difference existing between the eteranl and the non-eternal, sound may be treated as eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference" which aims at hurting an argument by assuming all things to be mutually non-different.

अस्योत्तरम्—

क्वचिद्धर्म्मानुपपत्तेः क्वचिच्चोपपत्तेः प्रतिषेधाभाव:॥ 24॥

यथा साध्यदृष्टान्तयोरेकधर्मस्य प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वस्योपपत्तेरनित्यत्वं धर्मान्तरमऽविशेषो नैवं सर्वभावानां सद्भावोपपत्तिनित्तं धर्मान्तरमस्ति येनाऽविशेषः स्या।

अथ मतम्-अनित्यत्वमेव धर्मान्तरं सद्भावोपपत्तिनिमित्तं भावानां सर्वत्र स्यादिति?, एवं खलु वै कल्प्यमाने-'अनित्याः सर्वे भावाः सद्भावोपपत्तेः' इतिपक्षः प्राप्नोति, तत्र प्रतिज्ञार्थव्यतिरिक्तमन्यदुदाहरणं नास्ति। अनुदाहरणश्च हेतुर्नास्तीति, प्रतिज्ञैकदेशस्य चोदाहरणत्वमनुपपन्नम्-न हि साध्यमुदाहरणं भवति, सतश्च नित्यानित्यभावादनित्यत्वानुपपत्तिस्तस्मात् 'सद्भावोपपत्तेः सर्वाविशेषप्रसङ्गः- इति निरभिधेयमेतद्वाक्यमिति। 'सर्वभावानां सद्भावोपपत्तेरनित्यत्वम्' इति ब्रुवताऽनुज्ञातं शब्दस्यानित्यत्वं तत्रानुपपन्नः प्रतिषेध इति॥24॥

क्वचित् kva chit, in some cases; धर्म्मानुपपत्ते: dharmma-anupapatteḥ, from non-proof of the property; क्वचित् kva chit, in some cases; च cha, and; उपपत्ते: upapatteḥ, from proof; प्रतिषेधाभाव: pratiṣedha-abhāvaḥ, absence of contradiction.

504. This is, we say, no opposition because the property possessed in common by the subject and the example happens in certain instances to abide in the reason while in other instances not to abide in it.—24.

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

Here the pot and sound possessing in common the property of being a product are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of non-eternality. On the same principle of all things are treated as non-different in consequence of their being existent, we would like to know in what respect they are non-different. If they are treated as non-different is respect of non-eternality, then the argument would stand thus :—

All things are non-eternal,
because they are existent,
like (?)

In this argument "all things" being the subject, there is nothing left which may serve as example. A part of the subject cannot be cited as the example because the example must be a well-established thing while the subject is a thing which is yet to be established. The argument, for want of an example, leads to no-conclusion. In fact all thing are not non-eternal since some at least are eternal. In other words, non-eternality abides in some existent things and does not abide in other existent things. Hence, all things are not mutually non-different and the opposition called "balancing the non-different" is unreasonable.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 10 : Non-difference : Sūtras : 23-24.

The opposition is to the effect that if the resemblance of sound and the pot in respect of their coming after affort leads to their resemblance in being non-eternal, then the resemblance of all objects in respect of their being existent leads to their resemblance in other respets. To this the reply is that the "other respects" should be defined. If the expression means non-eternality, then the non-eternality of sound which is the thesis is admitted by the opponent. The truth is that existence

is the highest genus and there is no other common attribute possessed by all existent objects. The Vaināśikas (Nihilists) no doubt maintain that like existence non-eternality also is a common attribute of all objects. Their thesis then should be : All entities are non-eternal, because they are existent. The thesis is so wide that no instance can be found for the demonstration. And a Reason or Mark without an instance does not exist. A part of the sādhya (all entities) cannot be the instance, because the character of a sādhya is that it is yet to be established. Moreover, if the sādhya is to furnish the instance it will furnish instances both eternal and non-eternal whereby the object of the Nihilist will be defeated.

उभयकारणोपपत्तेरुपपत्तिसम:॥ 25॥

यद्यऽनित्यत्वकारणमुपपद्यते शब्दस्य इत्यऽनित्य: शब्द:? नित्यत्वकारणमप्युपपद्यतेऽस्याऽस्पर्शत्वमिति नित्यत्वमप्युपपद्यते। उभयस्य=अनित्यत्वस्य नित्यत्वस्य च कारणोपपत्त्या प्रत्यवस्थानमुपपत्तिसम:॥25॥

उभयकारणोपपत्ते: ubhaya-kāraṇa-upapatteḥ, from proof of causes of both; उपपत्तिसम: upapatti-samaḥ, identical in respect of proof.

505. If an opposition is offered by showing that both the demonstrations are justified by reason the opposition will be called "balancing the demonstration."—25.

A certain person demonstrates the non-eternality of sound as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition by the alleged demonstration of the eternality of sound as follows :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the sky.

The reason in the first demonstration supports the non-eternality of sound while that in the second demonstration supports the eternality of sound, yet both the demonstrations are alleged to be right. The opponent advanced the second apparent demonstration as a balance against the first to create a dead-lock. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the demonstration".

अस्योत्तरम्–

उपपत्तिकारणाभ्यनुज्ञानादप्रतिषेधः।। 26।।

''उभयकारणोपपत्तेः'' इतिब्रुवता नाऽनित्यत्वकारणोपपत्तेरनित्यत्वं प्रतिषिध्यते, यदि प्रतिषिध्यते? नोभयकारणोपपत्तिः स्यात्। उभयकारणोपपत्तिवचनादनित्यत्व-कारणोपपत्तिरभ्यनुज्ञायते अभ्यनुज्ञानादनुपपन्नः प्रतिषेधः।

व्याघातात् प्रतिषेध इतिचेत्? समानो व्याघातः।

एकस्य नित्यत्वानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गं व्याहतं ब्रुवता उक्तः प्रतिषेध इतिचेत्? स्वपक्षपरपक्षयोः समानो व्याघातः स च नैकतरस्य साधक इति।।26।।

उपपत्तिकारणाभ्यनुज्ञानात् uapatti-kāraṇa-abhyanujñānāt, from admission of cause of proof (of the counter-subject); अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ non-contradiction.

506. This is, we say, no opposition because there is an admission of the first demonstration.—26.

The Naiyāyika says :—

The opponent having asserted that both the demonstrations are justified by reasons, has admitted the reasonableness of the first demonstration which supports the non-eternality of sound. If to avoid the incompatibility that exists between the two demonstrations, he now denies the reason which supports non-eternality we would ask why does he not deny the other reason which supports eternality of sound, for he can avoid incompatibility by denying either of the reason. Hence, the opposition called "balancing the demonstration" is not well-founded.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 11 : Demonstration : Sūtras : 25-26.

The opposition is to the effect that as in the case of sound, *e.g.*, the cause of its non-eternality is demonstrable, so is also the cause of its eternality, *viz.*, absence of touch. To this the reply is that if the opposition is valid the non-eternality of sound is admitted, and that if the argument is not valid the opposition also falls to the ground.

निर्दिष्टकारणाभावेऽप्युपलम्भादुपलब्धिसमः।। 27।।

निर्दिष्टस्य प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वास्याऽनित्यत्कारणस्याभावेपि वायुनोदनाद् वृक्षशाखाभङ्ग-जस्य शब्दस्यानित्यत्वमुपलभ्यते। निर्दिष्टस्य साधनस्याभावेपि साध्यधर्मोपलब्ध्या प्रत्यवस्थान-मुपलब्धिसमः।।27।।

निर्दिष्टकारणाभावे nirdiṣṭa-kāraṇa-abhāve, in the absence of the known

cause; अपि api, even; उपलम्भाद् upalambhāt, from perception; उपलब्धिसमः upalabdhi-samaḥ, identical in respect of perception.

507. If an opposition is offered on the ground that we perceive the character of the subject even without the intervention of the reason, the opposition wil be called "balancing the perception."—27.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal
because it is product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound can be ascertained to be non-eternal even without the reason that it is product, for we *perceive* that sound is produced by the branches of trees broken by wind. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the perception" which aims at demolishing an argument by setting up an act of perception as a belance against it.

अस्योत्तरम्–

कारणान्तरादपि तद्धर्मोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः।। 28।।

प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वादिति ब्रुवता कारणत उत्पत्तिरभिधीयते, न (तु) कार्यस्य कारणनियमः, यदि च कारणान्तरादप्युपपद्यमानस्य शब्दस्य तद् अनित्यत्वमुपपद्यते? किमंत्र प्रतिषिध्यते? इति।।28।।

कारणान्तरात् kāraṇa-antarāt, from other causes; अपि api, also; तद्धर्मोपपत्तेः tat-dharma-upapatteḥ, from proof of that property; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiciton.

508. This is, we say, no opposition because that character can be ascertained by other means as well.—28.

The Naiyāyika says that the argument, *viz.*, "sound is non-eternal because it is a product, like a pot," implies tha sound is proved to be non-eternal through the reason that it is a product. It does not deny other means, such as perception, etc., which also may prove sound to be non-eternal. Hence, the opposition called "balancing the perception" does not set aside the main argument.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 12 : Cognition : Sūtras : 27-28.

The opposition is that the cognition of sound does not depend only on the cause which is specified, *viz.*, its coming after effort, but that there is cognition of sound also when the branches of trees are broken by high winds (without the effort of man). To this the reply is "coming after effort" is the statement of a cause and not of the cause of sound, and that as to be a product is the mark of non-eternality, the opposition does not rebut the demonstration. The existence of sound bears no analogy to the existence of underground water, for example. The latter exists but is not perceived because of some obstruction. But no such obstruction to perception exists in the case of sound. Therefore, it cannot be said to exist unperceived. Hence, sound is not an instance of the manifestation an existent object but of production of a non-existent object.

न प्रागुच्चारणाद् विद्यमानस्य शबदस्यानुपलब्धि:, कस्मात्? आवरणाद्यनुपलब्धे:=यथा विद्यमानस्योदकादेरर्थस्याऽऽवारणादेरनुपलब्धिर्नैवं शब्दस्याऽग्रहणकारणेनाऽऽवरणादिनाऽनुपलब्धि:=गृह्येत चैतदस्याऽग्रहणकारणमुदकादिवद् न (च) गृह्यते तस्मादुदकादिविपरीत: शब्दोऽनुपलभ्यमान इति–

तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादभावसिद्धौ तद्विपरीतोपपत्तेरनुपलब्धिसम:॥ 29॥

तेषाम्=आवरणादीनामनुपलब्धिर्नोपलभ्यते अनुपलम्भान्नास्तीत्यऽभावोऽस्या: सिध्यति, अभावसिद्धौ हेत्वाभावात् तद्विपरीतमऽस्तित्वमावरणादीनामवधार्यते। तद्विपरीतोपपत्तेर्यत् प्रतिज्ञातम्–'न प्रागुच्चारणाद्विद्यमानस्य शब्दस्यानुपलब्धि:, इत्येतन्न सिध्यति, सोऽयं हेतु:–आवरणाद्यनुपलब्धेरिति आवरणादिषु चावरणाद्यनुपलब्धौ च समतयाऽनुपलब्ध्या प्रत्यवस्थितोऽनुपलब्धिसमो भवति।।29।।

तदनुपलब्धे: tat-an-upalabdheḥ, from non-congition of that; अनुपलम्भात् an-upalambhāt, from non-perception; अभावसिद्धौ abhāva-siddhau, non-existence being established; तद्विपरीतोपपत्ते: tat-viparīta-upapatteḥ, from proof of its opposite; अनुपलब्धिसम: an-upalabdhi-samaḥ, identical in respect of non-perception.

509. If against an argument proving the non-existence of thing by the non-perception thereof, on offers an opposition aiming at proving the contrary by the non-perception of the non-perception, the opposition will be called "balancing the non-perception."—29.

In aphorsim 2-2-19 the Naiyāyika has stated that there is no veil which covers sound for we do not perceive such a veil. In aphorsim 2-2-20 his opponent has stated that there is a veil because we do not perceive the non-perception thereof. If the non-perception of a thing proves its non-existence, the non-perception of the non-perception must, in the opinion of the opponent, prove the existence of the thing. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-perception" which aims at counter-acting as argument by setting up non-perception as a balance against it.

अस्योत्तरम्–

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनुपलब्धेरहेतु:॥ 30॥

'आवरणाद्यनुपलब्धिर्नास्ति–अनुपलम्भात्' इत्यहेतु:, कस्मात्?, अनुपलम्भात्कत्वादनुपलब्धे:=उपलम्भाभावमात्रत्वादनुपलब्धे: यदस्ति तदुपलब्धेर्विषय:=उपलंब्ध्या तदस्तीति प्रतिज्ञायते, यन्नास्ति तदनुपलब्धेर्विषय:=अनुपलभ्यमानं नास्तीति प्रतिज्ञायते, सोयमावरणाद्यनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भोऽनुपलब्धौ स्वविषये प्रवर्तमाने न स्वविषयं प्रतिषेधति, अप्रतिषिद्धा चारवणाद्यनुपलब्धिर्हेतुत्वाय कल्पते। आवरणादीनि तु विद्यमानत्वादुपलब्धेर्विषया: तेषामुपलब्ध्या भवितव्यं यत्तानि नोपलभ्यन्ते तद् उपलब्धे: स्वविषयप्रतिपादिकाया अभावाद्= अनुपलम्भादनुपलब्धेर्विषयो गम्यते–'न सन्त्यावरणादीनि शब्दस्याऽग्रहणकारणानि' इति, अनुपलम्भादनुपलब्धि: सिध्यति–विषय: स तस्येति।।30।।

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वात् an-upalmbhātmaka-tvāt, being of the nature of non-perception; अनुपलब्धे: an-upalabdheḥ, of non-cognition; अहेतु: a-hetuḥ, not a reason.

510. The reasoning through non-perception is not, we say, sound, because non-perception is merely the negation of perception.—30.

The Naiyāyika says :—Perception refers to that which is existent while non-perception to that which is non-existent. The non-perception of non-perception which signifies a mere negation of non-perception cannot be interpreted a referring to an existent things. Hence, the opposition called "balancing the non-perception" is not well-founded.

ज्ञानविकल्पानाञ्च भावाभावसंवेदनादध्यात्मम्॥ 31॥

अहेतुरिति वर्तते। शरीरे शरीरिणां ज्ञानविकल्पानां भावाभावौ संवेदनीयौ–'अस्ति मे संशयज्ञानम् नास्ति मे संशयज्ञानम्' इति, एवं प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमस्मृतिज्ञानेषु, सेयमावरणाद्यऽनुपलब्धि:=उपलब्ध्यभाव:स्वसंवेद्य:–नास्ति मे शब्दस्यावरणाद्युपलब्धि: इति='नोपलभ्यन्ते

शब्दस्याग्रहणकारणान्यावरणदीनि' इति, तत्र युक्तम्–'तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादभावसिद्धिः' इति एतन्नोपपद्यते।।31।।

ज्ञानविकल्पानाम् ñāna-vikalp, ānām, of diverse forms of cognition; च cha, and; भावाभावसंवेदनात् bhāva-abhāva-saṃvedanāt, from consciousness of existence and non-existence; अध्यात्मम् abhi-ātmam, in the soul.

511. There is, moreover, an internal perception of the existence as well as of the non-existence of the various kinds of knowledge.—31.

There are internal perceptions of such forms as "I am sure," "I am not sure," "I have dount," "I have no doubt", etc., which prove that we can perceive the non-existence of knowledge as well as the existence thereof. Hence, the non-perception itself is perceptible, and as there is no non-perception of non-perception, the opposition called "balancing the non-perception" falls to the ground.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 13 : Non-cognition : Sūtras : 29-31.

The opposition is to the effect that in the case of sound the non-cognition of the obstruction to its perception is itself as such incapable of cognition, and that the non-cognition of its non-cognition proves the existence of such obstruction, and that therefore it does not follow that obstructions do not prevent the cognition of sound (prior to its manifestation). In other words, non-cognition which is urged against the existence of obstruction equally applies to the non-cognition of obstruction. To this the reply is that cognition is of the nature of apprehension, while non-cognition is of the nature of non-apprehension, and that the object of cognition is something that exists, while the object of non-cognition is something that does not exist. Therefore when cognition does not apprehend, come into contact with, any obstruction in the case of sound it follows that such obstruction does not exist. Cognition or non-cognition is not its own object; the object is something different. Otherwise non-cognition will distroy itself; and leave obstruction and its cognition unaffected. Moreover, every body is aware of diverse forms of cognition within himself. So that a man becomes aware of the non-cognition of obstruction to the perception of sound in the same way as when he feels that his doubt remains or that his doubt is removed.

साधर्म्यात्तुल्यधर्मोपपत्तेः सर्वानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादनित्यसमः।। 32।।

'अनित्येन घटेन साधर्म्यादनित्यः शब्दः' इतिब्रुवतः–'अस्ति घटेनाऽनित्येन सर्वभावानां

साधर्म्यम्' इति सर्वस्यानित्यत्वमनिष्टं संपद्यते, सोयमनित्यत्वेन प्रत्यवस्थानादनित्यसम इति।।32।।

साधर्म्यात् sādharmmyāt, through resemblance; तुल्यधर्म्मोपपत्तेः tulya-dharma-upapatteḥ, because of proof of equal properties; सर्व्वानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् sarva-anityatva-prasaṅgāt, from implicaiton of non-eternality of all; अनित्यसमः anitya-samaḥ, identical in respect of non-eternality.

512. If one finding that things which are homogeneous possess equal characters, opposes an argument by attributing non-eternality to all things, the opposition will be called "balancing the non-eternality".—32.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

If sound is non-eternal on account of its being homogeneous with a pot which is non-eternal, it will follow as a consequence that al things are non-eternal because they are in some one or other respect homogeneous with the pot—a consequence which will render all inferences impossible for want of heterogeneous examples. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-eternal" which seeks to counteract an argument on the alleged ground that all things are non-eternal.

अस्योत्तरम्–

साधर्म्यादसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः प्रतिषेध्यसाधर्म्याच्च।। 33।।

प्रतिज्ञाद्यवयवयुक्तं वाक्यं पक्षनिवर्तकं प्रतिपक्षलक्षणं प्रतिषेधः तस्य पक्षेण प्रतिषेध्येन साधर्म्यं प्रतिज्ञादियोगः, तद् यद्यनित्यसाधर्म्यादनित्यत्वस्यासिद्धिः?–साधर्म्यादसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधस्याप्यसिद्धिः–प्रतिषेध्येन साधर्म्यादिति।।33।।

साधर्म्यात् sādharmmyāt, through resemblance; असिद्धेः a-siddheḥ, because of non-establishment; प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः pratiṣedha-asiddhiḥ, non-establishment of contradiction; प्रतिषेध्यसाधर्म्यात् pratiṣedhya-sādharmyāt, through resemblance to what is to be contradicted; च cha, and.

513. The opposition, we say, is unfounded because nothing can be established from a mere homogeneity and because there is homogeneity even with that which is opposed.—33.

The Naiyāyika syas :—

We cannot ascertain the character of a thing from its mere homogeneity with another thing : in doing so we must condiser the logical connection between the reason and the predicate. Sound, for instance, is non-eternal not merely because it is homogeneous with a non-eternal pot but because there is a universal connection between "being a product" and "being non-eternal." Hence, it will be unreasonable to conclude that all things are non-eternal simply because they are homogeneous with a non-eternal pot in some one or other respect. Similarly a mere homogeneity of all things with the eternal sky in some one or other respect, does not prove all things to be eternal. The opposition called "balancing the non-eternal" is therefore not founded on a sound basis.

दृष्टान्ते च साध्यसाधनभावेन प्रज्ञातस्य धर्म्मस्य हेतुत्वात्तस्य चोभयथाभावान्नाविशेषः॥ 34॥

दृष्टान्ते यः खलु धर्मः साध्यसाधनभावेन प्रज्ञायते स हेतुत्वेनाभिधीयते, स चोभयथा भवति-केन चित्समानः कुतश्चिद्विशिष्टः, सामान्यात् साधर्म्यं विशेषाच्च वैधर्म्यम्। एवं साधर्म्यविशेषो हेतुः नाऽविशेषेण साधर्म्यमात्रं वैधर्म्यमात्रं वा, साधर्म्यमात्रं वैधर्म्यमात्रं चाश्रित्य भवानाह-"साधर्म्यात्तुल्यधर्मोपपत्तेः सर्वानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादनित्यसमः 32" इति। एतदयुक्तमिति। अविशेषसमप्रतिषेधे च यदुक्तं तदपि वेदित्यम्॥34॥

दृष्टान्ते dṛṣṭānte, in the example; च cha, and; साध्यसाधनभावेन sādhya-sādhana-bhāvena, by the relation of the thing to be established and the means of establishing it; प्रज्ञातस्य prajñātasya, of the known; धर्मस्य dharmasya, of property; हेतुत्वात् hetu tvāt, being the reason; तस्य tasya, its; च cha, and; उभयथा ubhaya-thā, both ways; भावात् bhāvāt, from existence; अविशेष a-viśeṣaḥ, non-difference.

514. There is, we say, no non-distinction, because the reason in known to be the character which abides in the example as conducive to the establishment of the pradicate and because it is applied in both ways.—34.

The Naiyāyika says that we are not justified in concluding the all things are non-eternal because there is no character in respect of which "all things" may be homogeneous with a pot. In order to arrive at a correct conclusion we must consider the reason as being that character of the example (and consequently of the subject) which bears a univeral connection with the character of the predicate. The pot possesses no such character in common with "all things." The reason moreover is applied in the homogeneous as well as in the heterogeneous ways. We cannot draw a conclusion from a mere homogeneity of the subject with the example in a certian respect. The opposition called "balancing the non-eternal" is therefore unreasonable.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 14 : Non-eternal : Sūtras : 32-34.

The opposition is that as sound said to be non-erernal by reason of its resemblance to a pot, so for the same reason all entities would be non-eternal. To this the reply is that the opposition destroys itself, becaue if all entities are to be non-eternal owing to their resemblance to a pot, then the opposition will be equally futile as te thesis which it seeks to refute (*i.e.*, non-etenality of sound), owing to its resemblance to the thesis in being presented in the form of an argument of five members. Moreover, mere difference does not constitute the inferential mark. The mark of inference is that particular form of resemblance or difference which is universally known to be the means of the establishment of the proposed attribute in the sādhya.

नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेर्नित्यसमः॥ 35॥

'अनित्यः शब्दः' इति प्रतिज्ञायते, तदनित्यत्वं किं शब्दे नित्यम्? अथाऽनित्यम्? यदि तावत् सर्वदा भवति? धर्मस्य सदा भावाद् धर्मिणोपि सदा भाव इति 'नित्यः शब्दः' इति, अथ न सर्वदा भवति? अनित्यत्वस्याऽभावाद् नित्यः शब्दः, एवं नित्यत्वेन प्रत्यवस्थानात् नित्यसमः॥35॥

नित्यं nityam, eternally; अनित्यभावात् anitya-bhāvāt, from the nature of being non-eternal; अनित्ये anitye, in the non-eternal; अनित्यत्वोपपत्तेः anitya-tva-upapatteḥ, from proof of eternality; नित्यसमः nitya-samaḥ, identical in respect of eternal.

515. If one opposes an argument by attributing eternality all non-eternal things on the ground of these being eternally non-eternal, the opposition will be called "balancing the eternal."—35.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues follows :—

> Sound is non-eternal,
> because it is product,
> like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—You say that sound is non-eternal. Does this non-eternality exist in sound always or only sometimes? If the non-eternality exists *always*, the sound must also be always existent, or, in other words, sound is eternal. If the non-eternality exists only *sometimes*, then too the sound must in the absence of non-eternality be pronounced to be eternal. The sort of opposition is called "balancing the eternal" which counteracts an argument by setting up eternality as a balance against it.

अस्योत्तरम्–

प्रतिषेध्ये नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेः प्रतिषेधा-भावः॥ 36॥

प्रतिषेध्ये शब्दे 'नित्यमनित्यत्वस्य भावात्' इत्युच्यमानेऽनुज्ञातं शब्दस्यानित्यत्वम्, अनित्यत्वोपपत्तेश्च 'नाऽनित्यः शब्दः' इति प्रतिषेधो नोपपद्यते, अथ नाभ्युपगम्यते? 'नित्यमनित्यत्वस्य भावात्' इतिहेतुर्न भवतीति हेत्वभावात् प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिरिति। उत्पन्नस्य निरोधादऽभावः शब्दस्याऽनित्यत्वं तत्र परिप्रश्नानुपपत्तिः=सोयं प्रश्नः-'तदनित्यत्वं किं शब्दे सर्वदा भवति? अथ न?' इत्यनुपपन्नः, कस्मात्? उत्पन्नस्ययो निरोधादऽभावः शब्दस्य तद् अनित्यत्वम्। एवं च सत्यऽधिकरणाधेयविभागो व्याघातान्नास्तीति। नित्यानित्यत्वविरोधाच्च नित्यत्वमनित्यत्वं चैकस्य धर्मिणो धर्माविति विरुध्येते=न संभवतः, तत्र यदुक्तम्-'नित्यमनित्यत्वस्य भावाद् नित्य एव' तदऽवर्तमानार्थमुक्तमिति॥36॥

प्रतिषेध्ये pratiṣedhye, in what is to be contradicted; नित्यं nityam, eternally; अनित्यभावात् anitya-bhāvāt, from the nature of being non-eternal; अनित्ये anitye, in the non-eternal; नित्यत्वोपपत्तेः nityatva-upapatteḥ, from proof of eternality; प्रतिषेधाभावः pratiṣedha-abhāvaḥ, absence of contradiction.

516. This is, we say, no opposition because the thing opposed is always non-eternal on account of the eternality of the non-eternal.—36.

The Naiyāyika says :—

By speaking of eternality of the non-eternal you have admitted

sound to be *always* non-eternal and cannot now deny its non-eternality. The eternal and non-eternal are incompatible with each other : by admitting that sound is non-eternal you are precluded from asserting that it is also eternal. Hence, "balancing the eternal" is not a sound opposition.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 15 : the Eternal : Sūtras : 35-36.

The opposition is that the non-eternality of sound is itself either eternal or non-eternal and that in the former case sound also must be eternal and that in the latter case the supposed non-etenality of sound will some time case and sound will be eternal. To this the reply is that the allegation that the non- eternality of sound is eternal is an admssion of its non-eternality which is sought to be opposed. Moreover, by the non-eternality of sound is meant that sound which has been produced, ceases to exist after destruction, and not that non-eternality is a positive quality inhereing in sound. In such a case of non-existence due to destruction as the non-eternality of sound the question does not arise as to whether the non-eternality is eternal or non-eternal. Eternality and non-eternality again are contradictory attributes and cannot be predicated together of the same thing at the same time.

प्रयत्नकार्य्यानेकत्वात्कार्य्यसमः॥ 37॥

'प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वादनित्यः शब्दः' इति, यस्य प्रयत्नानन्तरमात्मलाभः तत्खलु अभूत्वा भवति यथा घटादि कार्यम्। अनित्यमिति च 'भूत्वा न भवति' इत्येतद्विज्ञायते, एवमवस्थिते "प्रयत्नकार्यानेकत्वात्" इतिप्रतिषेध उच्यते=प्रयत्नानन्तरमात्मलाभश्च दृष्टो घटादीनाम्। व्यावधानाऽपोहाच्चाऽभिव्यक्तिर्व्यवहितानाम्, तत् किं प्रयत्नानन्तरमात्मलाभः शब्दस्य? आहो अभिव्यक्तिः? इति विशेषोनास्ति। कार्याविशेषेण प्रत्यवंस्थानं कार्यसमः॥37॥

प्रयत्नकार्य्यानेकत्वात् prayatna-kārya-aneka-tvāt, from the diversity of the effects of effort; कार्य्यसमः kārya-samaḥ, identical in respect of effect.

517. If one opposes an argument by showing the diversity of the effect of efforts, the opposition will be called "balancing the effect."—37.

A certian person to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

> Sound is non-eternal,
> because it is an effect of effort.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

The effect of effort is found to be fo two kinds, *viz.* (1) the production of something which was previously non-existent, *e.g.* a pot, and (2) the revelation of something already existent, *e.g.* water in a well. Is sound an effect of the first kind or of the second kind? If sound is an effect of the first kind it wil be non-eternal but if it is of the second kind it will be eternal. Owing to this diversity of the effect of effort, it is not possible to conclude that sound is non-eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the effect."

अस्योत्तरम्—

कार्य्यान्यत्वे प्रयत्नाहेतुत्वमनुपलब्धिकारणोपपत्तेः।। 38।।

सति कार्यान्यत्वे अनुपलब्धिकारणानुपपत्तेः प्रयत्नस्याहेतुत्वं शब्दस्याभिव्यक्तौ=यत्र प्रयत्नानन्तरमभिव्यक्तिस्तत्रानुपलब्धिकारणं व्यवधानमुपपद्यते, व्यवधानापोहाच्च प्रयत्नानन्तरभाविनोऽर्थस्योपलब्धिलक्षणऽभिव्यक्तिर्भवतीति, न तु शब्दस्यानुपलब्धिकारणं किं चिदुपपद्यते यस्य प्रयत्नानन्तरमपोहात् शब्दस्योपलब्धिलक्षणाऽभिव्यक्तिभर्वतीति, तस्मादुत्पद्यते शब्दो नाभिव्यज्यते इति।।38।।

कार्य्यान्यत्वे kārya-anya-tve, in respect of the otherness of the effect; प्रयत्नाहेतुत्वम् prayatna-a-hetu-tvam, effort is not the cause; अनुपलब्धि-कारणोपपत्तेः an-upalabdhi-kāraṇa-upapatteḥ, because of proof of the cause of non-perception.

518. Effort did not give rise to the second kind of effect, because there was no cause of non-perception.—38.

The Naiyāyika answer the opposition called "balancing the effect" as follows :—

We cannot say that sound is revealed by our effort because we are unable to prove that it existed already. That sound did not exist previously is proved by our non-perception of the same at the time. You cannot say that our non-perception was caused by a veil because no veil covered sound. Hence, sound is an effect which is not revealed but produced.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 16 : the Effect : Sūtras : 37-38.

The opposition is to the effect that the reason, "coming after effort", does not necessarily infer the production of something which had no existence before, *e.g.* a pot, but that it may also infer the effect as manifestation by the removal of obstruction, so that sound, though an effect, being manifested, may yet be eternal. To this the reply is that

where manifestation is effected by the removal of obstruction the obstruction is known, but that in the case of sound there is cognition of no such obstruction the removal of which by effort causes its manifestation. It follows that sound is non-eternal.

हेतोश्चेदनैकान्तिकत्वमुपपाद्यते—अनैकान्तिकत्वादसाधकः स्यादिति, यदि चाऽनैकान्तिकत्वादसाधकत्वम्—?

प्रतिषेधेऽपि समानो दोषः।। 39।।

प्रतिषेधोप्यनैकान्तिकः—किंचित् प्रतिषेधति किंचिन्नेति, अनैकान्तिकत्वादऽसाधक इति। अथ वा शब्दस्यानित्यत्वपक्षे प्रयत्नानन्तरमुत्पादो नाभिव्यक्तिरिति विशेषहेत्वाभावः, नित्यत्वपक्षेपि प्रयत्नानन्तरमभिव्यक्तिर्नोत्पाद इति विशेषहेत्वभावः, सोयमुभयपक्षसमो विशेषहेत्वभाव इत्युभयमप्यनैकान्तिकमिति।।39।।

प्रतिषेधे pratiṣedhe, in the case of contradiction; अपि api, also; समानो samānaḥ, similar; दोषः doṣaḥ, defect.

519. The some defect, we say, attaches to the opposition too.—39.

A certain person argued :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

A certain other person opposed it saying that sound would not be non-eternal if "effect" meant a thing revealed.

The Naiyāyika observes that if an argument it is to be set aside owing to an ambiguous meaning of the word "effect", why is not the opposition too set aside on the same ground? The reason in the argument is as erratic as that in the opposition. Just as there is no special ground to suppose that the "effect" in the argument signified "a thing produced and not revealed", so also there is no special ground to suppose that the word in the opposition signified "a thing revealed and not produced." Hence, the opposition called "balancing the effect" is self-destructive.

सर्व्वत्रैवम्।। 40।।

सर्वेषु साधर्म्यप्रभृतिषु प्रतिषेधहेतुषु यत्र यत्राविशेषो दृश्यते तत्रोभयोः पक्षयोः समः प्रसज्यते इति।।40।।

सर्वत्र sarvatra, everywhere; एवम् evam, similarly.

520. Thus everywhere.—40.

If a special meaning is to be attached to the opposition, the same-meaning will have to be attached to the original argument. In this respect there will be an equality of the side in the case of all kinds of opposition such as "balancing the homogeneity", etc.

प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे प्रतिषेधदोषद्दोषः॥ 41॥

योऽयं प्रतिषेधेपि समानो दोषः अनैकान्तिकत्वमापाद्यते सोऽयं प्रतिषेधस्य प्रतिषेधेपि समानः, तत्र 'अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात्' इति साधनवादिनः स्थापना प्रथमः पक्षः, "प्रयत्नकार्य्यानेकत्वात् कार्य्यसमः 37" इति दूषणवादिनः प्रतिषेधहेतुना द्वितीयः पक्षः स च प्रतिषेध इत्युच्यते, तस्यास्य प्रतिषेधेपि समानो दोष इति तृतीयः पक्षः (स च) विप्रतिषेध उच्यते, तस्मिन् प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधेपि समानो दोषः अनैकान्तिकत्वं चतुर्थः पक्षः॥41॥

प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे pratiṣedha-vipratiṣedhe, in respect of the contradiction of a contradiction; प्रतिषेधदोषवत् pratiṣedha-doṣa-vat, as in the case of defect in contradiction; दोषः doṣah, defect.

521. Defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition just as it attaches to the opposition.—41.

A certain person to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

A certain other person, seeing that the effect is of diverse kinds, offers an opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.
(Here "effect" may mean "a thing revealed by effort")

The arguer replies that sound cannot be concluded to be eternal because the reason "effect" is erratic (which may mean "a thing produced by effort").

The opponent rises again to say that sound cannot also be concluded to be non-eternal because the reason "effect" is erratic (which may means thing revealed by effort). So, the defect which is pointed out in the case of the opposition, may also be pointed out in the case of the opposition of the opposition.

प्रतिषेधं सदोषमभ्युपेत्य प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे समानो दोषप्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा॥ 42॥

प्रतिषेधम्=द्वितीयं पक्षं सदोषमभ्युपेत्य=तदुद्धारमनुक्त्वाऽनुज्ञाय प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे=तृतीयपक्षे समानमऽनैकान्तिकत्वमिति समानं दूषणं प्रसजतो दूषणवादिनो मतानुज्ञा प्रसज्यते इति पञ्चमः पक्षः॥42॥

प्रतिषेधं pratiṣedham, contradiction; सदोषं sadoṣam, with defect, defective; अभ्युपेत्य abhyupetya, admitting for the sake of argument; प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे pratiṣedha-vipratiṣedhe, in case of contradiction of a contradiction; समानः samānaḥ, similar, same; दोषप्रसङ्गः doṣe-rasaṅgaḥ, implication of defect; मतानुज्ञा mata-anujñā, admission of an opinon.

522. If one admits the defect of his opposition in consequence of his statement that an equal defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition, it will be called "admission of an opinion."—42.

A certain person lays down a proposition which is opposed by a certain other person. The first person, *viz.* the disputant, charges the opposition made by the second person, *viz.*, the opponent, with a defect, *e.g*, that the reason is erratic. The opponent instead of rescuing his opposition from the defect with which it has been charged by the disputant, goes on chargeing the disputant's opposition of the opposition with the same defect. The counter-charge which the opponent brings in this way is interpreted by the disputant to be an admission of the defect pointed out by him. The disputant's reply consisting of this kind of interpretation is called "admission of an opinion."

स्वपक्षलक्षणापेक्षोपपत्त्युपसंहारे हेतुनिर्देशे परप्रक्षदोषाभ्युपगमात्समानो दोष इति॥ 43॥

स्थापनापक्षे "प्रयत्नकार्यानेकत्वात्" इतिदोषः प्रतिषेधहेतुवादिनः स्वपक्षलक्षणो भवति, कस्मात्? स्वपक्षसमुत्थत्वात्, सोयं स्वपक्षलक्षणं दोषमपेक्षमाणोऽनुधृत्य=अनुज्ञाय "प्रतिषेधेऽपि समानो दोषः 39" इत्युपपद्यमानं दोषं परपक्षे उपसंहरति, इत्थं चानैकान्तिकः प्रतिषेध इति हेतुं निर्दिशति, तत्र स्वपक्षलक्षणापेक्षेयोपपद्यमानदोषोसंहारे हेतुनिर्देशे च सति अनेन परपक्षोऽभ्युपगतो भवति। कथं कृत्वा?, यः परेण "प्रयत्नकार्यानेकत्वात्" इत्यादिनाऽनैकान्तिकान्तिकत्वदोष उक्तस्तमऽनुद्धृत्य "प्रतिषेधेपि समानो दोषः 49" इत्याह, एवं स्थापनां सदोषामभ्युपेत्य प्रतिषेधेपि समानं दोषं प्रसजतः परपक्षाभ्युपगमात् समानो दोषो भवति, यथा परस्य प्रतिषेधं सदोषमभ्युपेत्य प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधेति समानो दोषप्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा प्रसज्यते इति तथास्यापि स्थापनां सदोषामभ्युपेत्य प्रतिषेधेपि समानं दोषं प्रसजतो मतानुज्ञा प्रसज्यते इति, स खल्यवं षष्ठः पक्षः।

तत्र खलु स्थापनाहेतुवादिनः प्रथमतुतीयपञ्चमपक्षाः, प्रतिषेधहेतुवादिनः द्वितीयचतुर्थ-षष्ठपक्षाः, तेषां साध्वऽसाधुतायां मीमांस्यमानायां चतुर्थषष्ठयोरविशेषात् पुनरुक्तदोषप्रसङ्गः= चतुर्थपक्षे समानदोषत्वं परस्योच्यते-"प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे प्रतिषेधदोषवद् दोषः 41" इति, षेष्ठपि "परपक्षाभ्युपगमात् समानो दोषः" इति समानदोषत्वमेवोच्यते नार्थविशेषः कश्चिदस्ति। समानस्तृतीयपञ्चमयोः पुरुक्तदोषप्रसङ्गः=तृतीयपक्षेपि "प्रतिषेधेऽपि समानो दोषः 39" इति समानत्वमभ्युपगभ्यते। पञ्चमपक्षेपि प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे समानो दोषप्रसङ्गोऽभ्युपगम्यते नार्थविशेषः कश्चिदुच्यते इति।

तत्र पञ्चमषष्ठपक्षयोरर्थाविशेषात् पुनरुक्तदोषः, तृतीयचतुर्थयोर्मतानुज्ञा, प्रथमद्वितीय-योर्विशेषहेत्वभाव इति षट्पक्ष्यामुभयोरसिद्धिः। कदा षट्पक्षी?, यदा "प्रतिषेधेपि सामानो दोषः" इत्येवं प्रवर्तते तदोभयोः पक्षयोरसिद्धिः, यदा तु "कार्यान्यत्वे प्रयत्नाहेतुत्वमनुप-लब्धिकारणोपपत्तेः 38" इत्यनेन तृतीयपक्षो युज्यते तदा विशेषहेतुवचनात् प्रयत्नानन्तरमात्म-लाभः शब्दस्य नाभिव्यक्तिरिति सिद्धः प्रथमपक्षो न षट्पक्षी प्रवर्तते इति।।43।।

।। इति वात्स्यायनविरचिते न्यायभाष्ये पञ्चमोऽध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम्।।1।।

स्वपक्षलक्षणापेक्षोपपत्त्युपसंहारे svapakṣa-lakṣaṇa-apekṣa-upapatti-upasaṃhāra, in the conclusion by demonstration (in the opposite side) of, instead of removing, the defect in one's own side; हेतुनिर्देशे hetu-nirdeśe, in the statement of reason; परपक्षदोषाभ्युपगमात् para-pakṣa-doṣa-abhyupagamāt, from admission of the defect of other side; दोष doṣaḥ, defect; इति iti, it is.

523. "Admission of an opinion" also occurs when the disputant instead of employing reasons to rescue his side from the defect, with which it has been charged, proceeds to admit the defect in consequence of his statement that the same defect belongs to his opponent's side as well.—43.

Six-winged disputation (Ṣaṭpakṣī kathā).

Disputant—to prove the non-eternality of sound says :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort
This is the first wing.

Opponent—seeing that the effect is of diverse kinds, offers an opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

(Here "effect" means a thing which already existed and is now revealed by effort)

This is the second wing.

Disputant—seeing that the reason "effect" is erratic, charges the opposition with a defect thus :—

Sound is *not* eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

(Here the reaon "effect" is erratic meaning (1) either a thigs that did not previously exist and is now produced or (2) a thing that already existed and is now revealed by effort).

This is the thind wing.

Opponent—finding that the reason "effect," which is erratic, proves neither the eternality nor the non-eternality of sound, brings a counter-charge against the disputant thus :—

Sound is also *not* not-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

He alleges that the deffct (*viz.* the erraticity of the reason) with which his opposition (*viz.* sound is eternal) is charge, also attacches to the opposition of the opposition made by the disputant (*viz.* sound is *not* eternat or non-eternal).

This is the fourth wing.

Disputant—finding that the counter-charge brought against him amonts to his opponent's admission of self-defect says :—

The opponent by saying that "sound is also not non-eternal" has admitted that it is also not eternal. In other words, the counter-charge has proved the charge, that is, it has indicated that the opponent admits the disputant's opinion.

This is the fifth wing.

Opponent—finding that the disputant instead of rescuing his argument from the counter-charge has taken shelter under his opponent's admission of the charge says :—

The disputant by saying that "sound is also not eternal" has admitted that it is also not non-eternal. In other words, if the counter-charge proves the charge, the reply to the counter-charge proves the counter-charge itself.

This is the sixth wing.

This first, third and fifth wings belong to the disputant while the second, fourth and sixth to the opponent. The sixth wing is a repetition of the fourth while the fifth wing is a repetition of the third. The sixth wing is also a repetition of the meaning of the fifth wing. The third and fourth wings involve the defect of "admission of an opinion." All the wings except the first three are unessential.

The disputation would have come to a fair close at the third wings if the disputant had pointed out that the word "effect" had a special meaning, *viz.*, a thing which did not previously exist but was produced.

This disputant and the opponent instead of stopping at the proper limit has carried on their disputation through six wings beyond which no further wing is possible. After the six-winged disputation has been carried on, it becomes patent that neither the disputant nor the opponent is a fit person to be argued with.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 17 : Futile Controversy of Six Steps : Sūtras : 39-43.

(Where the opposition employs a futile reason and the speaker meets it with a proper reply the controversy ents in the determination of the truth as shown in the Sūtras 1 to 38. But where the speaker also employs a futile reason to meet a futile reason the controversy drifts into six steps and ends in confusion). The six steps have been exhibited in the text.

॥ इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने पञ्चमोऽध्यायस्य प्रथमामाह्निकम्॥1॥

Book V, Chapter II

विप्रतिपत्त्यऽप्रतिपत्त्योर्विकल्पान्निग्रहस्थानबहुत्वमिति संक्षेपेणोक्तं तदिदानीं विभजनीयम्। निग्रहस्थानानि खलु पराजयवस्तून्यऽपराधाधिकरणानि प्रायेण प्रतिज्ञाद्यवयवाश्रयाणि तत्त्ववादिनमऽतत्त्ववादिनं चाभिसंप्लवन्ते, तेषां विभागः—

प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासो हेत्वन्तरमर्थान्तरं निरर्थकमविज्ञातार्थमपार्थकमप्राप्तकालं न्यूनमधिकं पुनरुक्तमननुभाषणमज्ञानममप्रतिभा विक्षेपो मतानुज्ञा पर्य्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनुयोज्यानुयोगोऽपसिद्धान्तो हेत्वाभासाश्च निग्रहस्थानानि॥ 1॥

तानीमानि द्वाविंशतिधा विभज्य लक्ष्यन्ते॥1॥

प्रतिज्ञाहानिः Pratijñā-hāniḥ, injury ot the proposition; प्रतिज्ञान्तरं pratijñā-antaram, change of proposition; प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः pratijñā-virodhaḥ, conflict of proposition; प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासः pratijñā-sannyāsaḥ, abandonment of proposition; हेत्वन्तरं hetuantaram, change of the reason; अर्थान्तरं artha-antaram, change of topic; निरर्थकं nir-arthakaṁ, senseless; अविज्ञातार्थ a-vijñāta-artham, unintelligible; अपार्थकं apa-arthaka, senseless; अप्राप्तकालं a-prāpta-kālam, before-time, disordered, misarranged, न्यूनं nyūnam, deficient; अधिकं adhika, too much, superfluous, verbose; पुनरुक्तं punar-uktaṃ, repetition; अननुभाषणं an-anubhāṣaṇam, non-reply, silence; अज्ञानं a-jñānam, ignorance; अप्रतिभा a-pratibhā, want of ready wit; विक्षेपः vikṣrpaḥ, evasion, diversion; मतानुज्ञा, mata-anujñā, admission of an opinion; पर्य्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं paryanuyojya-upekṣaṇam, overlooking the censurable; निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः niranuyojya-abytigaḥ, censuring the non-cersuring the non-cersurable; अपसिद्धान्तः apa-siddhāntaḥ, contrary tenet; हेत्वाभासा hetu-ābhāsāḥ, pesudo-marks; च cha, and; निग्रहस्थानानि nigraha-sthānāni, grounds of defeat, occasions for rebuke.

524. The occasions for rebuke are the following :—

1. Hurting the proposition, 2. Shifting the proposition,

3. Opposing the proposition, 4. Renouncing the proposition, 5. Shifting the reason, 6. Shifting the topic, 7. The meaningless, 8. The unintelligible, 9. The incoherent, 10. The inopportune, 11. Saying too little, 12. Saying too much, 13. Repetition, 14. Silence, 15. Ignorance, 18. Non-ingenuity, 17. Evasion, 18. Admission of an opinion, 19. Overlooking the censurable, 20. Censuring the non-censurable, 21. Deviating from a tente, and 22. The semblance of a reason.—1.

The definition of "an occasion for rebuke" has been given in aphorism 1-2-19. "An occasion for rebuke" which is the same as "a ground of defeat", "a place of humiliation" or "a point of disgrace" arises generally in connection with the proposition or nay other part of an argument and any implicate any disputant whether he is a discutient, wrangler or caviller.

प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्म्माभ्यनुज्ञा स्वदृष्टान्ते प्रतिज्ञाहानिः॥ 2॥

साध्यधर्मप्रत्यनीकेन धर्मेण प्रत्यवस्थिते प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्मं स्वदृष्टान्तेऽभ्यनुजानन् प्रतिज्ञां जहातीति प्रतिज्ञाहानिः, निदर्शनम्–'ऐन्द्रियकत्वादनित्यः शब्दो घटवत्' इतिकृते। अपर आह–'दृष्टमैन्द्रियकत्वं सामान्ये नित्ये कस्मान्न तथा शब्दः?, इति, (एवम्) प्रत्यवस्थिते। इदमाह–'यद्येन्द्रियकं सामान्यं नित्यम्? कामं घटो नित्योस्तु' इति स, खल्वयं साधकस्य दृष्टान्तस्य नित्यत्वं प्रसञ्जयन् निगमनान्तमेव पक्षं जहाति। पक्षं जहत् प्रतिज्ञां जहातीत्युच्यते–प्रतिज्ञाश्रयत्वात् पक्षस्येति॥2॥

प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्म्माभ्यनुज्ञा pratidṛṣṭānta-dharmma-abhyanujñā, admission of the property of the counter-example; स्वदृष्टान्ते sva-dṛṣṭānte, in one's own example; प्रतिज्ञाहानिः pratijñā-hāniḥ, injury to the proposition.

525. "Hurting the proposition" occurs when one admits ine one's own example the character of a counter-example. —2.

A disputant argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is cognisable by sense,
Whatever is cognisable by sense is non-eternal
as a pot,
Sound is cognisable by sense,
Therefore sound is non-eternal.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus :—

A genus (*e.g.*, potness or pot-type), which is cognisable by sense, is found to be eternal, why cannot then the sound which is also cognisable by snse, be eternal?

The disputant being thus opposed says :—

Whatever is cognisable by sense is eternal
as a pot,
Sound is cognisable by sense,
Therefore sound is eternal.

By this admitting in his example (pot) the character of a counter-example (genus or type), the has hurt his own proposition (*viz.* sound is non-eternal). A person who hurts his proposition in this way deserves nothing but rebuke.

प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे धर्म्मविकल्पात्तदर्थनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञान्तरम्॥ 3॥

प्रतिज्ञातार्थः–'अनित्यः शब्द ऐन्द्रियकत्वाद् घटवत्' इत्युक्ते योऽस्य प्रतिषेधः= प्रतिदृष्टान्तेन हेतुव्यभिचारः–'सामान्यमैन्द्रियकं नित्यम्' इति तस्मिंश्च प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे धर्मविकल्पादिति=दृष्टान्तप्रतिदृष्टान्तयोः साधर्म्ययोगे धर्मभेदात्=सामान्यमैन्द्रियकं सर्वगतम् ऐन्द्रियकस्त्वऽसर्वगतो घट इति धर्मविकल्पात्। तदर्थं निर्देश इति साध्यसिद्ध्यर्थम्। कथम्? यथा घटोऽसर्वगत एवं शब्दोप्यसर्वगतो घटवदेवानित्य इति, तत्र–'अनित्यः शब्दः' इति पूर्वा प्रतिज्ञा। 'असर्वगतः' इति द्वितीया प्रतिज्ञा प्रतिज्ञान्तरम्। तत् कथं निग्रहस्थानमिति?, न प्रतिज्ञायाः साधनं प्रतिज्ञान्तरं किं तु हेतुदृष्टान्तौ साधनं प्रतिज्ञायाः, तदेतदऽसाधनोपादानमऽनर्थकमिति, आनर्थक्यान्निग्रहस्थानमिति॥3॥

प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे pratijñāta-artha-pratiṣedhe, there being opposition to the object or topic proposed; धर्म्मविकल्पात् dharma-vikalpāt, through a different property; तदर्थनिर्देशः tat-artha-nirdeśaḥ, statement of that object; प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् pratijñā-antaram, change of proposition.

526. "Shifting the proposition" arises when a proposition being opposed one defends it by importing a new character to one's example and counter-example.—3.

A certain person argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense
like a pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense like a genus (ro type).

The first person in order ot defend himself says tha a genus (or type) and a pot are both cognisable by sense, yet one is all-pervasive and the other is not so : hence, the sound which is likened to a pot is non-all-pervasively non-eternal.

The defence thus made involves a change of proposition. The proposition originally laid down was :—

Sound is non-eternal,

while the proposition now defended is :

Sound is non-all-pervasively non-eternal.

A person who shifts his proposition in this way is to be rebuked inasmuch as he has not relied upon his original reason and example.

प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः।। 4।।

'गुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यम्' इति प्रतिज्ञा। 'रूपादितोऽर्थान्तरस्यानुपलब्धेः' इति हेतुः। सोयं प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः। कथम्?, यदि गुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यम्? रूपादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरस्यानुपलब्धेः (इति) नोपपद्यते, अथ रूपादिभ्योर्थान्तरस्यानुपलब्धिः?, गुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यमिति नोपपद्यते, गुणव्यतिरिक्तं च दुव्यं रूपादिभ्योर्थान्तरस्यानुपलब्धिरिति विरुध्यते=व्याहन्यते=न संभवतीति।।4।।

प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वो pratijñā-hetvoḥ, of the proposition and the reason; विरोधः virodhaḥ, contradiction; प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः pratijñā-virodhaḥ, conflict of proposition.

527. "Opposing the proposition" occurs when the proposition and its reason are opposed to each other.—4.

Substance is distinct from quality,
because it is perceived to be non-distinct from colour, etc.

In this arguement it is to be observed that if substance is distinct from quality, it must also be distinct from colour, etc. which constitute the quality. The reason, *viz.* substance is non-distinct from colour, etc. is opposed to the proposition, *viz.* substance is distinct from quality. A person who thus employs a reason which opposes his proposition is to be rebuked as a fool.

पक्षप्रतिषेधे प्रतिज्ञातार्थापनयनं प्रतिज्ञासन्यासः।। 5।।

'अनित्यः शब्द ऐन्द्रियकत्वात्' इत्युक्ते परो ब्रूयात्–'सामान्यमैन्द्रियकं न चानित्यमेवं शब्दोप्यैन्द्रियको न चानित्यः' इति, एवं प्रतिषिद्धे पक्षे यदि ब्रूयात्–'कः पुनराह अनित्यः शब्दः (इति)?' इनि, सोयं प्रतिज्ञातार्थनिह्निवः प्रतिज्ञासंन्यास इति।।5।।

पक्षप्रतिषेधे pakṣa-pratiṣedhe, there being opposition to the subject; प्रतिज्ञातार्थापनयनम् pratijñāta-artha apanayanam, removeal of the object proposed; प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासः pratijñā-sannyāsaḥ, abandonment of the proposition.

528. A proposition being opposed if one disclaims its import, it will be called "renouncing the proposition."—5.

A certain person argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus :—

Just as a genus (or type) is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal, so a sound is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal. The first person, as a defence against the opposition, disclaims the meaning of his proposition thus :—

Who says that sound is non-eternal?

This sort of denial of the import of one's own proposition is called "renouncing the proposition" which rightly furnishes an occasion for-rebuke.

अविशेषोक्ते हेतौ प्रतिषिद्धे विशेषमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरम्।। 6।।

निदर्शनम्–'एकप्रकृतीदं व्यक्तम्' इति प्रतिज्ञा, कस्माद् हेतोः? 'एकप्रकृतीनां विकाराणां परिमाणात्' 'मृत्पूर्वकाणां शरावादीनां दृष्टं परिमाणं यावान् प्रकृतेर्व्यूहो भवति तावान् विकारः' इति, दृष्टं च प्रतिविकारं परिमाणम्। अस्ति चेदं परिमाणं प्रतिव्यक्तम्। तदेकप्रकृतीनां विकाराणां परिमाणात् पश्यामो व्यक्तमिदमेकप्रकृतीति। अस्य व्यभिचारेण प्रत्यवस्थानम्–नानाप्रकृतीनामेकप्रकृतीनां च विकाराणां दृष्टं परिमाणमिति। एवं प्रत्यवस्थिते आह–एकप्रकृतिसमन्वये सति शरावादिविकाराणां परिमाणदर्शनात्। सुखदुःखमोहसमन्वितं हीदं व्यक्तं परिमितं गृह्यते, तत्र प्रकृत्यन्तररूपसमन्वयाभावे सत्येकप्रकृतित्वमिति। तदिदमविशेषोक्ते हेतौ प्रतिषेद्धे विशेषं ब्रुवतो हेत्वन्तरं भवति, सति च हेत्वन्तरभावे पूर्वस्य हेतोरसाधकत्वान्निग्रहस्थानम्, हेत्वन्तर चवने सति यदि हेत्वर्थनिदर्शनो दृष्टान्त उपादीयते? नेदं व्यक्तमेकप्रकृति भवति–प्रकृत्यन्तरोपादानात्। अथ नोपादीयते? दृष्टान्ते हेत्वर्थस्याऽनिदर्शितस्य साधकभावानुपपत्तेः आनर्थक्याद् हेतोरनिवृत्तं निग्रहस्थानमिति।।6।।

अविशेषोक्ते a-viseṣa-ukte, stated without particulars, of a general character; हेतौ hetau, reason, mark; प्रतिषिद्धे pratiṣiddhe, being opposed; विशेषं viśeṣam, particular or special character; इच्छतः ichchhataḥ, of one who desires; हेत्वनतरम् hetu-antaram, change of reason.

528. "Shifting the reason" occurs when the reason of a general character being opposed one attaches a special character to it.—6.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,

because it is cognisable by sense.

A certain other person says that sound cannot be proved to be non-eternal through the mere reason of its being cognisable by sense, just as a genus (or type) such as pot-ness (or pot-type) is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal.

The first person defends himself by saying that the reason, *viz.* being cognisable by sense, is to be understood as as signifying that which comes under a genus (or type) and is as such cognisable by sense. Sound comes under the genus (or type) "soundness" and is at the same time cognisable by sense; but a genus or type such as pot-ness or pot-type does not come under another genus or type (such as pot-ness-ness or pot-type-type) through it is cognisable by sense. Such as defence, which consists in shifting one's reason, rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 1 : Errors of the Proposition and the Mark : Sātras : 1-6.

They are five in number :

(1) Admission of the attribute of the counter-example in one's own example which is the means of the establishment of one's proposition.

(2) Substitution for one's own proposition a different proposition suggested by the reason put forward by the opponent.

(3) Contradiction between the proposition and the reason.

(4) Abandonment of the proposition on opposition.

For example of the above *see* pages 412-15.

(5) Qualification of the Mark, on opposition. *E.g. :* The speakar sets out with the proposition that all manifested objects must have a common origin, and advance the reason that magnitude is their common attribute. The opponent urges that magnitude is seen in things not having the same origin as well as in things having the some origin. Upon this

the speaker qualifies his reason and re-states it as that all mainfested things, while endowed with the same nature of causing pleasure, pain and delusion, possess magnitude. He thus changes the reason and admits that the reason previously advanced was not sufficient to establish the proposition. And as regards the reason subsequently put forward, it fails of its purpose in the absences of an Example; for an Example must be of a different class and his own reason, all things etc., preculdes the possibility of any such example being found. While, if it is found, it must be something having a different origin and thereby hurt his proposition.

प्रकृतादर्थादप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थमर्थान्तरम्॥ 7॥

यथोक्तलक्षणे पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहे हेतुतः साध्यसिद्धौ प्रकृतायां ब्रूयात्–'नित्यः शब्दः अस्पर्शत्वादिति हेतुः' हेतुर्नाम हिनोतेर्धातोस्तुनि प्रत्यये कृदन्तपदम्। पदं च–नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताः अभिधेयस्य क्रियान्तरयोगाद् विशिष्यमाणरूपः शब्दो नाम, क्रियाकारकसमुदायः कारकसंख्याविशिष्टक्रियाकालयोगाभिधायि आख्यातम्। धात्वर्थमात्रं च कालाभिधानविशिष्टम्। प्रयोगेष्वर्थादभिद्यमानरूपा निपाताः, उपसृज्यमानाः, क्रियाऽवद्योतका उपसर्गाः, इत्येवमादि, तदर्थान्तरं वेदितव्यम्॥7॥

प्रकृतात् prakṛtāt, real under consideration; अर्थात् arthāt, from the object; अप्रतिसंबद्धार्थम् a-pratisambaddhārtham, importing an un-correlated, irrelevant object; अर्थान्तरम् artha-antaram, change of topic or object.

530. "Shifting the topic" is an argument which setting aside the real topic introduces one which is irrelevant.—7.

A certain person, to prove the eternality of sound, argnes as follows :—

Sound is eternal (proposition)

because it is intangible (reason).

Being opposed by a certain other person he attempts, in the absence of any other resource, to defend his position as follows :—

Hetu, which is the Sanskrit equivalent for "reason," is word derived from the root "hi" with the suffix "tu". A word, as a part of a speech, may be a noun, a verb, a prefix or an indeclinable. A noun is defined as etc.

The defence made in this way furnishes as instance of defeat through non-relevancy. The person who makes it deserves rebuke.

वर्णक्रमनिर्द्देशवन्निरर्थकम्॥ 8॥

यथा 'नित्यः शब्दः कचटतपानां जबगडदशत्वात् झभञ्घढधषवत्' इति एवंप्रकारं निरर्थकम्–अभिधानाभिधेयभावानुपपत्तौ अर्थगतेरभावाद् वर्णाः क्रमेण निर्दिश्यन्ते इति॥8॥

वर्णक्रमनिर्द्देशवत् varṇa-krama-nirdeśa-vat, like the statement of the order of letters (in the alphabet); निरर्थकम् nir-arthaka, meaningless.

531. "The meaningless" is an argument which is based on a non-sensical combination of letters into a series.—8.

A certain person, to prove the eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is eternal,
because k, c, ṭ, t, and p are j, v, g, ḍ and d,
like jh, bh, gh, ḍh, and dh.

As the letters k, c, ṭ, etc. convey no meaning, the person who employs them in his argument deserves rebuke.

परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां त्रिरभिहितमप्यविज्ञातमविज्ञातार्थम्॥ 9॥

यद् वाक्यं परिषदा प्रतिवादिना च त्रिरभिहितमपि च विज्ञायते श्लिष्टशब्दमऽप्रतीत-प्रयोगमऽतिद्रुतोच्चारितमित्येवमादिना कारणेन तदविज्ञातार्थम्, अविज्ञातार्थमऽसामर्थ्यसंवरणाय प्रयुक्तमिति निग्रहस्थानमिति॥9॥

परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां pariṣat-prativādibhyām, by the assembly and the opponent; त्रिः triḥ, three times; अभिहितं abhihitam stated; अपि api, even; अविज्ञातं a-vijñātam, not understood; अविज्ञातार्थं a-vijñāta-artham, unintel-ligible.

532. "The unintelligible" is an argument, which although repeated three times, is understood neither by the audience nor by the opponent.—9.

A certain person being opposed by another person and finding no means of self-defence, attempts to hide his inability in disputation by using words of double entendre or words not in ordinary use or words very quickly uttered which as such are understood neither by his opponent nor by the audience although they are repeated three times. This sort of defence is called "unintelligible" which rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

पौर्व्वापर्य्यायोगादप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थमपार्थकम्॥ 10॥

यत्राऽनेकस्य पदस्य वाक्यस्य वा पौर्वापर्येणान्वयोगो नास्ति इत्यऽसंबद्धार्थत्वं गृह्यते तत्समुदायार्थस्याऽपायादपार्थकं यथा–'दश दाडिमानि, षडपूपाः, कुण्डमजाजिनम्। पललपिण्डः, अधरौरुकमेतत्, कुमार्याः पाय्यं तस्याः पिता अप्रतिशीनः' इति॥10॥

पौर्व्वापर्य्यायोगात् paurvya-āparya-a-yogāt, owing to absence of sequence; अप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थम् a-pratisambaddha-artham, of unconnected import; अपार्थकम् apa-arthaka, senseless.

533. "The incoherent" is an argument which conveys no connected meaning on account of the words being strung together without any syntactical order.—10.

A certain person being opposed by another person and finding no other means of self-defence, argues as follows :—

Ten pomegranates, six cakes, a bowl, goat's skin and a lump of sweets.

This sort of argument, which consist of a series of unconnected words, is called "the incoherent" which rightly presents on occasion for rebuke.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 2 : Errors of Failure to Establish the Proposition : Sūtras : 7-10.

The number of such errors is four :

(1) Irrelevancy, (2) absence of sense, (3) obscurity, and (4) incoherence. For examples *see* pages 417-419.

अवयवविपर्य्यासवचनमप्राप्तकालम्॥ 11॥

प्रतिज्ञादीनामक्यवानां यथालक्षणकर्थवशात् क्रमः तत्रावयवविपर्यासेन वचनमऽप्राप्तकालम् असंबद्धार्थं निग्रहस्थानमिति॥11॥

अवयवविपर्य्यासवचनं avayava-viparyāsa-vachanam, statement without the order of the member of an argument; अप्राप्तकालं a-prāpta-kālam disordered.

534. "The inopportune" is an argument the parts of which are mentioned without any order of precedence.—11.

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues as follows :—

The hill has fire (proposition).

Whatever has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example).

Because it has smoke (reason).

The hill has fire (conclusion).

The hill has smoke (application).

This sort of argument is called "the inopportune" which rightly presents an occasion for rebuke. Since the meaning of an argument is affected by the order in which its parts are arranged, the person who overlooks the order cannot establish his conclusion and is therefore rebuked.

हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन न्यूनम्।। 12।।

प्रतिज्ञादीनामवयवानामन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन हीनं न्यूनं निग्रहस्थानम्-साधनाभावे साध्यासिद्धिरिति।।12।।

हीनं hīnam, deficient; अन्यतमेन anya-tamena, by any one; अपि api, even; अयवयवेन avayavena, member; न्यूनम् nyūnam, deficient.

535. If an argument lacks even one of its parts, it is called "saying too little."—12.

The following is an argument which contains all its five parts :—

1. The hill has fire (proposition),
2. Because it has smoke (reason),
3. All that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example),
4. The hill has smoke (application),
5. Therefore the hill has fire (conclusion).

As all the five parts or members are essential, a person who omits even one of them should be "saying too little."

हेतूदाहरणाधिमधिकम्।। 13।।

एकेन कृतत्वादन्यतरस्याऽऽनर्थक्यमिति, तदेतन्नियमाभ्युपगमे वेदितव्यमिति।।13।।

हेतूदाहरणाधिकं hetu-udāharaṇa-adhikam, consisting of more then one reaon or example; अधिकम् adhikam, verbose, redundant.

536. "Saying too much" is an argument which consists of more than one reason or example.—13.

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues as follows :—

The hill has fire (proposition),
Because it has smoke (reason),
And because it has light (reason),
like a kitchen (example).
and like a furnace (example),

In this argument the second reason and the second example are redundant.

A person, who having promised to argue in the proper way (according to the established usage), employs more than one reason or example is to be rebuked as "saying too much."

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 3 : Errors of Misstatement of one's argument : Sūtras : 11-13.

There are three of such errors :

(1) Absence of order among the members of the Nyāya.

(2) Absence of one or more of the members of the Nyāya.

(3) Redundancy of Reasons or Examples.

For example *see* pages 419-21.

शब्दार्थयोः पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमन्यत्रानुवादात्।। 14।।

अन्यत्रानुवादात् शब्दपुनरुक्तमऽर्थपुनरुक्तं वा-'नित्यः शब्दः नित्यः शब्दः' इति शब्दपुनरुक्तम्। अर्थपुनरुक्तम्-'अनित्यः शब्दः. निरोधधर्मको ध्वानः' इति।।14।।

शब्दार्थयोः śabda-arthayoḥ, of the word and the object; पुनर्वचनं punarvachanam, restatement; पुनरुक्तं punar-uktam, repretition; अन्यत्र anyatra, elsewhere; अनुवादात् anuvādāt, than re-inculcation, anuvāda.

537. "Repetition" is an argument in which (except in the case of reinculcation) the word or the meaning is said over again.—14.

Repetition of the word—Sound is non-eternal,
Sound is non-eternal.

Repetition of the meaning—Sound is non-eternal,
echo is perishable, what is heard is impermanent, etc.

A person who unnecessarily commits repetition is to be rebuked as a fool.

Reinculcation has been explained in aphorism 2-1-68.

अनुवादे त्वपुनरुक्तं शब्दाभ्यासादर्थविशेषोपपत्तेः॥ 15॥

यथा–"हेत्वपदेशात् प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं निगमनम् 1-1-39" इति॥ 15॥

238. In renculcation there is no repetition in as much as a special meaning is deduced from the word which is repeated.—15.

The hill has fire (proposition),
Because it has smoke (reason),
All that has smoke has fire
as a kitchen (example),
The hill has smoke (application),
Therefore the hill has fire (conclusion).

In this argument the "conclusion" is a mere repetition of the "proposition" and yet it serves a special purpose.

(13) **अर्थादापन्नस्य स्वशब्देन पुनर्व्वचनम्॥ 16॥**

पुनरुक्तमिति प्रकृतम्, निदर्शनम्–'उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वादनित्यम्" इत्युक्त्वा अर्थादापन्नस्य योऽभिधायकः शब्दस्तेन स्वशब्देन ब्रूयात्–'अनुत्पत्तिधर्मकं नित्यम्' इति तच्च पुनरुक्तं वेदितव्यम्–अर्थसंप्रत्ययार्थे शब्दप्रयोगे प्रतीतः सोऽर्थोऽर्थापत्त्येति॥16॥

अर्थात् arthāt, from context; आपन्नस्य āpannasya, of what has followed; स्वशब्देन sva-śabdena, by its own name; पुनर्वचनं punar-vachanam, restatement.

539. "Repetition" consists also in mentioning a thing by name although the thing has been indicated through presumption.—16.

"A thing possessing the character of a product is non-eternal"—this is a mere repetition of the following :—

"A thing not possessing the character of a product is not non-eternal."

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 4 : Error of Repetition : Sūtras : 14-16.

Repetition should be distinguished from re-inculcation (see II.i. 68). Repetition also includes express mention of what appears clear by implication. For examples *see* page 422.

विज्ञातस्य परिषदा त्रिरभिहितस्याप्यप्रत्युच्चारणमननुभाषणम्॥ 17॥

विज्ञातस्य वाक्यार्थस्य परिषदा प्रतिवादिना त्रिरभिहितस्य यदऽप्रत्युच्चारणं तदऽननुभाषणं नाम निग्रहस्थानमिति अप्रत्युच्चारयन् किमाश्रयं परपक्षप्रतिषेधं ब्रूयात्?॥17॥

विज्ञातस्य vijñātasya, of what has been understood; परिषदा pariṣadā, by the assembly; त्रिः triḥ, three times; अभिहितस्य abhihita-sya, of what has been declared; अपि even; अप्रत्युच्चारणम् a-prati-uchchāraṇam, non-reply; अननुभाषणम् an-anubhāṣaṇam, non-reply.

540. "Silence" is an occasion for rebuke which arises when the opponent makes no reply to a proposition although it has been repreated three times by the disputant within the knowledge of the audience.—17.

How can a disputatnt carry on his argument if his opponent maintains an attitude of stolid silence? The opponent is therefore to be rebuked.

(15) **अविज्ञातञ्चाज्ञानम्॥ 18॥**

विज्ञातार्थस्य परिषदा, प्रतिवादिना त्रिरभिहितस्य यदविज्ञानं तदऽज्ञानं निग्रहस्थानमिति, आयं खल्वविज्ञाय कस्य प्रतिषेधं ब्रूयादिति?॥18॥

अविज्ञातम् a-vijñātam, the not-understood; च cha, and; अज्ञानं a-jñānam ignorance.

541. "Ignorance" is the non-understanding of a proposition.—18.

Ignorance is betrayed by the opponent who does not understand a proposition although it has been repeated three times within the knowledge of the audience. How can an opponent refute a proposition the meaning of which he cannot understand? He is to be rebuked for his ignorance.

(16) **उत्तरस्याप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिभा॥ 19॥**

परपक्षप्रतिषेधः उत्तरं तद् यदा न प्रतिपद्यते? तदा निगृहीतो भवति॥19॥

उत्तरस्या uttarasya, of the answer; अप्रतिपत्तिः a-pratipattiḥ, non-suggestion; अप्रतिभा a-pratibhā, want of ready wit.

542. "Non-ingenuity" consists in one's inability to hit upon a reply.—19.

A certain person lays down a proposition. If his opponent understands it and yet cannot hit upon a reply, he is to be scolded as wanting in ingenuity.

कार्य्यव्यासङ्गात् कथाविच्छेदो विक्षेपः।। 20।।

यत्र कर्तव्यं व्यासज्य कथां व्यवच्छिनत्ति-'इदं मे करणीयं विद्यते तस्मिन्नऽवसिते पश्चात् कथयिष्यामि' इति (तत्) विक्षेपो नाम निग्रहस्थानम्। एकनिग्रहावसानायां कथायां स्वयमेव कथान्तरं प्रतिपद्यते इति।।20।।

कार्य्यव्यासङ्गात् kārya-vyāsaṅgāt, through pretext of other business; कथाविच्छेदः kathā-vichchhedaḥ, cutting short a discussion; विक्षेपः vikṣepaḥ, evasion, diversion.

543. "Evasion" arises if one stops an argument on the pretext of going away to attend another business.—20.

A certain person having commenced a disputation in which he finds it impossible establish his side, stops its further progress by saying that he has to go away on a very urgent business. He who stops the disputation in this way courts defeat and humiliation through evasion.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 5 : Errors of Non-reply : Sūtras : 17-20.

Their number is four :

(1) Failure to re-state the counter-theisi, so as to demolish it.

(2) Ignorance of the meaning of the counter-thesis, which cannot therefore be demolished.

(3) Want of ready wit, which naturally courts defeat.

(4) Evasion on some pretext.

स्वपक्षदोषाभ्यनुपगमात् परपक्षदोषप्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा।। 21।।

यः परेण चोदितं दोषं स्वपक्षेऽभ्युपगम्य=अनुद्धृत्य वदति-'भवत्पेक्षपि समानो दोषः' इति। स स्वपक्षे दोषाभ्युपगमात् परपक्षे दोषं प्रसञ्जयन् परमतमऽनुजानातीति मतानुज्ञानाम निग्रहस्थानमापद्यते इति।।21।।

स्वपक्षदोषाभ्यनुपगमात् sva-prakṣa-doṣae-abhyupagamāt, by admitting defect in one's own side; परपक्षे para-pakṣe, in the opposite side; दोषप्रसङ्ग doṣa-prasaṅgaḥ, attribution of defect; मतानुज्ञा mata-anujñā, admission of an opinion.

544. "The admission of an opinion" consists in charging the opposite side with a defect by admitting that the same defect exists in one's own side.—21.

A certain person addressing another person says:—"You are a thief."

The other person replies :—"You too are a thief."

This person, instead of removing the charge brought against him, throws the same charge on the opposite side whereby he admits that the charge against himself is true. This sort of counter-charge or reply is an instance of "admissio of an opinion" which brings disgrace on the person who makes it.

निग्रहस्थानप्राप्तस्यानिग्रहः पर्य्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम्।। 22।।

पर्यनुयोज्यो नाम निग्रहोपपत्त्या चोदनीयः तस्योपेक्षणम्='निग्रहस्थानं प्राप्तोसि' इत्यऽननुयोगः। एतच्च 'कस्य पराजयः?' इत्यनुक्तया परिषदा वचनीयम्-न खलु निग्रहं प्राप्तः स्वकौपीनं विवृणुयादिति।।22।।

निग्रहस्थानप्राप्तस्य nigraha-sthāna-prāptasya, of one who has reached the ground of defeat; अनिग्रहः a-nigrahaḥ, not defeating; पर्य्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् paryanuyojya-upekṣaṇam, overlooking the censurable.

545. "Overlooking the censurable" consists in not rebuking a person who deserves rebuke.—22.

It is not at all unfair to censure a person who argues in a way which furnishes an occasion for censure. Seeing that the person himself does not confess his short-coming, it is the duty of the audience to pass a vote of censure on him. If the audience failed to do their duty they would earn rebuke for themselves on account of their "over-looking the censurable."

अनिग्रहस्थाने निग्रहस्थानाभियोगो निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः।। 23।।

निग्रहस्थानलक्षणस्य मिथ्याध्यवसायादऽनिग्रहस्थाने 'निगृहीतोसि' इति परं ब्रुवन् निरनुयोज्याऽनुगाद् निगृहीतो वेदितव्य इति।।23।।

अनिग्रहस्थाने a-nigraha-sthāne, in case of non-defeat; निग्रहस्थानाभियोगः ngraha-sthāna-abhiyogaḥ, accusation of defeat; निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः nir-anuyojya-annuyogaḥ, censuring the non-censurable.

546. "Censuring the non-cesurable" consists in rebuking a person who does not desever rebuke.—23.

A person brings descredit on himself if he rebukes a person who does not deserve rebuke.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 6 : Errors of Weakness and Confusion : Sūtras : 21-23.

They are :

(1) Admission of the opponent's view and turning it against him.

(2) Overlooking the censurable in the opposition.

(3) Censuring the non-censurable in the opposition.

सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्यानियमात्कथाप्रसङ्गोऽपसिद्धान्तः॥ 24॥

कस्यचिदर्थस्य तथाभावं प्रतिज्ञाय प्रतिज्ञातार्थविपर्ययात्=अनियमात् कथां प्रसञ्जयतोऽपसिद्धान्तो वेदितव्यो यथा–'न सदाऽऽत्मानं जहाति=न सतो विनाशः, नाऽसदाऽऽत्मानं लभते=नाऽसदुत्पद्यते' इति सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य स्वपक्षं व्यवस्थापयति–एकप्रकृतीदं व्यक्तम्–विकाराणामन्वयदर्शनात्। मृदन्वितानां शरावादीनां दृष्टमेकप्रकृतित्वं तथा चायं व्यक्तभेदः सुखदुःखमोहसमन्वितो दृश्यते तस्मात् समन्वयदर्शनात् सुखादिभिरेकप्रकृतीदं विश्वमिति।

एवमुक्तवानऽनुयुज्यते–अथ प्रकृतिर्विकार इति कथं लक्षितव्यम्? इति, यस्याऽवस्थितस्य धर्मान्तरनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरं प्रवर्तते सा प्रकृतिः। यच्च धर्मान्तरं प्रवर्तते स विकार इति। सोऽयं प्रतिज्ञातार्थविपर्ययात्=अनियमात् कथां प्रसञ्जयति=प्रतिज्ञातं खल्वनेन–'नाऽसदाविर्भवति न सत्तिरो भवति' इति। सदसतोश्च तिरोभावाऽऽविर्भावमऽन्तरेण न कस्यचित् प्रवृत्तिः प्रवृत्त्युपरमश्च भवति, मृदि खल्ववस्थितायां भविष्यति शरावादिलक्षणं धर्मान्तरमिति प्रवृत्तिर्भवति। अभूदिति च प्रवृत्त्युपरमः तदेतद् मृद्धर्माणामपि न स्यात्, एवं प्रत्यवस्थितो यदि सतश्चाऽऽत्महानमऽसतश्चाऽऽत्मलाभमभ्युपैति? तदस्याऽपसिद्धान्तो निग्रहस्थानं भवति, अथ नाभ्युपैति? पक्षोऽस्य न सिध्यति॥24॥

सिद्धान्तं siddhāntam, tenet; अभ्युपेत्य abhyupetya, accepting अनियमात् a-niyamāt, through departure, or wandering; कथाप्रसङ्ग kathā-prasaṅgaḥ, disputation; अपसिद्धान्तः apa-siddhāntaḥ, contrary to tenet.

547. A person who after accepting a tenet departs from it in the course of his disputation, is guilty of "deviating from a tenet."—24.

A certian person promises to carry on his argument in consonance with the Sāṅkhya philosophy which lays down that (1) what is existent never becomes non-existent, and (2) what is non-existent never comes in to existence, etc. A certain other person opposes him by saying that all human activity would be impossible if the thing now non-existent could not come into existence in the course of time and that no activity would cease if what is existent now could continue for ever. If the first person being thus opposed admits that existence springs from non-existence and non-existence from existence, then he will rightly deserve rebuke for his deviation from the accepted tenet.

हेत्वाभासाश्च यथोक्ताः॥ 25॥

हेत्वाभासाश्च निग्रहस्थानानि। किं पुर्नलक्षणान्तरयोगाद् हेत्वाभासा निग्रहस्थानत्वमापन्नाः यथा प्रमाणानि प्रमेयत्वम्? इत्यत आह–यथोक्ता इति=हेत्वाभासलक्षणेनैव निग्रहस्थानभाव इति। ते इमे प्रमाणादयः पदार्था उद्दिष्टा लक्षिताः परीक्षिताश्चेति॥25॥

योऽक्षपामृषिं न्यायः प्रत्यभाद्वदतां वरम्।
तस्य वात्स्यायन इदं भाष्यजातमवर्तयत्॥

॥ इति विद्वद्वरवात्स्यायनविरचिते न्यायभाष्ये पञ्चमोऽध्यायः समाप्तः॥

हेत्वाभासाः hetu-ābhāsāḥ, pseudo-marks; च cha, and; यथोक्ताः yathāuktāḥ, as stated before.

548. "The fallacies of reason" already explained do also furnish occasions for rebuke.—25.

From aphorism 1-2-4 it is evident that the fallacies are mere semblances of reason. A person who employs them in a disputation does certainly deserve rebuke.

There are infinite occasions for rebuke of which only twenty-two have been enumerated here.

Vātsyāyana Commentary (SUMMARY)

Topic 7 : Errors of Inconsistency and Fallacies of Reason : Sūtras : 24-25.

These are :

(1) Deviation from tenet, *i.e.*, random discourse at variance with the subject proposed. For example *see* the text.

(2) Fallacies of reason are, as described, grounds of defeat, and not on any other account. By their very nature they furnish occasions for rebuke.

॥ इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने पञ्चमोऽध्यायः द्वितीयमाह्निकम्॥2॥

॥ न्यायदर्शनं चेदं समाप्तम्॥

APPENDIX A

NYĀYA-SŪCHĪ-NIBANDHA
OF
VĀCHASPATI MIŚRA

[Based on the text edited by Dr. Gaṅgānātha. Jhā, M. A., D.Litt., and published in the Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares.]

The Nyāya-Śāstra contains five books ten chapters, eighty-four topics, five hundred and twenty-eight aphorisms, one hundred and ninety-six measures, and eight thouasand, three hundred and eighty-five syllables.

[Book = adhyāya, Chapter-āhṇika, *lit.* a daily portion, Topic = prakaraṇa, Aphorism = Sūtra, Measure = pada, Syllabl = akṣara]

Adhyāya—I : Āhṇika.—1 : Prakaraṇas—7 : Sūtras—41.

1. Statement of the subject matter (viṣaya), purpose (prayojana) and relation (sambandha) of the Śāstra—Ss. 1-2.

2. Definition of Pramāṇa (Instrument of Right Cognition)—Ss. 3-8.

3. Definition of Prameya (Object of Right Cognition)—Ss. 9-22.

4. Definition of the pre-requisites (pūrva aṅga) of a Nyāya—Ss. 23-25.

5. Definition of Siddhānta (Tenet) which is the basis of a Nyāya—Ss. 26-31.

6. Definition of Nyāya (Process of Ratiocination or Reasoning)—Ss. 32-39.

7. Definition of processes subsidiary, (uttara aṅga) to a Nyāya—Ss. 40-41.

Adhyāya—I : Āhṇika—2 : Prakaraṇas—4 : Sūtras—20.

1. Definition of Kathā (Controversy)—Ss. 1-3. 2. Definition of Hetvābhāsa (Fallacious Marks of Inference)—Ss. 4-99.

3. Definition of Chhala (lit. Fraud, Quibble)—Ss. 10-17.

4. Definition of Liṅgadoṣa (General Fault in, Marks of Inference) due ot incapacity of the arguer (Puruṣa-aśakti)—Ss. 18-20.

Adhyāya—II : Āhṇika—I : Prakaraṇas—9 : Sūtras—68.

1. Examination of Saṃśaya (Doubt)—Ss.1-7.

2. Examination of Pramāṇa generally—Ss. 8-20.

3. Examination of Pratyakṣa (Preception)—Ss. 21-32.

4. Examination of incidentally of Avayavī (the whole)—Ss. 33-36.

5. Examination of Anumāna (Inference)—Ss. 37-38.

6. Examination (introductory) of present time—Ss. 39-43.

7. Examination of Upamāna (Analogy)—Ss. 44-48.

8. Examination of Śabda (lit. word, Testimony) generally—Ss. 49-56.

9. Examination of Śabda in particular (the Veda)—Ss. 57-68.

Adhyāya—II : Āhṇika—2 : Prakaraṇas—4 : Sūtras—69.

1. Examination of the fourfold division of Pramāṇa—Ss. 1-12.

2. Examination of the doctrine of the non-eternality of Śabda—Ss. 13-39.

3. Examination of the doctrine of Śabda-praṇāma (Transformation of word)—Ss. 40-57.

4. Examination of Śabda-Śakti (Force of Word)—Ss. 58-69.

Adhyāya—III : Āhṇika—1 : Prakarṇas—9 : Sūtras—73.

1. The Soul is over and above the Senses—Ss. 1-3.

2. The Soul is different from the Body—Ss. 4-6.

3. Refutation (incidentally) of the doctrine that the Eye is only one—Ss. 7-14.

4. The Manas (Mind) is not the Soul—Ss.—15-17.

5. The Soul is eternal—Ss. 18-26.

6. Examination of the Body—Ss.—27-31.

7. Examination of the materiality (bhautika-tva) of the Indriya (Sense)—Ss. 32-51.

8. The Indriya is manifold—Ss. 52-61.

9. Examination of Artha (Sense and Object of Sense)—Ss. 62-73.

Adhyāya—III : Āhṇka—2 : Prakaraṇas—7 : Sūtras—72.

1. The Buddhi (Cognition) is not eternal—Ss. 1-9.

2. Introduction of the doctrine of Transiency (kṣaṇa-bhaṅga)—Ss. 10-17.

3. The Buddhi is an attribute of the Soul—Ss. 18-41.

4. The Buddhi perishes as soon as produced (utpanna-apavargitva)—Ss.. 42-45.

5. The Buddhi is not a quality of the Body—Ss. 46-55.

6. Examination of the Manas—Ss. 56-59.

7. The Body is produced by Adṛṣṭa (Deserts)—Ss. 60-72.

Adhyāya—IV : Āhṇika—1 : Prakaraṇas—14 : Sūtras—67.

1. Examination of the Faults and Pravṛtti (Activity)—Ss. 1-2.

2. Doṣa (Fault) is threefold—Ss. 3-9.

3. Examination of Pretya-bhāva (Re-birth)—Ss. 10-13.

4. The Upādāna (material) cause of the Universe is not the Śūnya (Void)—Ss. 14-18.

5. Īśvara (God) is not the Upādāna of Universe—Ss. 19-21.

6. Chance is not the Upādāna—Ss. 22-24.

7. Refutation of the doctrine that all is non-eternal (sarva-anitya-tva)—Ss. 25-28.

8. Refutation of the doctrine that all is eternal (Sarva-nitya-tva)—Ss. 29-33.

9. Refutation of athe doctrine that all is discrete (Sarva-pṛthak-tva)—Ss. 34-36.

10. Refutation of the doctrine that all is void (Sarva-śūnya-tā)—Ss. 37-40.

11. Refutation of the doctrine that the Reality is one or otherwise fixed in number (Saṅkhyā-ekānta-vāda)—Ss. 41-43.

12. Examination of Phala (Fruit)—Ss. 44-53.

13. Examination of Duḥkha (Pain)—Ss. 54-57.

14. Examination of Apavarga (Release)—Ss. 58-67.

Adhyāya—IV : Āhṇika—2 : Prakaraṇas—6 : Sūtras—51.

1. Production of Tattva-jñāna (Knowledge of Reality)—Ss. 1-3.

2. Incidental examination of the relation of the whole avayavī) and parts (avayava)—Ss. 4-17.

3. Examination of the Partless (niravayava, *e.g.* Atom)—Ss. 18-25.

4. Refutation of the doctrine of the transiency of external objects (bāhya-artha-bhaṅga)—Ss. 26-37.

5. How Tattva-Jñāna is developed—Ss. 38-49.

4. How Tattva-Jñāna is maintained—Ss,. 50-51.

Adhyāya—V : Āhṇika—I : Prakiaraṇas—17 : Sūtras-43.

1. Introduction of Parity of Reasoning (Jāti) : (24): Indenticals (2) in respect of Resemblance and Difference—Ss. 1-3.

2. Identicals (6) in relation to the Sādhya (subject) and Dṛṣṭānta-(Exammple): that is, arising from the diverse properties of the Subject and the Example—Ss. 4-6.

3. Identicals (2) in respect of the extension or non-extension of the Hetu (Mark) to the Sādhya (subject)—Ss. 7-8.

4. Identicals (2) in respect of regression and counter example—Ss. 9-11.

5. Identical (1) in respect of non-production—Ss. 12-13.

6. Identical (1) in respect of doubt—Ss. 14-15.

7. Identical (1) in respect of the Topic—Ss. 16-17.

8. Identical (1) in respect of non-Mark—Ss. 18-20.

9. Identical (1) in respect of Presumption—Ss. 21-22.

10. Identical (1) in respect of Non-difference—Ss. 23-24.

11. Identical (1) in respect of Demonstration—Ss. 25-26.

12. Identical (1) in respect of Cognition—Ss. 27-28.

13. Identical (1) in respect of Non-Cognition—Ss. 29-31.

14. Identical (1) in respect of the Non-eternal—Ss. 32-34.

15. Identical (1) in respect of the Eternal—Ss. 35-36.

16. Identical (1) in respect of the Effect—Ss. 37-38.

17. Futile controversy of Six Steps—Ss. 39-43.

Adhyāya—V : Āhṇrka—2 : Prakaraṇas—7 : Sūtras—24.

1. Enunciation of the five Errors of the opponent depending upon the one or the othr os the Proposition and the Mark—Ss. 1-6.

2. The four Errors leading to failure to establish the desired proposition—Ss. 7-10.

3. The three Errors leading to mispresentation of one's own conclusion—Ss. 11-13.

4. The Error of Repetition—Ss. 14-15.

5. The four Errors leading to failure to reply—Ss. 16-19.

6. The three Errors of acquiescence in a defect, failure to attack, and misplaced attack—Ss. 20-22.

7. The two Errors of Inconsistency and Fallacies—Ss. 23-24.

Appendix B

ALPHABETICAL INDEX TO THE SŪTRAS

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APPENDIX C
WORD INDEX TO THE NYĀYA SŪTRAS

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APPENDIX D
INDEX OF WORDS IN ENGLISH

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